BLANCHARD, Alec

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 31, 2021

2020004719 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/892,216 11/19/2015 Alec Blanchard P2966US00 8841 136839 7590 03/31/2021 Andre Roland S.A. Avenue Collonges 21 Lausanne, VD, 1004 SWITZERLAND EXAMINER SANDERSON, JOSEPH W ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3619 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/31/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): contact@andreroland.com nschibli@andreroland.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte ALEC BLANCHARD ____________________ Appeal 2020-004719 Application 14/892,216 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before JOHN C. KERINS, STEFAN STAICOVICI, and EDWARD A. BROWN, Administrative Patent Judges. KERINS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s Decision rejecting claims 22 and 23, the only claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 The term “Appellant” is used herein to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the named inventor, Alec Blanchard, as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-004719 Application 14/892,216 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant’s invention relates to a method for generating a propulsive force to a mechanical system. Independent claim 22 is illustrative, and is reproduced below: 22. A method for generating a propulsive force to a mechanical system having a first and a second object that are rotating around a rotational center axis, the method comprising the step of: generating the propulsive force by reducing a first rotational radius of the first object that is performing a first rotational movement around the rotational center axis by applying a first centripetal force to the first object at a first location along a trajectory of the first object, to increase at least one of a speed of the first rotational movement and a mass of the first object, the first centripetal force being created by a cable that is pulled to reduce the first rotational radius, and increasing a second rotational radius of the second object that is performing a second rotational movement around the rotational center axis by applying a second centripetal force to the second object at a second location along a trajectory of the second object, to decrease at least one of a speed of the second rotational movement and a mass of the second object, the second centripetal force being created by a cable that is released to increase the second rotational radius; and wherein an amplitude of the propulsive force to the mechanical system depends on the mass of the first and second object, the first and second rotational radii, and the speed of the first and second object. Appeal 2020-004719 Application 14/892,216 3 REJECTION The Examiner rejects claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as not reasonably enabling a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with the breadth of the claims. ANALYSIS The Examiner finds that, although the Specification is enabling as to a mechanical system which interacts with, and relies on frictional engagement and disengagement with, a surface, the Specification is not enabling for a method of propulsion in the absence of a surface and frictional interaction therewith. Non-Final Act. 2–4 (“[s]pecifically, the rejection relates to the lack of enablement for non-surfaced based propulsion, e.g., air and space flight.”). The Examiner’s reference to air and space flight are exemplary, and are based on Appellant’s assertions found in an Amendment dated May 8, 2018, in which Appellant avers that its Specification would enable one of ordinary skill in the art to know how to use the method for the propulsion of “space vessels, airplanes, boats, or submarines.” Amendment, p. 12, ll. 18– 21. The Examiner posits that, in that absence of the frictional interaction with a surface, propulsion of an object would not be expected, and, instead, the object would be expected to only vibrate, leaving the creation of propulsion from vibration within the realm of requiring undue experimentation. Non-Final Act. 3. Appellant argues that the Specification enables one of skill in the art to make and use a method that allows for creation of propulsive force for mechanical devices attached to a frame. Appeal Br. 6. To the extent that this is intended to mean a device in frictional contact with the surface of another object, it appears that the Examiner agrees. Appellant then Appeal 2020-004719 Application 14/892,216 4 maintains that “[t]he case law sets forth that as long as the specification discloses at least one method for making and using the claimed invention that bears a reasonable correlation to the entire scope of the claim, then the enablement requirement . . . is satisfied.” Id. at 7, citing In re Fisher, 427 F.2d, 833, 839 (CCPA 1970). Appellant additionally cites United States v. Teletronics, Inc., 857 F.2d. 778 (Fed. Cir. 1988), as an example in which one enabling embodiment was present, and thus the claims were held to be enabling. Appeal Br. 8. The only parallel Appellant points to between that case and the present situation is that a single embodiment is considered to be enabled; no other common facts or factors are alluded to. See id. After noting that utility and specific application for surface propulsion are demonstrated in the record, which the Examiner acknowledges for the purpose of framing the enablement rejection, Appellant argues that “[t]he Office erred in requiring a full and detailed description of embodiments of the method for all sorts of propulsion applications, namely ‘for airborne or space propulsion,’ as this contention requires disclosure of an unreasonably and inadmissibly broad range of different uses” of the claimed method. Appeal Br. 7–8. Appellant maintains that “the elements of the claim do not require ‘sea, air, and space propulsion,’ nor does Appellant’s specification discuss the application of the claimed method for generating a propulsive force to ‘sea, air, and space propulsion.” Reply Br. 2. Appellant then notes agreement with the principle that the full scope of a claim has to be enabled, but maintains that “the law does not require an applicant to describe in his specification every conceivable embodiment of the invention.” Id., citing SRI Int’l v. Matshushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Appeal 2020-004719 Application 14/892,216 5 As noted previously, the Examiner uses sea, air, and space vehicles as examples of potential uses not enabled, largely because Appellant has professed that its method would be recognized as being usable for such vehicles. The Examiner’s interpretation of claim 22 is not that it specifies or requires implementation specifically for any sea, air, or space vehicle, but rather, because the Specification does not describe in any detail any specific “mechanical system,” the term appearing in claim 22, to which the propulsive force is applied, it is reasonable to consider the scope of the claim as being inclusive of systems operating at sea, or in air or space. Ans. 3–4. The Examiner’s rejection is that the device forming the basis for the claimed method, “on its own is inoperable to create a propulsive force,” and instead may create movement, likened to propulsion, of an object when in combination with a surface. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). As the Examiner states: Per NASA, when the system is “absent any connection with external masses, then the center of mass of the entire system would follow the freefall trajectory without deviation, while the devices external frame and its internal masses would just oscillate with respect to one another.” Id. at 5 (citing NASA document, “Responding to Mechanical Antigravity,” of record in this application). Appellant does not contest the Examiner’s claim construction as to the broadest reasonable interpretation being inclusive of mechanical systems that do not frictionally interact with a surface to provide a propulsive effect. Indeed, Appellant discloses a mechanical system propulsion embodiment that purports to generate this propulsive effect using electrons rotating around center axes, which supports the Examiner’s construction. See Spec. ¶ 8. The Examiner is not attempting to have Appellant disclose an Appeal 2020-004719 Application 14/892,216 6 unreasonably broad range of different uses, nor to have Appellant describe every conceivable embodiment of the invention. Instead, the rejection is founded on the utter absence of any indication how to make and/or use the claimed method with some mechanical system that does not require the object to frictionally engage and disengage with a surface of some other article or object. In that respect, the Fisher case cited by Appellant is quite instructive. The Court there states that the enablement standard “requires that the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.” Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839. Appellant’s argument fails to take account of the “reasonable correlation” language of this principle. Providing an enabling disclosure of a mechanical system falling within the scope of claim 22, which system relies on frictional interaction with an external surface, is not reasonably correlated to a mechanical system that does not rely on such frictional interaction, and such systems are also within the scope of claim 22. Appellant’s reliance on the general notion that the mechanical arts and mechanical elements involve predictable factors for which a single embodiment might provide broad enablement is of no avail in the present case, in that there is no indication that “other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws.” Id. The Examiner has indeed provided evidence in this record that there is an absence of predictability as to how a claimed system will operate in the absence of interaction with an external object. As such, we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s position relative to the lack of enablement of the full scope of claim 22. The Appeal 2020-004719 Application 14/892,216 7 rejection is sustained. Claim 23 is not separately argued, and falls with claim 22. DECISION The rejection of claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or § 112, first paragraph, as failing to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention, is affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 22, 23 112(a) Non- enablement 22, 23 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED