B.F.C. Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 31, 1987

285 N.L.R.B. 583 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

B F C CORP 583
B.F.C. Corp. and International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers , Local 59 , AFL-CIO. Case 16-
CA-8122
31 August 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 10 March 1980 Administrative Law Judge
Robert A. Gritta issued the attached decision. The
Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, the Respondent and the General Counsel
each filed cross-exceptions and supporting briefs,
and the Charging Party filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided, to affirm the judge 's rulings, findings, i and
conclusions as modified, and to adopt the recom-
mended Order as modified
The facts are set out more fully in the judge's
decision. Briefly, the judge found that in October
1975, the Respondent, an electrical contractor,
signed a letter of assent-A with the Union which
expressly authorized NECA to represent it as its
collective-bargaining agent with Local 59 with
regard to the then-current inside agreement be-
tween NECA and the Union. Such authorization
continued in effect unless terminated by the Re-
spondent at least 150 days prior to the contract's
then-current anniversary date. The effective dates
of the agreement were 1 June 1975 through 31
May 1977. On 30 May 1977 the Respondent exe-
cuted a subsequent letter of assent-A respecting the
newly negotiated contract bearing the effective
dates of 1 June 1977 to 31 May 1977. Just prior to
that contract's effective date the Union and NECA
negotiated and executed a memorandum of agree-
ment , dated 27 May 1977 and effective 1 June
i The judge found that the Respondent was engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act, both as an individual employer and as a
member of NECA In agreeing with the judge's conclusion that jurisdic-
tion is properly asserted over the Respondent, we find it unnecessary to
pass on the judge's alternative jurisdictional finding based on the Re-
spondent's NECA membership Additionally, in concluding that jurisdic-
tion is properly asserted, we note that the General Counsel introduced
into the record evidence of indirect inflow sufficient to establish jurisdic-
tion over the Respondent individually and that this evidence was not
controverted by the Respondent Moreover, we further rely on the par-
ties' posthearing stipulation concerning commerce which , in light of the
evidence noted above, was merely cumulative In this regard, we find
that the judge did not abuse his discretion by reopening the record and
thereafter accepting the parses' stipulation Cf Sparkie's Special Delivery,
247 NLRB 623 (1980) Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to pass on
the Respondent's still-pending motion to the judge of 5 July 1979 con-
cerning his order reopening the hearing as that motion , in light of the
above, is now moot
1977. The purport of the memorandum was, inter
alia, to allow signatory employers to pay employ-
ees less than union scale on certain jobs to become
competitive with nonunion shops. All fringe bene-
fits payable to the Union relative to memorandum
controlled jobsites were paid pursuant to the inside
agreement 's terms Until the memorandum was exe-
cuted, the Respondent paid union scale. After the
memorandum, however, the Respondent accepted
only jobs covered by the memorandum and allow-
ing less than union scale. From October through
August 1978, the Respondent paid all fringe bene-
fits required by the current inside agreement nego-
tiated by NECA and the Union. Beginning Septem-
ber 1978, fringe benefit payments were not made
by the Respondent.
During the summer of 1978, the Respondent had
two jobs in progress under a single construction
contract. That contract was governed by the
memorandum . The Respondent employed four em-
ployees at these jobsites: Charles Evans, Terry
Cunningham, Larry Buck, and Terry Fagala. On
20 September 1978 Andrew Brockelman, the Re-
spondent's president, sought out Evans to give him
a message for the crew. Brockelman told Evans
that "under the circumstances" he could no longer
work under the union contract. Brockelman stated
to Evans that he and the other men could either
stay with the Company or get off early to go to
the hall. Evans gave Brockelman's message to the
other employees. All four of them went to the
union hall rather than continuing to work for
Brockelman. Each stated that the reason for his
action was to save his union membership and job
benefits as each knew that he could lose his mem-
bership job-related benefits if he worked for a non-
union contractor.
On 2 November 1978 Brockelman sent a letter to
NECA terminating the letter of assent by B.F C.
Corp. The letter, by its terms, withdrew any au-
thorization to NECA to act as bargaining agent for
Brockelman or B.F.C. Corp. The Union did not re-
ceive a copy of this letter. NECA, however, did
inform the Union of receipt of the revocation.
The judge concluded that the Union was the ex-
clusive representative under Section 9(a) of all the
employees in a unit consisting of "all apprentice
electricians and journeymen electricians employed
by B.F.C. Corp., or employer-members of NECA
and/or employers who authorize NECA to repre-
sent them in collective bargaining within the juris-
diction of the Union, exclusive of all other employ-
ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act."
The judge further found that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act on 20 September
1978 by unilaterally changing terms and conditions
285 NLRB No. 73
584 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of employment of its unit employees and modifying
the 1977-1979 collective-bargaining agreement by
unilaterally repudiating the 1977-1979 collective-
bargaining agreement, by attempting to withdraw
from the multiemployer association without notifi-
cation to the Union at a time when such withdraw-
al was not effective, and by unilaterally terminating
payments required under the contract to various
union funds. Further, the judge found that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
when it constructively discharged employees
Evans, Buck, Cunningham, and Fagala and failed
to reinstate them. Lastly, the judge found that the
Respondent's termination notice of 2 November
1978 timely revoked the prior delegation of bar-
gaining authority to NECA and was effective as of
the expiration of the inside agreement on 31 May
1979, thereby relieving the Respondent of any bar-
gaining obligation to the Union that may have been
incurred by NECA thereafter on behalf of
member-employers.
In John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 NLRB 1375
(1987), the Board overruled R. J. Smith Construc-
tion Co., 191 NLRB 693 (1971), enf. denied sub
nom. Operating Engineers Local 150 v. NLRB, 480
F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973), abandoned the conver-
sion doctrine, and modified unit scope rules in 8(f)
cases. As set forth more fully in Deklewa, supra,
1377-1378, the Board decided to apply the follow-
ing principles in 8(f) cases:
(1) a collective-bargaining agreement permit-
ted by Section 8(f) shall be enforceable
through the mechanisms of Section 8(a)(5) and
Section 8(b)(3); (2) such agreements will not
bar the processing of valid petitions filed pur-
suant to Section 9(c) and Section 9(e); (3) in
processing such petitions, the appropriate unit
normally will be the single employer's employ-
ees covered by the agreement; and (4) upon
the expiration of such agreements, the signato-
ry union will enjoy no presumption of majori-
ty status, and either party may repudiate the
8(f) bargaining relationship.
The Board also noted, at footnote 41 of Deklewa,
that it will require the party asserting the existence
of a 9(a) relationship to prove it.
Under Deklewa, we find that the General Coun-
sel, while asserting that the Respondent is bound to
recognize the Union under Section 9(a), has failed
to establish that the relationship between the Re-
spondent and the Union is anything other than a
relationship governed by Section 8(f) of the Act.
The evidence shows that the Respondent is en-
gaged in the construction industry. The record,
however, fails to demonstrate that a 9(a) relation-
ship was ever' established between the Respondent
and the Union. Thus, we find that the relationship
between' the -Respondent and the Union is gov-
erned by Section 8(f) of the Act.2
Consistent with Deklewa, however, we agree
with the judge's conclusion that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when, in
September 1978, during the term of the 1977-1979,
collective-bargaining agreement, it ceased making
contractually required contributions to the union
trust funds on behalf of its unit employees, unilater-
ally changed terms and conditions of employment
of its unit employees, and repudiated its collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union.3 We also
agree with the judge that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by constructively
discharging employees Evans, Buck, Cunningham,
and Fagala. John Costa Painting Co., 277 NLRB
926 (1985).
In his recommended remedy for the constructive
discharges, the judge provided, inter alia, fqr back-
pay to terminate no later than the complon of
work at the jobsites involved here.4 Further, in
view of his finding that the Respondent was only
obligated to the Union for the term of the 1977-
1979 collective-bargaining agreement, the judge
failed to include a reinstatement remedy as part of
his proposed order. In our recent decision in Dean
General Contractors, 285 NLRB 575, issued this
date, however, we determined that in the construc-
tion industry the traditional make-whole remedy of
reinstatement and backpay is appropriate, with the
understanding that any issues concerning the dura-
tion of the remedy, including whether employees
would be transferred or reassigned to other job-
sites, could be litigated at the compliance stage of
the proceeding. We shall amend the order accord-
ingly.
2 In view of this finding, we further find that the appropriate unit is
that limited to the Respondent's employees. Accordingly, we do not rely
on the judge's unit findings to the extent that they exceed the single em-
ployer unit
3 Inasmuch as we agree with the judge that the Respondent's letter of
2 November 1978 revoking NECA's bargaining authority was timely and
effective as of the expiration of the inside agreement on 31 May 1979, we
find it unnecessary to pass on the consequences of an "untimely" revoca-
tion Additionally, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge's conclu-
sion that, in effect, the Respondent's repudiation of the contract constitut-
ed an untimely and ineffective withdrawal from the multiemployer asso-
ciation since this conclusion of the judge , in light of our other findings, is
merely cumulative
4 We agree with the judge that because, under the terms of the memo-
randum of agreement, all jobs started under the memorandum will be fin-
ished under its terms without regard to the termination date of the con-
trolling inside bargaining agreement, backpay due the discriminatees for
work performed on the projects in existence at the time of the construc-
tive discharges should be determined under the agreement controlling at
the time of their constructive, discharges without regard to its termination
date
B F C CORP 585
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All apprentice electricians and journeymen
electricians employed by B.F.C Corp, excluding
all other employees , guards, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, constitute an appropriate unit of
the Respondent's employees for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining under the Act.
4. By unilaterally changing, on 20 September
1978, wages, hours, and working conditions of its
employees in the unit described above without no-
tifying the Union of its intention to do so or afford-
ing the Union an opportunity to bargain on the
subject, and by modifying the agreement effective
1 June 1977 to 31 May 1979, the Respondent re-
fused to bargain collectively with the Union as the
representative of its employees in the unit de-
scribed above and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
5. By unilaterally rejecting, on 20 September
1978, the collective -bargaining agreement effective
1 June 1977 to 31 May 1979, the Respondent re-
fused to bargain collectively with the Union as the
representative of its employees in the unit de-
scribed above and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
6 By unilaterally terminating , on 20 September
1978, payments to the national electrical benefit
fund, the electrical training fund, the welfare fund,
the annuity fund , and the vacation fund and other
terms and conditions of employment set forth in
the bargaining agreement effective 1 June 1977 to
31 May 1979, the Respondent refused to bargain
with the Union as the exclusive representative of
its employees in the unit described above and
thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.5
7. On 20 September 1978 the Respondent did
constructively discharge employees Charles Evans,
Larry G. Buck, Terry Cunningham, and Terry
Fagala and has failed to reinstate these employees
to their former or substantially equivalent positions
because they refused to accept unilaterally changed
wages and working conditions , other than those re-
quired by the collective -bargaining agreement ef-
5 The parties ' 1977-1979 collective -bargaining agreement also provided
for employer contributions to an industry fund inasmuch as industry ad-
vancement funds are permissive , nonmandatory subjects of bargaining, it
is not an unfair labor practice for an employer unilaterally to discontinue
its contributions to such a fund See FMS Supply, 258 NLRB 604 fn 3
(1981), Finger Lales Plumbing Co, 254 NLRB 1399 (1981) Accordingly,
we shall not require the Respondent to make contributions to that fund
fective 1 June 1977 to 31 May 1979, thereby violat-
ing Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
9. The Respondent 's termination notice of 2 No-
vember 1978 is timely to revoke the prior delega-
tion of bargaining authority to NECA and is effec-
tive with the expiration of the inside agreement on
31 May 1979, thereby relieving the Respondent of
any bargaining obligation to the Union which may
be incurred by NECA thereafter on behalf of
member-employers.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified and set forth in full below and
orders that the Respondent, B.F.C. Corp., Sher-
man, Texas , its officers , agents, successors , and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to give full effect to and
complying with the collective -bargaining agree-
ment between NECA and Local Union No. 59
dated 1 June 1977 to 31 May 1979 during its terms.
(b) Unilaterally changing the terms and condi-
tions of employment of the employees in the appro-
priate unit during the term of a valid collective-
bargaining agreement without prior consultation
with Local Union No. 59 as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of these employees.
(c) Unlawfully terminating employees or other-
wise unlawfully discriminating in regard to em-
ployees' wages, terms, and conditions of employ-
ment.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining , or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) For the term of the 1977-1979 collective-bar-
gaining agreement restore and place in effect all
terms and conditions of employment as provided in
the agreement which were unilaterally changed
and abandoned by the Respondent.
(b) Make such national electrical benefit fund,
electrical training fund , welfare fund , annuity fund,
and vacation fund payments on behalf of those em-
ployees in the above unit for whom contributions
were not previously made that would have contin-
ued to be made had the Respondent not unlawfully
abandoned the above collective-bargaining agree-
586 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment6 and reimburse those employees for expenses
incurred by them due to the failure to make such
contributions in accord with Kraft Plumbing, 252
NLRB 891 (1980).
(c) Make whole Charles Evans, Larry G. Buck,
Terry Cunningham, and Terry Fagala for any loss
of wages or other benefits suffered by reason of
Respondent's unlawful conduct.
(d) Offer Charles Evans, Larry G. Buck, Terry
Cunningham, and Terry Fagala immediate and full
reinstatement to their former jobs. or, if those jobs
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously' enjoyed, and
make them whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against them in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of the decision.
(e) Preserve and, on request, make available to
the Board or its agents for examination and copy-
ing, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(f) Post at its facility in Sherman, Texas, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."7
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 16, after being signed
by the Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
6 Because the provisions of employee benefit fund agreements are vari-
able and complex, the Board does not provide for the addition of a fixed
rate of interest on unlawfully withheld fund payments at the adjudicatory
stage of a proceeding . We leave to the compliance stage the question
whether the Respondent must pay any additional amounts into the benefit
funds in order to satisfy our "make-whole" remedy Depending on the
circumstances of each case , these additional amounts may be determined
by reference to provisions in the documents governing the funds at issue
and, when there are no governing provisions, by evidence of any losses
directly attributable to the unlawful withholding, which might include
the loss of return on investment of the portion of funds withheld, addi-
tional administrative costs, etc, but no collateral losses Merryweather Op-
tical Co., 240 NLRB 1213 fn 7 (1979)
T If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to give effect to and
comply fully with the terms of the bargaining
agreement with National Electrical Contractors
Association, Northwest Texas Chapter and Local
Union No. 59, International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, dated 1 June 1977 to 31 May 1979,
with respect to the employees in an appropriate
unit represented by the Local Union No. 59, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, during
the term of the agreement entered into with the
Union, pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act. The ap-
propriate unit was:
All apprentice electricians and journeymen
electricians employed by B.F.C. Corp., exclud-
ing all other employees, guards and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change terms and
conditions of employment of employees in the
above unit during the term of a valid collective-
bargaining agreement without prior notice to and
consultation with the Union.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully discharge you or oth-
erwise discriminate against you because you are
members of the Union or obligated to become
members of the Union, or because you want to
remain members of the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL make all payments required by the
above bargaining agreement for the national elec-
trical benefit fund, the welfare fund, the annuity
fund, the electrical training fund, and the vacation
fund on behalf of all employees in the unit for
whom we previously made such contributions,
which contributions would have continued had we
complied with the above bargaining agreement
during its terms and WE WILL reimburse the unit
employees for any expenses incurred due to our
failure to make such contributions, plus interest.
WE WILL offer Charles Evans, Larry G. Buck,
Terry Cunningham, and Terry Fagala immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equiva-
B F C CORP 587
lent positions , without prejudice to their seniority
or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed as a result of their discharges.
WE WILL make whole , with interest , Charles
Evans, Larry G. Buck , Terry Cunningham, and
Terry Fagala for any loss of wages or other bene-
fits they may have suffered as a result of our dis-
crimination against them.
B.F.C. CORP.
Michael P. Alden, Esq. and Martha Kinard, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
David Watkins, Esq. (Jenkins & Watkins, Inc.), of Dallas,
Texas, for the Respondent.
David Richards, Esq, of Austin, Texas, for the Charging
Party
DECISION
ness stand , and on substantive , reliable evidence consid-
ered along with the consistency and inherent probability
of testimony, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that B .F.C Corp. is a Texas corporation engaged in the
building and construction industry as an electrical con-
tractor with offices in Sherman , Texas. The parties stipu-
lated that Respondent in the material 12 -month period, in
the course and conduct of its business operations, pur-
chased goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
from suppliers within the State of Texas , who in turn
purchased said good directly from points located outside
the State of Texas . I conclude and find that Respondent,
B.F C Corp is an employer engaged in commerce and
in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GRITTA, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was heard on February 5 and 6, 1979, in Fort
Worth, Texas, based on charges filed by the Internation-
al Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 59, AFL-
CIO (Local 59) on October 4 and 27 and November 13,
1978, and a complaint issued by the Acting Regional Di-
rector for Region 16 on November 17, 1978. Respond-
ent's timely answer denied virtually all material allega-
tions in the complaint and the commission of any unfair
labor practices.
The primary issues are whether B.F C Corp (Re-
spondent) (a) had a duty to recognize and bargain with
the Union, (b) unlawfully withdrew recognition from the
Union and repudiated the contract with the Union in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act when it
ceased making contributions to union benefit programs
and went open shop, and (c) constructively discharged
several employee members of the Union in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Secondary issues deal with the status of the Union as a
labor organization and exclusive representative of em-
ployees.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evi-
dence, and to argue orally. A brief was submitted by the
General Counsel and was considered.
On the entire record in this case' and from my obser-
vation of the witnesses and their demeanor on the wit-
' The following posthearing motions , responses , and orders have been
marked for identification as shown and received into the record The
General Counsel's motion to reopen the record dated February 22, 1979,
GC Exh 7, Respondent's opposition thereto, R Exh 2, my Order to
reopen for limited purpose , dated March 28, 1979, it Exh 1, my Order
of May 1, 1979, rescinding the March 28 Order, Jt Exh 2, General
Counsel's letter of May 7, 1979, forwarding a stipulation of the parties on
commerce facts to me, G C Exh 8a , the stipulation on commerce facts
received on May 28, 1979, G C Exh 8b, Respondent's motion dated July
5, 1979, to me to withdraw my Order of May 1, 1979, R Exh 3a, Re-
spondent's prepared Order withdrawing my Order of May 1, 1979, R
Exh 3b , and, the General Counsel's opposition to Respondent ' s motion
II. STATUS AS LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is affiliated with the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Foreman, the
Union 's business manager and financial secretary , testi-
fied that employees participate in the internal affairs of
the Union, and that the Union exists for the purpose of
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours and working conditions
of its members. Within its jurisdiction the Union negoti-
ates contracts with the Northwest Texas Chapter of the
National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) as
well as other individual contractors Two such associa-
tion contracts are in this record. Further the Union has
previously been found to be a labor organization within
the meaning of the Act.3 No testimony to the contrary
was offered. Therefore, in view of the above, I find that
the Union is a labor organization as defined in Section
2(5) of the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts4
Respondent began operations as an electrical contrac-
tor in Sherman, Texas, sometime prior to 1975. Initially
for withdrawal of my May 1, 1979 Order dated July 9, 1979, G C Exh
9
2 Additional pleadings allege Respondent to be a member of NECA
and thereby within the Board 's jurisdiction over employer associations
through one or more of the association 's member employers Here, the
Board would have jurisdiction over NECA and its members by the way
of prior assertion over members Fisk Electric and Fischback & Moore
See Electrical Workers IBEW Local 716, 203 NLRB 333 (1973), and
O'Keefe Electric Co, 158 NLRB 434 (1966) In view of my subsequent
finding of Respondent's membership in NECA the issue of jurisdiction is
further resolved
' Electrical Workers IBEW Local 59 (Andersen Co), 135 NLRB 504
(1962)
4 Andrew Brockelman, president and managing officer of Respondent,
testified without contradiction to the affairs of B F C Corp Supplemen-
tal testimony by Foreman and Potts was also uncontroverted,
588 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARDZ
employees were referred from the Sherman, Texas Elec-
trical Union No. 338 for local jobs. In January 1975
Local No. 338 merged with the Electricians Local Union
No. 59 in Dallas. Local 59 thereafter maintained an
office in Sherman, Texas. Respondent, in October 1975,
signed a ' letter of Assent-A with Local 59, which ex-
pressly authorized NECA to represent it as collective-
bargaining agent with Local 59 with regard to the cur-
rent inside agreement between NECA and Local 59.
Such authorization continued in effect unless terminated
by Respondent at least 150 days prior to the contract's
then current anniversary date. The effective dates of the
subject agreement were June 1, 1975, through May 31,
1977.5 On May 30, 1977, Respondent executed a subse-
quent letter of Assent-A respecting the newly negotiated
contract bearing the effective dates of June 1, 1977, to
May 31, 1979.6 Just prior to the current contract's effec-
tive date Local Union No. 59 and NECA negotiated and
executed a memorandum of agreement, dated May 27,
1977, and effective June 1, 1977. The purport of the
memorandum was to allow signatory employers to pay
employees less than union scale on certain jobs thereby
becoming competitive with nonunion shops. In addition
the Local Union was reducing its out-of-work list by
having more jobs available for its members or prospec-
tive members. The memorandum further provided that
Local Union No. 59 members will fiave top priority for
hiring and Local Union No. 59 shall supply all employ-
ees,, whether union members or not. All nonmember re-
ferrals were union applicants prior to referral and subject
to a restricted tenure if membership was not ultimately
obligated to the Union. All fringe benefits payable to the
Local Union relative to memorandum controlled jobsites
were paid pursuant to the current inside agreement's
terms. From inception, in October 1975, Respondent paid
all fringe benefits required by the current inside agree-
ment negotiated by NECA and Local Union No. 59 up
to and including payments for August 1978. September
1978 and subsequent fringe benefits to the Union were
not made by Respondent on advice of his counsel.
