Bharath Sridharan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 2, 2019

14062040 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 2, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/062,040 10/24/2013 Bharath Sridharan 26405US02 1088
23446 7590 10/02/2019
MCANDREWS HELD & MALLOY, LTD
500 WEST MADISON STREET
SUITE 3400
CHICAGO, IL 60661
EXAMINER
ULLAH, ARIF
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mhmpto@mcandrews-ip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte BHARATH SRIDHARAN, JEN-HAO YANG, and
SAHIL BHAGAT1
________________

Appeal 2018-002319
Application 14/062,040
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, SHARON FENICK, and
RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 2–7 and 9–20, which constitute all of the pending
claims. Appeal Br. 1; Final Action mailed Feb. 8, 2017 (“Final Act.”) 2.
These claims stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter (Final Act. 9–22) and under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable (Final Act. 22–31). We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Sears
Brands, L.L.C. Appeal Brief filed July 10, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”) 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant describes the present invention as follows: “Methods and
apparatus are disclosed that utilizes voice mail messages to direct
personalized employee training. Voice mail messages instruct an employee
to perform various tasks. Employee actions are monitored to determine
whether the various tasks were performed as instructed.” Abstract.

THE REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Independent claim 6 is representative of the appealed claims.2 It is
reproduced below with formatting modified for clarity and emphasis added
to the claim language that recites an abstract idea:
6. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
[i] selecting, with one or more computer systems, an
employee for a training exercise;
[ii] sending, from the one or more computer systems to the
selected employee, a callback request that comprises a telephone
number for a voice mail message associated with the training
exercise;
[iii] presenting, with the one or more computer systems, the
voice mail message to the employee via a telephony device in
response to an incoming telephone call directed to the telephone
number of the call-back request, wherein said presenting the
voice mail message comprises instructing the employee to
perform a task via a computer device associated with the
employee; and

2 In relation to the patent-ineligibility rejection, Appellant generally argues
all of the claims together as a group. Appeal Br. 9–22. To that extent, we
select independent claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We address separately claims 11–14, for which Appellant presents
additional arguments.
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[iv] monitoring, with the one or more computer systems, the
employee to determine whether the employee has successfully
completed the training exercise in response to the presented
voice mail message, wherein said monitoring comprises
receiving signals from the computing device to determine, with
the one or [more] computer systems based upon the received
signals, whether the task has been performed as requested.
Principles of Law
A. SECTION 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and
Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
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that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE
In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”). Under the 2019
Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Analysis
STEP 2A, PRONG 1:
Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Limitation [i] of claim 6 recites “selecting . . . an employee for a
training exercise.” The act of selecting an employee reasonably can be
characterized as a mental process—more specifically, a judgment that can be
performed in the human mind. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes
judgments that can be performed in the human mind as mental processes that
constitute a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly,
limitation [i] reasonably can be characterized as reciting a patent-ineligible
abstract idea.
Limitation [ii] recites “sending . . . to the selected employee, a
callback request that comprises a telephone number for a voice mail message
associated with the training exercise.” The act of sending an employee a
request reasonably can be characterized as a method of organizing human
activity. More specifically, sending an employee such a request reasonably
can be characterized as a method of managing personal behavior or
interactions between people, such as a method of teaching or conveying
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rules or instructions to be followed. The 2019 Guidance expressly
recognizes managing personal behavior and interactions between people,
including teaching and following rules or instructions, as certain methods of
organizing human activity that constitute patent-ineligible abstract ideas.
84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly, limitation [ii] reasonably can be
characterized as reciting a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
Limitation [iii] recites
presenting . . . the voice mail message to the employee . . .
in response to an incoming telephone call directed to the
telephone number of the call-back request, wherein said
presenting the voice mail message comprises instructing the
employee to perform a task via a computer device associated
with the employee.
Presenting messages to an employee in response to the occurrence of
condition precedent also reasonably can be characterizes as a method of
organizing human activity that entails a method of managing personal
behavior or interactions between people, such as a method of teaching or
conveying rules or instructions to be followed. Similar to limitation [ii],
then, limitation [iii] reasonably can be interpreted as reciting a patent-
ineligible abstract idea.
