BFKW, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 13, 2021

2021002880 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 13, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/019,497 02/09/2016 Randal S. Baker BAK04 P-122C 5617
15671 7590 09/13/2021
Gardner, Linn, Burkhart & Ondersma LLP
2900 Charlevoix Dr., SE, Suite 300
Grand Rapids, MI 49546
EXAMINER
PINDERSKI, JACQUELINE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3785
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/13/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Vredeveld@gardner-linn.com
clark@gardner-linn.com
patents@gardner-linn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RANDAL S. BAKER and JAMES A. FOOTE
Appeal 2021-002880
Application 15/019,497
Technology Center 3700
Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–13, 16–24 and 49–59. See Final Act.
1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An oral hearing was
conducted August 23, 2021.
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as BFKW, LLC. Appeal
Br. 3.
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2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method and device for treating metabolic
disease. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. An organic method of treating metabolic disease in a patient
having a metabolic disease, comprising:
deploying a device having a member with a surface that is
shaped to a portion of the gastrointestinal tract of the patient;
applying stress with the surface of the deployed device to
the portion of the gastrointestinal tract to thereby treat the
metabolic disease and produce satiety in the patient; and
titrating the stress applied with the surface of the deployed
device, including titrating the stress according to activity of the
patient to regulate caloric intake, wherein said titrating the stress
comprises titrating the stress applied based on the patient's
activity to avoid satiety from the applied stress interfering with
the patient’s consumption of calories if the patient does not have
significant excess body mass.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Forsell US 2001/0011543 A1 Aug. 9, 2001
Saadat US 2005/0192629 A1 Sept. 1, 2005
Baker US 2007/0293716 A1 Dec. 20, 2007
Birk US 2012/0203061 A1 Aug. 9, 2012
Dixon Health Outcomes of
Severely ObeseType 2
Diabetic Subjects 1
Year After
Laparoscopic
Adjustable Gastric
Banding
Feb. 2002

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–11, 13, 16–24, and 49 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Birk, Dixon and Forsell. Final Act. 3.
Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Birk, Dixon and Forsell, and Baker and Saadat. Final Act. 10.
Claims 50–59 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Birk and Dixon. Final Act. 11.
OPINION
The rejection of independent claims 1 and 50
The Examiner rejected independent claim 1 based on the combination
of Birk, Dixon, and Forsell. Final Act. 3–5. In that rejection Birk was
essentially relied on for the basic device used in the method and basic
aspects of its operation. Final Act. 3. There is no structural distinction
asserted between the device used to practice Appellant’s invention and that
of Birk. Rather, Appellant is attempting to secure claims directed to new
uses of the Birk device. Hearing Transcript 5–6. The Examiner cites Dixon
as linking obesity, the condition with which Birk is concerned, with type 2
diabeties—a metabolic disease. Final Act. 3–4; Birk paras. 3–4. Appellant
does not raise any issues concerning the Examiner’s reliance on Dixon in
this regard and Appellant’s Specification appears to acknowledge this
relationship was known. Spec. 3:7. The Examiner relies on Birk for the
general ability to titrate the applied stress. Final Act. 3 (citing Birk para.
1082). The Examiner’s reliance on Birk in that regard is not disputed. The

2 “A variation of the above embodiments would be to allow the device to be
adjustable via an adjustment element. This adjustability could be in the
length, shape, angle or stiffness of the cardiac 12, esophageal 36, connecting
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Examiner relies on Forsell for the titrating step to specifically be “according
to activity of the patient to regulate caloric intake.” Final Act. 4 (citing
Forsell para. 38). The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to
incorporate that teaching of Forsell into Birk “in order to help treat patients
suffering from heartburn and reflux disease.” Final Act. 4 (citing Forsell
para. 38). The Examiner relies on substantially similar fact findings and
reasoning with regard to claim 50, the other independent claim before us.
Claim 50, however, does not recite a titrating step, and the Examiner did not
rely on Forsell in the rejection of claim 50. Appellant separately argues each
independent claim.

The motivation for incorporating Forsell’s teachings
Initially Appellant makes a somewhat tangential attack on the
Examiner’s stated motivation for combining the references, in that Appellant
does not actually address the motivation stated by the Examiner of treating
“heartburn and reflux.” Rather, Appellant asserts that one seeking to treat
obesity, as is the case with Birk, would not seek to “regulate caloric intake to
avoid satiety” in the manner Appellant sought. Appeal Br. 9. This argument
does not address the Examiner’s proposed reason for combining the
teachings of Forsell with Birk. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“The
arguments shall explain why the examiner erred . . .”). Appellant makes no
assertion that a patient suffering from, or having a history of, obesity or
metabolic disease, would or could not additionally, or at another time, also

25, and/or fixation elements 31. Adjustability may be a desirable feature,
whether manual or automated.”
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suffer from heartburn or reflux, and therefore benefit from a method of
treating such ailments.
It is well-settled that it is not necessary for the prior art to serve the
same purpose as that disclosed in Appellants’ Specification in order to
support the conclusion that the claimed subject matter would have been
obvious. See In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016 (CCPA 1972); see also KSR
Int’l. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (“[N]either the particular
motivation nor the avowed purpose of the [Appellants] controls” in an
obviousness analysis.) “[A]ny need or problem known in the field of
endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a
reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed” KSR Int’l. v.
Teleflex 550 U.S. at 420; In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“As long as some motivation or suggestion to combine the references is
provided by the prior art taken as a whole, the law does not require that the
references be combined for the reasons contemplated by the inventor.”).
Here, the Examiner’s position that one would have been motivated to make
the proposed combination in order to be able to treat heartburn or reflux
stands uncontroverted.
To the extent Appellant is arguing the statement of purpose “to
regulate caloric intake” must be an expressly stated goal of the prior art
because it is recited in the claim, we first note that claim 1 does not actually
include any language indicating that the “regulat[ion of] caloric intake” must
always be “to avoid satiety.” Claim 1 uses the open-ended transitional
phrase “comprises” to define a further aspect of the “titrating the stress.”
According to the language following the term “comprises,” the avoidance of
satiety must only be an aspect of titrating “if the patient does not have
significant excess body mass.” We will discuss issues related to contingent
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limitations and intended purposes or results in greater detail where we
address Appellant’s arguments more directly related to those issues. See
Appeal Br. 12–14; Reply Br. 5–6.
Appellant’s argument that (the heartburn/reflux embodiment) of
Forsell teaches away from Birk (Appeal Br. 9) is unpersuasive because
Forsell clearly and undisputedly teaches alternatives and it is well-settled
that “the prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not
constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such
disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution
. . .” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellant’s
argument that “Forsell could not treat obesity and reflux in the same paitent
at the same time,” (Reply Br. 2) apparently refers to the exact same moment
in time (Reply Br. 4). The Examiner does not actually attempt to assert
Forsell could be used in such a manner. To the extent this is an argument
that the heartburn/reflux embodiment of Forsell would be incompatible with
Birk’s obesity treatment, Appellant does not apprise us of any reason why
both conditions could not be treated at different instances over the same or
sequential time periods while the device is implanted. Again, as noted
above, there is nothing of record to suggest a patient suffering from, or
having a history of, obesity or metabolic disease would or could not
additionally, or at another time, also suffer from heartburn or reflux, and
therefore benefit from a method of treating such ailments.

Analogousness
Appellant next contends that Forsell, or at least the portion of Forsell
directed to teaching the treatment of heartburn and reflux disease, should be
considered nonanalogous art. Appeal Br. 10–12. Appellant does not cite, and
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we are not aware of any, authority for treating only a portion of a reference
as nonanalogous art. Indeed, the presence of different embodiments in the
same reference evinces the fact that one skilled in the art would consider the
subject matter associated with those embodiments analogous. In any case,
Forsell clearly satisfies the structure and function test associated with the
field of endeavor prong of the analogous art inquiry.
There is no dispute that the device Forsell employs for treating obesity
is structurally identical to that used for treating heartburn or reflux. The
distinction Appellant attempts to draw between the methods of Forsell are
rooted more in their intended use rather than actual function. In both
methods the manipulative steps associated with the devices are essentially
the same:
[0035] In accordance with another aspect of the present invention
there is provided a method of controlling the food flow in the
stomach or esophagus of a patient, comprising: (a) Surgically
implanting in the patient an adjustable restriction device
engaging the patient's stomach or esophagus to form a stoma
opening in the stomach or esophagus. (b) Surgically implanting
in the patient an adjustment device which adjusts the restriction
device and a sensor for sensing at least one physical parameter
associated with the patient. And (c) controlling the adjustment
device to adjust the restriction device to change the size of the
stoma opening in response to the sensor sensing a change in the
physical parameter.
The fact that different control settings can be applied in order to put the
device to a different use (compare Forsell para. 36 with para. 38) does not
significantly alter the functioning of the device or method itself. The device
and method still function according to the same basic principles outlined in
paragraph 35. That minor modifications can be made to Forsell’s control
algorithm to produce different in vivo results to treat different conditions
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does not demonstrate a significant functional difference in Forsell’s method
of treating heartburn or reflux such that a skilled artisan would regard those
teachings as irrelevant in the context of treating obesity or metabolic
disorders.

Contingent limitations
Appellant’s next two arguments (Appeal Br. 12–14) ultimately
depend on the same underlying issue: what is the effect of “if” in claim 1
where the claim recites the condition: “if the patient does not have
significant excess body mass.” Although the Examiner cites MPEP
§ 2173.05(h) (Ans. 20), no rejection under § 112(b) is presently before us for
review. However, we note that we do have some question as to precisely
which clause the conditional “if” language in claim 1 refers back to as being
contingent upon the condition being satisfied. The most likely possible
contingent clauses are the ones that begin: “titrating the stress applied . . .”;
“titrating the stress according to activity . . . ”; or “wherein said titrating the
stress comprises . . .” Although we would certainly recommend clarification
of this language in any further prosecution, we can briefly consider each
alternative without seeking further clarification at this time and the chosen
construction is not ultimately determinative of the outcome of the prior-art
rejections before us.
Interpreting contingencies in claim language is covered in MPEP
§ 2111.04 which discusses Ex parte Schulhauser, Appeal 2013-007847
(PTAB April 28, 2016) (precedential). Schulhauser (as quoted in MPEP
§ 2111.04) states: “[i]f the condition for performing a contingent step is not
satisfied, the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order
for the claimed method to be performed.” Schulhauser at 10.
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As mentioned, the “condition for performing a contingent step” in
claim 1 is: “the patient does not have significant excess body mass.” When
using Birk’s device, it would seem that condition is likely to go unsatisfied
because Birk is concerned specifically and primarily with treating obesity.
We must then consider what the contingent step that “need not be
carried out” is then in claim 1. If the contingent step depending on the “if”
condition being satisfied is the entire “titrating the stress applied . . .” clause
then the claim would seem to be clearly met by Birk and Dixon, and Forsell
would not appear to be needed for the rejection. The Examiner does not
appear to have advanced such a position and such an interpretation seems
the least likely of the three options discussed above in the context of claim 1
so we need not discuss it further for purposes of this review.
The contingent step at the very least includes:
to avoid satiety from the applied stress interfering with the
patient's consumption of calories
because, grammatically, this immediately precedes the condition and
contextually it naturally follows from the subject matter of the present
application that “if the patient does not have excess body mass” one would
want “to avoid satiety” so as not to cause insufficient low caloric intake.
Contextually, it is conceivable that one may still want to “titrat[e] the
stress applied based on the patient’s activity” in both cases where the patient
does and does not have significant excess body mass. However,
grammatically, there being no punctuation offsetting this clause from that
following, it would seem that the contingency mentioned above should also
include:
wherein said titrating the stress comprises titrating the stress
applied based on the patient's activity
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Appellant’s arguments on page 9 of the Brief (“[the prior art] does not
disclose titrating the stress according to activity of the patient to regulate
caloric intake to avoid satiety”) seem to indicate Appellant believes that
claim 1 should be interpreted such that “regulat[ion] of caloric intake”
results in “avoid[ing] satiety.” Under such an interpretation it would seem
that the clause:
including titrating the stress according to activity of the patient
to regulate caloric intake
should additionally be included as part of the contingent step for purposes of
the conditional language analysis because one would seemingly only want to
achieve the end of avoiding satiety “if the patient does not have significant
excess body mass.” However, as the claim does not contain any express
language indicating the recited caloric regulation must be to avoid satiety,
we think the claim is better construed to regard avoiding satiety as one
possible effect of more broadly “regulat[ing] caloric intake.” In other words,
we see nothing in the claim language or Specification requiring or
suggesting that the term “regulate” should be limited to only cover
downregulation of caloric intake in all situations. In this context it would
seem one may want to upregulate or downregulate caloric intake based on
activity level and it is only when the patient does not have significant excess
body mass that such regulation need be downregulation (“to avoid satiety”).
This construction is the one that appears to be advanced by the Examiner,
and is in Appellant’s best interest, narrowing the claim somewhat, for
purposes of the conditional language analysis. Thus, under the best
interpretation of claim 1, the contingent step that “need not be carried out” if
the condition precedent (“the patient does not have significant excess body
mass”) is satisfied is:
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wherein said titrating the stress comprises titrating the stress
applied based on the patient's activity to avoid satiety from the
applied stress interfering with the patient's consumption of
calories
Regarding the condition precedent, claim 1 makes no mention of
anything further that is required when treating a patient with excess body
mass, i.e., if the condition is not satisfied. Claim 1 also does not include any
language limiting the scope of subject matter covered by claim 1 to methods
performed on patients not having excess body mass. Contra Hearing
Transcript at 9. We also do not discern any language in claim 1 to indicate
that the method is first used to treat a patient with obesity, then subsequently
used to treat a patient that no longer exhibits excess body mass. Contra
Hearing Transcript at 9. Thus, we are in agreement with the Examiner (Ans.
20) that in order to demonstrate the obviousness of the claimed method, the
cited prior art need not necessarily show at least:
wherein said titrating the stress comprises titrating the stress
applied based on the patient's activity to avoid satiety from the
applied stress interfering with the patient's consumption of
calories
Ans. 20. It is enough for that purpose that Birk teaches deploying the device
in patients suffering from obesity, that Dixon demonstrates obesity is linked
to metabolic diseases, and that it would have been obvious to modify Birk in
view of Forsell to titrate the stress applied by the device based on the
patient’s activity (e.g., eating or sleeping) in order to, also or instead, treat
heartburn or reflux.
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If the contingent limitation is the entirety of the clause beginning,
“including titrating the stress . . .”, no further analysis of claim 1 need be
conducted. If instead the contingent limitation is regarded, as we think most
appropriate, as beginning with the “wherein said titrating . . .” language
quoted above, the only question that would then remain with regard to claim
1 relates to the language “to regulate caloric intake.”