Until the memorandum was executed Respondent paid
the union scale, however, after the memorandum Re-
spondent accepted only jobs covered by the memoran-
dum and allowing less than union scale.' Respondent
was notified of jobs covered by the memorandum
through letters from NECA to signatory employers.
At all times prior to September 1978 Respondent's
jobs were manned by employees referred by the Union
5 Although Local Union No 59 and NECA negotiate several contracts
in the industry , only the inside electrical agreement is material herein
'' An object of written agreements is to achievecertainty of substance
Respondent's Assent-A, dated May 30, 1977, by Respondent and bearing
the Union's approval date of June 7, 1977, is on its face clear and unmis-
takable as to effective date Brockelman offered testimony to vary the
date of the instrument (affixed by himself) to sometime in August 1977
An obvious change in date of the Union's transmittal letter was offered as
supporting evidence of the variance I do not credit Brockelman 's testi-
mony on this point His testimony was vague , unconvincing , and sketchy
and only served as conclusions which of themselves were not sufficient
to vary the terms of the instrument Additionally, the obvious change in
the date of the transmittal letter went only to the day'of the week, the
month_of June and the year 1977 was not subject to question
7 Journeymen scale was $10,43 in 1977, $11 03 in 1978 The memoran-
dum wage scale for journeymen was $7 in 1977 and $7.50 in 1978
with the single exception of one job that required some
rework. Respondent accomplished the rework with em-
ployees not within Local Union No. 59's membership.
All employees referred by Local Union No. 59 were
classified as journeymen or apprentice electricians. Re-
spondent paid the employees pursuant to either the cur-
rent inside agreement or the memorandum of agreement
depending on which controlled the particular jobsite.
During the period May to September 1979 the Union re-
ferred approximately 15 employees with the last referral
dating September 18, 1978. Supervision of all employees
was accomplished by Brockelman and his son.
Brockelman testified that Local Union No. 59 repre-
sents all the electrical workers dispatched from Local
Union No. 59's hall in their relations with Respondent
and makes sure that the contract is followed. Brockel-
man dealt with Local Union No. 59 when complaints
arose in an attempt to resolve the problems. Both Brock-
elman and Foreman recall the complaint of poor work-
manship arising in July 1978. Brockelmen complained to
Local 59 and the Union offered to have the work redone
by the employees on their own time and during regular
working hours pursuant to the contract. Brockelman,
however chose to have the work done outside regular
working hours at his own expense.
At some time during the summer of 1978 Brockelman
told his employees that there was a possibility that he
might get out of the Union.
During this time period Respondent had two jobs in
progress under a single construction contract. Both jobs
were elementary schools in Carrollton, Texas, and were
ultimately manned by the four employees involved in the
alleged unfair labor practices. Each employee was hired
as follows: Evans, April 1978; Cunningham, June 1978;
Buck, July 1978; Fagala, September 1978.
On September 22, 1978, Brockelman sought out
Charles Evans to give him a message for the crew.
Brockelman told Evans that under the circumstances he
was going to go open shop. Brockelman stated to Evans
that he and the other men could either stay with the
Company or get off early to go to the hall. Brockelman
testified:
A. I told them, due to circumstances beyond my
control I could no longer stay with them in the
Sherman area and I assumed it would be the same
way there. I told him [Evans] that under the cir-
cumstances that I could no longer be-handle it in
the Sherman area and consequently would mean the
Carrollton area.
Q. Could no longer handle working under the
union contract, is that correct?
A. Yes, with-under their standards, yes.
Q. Under the Union standards?
A. Yes.
Q. What was it you told the employees and what
options did you give them?
A. I told them I didn't know what I was going to
have to do, and wanted to know what they would
have to do.
B F.C. CORP.
Q. Well, you also told-at least you told Evans
that you couldn't go on any longer working as a
union contractor?
A. In the Sherman area.
Q. And that, that also meant you couldn't work
in the Dallas area?
A. Well, I assumed that it meant the same thing
there.
Q. You told Evans that then that I am not going
to be able to be a union contractor?
A. Under the circumstances I did not think that I
could be-I did not say that I wouldn't be. I said I
think that I would not be.
Q. Well, did he ask you any questions about what
you meant?
A. No, sir.
Q. And you told them that they could either stay
on and work with you or go back to the hall and
get referred out to some other job.
A. No.
Q. What did you tell them?
A. I told them that that option was theirs. I asked
them if they would stay on under the circumstances
and I didn't know, you know, at that time know
what I was to do, what I was going to do. Not
what I was to do but what I was going to do.
Q. Well, what did you do?
A. When they said they wanted to go into the
hall I wrote out their checks.
Q. And from that-point forward did you follow
any of the terms and provisions of the union con-
tract?
A. No.
Q. From that point forward you abandoned the
union contract, is that correct?
A. Yes, right.
Q. From September 22, 1978 to date you have
operated as if you were no longer 'bound by the
union contract?
A. True.
Evans testified that' the morning of September 20,
1978, Brockelman came to the jobsite and in a private
conversation told Evans that he was going "open shop."
Evans asked him when and Brockelman said he did not
know yet. The conversation ended with job-related re-
marks, then Evans went back to work. After lunch that
same day, Brockelman conversed with Evans again that
he was going "open shop" now. The Union was going
downhill and he just did not get along with the Union.
Brockelman said the employees could work for him but
he did not want to tell them what to do. Evans replied
that he was going to stay in the Union but he would tell
the other men what Brockelman had said. Evans then
went to Cunningham, Buck, and Fagala and told them
what Brockelman had said. Then three employees told
Evans that they were going to go back to the union hall
and sign the book. They were not going to work "open
shop" and lose their membership.
Each of the four employees stated that the reason he
had decided to go to the union hall rather than continue
589
working for Brockelman was to save their union mem-
bership and job benefits. Each knew he could lose his
membership and job-related benefits if he worked for a
nonunion contractor.
All four employees had applied for membership in
Local Union No. 59 prior to referral to B.F.C. Corp.
Evans perfected his union membership in August 1978.
Cunningham and Buck perfected their membership in
November 1978. Fagala became an indentured apprentice
in May 1978.
On November 2, 1978, Brockelman sent a letter to
NECA terminating any letter of assent by B.F.C. Corp.
The letter by its terms withdrew any authorization to
NECA to act as bargaining agent for Brockelman or
B.F.C. Corp. Local Union No. 59 did not receive a
copy. NECA, however, did inform Local 59's business
manager of receipt of the revocation.
B. The Alleged 8(a)(5) Violations and Findings and
Conclusions
1. Respondent's membership in NECA
The General Counsel contends that Respondent's exe-
cution of letters of assent-A unequivocally evidence an
intent to be bound by the group action of NECA and
Local `Union No. 59. The intent, thus established, makes
Respondent a member of the multiemployer bargaining
group. Respondent, except for its answer to the com-
plaint and statements at the hearing, did not offer to
gainsay its membership status. The absence of a denial,
however, is not dispositive of the membership issue. The
Board has held, as the General -Counsel contends, that
certain agreements executed by employers clearly show
a delegation, to a multiemployer group, of authority to
bargain collectively thus establishing membership in the
multiemployer group. Conversely, where the agreement
executed by the employer was only to accept the terms
of a particular contract the Board found no express grant
of authority and therefore no membership in the multi-
employer group. Northern Nevada Electrical Contractors
Assn., 131 NLRB 550 (1961). Albeit the above case in-
volves NECA, the terms of the Assent-A letter are not
included in the decision.
In a subsequent decision, involving an Assent-A letter
substantially identical to that in issue here, the Board
found the employer to be a member of the multiemploy-
er bargaining group. Provided, however, a timely revo-
cation was not communicated. Central New Mexico Elec-
trical Contractors Assn., 152 NLRB 1604 (1965). The
Board further found that the revocation if timely is pro-
spective and has no operative effect relative to the col-
lective-bargaining agreement then in effect Accordingly,
I find that B.F.C. Corp. was a member of NECA via its
Assent-A letter and was obligated as a member to the
terms of the contract in effect from June 1, 1977, to May
31, 1979.8 In so finding I note particularly that Respond-
8 Preamble of the contract, " Agreement" clause, states, "It shall apply
to all firms who sign a letter of assent to be bound by this agreement
" The term "Employer" shall mean an individual firm who has
been recognized by an assent to this agreement.
'590 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ent, as a member , abided by the negotiations between
NECA and Local Union No. 59, which resulted in the
memorandum of agreement modifying the application of
the contract. Respondent therefore received benefits and
used the privileges and rights of NECA membership in
conducting its business.
2. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges the appropriate unit to be all ap-
prentice electricians and journeymen electricians em-
ployed by the employer-member of NECA performing
work within the territorial and work jurisdiction of the
Union as defined in the contract referred to in paragraph
7 above excluding all other employees of said employers
and all supervisors as defined in the Act. (The contract is
to the current inside agreement in evidence as G.C. Exh.
3.) Respondent 's answer neither admitted nor denied the
appropriateness of the unit.
The record evidence shows that respondent employees
only journeymen electricians and apprentice electricians
skilled in the electrical trade. The Respondent only en-
gages in electrical construction of a commercial nature.
The supervisor of all crews is accomplished by Respond-
ent's president and his son . At times the crew size on
certain jobs dictates the appointment of a journeyman, as
working foreman , but he nonetheless works 100% of the
time with his tools. The unit of employees therefore con-
sists of all employees - of Respondent defined as journey-
men and apprentice electricians.
Under Section 9(b) the Board is empowered to deter-
mine in each case the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining. It may be the employer unit or
craft unit, among others . In, fact the statute specifically
acknowledges the ultra-appropriateness of a craft union.9
There being no dispute of the craft status of Respond-
ent's only employees and such employees being identified
with only one craft (electrical), I conclude and find that
the unit alleged in the complaint defines a homogeneous
unit of craft employees and a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective-bargaining within the meaning of
the Act.
3. The majority issue
As shown in the record , all employees referred by the
Union to Respondent's jobsite were previously contract-
ed or obligated to the Union for membership . As noted
in the memorandum of agreement (germane to work Re-
spondent performed) all nonmembers referred had a lim-
ited tenure on the job if the necessary obligation to the
Union was not forthcoming . All of Respondent's em-
ployees were referred by the Union pursuant to its hiring
hall and the terms of the contract extant . The contract
also includes a recognition clause for all signatory em-
ployers or assenting employers . At the time of the al-
leged unfair labor practices herein , Respondent em-
ployed four employees at two jobsites . These same em-
ployees were allegedly constructively discharged when
they , en masse, chose to go to the union hall rather than
Sec 9(b)(2) and its proscription
work nonunion . I see no argument nor evidence in the
record contrary to the Union 's representative status.
The Union is entitled , in the least, to a presumption of
majority status based on its contract with Respondent.
Even if the Union was not entitled to the presumption,
the Union did have a numerical majority of Respondent's
employees at the critical time by virtue of all of Re-
spondent 's employees ' contractual obligations to the
Union . Accordingly , I find that the Union represented a
majority of Respondent 's employees in an appropriate
unit at all times material herein , and particularly since
May 30, 1977.
4. The 8(a)(5) allegations
The General Counsel contends that Respondent re-
fused to bargain with the Union by bargaining individ-
ually with employees and by unilaterally rejecting and
repudiating its contract with the Union including cessa-
tion of benefit payments to the Union's various funds.
Respondent denies the complaint allegations, but
makes no argument or defense other than to show that
Respondent tendered a revocation of the Assent-A letter
to NECA and attempted to show Respondent 's dissatis-
faction with the union employees ' work, which resulted
in financial losses to Respondent . Respondent did offer
testimony that the Assent-A letter was meant to last only
1 year. The limitation of 1 year was apparently based on
the initial Assent-A executed in October 1975 during the
term of the previously negotiated contract . Assuming ar-
guendo, the partial effectiveness of the 1975 assent letter
spans 19 months of a 2-year contract term . Additionally,
Respondent 's admission to a 1-year delegation evinces a
procedural basis rather than a substantive basis for its
denial of a bargaining obligation.
With regard to Respondent 's defense of the written
revocation , it is sufficient to explain that such a revoca-
tion is only effective to withdraw bargaining authority
(and thereby membership in NECA) for future negotia-
tions. The language of the grant of authority is clear that
such delegation is for the life of the then current agree-
ment. The agreement and the delegation of authority
expire simultaneously , May 31, 1979, pursuant to the
timely revocation of November 2, 1978. Therefore,
during the life of the agreement , the prior delegation of
bargaining authority remains viable.
Respondent was chagrined over the quality of work
performed by several union members and complained to
the Union. The Union suggested the contract procedure
of rework but Respondent preferred an individual resolu-
tion, which was within Respondent 's contract obligation.
Respondent thus bore the entire cost of rework including
wages for nonunion employees . Respondent offers the
cost attendant to the rework as, apparently , a permissible
reason for his unilateral withdrawal of recognition of the
Union. Even if economics were an acceptable circum-
stance to support an employer ' unilateral action under a
contract , it would never be acceptable as a defense to
unilateral withdrawal of recognition . One breach of a
contract never justifies another breach. To put it another
way, the very acceptance of collective bargaining envi-
sions negotiation as the only avenue to resolve differ-
B.F C CORP.
ences that arise between the parties, without regard for
the origins of those differences. Here Respondent, by his
individual conduct, completely repudiated his obligation
previously under taken by agreement. Further, the eco-
nomic defense of rework costs offered by, Respondent is
based completely on Respondent's voluntary conduct
rather than the bilateral procedure dictated'by the obli-
gations of each party. 10
Additionally, Respondent's announcement that hence-
forth it will operate "open shop" shows a previous com-
mitment to a "union shop" and undoubtedly founded on
Respondent's admitted prior obligation to the union con-
tract and NECA collective bargaining. To further evi-
dence Respondent's admitted prior obligation to the
union contract and NECA collective bargaining, the
record shows that Respondent from October 1975 to
August 1978 made all necessary fringe payments to the
Union as required by the contract including all negotiat-
ed increases. Only with Respondent's announcement of
his desire to operate "open shop" were the fringe pay-
ments affected. I i With Respondent's decision to operate
"open shop," his counsel 's advise was to cease making all
fringe payments under the contract. The announced
desire is thus inextricably comingled with Respondent's
failure to make the fringe payments for September 1978
and thereafter. The record as a whole demonstrates un-
equivocally the existence of a continuing bargaining rela-
tionship between the Respondent and the Union. I there-
fore conclude and find that Respondent, by announcing
its intention to "go open shop" and by ceasing the fringe
payments to the union funds, unilaterally withdrew rec-
ognition from the Union and repudiated its contract obli-
gations with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. I do not perceive that Respondent's "open
shop" announcement was individual bargaining with em-
ployees and thereby an additional violation of the Act.
The part played by the employees was totally subordi-
nate allowing only for blind acceptance of the terms of
the announcement, nothing more. 12
C. Alleged Constructive Discharges
The complaint alleges Charles Evans, Larry G. Buck,
Terry Cunningham, and Terry Fagala to be constructive-
ly discharged by their refusal to accept unilateral
changes in their working conditions demanded by Re-
spondent on September 20, 1979.
Respondent answers that the named employees quit,
engaged in an illegal work slowdown or work stoppage,
or took voluntary action precluding any issue of dis-
charge.
10 Albeit the record does not disclose which of Respondent's employ-
ees were responsible for the rework, apparently not all employees were
incapable A majority of employees employed in July 1978 when the
rework occurred were offered continued employment by Respondent in
September 1978 after the rework had been accomplished
11 Brockelman's protestations notwithstanding, the imminence of the
change to an "open shop" operation is tantamount to a specific an-
nouncement of an effective date and time so far as the effect on the em-
ployees is concerned They must make a decision to continue working
under changed conditions and benefits with no contract protection or
quit to seek other union employment
12 Even if individual bargaining were found, the remedy ordered
herein would not require modification
591
Brockelman's recall of his conversation of September
20, 1978, with Evans was insubstantial and punctuated
throughout with, "I didn't say I would I only said I
may." In response to specific questions, the thrusts of his
statements to Evans were defined. Evans' recall was
more specific and completely credible. Each employee
testified to his reasons for leaving on learning of Brock-
elman's plans to go "open shop." Their reasons for leav-
ing, although questioned by Respondent, were not con-
tradicted by Respondent. Respondent did argue, hesitant-
ly, that because of Respondent's lack of knowledge of
employees' individual union membership and benefits
constructive discharge could not lie. To,wit, "How can
you deny something to someone if you don't know they
have it in the first place." It is sufficient to respond that
Respondent knew that the very liabilities he was obviat-
ing were directly attributable to the employees on his
payroll pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union. The only benefits that any of Respond-
ent's employees enjoyed came from the union contract.