Limitation [iv] recites “monitoring . . . the employee to determine
whether the employee has successfully completed the training exercise in
response to the presented voice mail message, wherein said monitoring
comprises receiving signals . . . to determine . . . whether the task has been
performed as requested.” Monitoring an employee’s training progress
reasonably can be characterized as a method of organizing human activity
that entails managing personal behavior through teaching. Monitoring an
employee’s training progress alternatively can be characterized reasonably
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as a mental process that entails observation performed in the human mind.
The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes this certain method of organizing
human activity, as well as this sort of mental process, as constituting a
patent-ineligible abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly, limitation [iv]
reasonably can be characterized as reciting a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
For these reasons, each of limitations [i]–[iv] reasonably can be
characterized as reciting patent-ineligible subject matter under step 2A,
prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance.
STEP 2A, PRONG 2:
Under step 2A, prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze
whether claim 6 recites additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
The Examiner determines that the claims as a whole are directed to
gathering, assessing, and ranking information, and, as such, are directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3. Appellant, on the other hand,
argues that claim 6, instead, “is directed to a practical, technological solution
to a problem.” Appeal Br. 14.
More specifically, Appellant argues that claim 6 addresses the
financial problem of companies that have limited training budgets. Id. at
14–15. According to Appellant,
[the invention] addresses this problem via an innovative
combination of technical equipment . . . to train an employee to
perform various tasks that involve the computer device. In this
manner, claim 6 addresses a problem unique to the computer arts,
namely how to economically train employees to properly operate
computer devices to perform the tasks associated with their
respective jobs. . . . Claim 6 is therefore not directed to an
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abstract idea, but instead to a practical, concrete solution for
training employees to perform computer-oriented tasks.
Id. at 15.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive. Appellant’s invention entails
automating employee training through the use of computers. In DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com., L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014), our
reviewing court distinguished a claimed solution necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in
the realm of computer networks from claims that “merely recite the
performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet world
along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet.” Id. at 1257.
“[M]ere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Relying on a “processor” to “perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Appellant also presents additional arguments specifically in relation to
claims 11–14:
Each of claims 11–14 further recites “storing a plurality of
voice mail messages for a plurality of distinct training exercises,
wherein each voice mail message of the plurality of voice mail
messages is associated with a distinct telephone number.” Thus,
each of claims 11–14 sets forth a novel and a nonobvious
arrangement of voice mail messages and telephone numbers.
Such arrangement permits retrieving and associating appropriate
voice mail messages based on a telephone number of an
incoming call. As such, each of claims 11–14 sets forth an
innovative arrangement that leverages a voice mail system to
deliver appropriate training exercises to employees. In this
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manner, each of claims 11–14 sets forth structures that render the
claims patent-eligible in a similar manner that the database
structure set forth in Enfish, LLC. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) rendered the claims patent-eligible.
Appeal Br. 16.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive. In Content Extraction and
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, (Fed.
Cir. 2014), our reviewing court held ineligible, claims “drawn to the abstract
idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected
data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory.” Id. at 1347. The
court reasoned that “[t]he concept of data collection, recognition, and
storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have always
performed these functions.” Id. In the present case, the storage of training
materials and use of telephone numbers to obtain them does not improve the
functioning of a computer, as in Enfish, but, rather, automates training by
using the storage and retrieval elements “in [their] ordinary capacity.” Id.
at 1336.
For these reasons, Appellant does not persuade us that any of claims 6
and 11–14 is directed to an improvement in the function of a computer or to
any other technology or technical field. MPEP § 2106.05(a). Nor are these
claims directed to a particular machine or transformation. MPEP
§ 2106.05(b), (c). Nor has Appellant persuasively demonstrated that any of
these claims adds any other meaningful limitations. MPEP § 2106.05(e).
Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us that claim 6 or claims 11–14
integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application within the
meaning of the 2019 Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
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STEP 2B:
Under step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether
claim 6 adds any specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. 84 Fed. Reg. 56;
MPEP § 2106.05(d).
The Examiner additionally determines that the additional claim
elements, viewed individually and as an ordered combination do not add
significantly more to the abstract idea to which claim 6 is directed. Final
Act. 5.
Appellant argues that the claims add significantly more because the
claims do not preempt the abstract idea. Appeal Br. 16–20. This argument
is unpersuasive. We recognize that the Supreme Court has described “the
concern that drives this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract
ideas from patent eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 216. However, characterizing preemption as a driving concern
for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole
test for patent eligibility. As our reviewing court has explained: “The
Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis
for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions
on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). Although “preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
Appellant additionally argues the claims are directed to a particular
implementation or solution for training employees. Appeal Br. 22.
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Appellant further argues that each of the claims “includes significant and
meaningful recitations that go beyond mere gathering, analyzing, and
ranking [of] information.” Id. Appellant contends that the claims “are
directed to a particular concrete technical solution to the problem of training
employees.” Id.
These arguments are not persuasive. We agree with the Examiner that
“Applicant presents a business solution to a business problem; not a
technical solution to a technical problem.” Final Act. 5. Appellant’s
Specification also supports the Examiner’s determination that the claimed
“processes are carried out using generic computer components in routine and
conventional manner.” Id. at 6. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 12 (indicating that the
training system can be connected to backend systems via conventional
networks); id. ¶ 13 (indicating that the client device may be any
conventional type of computing terminal); id. ¶ 14 (indicating that any
conventional telephony device may be employed); id. ¶ 16 (stating the
training system 10 may be implemented using a client/server architectures, a
peer-to-peer architecture, or other networking architectures); id. 27
(explaining that the computing device may include any of various
conventional processors, memory, storage device, network interfaces, and
input/output devices).
For these reasons, we determine that claim 6 does not recite additional
elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception within
the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55; MPEP
§ 2106.05(d).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. We,
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also sustain the 101 rejection of claims 11–14 for the reasons set forth
above. And we, likewise, sustain the rejection of claims 2–5, 7, 9, 10, and
15–20, which Appellant does not argue separately. Appeal Br. 9–22.

THE REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
The Rejections
Claims 2–7 and 9–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Miller (US 6,587,668 B1; issued
July 1, 2003) and Ball (US 6,240,391 B1; issued May 29, 2001), either alone
(claims 4–7 and 11–14) or in view of other references that are not addressed
on appeal (claims 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, and 18). Final Act. 18–69; Appeal
Br. 22–31. Appellant primarily argues the rejection of independent claim 6,
which is reproduced above.
In relation to claim 6, the Examiner relies on Miller for teaching a
computer-implemented method of performing automated training and
tracking. Final Act. 23. According to the Examiner, Miller discloses
“selecting, with one or more computer systems, an employee for a training
exercise,” as claimed. Id. (citing Miller, col. 8, ll. 22–31). The Examiner
further finds that Miller discloses “monitoring, with the one or more
computer systems, the employee to determine whether the employee has
successfully completed the training exercise,” as claimed. Id. (citing Miller,
col. 2, ll. 16–20).
The Examiner finds that Miller does not disclose the method by which
the employee is instructed to telephonically access the automated training, as
claimed. Id. at 24. But the Examiner further finds that Ball teaches the
claim steps of
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sending, from the one or more computer systems to the selected
employee, a call-back request that comprises a telephone number
for a voice mail message associated with the training exercise; in
response to the presented voice mail message; [and] presenting,
with the one or more computer systems, the voice mail message
to the employee via a telephony device in response to an
incoming telephone call directed to the telephone number of the
call-back request;
Id. at 24–25 (citing Ball, col. 1, ll. 21–45, col. 2, ll. 10–20, col. 7, ll. 45–60).
The Examiner also finds that Ball teaches the claim requirement that
“said presenting the voice mail message comprises instructing the employee
to perform a task via a computer device associated with the employee,” as
claimed. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ball, col. 2, ll. 5–20 , col. 6, ll. 23–45, col. 7,
l. 61–col. 8, l. 8, col. 13, ll. 12–35). The Examiner also finds that Ball
teaches claim 6’s requirement that “said monitoring comprises receiving
signals from the computing device to determine, with the one or [more]
computer systems based upon the received signals, whether the task has
been performed as requested.” Id. 27–28 (citing Ball, col. 18, l. 45–col. 19,
l. 5, col. 21, ll. 53–60). The Examiner then finds that motivation existed to
combine the teachings of Ball and Miller. Id. at 28.
Contentions and Analysis
Appellant argues that
Ball does not teach “wherein said presenting the voice mail
message comprises instructing the employee to perform a task
via a computer device associated with the employee; and . . .
wherein said monitoring comprises receiving signals from the
computing device to determine, with the one or more computer
systems based upon the received signals, whether the task has
been performed as requested.”