Inherency
Appellant mentions the “to regulate caloric intake” limitation only
tangentially on page 12 of the Brief, focusing instead on the “to avoid
satiety” language in that section of the Brief, but returns the focus to the “to
regulate caloric intake” language in the Reply Brief. Reply Br 5.
To the extent the limitation is outside of the contingent clause and
always required by claim 1, the issue with regard to the “to regulate caloric
intake language” of claim 1 is essentially the same as the sole issue raised
with regard to claim 50 where Appellant asserts the Examiner has not
established that the prior art teaches “increasing motility of the
gastrointestinal tract of the patient.” Appeal Br. 14–17. Although the
Examiner does not appear to cite or quote from relevant authorities for
support, the Examiner’s analysis of this issue (Ans. 19, 21–22) is exactly
correct.
The patent laws include express provisions indicating that claims
directed to processes may permissibly be directed to new uses of known
processes, materials, or apparatus. 35 U.S.C. § 100. However, jurisprudence
on the subject has long recognized a distinction between a new “use,” where
that use consists of a series of manipulative steps in a process, and the mere
discovery of latent or inherent properties, or results, naturally present in, or
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flowing from, known or existing processes or apparatus. See, e.g., cases
cited at MPEP § 2112.02(II). When the issue arises, each case must be
examined on its own facts to determine whether a claim directed to a process
is, in fact, directed to a new use of the type contemplated in § 100, or instead
amounts to appending newly discovered properties or results to a known or
obvious process. Claims 1 and 50, in their present form, involve the latter.
Of particular relevance here are cases involving claims in which the
only distinguishing limitation involves “efficacy” or some other result
occurring in vivo because the recitations at issue here, “to regulate caloric
intake” and “increasing motility of the gastrointestinal tract of the patient,”
amount not to manipulative steps undertaken by the practitioner of the
methods, but to results naturally and inherently flowing from the actual
manipulative steps that must be undertaken to practice the recited methods.
Ans. 19, 21–22. While new uses of known processes may be patentable,
newly discovered results of known processes do not, without more, render a
process patentable. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc.
246 F.3d 1368, 1376–1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[E]xpressions of intended
efficacy and reduced toxicity are non-limiting”).
There is a strong policy incentive behind this jurisprudence.
Congress, with § 103, and before that the U.S. Supreme Court, has
recognized it is undesirable to grant patent monopolies on obvious
combinations that serve to withdraw subject matter from the public and
diminish the resources available to skilled artisans. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950) (discussed with approval in
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)). Above, we
have discussed the reasons why processes including all of the manipulative
steps recited in claims 1 and 50 would have been obvious.
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The purpose of both Appellant’s method and Forsell’s is to titrate
stress on the stomach caused by the implanted device according to patient
activity. The distinction lies not in the process but in the results of that
titration: caloric regulation versus heartburn or reflux mitigation. The
Examiner’s position with respect to claim 1 is that the act of “titrating the
stress according to activity of the patient” in the manner disclosed in Forsell
would, despite being intended to mitigate heartburn or reflux, inherently
serve “to regulate caloric intake.” Ans. 19. Appellant’s own Specifiation
supports the Examiner’s position in this regard, stating (with emphasis
added), “[t]itration could be affected by adjusting the pressure on a portion
of the GI tract and the amount of time that the pressure is increased. This
causes a neurohormonal response to regulate caloric intake and intestinal
transit time . . . ” Spec. 8:1-3. It is true, and Appellant and the Examiner
seem to agree, that Forsell does not expressly disclose caloric regulation as
the purpose or result of the stress regulation dictating the opening size of the
stoma during the heartburn or reflux treatment, only the obesity treatment.
Ans. 19; Reply Br. 5–6; Forsell para. 18. However, the Examiner articulates
a sound technical basis for the conclusion that reversing the process used in
the obesity treatment would ultimately have the reverse effect, thereby
inherently upregulating caloric intake, whether intended, desirable, known to
happen or not. Ans. 19.
On the record presently before us, the Examiner has articulated a
reasonable basis to conclude that if reducing the stoma opening causes
satiety (Forsell paras. 18, 36), enlarging the stoma opening (Forsell para. 38)
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would inherently “[up]regulate caloric intake” to thereby, “avoid satiety[3]”
at least to some degree.
The Examiner makes similar and reasonable findings with regard to
claim 50 in that, based on Appellant’s own Specification4 and arguments, no
further manipulative steps beyond those recited in claim 50 have been
identified as needing to be performed to achieve the recited result of
“increasing motility in the gastrointestinal tract of the patient.” Indeed, if
there were additional steps required, the claim runs the risk of being
incomplete. See, e.g., In re Mayhew, 527 F.2d 1229, 1233 (CCPA 1976)
(Method claims lacked an enabling disclosure for omitting a step, without
which, the invention as claimed could not produce the claimed product). The
Examiner’s position is that Appellant may have recognized something quite
interesting about Birk’s process when used in a patient with metabolic