Any conduct of Respondent that forces an employee to
choose between contract benefits and continued union
membership or continued employment without benefits is
destructive of working conditions and thereby the em-
ployment relationship. It is this very circumstance cre-
ated by the employer that dictates the application of the
constructive discharge principle.
When confronted with the prospect of working non-
union without union benefits, each employee elected to
quit Respondent's employ and return to the union hall.
Each did so to protect his union membership and his ac-
cruing benefits growing out of his union employment.
Each knew that only under a union contract did his ben-
efits continue to accrue.
I conclude and find that the separations of Evans,
Buck, Cunningham, and Fagala were forced by Re-
spondent's unilateral demand for changes in their work-
ing conditions and its announced intention to operate
"open shop" in the future, thereby constructively dis-
charging them in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act. Johnson Electric Co., 196 NLRB 637 (1972).
ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, B.F.C. Corp. both individually
and as a member of NECA is engaged in commerce and
in operations affecting commerce withing the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. (See fn. 2 and sec.
B,1; Pearl Beer Distributing Co., 143 NLRB 596 (1963).)
2. The following multiemployer unit or employer
member unit constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act:
All apprentice electricians and journeymen elec-
tricians employed by B.F .C. Corp. or employer-
members of NECA and/or employers who author-
ize NECA to represent them in collective bargain-
ing within the jurisdiction of the Union , exclusive
of all other employees , guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
592 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS- BOARD
3. At all times since May 30, 1977, and continuing to
May 31, 1979, Local Union No. 59 has been the exclu-
sive representative fo all the employees within the above
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
4. By ' unilaterally changing, on September 20, 1978,
wages, hours, and working conditions of its employees,
in the unit described above, without notifying the Union
of its intentions to do so or affording the Union an op-
portunity to bargain on the subject, and by modifying
the agreement effective June 1, 1977, to May 31, 1979,
the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive representative of its employ-
ees in the unit described above and thereby violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
5. By unilaterally rejecting on September 20, 1978, the
collective-bargaining agreement effective June 1,_1977, to
May 31, 1979, and attempting to withdraw from the mul-
tiemployer association described herein as NECA with-
out notification to the Union and at a time when such'
withdrawal was not effective the Respondent refused to
bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive rep-
resentative of its employees in the unit described above
and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
6. By unilaterally terminating on September 20, 1978,
payments to the existing national electrical benefit fund,
the electrical training fund, the welfare fund, the annuity
fund, the industry fund and the vacation fund and other
terms and conditions of employment set forth in the bar-
gaining agreement effective June 1, 1977, to May 31,
1979, Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of its employees in the
unit described above and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act.
7. On September 20, 1978, the Respondent did con-
structively discharge employees Charles Evans, Larry G.
Buck, Terry Cunningham, and Terry Fagala and has
failed to reinstate said employees to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent positions because they refused to
accept unilaterally changed wages and working condi-
tions other than those required by the bargaining agree-
ment effective June 1, 1977, to May 31, 1979, thereby
violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
9. Respondent's termination notice of November 2,
1978, is timely to revoke the prior delegation of bargain-
ing authority to NECA and is effective with the expira-
tion of the inside agreement on May 31, 1979, thereby
relieving Respondent of any bargaining obligation to the
Union that may be incurred by NECA thereafter in
behalf of member-employers.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices it will be recommended that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Respondent will be directed to cease and desist from
engaging in the conduct found unlawful herein, or any
such conduct; to rescind and revoke its unlawful aban-
donment of the terms and conditions of employment of
the unit employees contained in the bargaining agree-
ment effective June 1, 1977, to May 31, 1979; to give ret-
roactive effect to the terms and conditions of employ-
ment as contained in that agreement from September 20,
1978, the effective date of Respondent's unlawful repudi-
ation, to May 31, 1979, the expiration date of said agree-
ment; to make whole the employees in the unit found ap-
propriate herein for any loss of wages or other benefits
they may have suffered as a result of Respondent's un-
lawful constructive discharge and refusal to bargain; to
pay all national electrical benefits funds, all electrical
training funds, all welfare funds, all annuity funds, all in-
dustry funds, and all vacation moneys as provided for
under the bargaining agreement effective June 1, 1977, to
May 31, 1979, which have not been paid and which
would have been paid but for Respondent's unlawful dis-
continuance of such payments; and to post the attached
notice.
The record evinces a steadily decreasing work force
on the several jobsites controlled by the memorandum of
agreement. The record is silent on prospective dates of
completion of those jobs. However, the four discrimina-
tees herein were the entire work force on the two re-
maining jobsites at the time of the discrimination. It
would therefore appear that the four discriminatees
would have worked until the completion of the two jobs
but for Respondent's discrimination. Since the memoran-
dum of agreement provides that all jobs started under
the memorandum will be finished under its terms without
regard for the termination date of the controlling inside
bargaining agreement, the fact that the, two jobsites
herein may not have been completed by the expiration
date of May 31, 1979, will not affect the length of the
backpay period. Further, in view of my findings that Re-
spondent is only obligated to the Union for the term of
the existing collective-bargaining agreement (inside
agreement, June 1, 1979, to May 31, 1979), I shall not
order reinstatement, but shall order that the discrimina-
tees be made whole for wages and other benefits lost
from the time of their constructive discharge until the
date of completion of the jobs on which they were
working at the time of their constructive discharges. The
backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest
as provided in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651
(1977). 13
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
13 See, generally, Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)