Appeal Br. 23–24. Appellant contends “that Ball teaches that such
interactions are via a telephone set not via a computing device.” Id. at 24.
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Appellant also assert that “the Final Action does not rely upon Miller for a
teaching” these limitations either. Id. at 25.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because the arguments are
directed to the teachings of Miller and Ball individually, as opposed to the
combined teachings of Ball and Miller, which combination was the basis for
the obvious rejection. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of
references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck
& Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
In relation to claims 11–14, Appellant additionally argues that
Each of claims 11–14 further recites “storing a plurality of
voice mail messages for a plurality of distinct training exercises,
wherein each voice mail message of the plurality of voice mail
messages is associated with a distinct telephone number.” The
Appellant respectfully submits that the proposed combination of
Miller and Ball does not teach, disclose, or otherwise render
obvious one or more of the above-identified aspects of claims
11–14.
Appeal Br. 27.
Appellant further argues that
While Ball may teach structured messages with links that may be
activated to call a particular phone number, the Appellant has
been unable to locate any teaching in Ball with respect to “storing
a plurality of voice mail messages for a plurality of distinct
training exercises, wherein each voice mail message of the
plurality of voice mail messages is associated with a distinct
telephone number.” Ball may teach storing structured messages,
but there is no indication that each structured message is
associated with a distinct telephone.
Id. at 28.
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This argument is unpersuasive. Ball expressly explains that a
structured message may link to telephone numbers to retrieve distinct
messages:
The structured message may also contain embedded
addresses, or “links” as they are currently known in the
Internet art, that specify a telephone address such as a
telephone number, or an IP telephony address. If the recipient
performs an action, such as making a keypad entry or supplying
a voice input, during his interaction with a structured message,
which action is interpreted by the messaging system to represent
a selection by the recipient of a specific link, placement of a call
to that telephone number or address associated with that link is
effected by the messaging system.
Ball. Col. 2, ll. 34–45 (emphasis added), cited in Final Act. 30.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reasoning for
why the combination of cited art teaches interactions may be made via a
computing device is based upon impermissible hindsight. Reply Br. 7.
According to Appellant, the reasoning “is explicitly based on knowledge
gleaned only from the Applicant’s own disclosure.” Id.
More specifically, Appellant points to the following explanation that
appears in the Examiner’s Answer:
[P]aragraph 0014 of the Appellant[’]s specification, where the
specification states “In such embodiments, the client device 20
may eliminate separate telephony devices 22 and may instead
provide the functionality of both the telephony device 22 and the
client device 20.” In light of this information it is apparent that
the Applicant in the specification argues both a telephony and
client device. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would agree
that Ball teaches a client device that teaches the functionality of
the claimed invention, while the combination of Miller and Ball
teach all the limitations of claim 6 (the claim in question).
Ans. 8–9, cited in Reply Br. 7.
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This argument is unpersuasive. We do not interpret this
statement to be expressing an improper reliance on Appellant’s
Specification for providing a motivation for why one would want to
add or somehow modify a client device. We, instead, understand the
Examiner to be explaining how one of ordinary skill would interpret
the meaning of the claim term “client device” in light of Appellant’s
usage of the term within Appellant’s Specification.
Conclusions Regarding the Obviousness Rejection
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claims 6 and 11.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of those claims over Miller
and Ball, as well the rejection as claims 4–7 and 12–14, which Appellant
does not argue separately from claims 6 and 11, respectively. Appeal Br.
29–31.
We likewise sustain the Examiner’s remaining obviousness rejections
of claims 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, and 17 over Miller, Ball, and additionally cited
references. Appellant has not particularly pointed out errors in the
Examiner’s reasoning regarding the additional references’ teachings, but
merely relies on the same arguments regarding the alleged deficiencies of
Miller and Ball that are set forth in relation to independent claims 6 and 11.
Appeal Br. 29–31.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

Claims Rejected Basis References Affirmed Reversed
2–7 and 9–20 § 101 2–7 and 9–20
4–7 and 11–14 § 103 Miller and Ball 4–7 and 11–14
2 and 9 § 103 Miller, Ball,
and Araki
2 and 9
3 and 10 § 103 Miller, Ball,
Araki, and
Rector
3 and 10  
16 § 103 Miller, Ball,
and Loos
16
17 § 103 Miller, Ball,
Loos, Araki,
and Rector
17  
Overall Outcome 2–7 and 9–20