3 To the extent “avoid[ing] satiety” may be required by claim 1 in light of
the conditional language.
4 Appellant asserts it is improper to look to Appellant’s own Specification
for proof of inherency. Appeal Br. 17; Reply Br. 10. We disagree. “The
perceived problem with combining references using hindsight to render a
claimed invention obvious is that it ‘simply takes the inventor’s disclosure as
a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability.’ This fear
of hindsight recreation in the context of obviousness determinations,
however, is not applicable in the context of inherency. There is simply no
basis in our law to support the proposition that the source of proof for
inherency must be found in the prior art and cannot be found in a patentee’s
own disclosure or other source.” Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mayo
Foundation, 304 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), J. Dyk,
dissenting (vacated at 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc), superseded
by 346 F.3d 1051); see also, In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697–99 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (admissions in an applicant’s own specification indicating that the
applicant’s claim distinguish from the prior art by merely reciting latent
properties or characteristics of an old product, may be used against an
applicant to reject those claims.)
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disease as suggested by Dixon, in that it can increase motility of the
gastrointestinal tract of the patient. However, such a discovery, without
more, does not amount to inventing a new and nonobvious process within
the meaning of that term as it is used in 35 U.S.C. § 100. In re Cruciferous
Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Thus, in the context of both claim 1 and claim 50 the Examiner has set
forth a reasonable basis to shift the burden to Appellant to come forward
with technical reasoning or evidence demonstrating error in the Examiner’s
positions. MPEP § 2112(IV), (V) (Appellant is in the best position to
provide technical reasoning or evidence to show error in the Examiner’s
inherency determinations). This burden is not carried merely by pointing out
Forsell lacks express disclosure of the supposedly inherent subject matter as
Appellant has done. On the record presently before us, the Examiner’s
inherency positions stand without any meaningful rebuttal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11, 13,
16–24, 49
103 Birk, Dixon,
Forsell
1–11, 13,
16–24, 49

12 103 Birk, Dixon,
Forsell, Baker,
Saadat
12
50–59 103 Birk, Dixon 50–59
Overall
Outcome
1–13, 16–
24, 49–59

RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED