Betts Baking Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 29, 1968

173 N.L.R.B. 1018 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Betts Baking Company and William D. Parkhurst, An
Individual . Case 17-CA-2629
November 29,1968
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
On December 6, 1965, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board issued a Decision and Order in the
above-entitled case, finding, inter alia , that Respond-
ent had discriminated against Bob Mummey and
Robert Brown in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act.'
On June 20, 1966, Respondent filed a petition for
review of the Board's Decision with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Board's
Order was enforced by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and a - decree was
entered on May 26, 1967, against Respondent, Betts
Baking Company.2 The decree provided that Re-
spondent make whole Bob Mummey and Robert
Brown for any loss of pay suffered by reason of
Respondent's discrimination against them.
On March 8, 1968, the Regional Director for
Region 17 issued an amended backpay specification,
and on March 22, 1968, Respondent filed an answer.
Upon appropriate notice issued by the Regional
Director, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner
Boyd Leedom, for the purpose of determining the
amount of backpay due to the claimants.
On June 19, 1968, the Trial Examiner issued his
Supplemental Decision, attached hereto, in which he
found that the claimants were entitled to specific
amounts of backpay. Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions to the Supplemental Decision and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case
to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed.' The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Supplemental Decision, the exceptions,
the brief, and the entire record in this case, and
hereby adopts the recommendations of the Trial
Examiner for the reasons set forth below.
The central issue in this backpay proceeding is
whether Respondent's letters to Bob Mummey and
t 155 NLRB 1313
2 380 F.2d 199
3 Under the view we take of this case , it is unnecessary to pass on
the Trial Examiner 's admission of a former Board agent 's testimony
relating to settlement negotiations between himself and Respondent
after the original unfair labor practice hearing.
Robert Brown were valid offers of reinstatement,
tolling Respondent's backpay obligation. The Trial
Examiner, applying the rationale of Burnup and Sims,
Inc., 157 NLRB 366, enfd. 383 F.2d 987 (C.A. 5),
found that they were not valid, since neither the
Respondent nor the discriminatees understood the
letters to be sincere offers. We find it unnecessary to
reach this issue, because we agree with the General
Counsel's contention that these offers were invalid
due to the unreasonably short period of time in which
Mummey and Brown were required to reach a
decision on acceptance.
On Tuesday, July 27, 1965, identical written offers
of reinstatement arrived at the homes of the discrimi-
natees, instructing them to report for work on
Sunday, August 14 Brown saw his letter the day it
was delivered; Mummey first saw his on the evening
of Friday, July 30, when he returned home from a
week out of town. The men, who had other jobs, did
not contact the company by August 1. On August 13,
Mummey went to Respondent's office and requested
reinstatement but was turned down, the only reason
being that he had not reported for work on August 1.
Respondent conceded that there was no business
significance to the August 1 cutoff date.
The Board's powers under Section 10(c) of the Act
are remedial, aimed at undoing the effects of unfair
labor practices. It was early recognized that the
remedy of reinstatement is vital to the Act, for, as the
Supreme Court said in Phelps Dodge Corporation v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 at 193:
(T)o limit the significance of discrimination
merely to questions of monetary loss to workers
would thwart the central purpose of the Act,
directed as that is toward the achievement and
maintenance of workers' self- organization. . . .
(T)o deny the Board power to wipe out the prior
discrimination by ordering the employment of such
workers would sanction a most effective way of
defeating the right of self-organization.
Realizing its importance, the Board has been zealous
in assuring the continued efficacy of this crucial
remedy. Compliance in form only is not sufficient to
undo the wrong that has been committed.
Offers of reinstatement requiring acceptance within
4 days have been held to be invalid, as allowing the
discriminatees an unreasonably short period of time
in which to make arrangements to begin work.
Thermoid Company, 90 NLRB 614; Harrah's Club,
158 NLRB 758. We can perceive of no ground for
distinction between such offers and those in the case
at bar, for in each case the discriminatee would have
been required to leave his present job while giving less
4 The letter said
This is a letter offering you reinstatement in our Company as a
transport driver. Please report to work Sunday , August 1 , 1965. You
will have the same pay scale as you did before , while working for me.
173 NLRB No. 157
BETTS BAKING CO. 1019
than reasonable notice. See Thermoid Company,
supra. Moreover, the ambiguous nature of the offer in
the present case, which seemed to indicate that the
discriminatees would be reinstated at their old, rather
than the current, increased pay scale, and the Re-
spondent's refusal to rehire Mummey 12 days after
August 1, indicate that, at most, Respondent was
complying in form, but not in substance, with the
Board's Order. Accordingly, we conclude, as did the
Trial Examiner, that Respondent's letters of July 27
did not toll its backpay obligation.
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing Supplemental Deci-
sion and the entire record in this case, the National
Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Respond-
ent, Betts Baking Company, Hutchinson, Kansas, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall pay to
Robert Brown and Bob Mummey as net backpay the
amounts set forth in the Trial Examiner's Supple-
mental Decision, and shall also make to Robert
Brown a valid offer of reinstatement.5
CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH , concurring:
I concur in my colleagues' determination that the
Respondent's letters of July 27 did not toll its
backpay obligation and join them in the issuance of
the foregoing Order. I rest my decision, however, on
the grounds set forth in the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion.
intended to cover some backpay for two others found later not
to have been discriminatorily discharged The principal diffi-
culty however that prevented settlement in the later stages, has
to do with the question whether letters marled by Respondent
to each of the named employees in June 1965, offering them
their jobs back, were actually good-faith offers of reinstate-
ment that effectively tolled backpay.
Certain issues were eliminated at the trial. Two procedural
questions arose (1) whether the testimony of the attorney
who tried the case initially for the Government should be
rejected in this proceeding for the reason it related to
settlement negotiations, and (2) whether this attorney, no
longer with NLRB, should be permitted to testify lacking
consent of the General Counsel or Board, under the Board rule
requiring such consent before any Board agent may take the
stand. After considerable discussion of these problems, espe-
cially the admissibility of testimony relating to settlement
negotiations, the objections made by counsel for Respondent
on both grounds were overruled. Both rulings are hereby
reaffirmed.
On the basis of the entire record and the oral and written
argument of counsel, the issue-whether the letters offering
reinstatement tolled backpay in July 1965-is also resolved
against Respondent; and backpay as to the two employees
Brown and Mummey is allowed in accordance with specifica-
tions filed by counsel for the Board on the basis of the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. THE JULY 1965 "REINSTATEMENT" LETTERS
5 The Trial Examiner found that Respondent had satisfied its
obligation to reinstate Mummey by a valid offer on July 8, 1967.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BOYD LEEDOM, Trial Examiner This is a backpay pro-
ceeding, supplemental to the Board's Decision and Order in
155 NLRB 1313 (enfd 380 F 2d 199 (C A 10, 1967)) The
case was tried in Hutchinson, Kansas, April 23 and 24, 1968.
The Board previously found that the Respondent had
discriminatorily discharged its former employees Bob
Mummey on January 11 and Robert Brown on February 5,
1965, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, and ordered that Respondent offer each
reinstatement and full pay for time lost
Even before Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel handed down
his decision on September 3, 1965, there had been settlement
negotiations between Respondent Betts Baking Company and
representatives of the Board's Regional Office The parties to
the proceeding are not in agreement as to all the factors
covered by these negotiations, but they did include considera-
tion of full backpay to the two named employees on waiver of
the right of reinstatement. The record in this proceeding
probably does not disclose all the reasons why the settlement
efforts failed but a contributing factor appears to have been
the question whether the money offered by Respondent was
intended for the two named employees only or was also
In late July, Brown and Mummey each received identical
letters dated July 23, 1965, in which Respondent stated:
This is a letter offering you reinstatement in our
Company as a transport driver Please report to work
Sunday, August 1, 1965. You will have the same pay scale
as you did before, while working for me.
A second paragraph advises each recipient that if he failed to
report by the stated time Respondent would understand the
employees were not interested in reinstatement
Respondent has contended from the time these letters went
out that the offers of reinstatement were made in good faith,
that they were made to these two employees only (of four
allegedly discrirmnatorily discharged) because the evidence of
Respondent's violation appeared to be much stronger as to
Brown and Mummey; and according to the evaluation of the
case made immediately after trial by Respondent's counsel,
such offers should go forth to stop backpay in light of the
probability that the Trial Examiner would find violations as to
these two employees.
Counsel for the Board attacks the letters and the position of
Respondent respecting them on three grounds: (1) The letters
were sent after Respondent's offer to pay the employees full
backpay (if they would waive reinstatement) when Respond-
ent had good reason to believe such offers would not be
treated as genuine offers of reemployment but only as
procedural steps in connection with the settlement then
pending, and that jobs would therefore not be claimed by
either employee; (2) that the letters did not allow the
employees reasonable time in which to accept or reject the
offers; and (3) the offer of reinstatement in each case was
1020 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
inadequate in that "the same pay scale as you" received before
was a material departure from return to the job previously held
or its equivalent in that pay increases had been made in the
classification from which the employees were discharged,
before the offers were made.
Because I find and conclude that these offers did not toll
backpay for the reasons hereinafter set out, it is not necessary
to, and I do not resolve, the issues raised in grounds (2) and (3)
appearing above.
Whether counsel for the Board takes a sound position in
arguing that the notices were not effective in tolling backpay,
because they were not made in good faith, depends on the
application to the facts here of the rule enunciated by the
Board in Burnup and Sims, Inc. 157 NLRB 366, enfd. 383
F 2d 987 (C A 5, 1967) Resolution of this issue presents
some difficulty.
I find and conclude from all the evidence that when the
decision was made by Respondent, in consultation with its
attorney, to send the notices, Respondent through its attorney
had good reason to believe that there would be acceptance of
the offer previously made to pay backpay due, if the
employees would waive reinstatement. Thus, I find as a fact
from the testimony of the witness Bruckner that he, while in
settlement negotiations with Respondent's attorney, had told
the attorney (lust before the letters of "reinstatement" were
sent) that he Bruckner had recommended to the employees
they not accept the offer (previously made by Respondent to
give them their backpay in full provided they would waive their
rights to reinstatement) but that he expected them to take the
backpay and decline their jobs. There is nothing in the
evidence to refute Bruckner's testimony he advised counsel
that Respondent's offer likely would be accepted. Counsel for
Respondent, however, contends that he assumed, in view of
Bruckner's negative recommendation, the offer would not be
accepted.
When the letters were received by the two employees-by
Brown on July 27 and by Mummey not until July 30 due to
his absence from his home-each was perplexed and concluded
either on advice of counsel or his own interpretation of the
offer that Respondent's letter called for no action and really
was given pursuant to Respondent's offer, just made, to pay
them full backpay if they did not claim their jobs. Each
employee therefore took no action on the written offer
contained in the letter to give each his job back.
The eight circumstances hereinafter set forth contribute to
my decision herein; and from them I infer that the letters of
reinstatement were not written by Respondent with the
intention of (1) making jobs available to the two employees, or
(2) that they would be interpreted as real offers by the
recipients. Each circumstance is grounded on facts I find from
the whole record, and largely on facts not in dispute.
Circumstance No 1. It is of course significant that by the
time Brown and Mummey received Respondent's July 23,
1965 offers of reinstatement they had, along with the two
other alleged discriminatees in the original case, just made a
decision and transferred it by letter to Bruckner, that they
would accept Respondent's offer of full backpay and would
refuse reinstatement if offered to them. It is inescapable that
the reaction of Brown and Mummey to Respondent's July 23
letter must be considered in the light of the employees' state
of mind, including their expectation that backpay would be
forthcoming and that they had waived their right to reemploy-
ment when the offers of reinstatement reached them.
Circumstance No 2. According to the testimony of the
attorney for Respondent in the instant proceeding, who also
represented Respondent in the original case and the settlement
negotiations, he made a decision immediately after the close of
the original case that the Trial Exarmner was likely to find
Respondent in violation as to Brown and Mummey and that
the wise course respecting these two employees would be to
give notice immediately of reinstatement to stop backpay.
Then, according to his testimony, when the president of
Respondent Company asked him if he would feel surer of his
evaluation of the case after he had read the transcript, he
acquiesced in this course. He advised his client that the
transcript would be in his office when he returned from the
vacation on which he was leaving within a day or two, that he
could read it immediately, and make his final decision The
record reveals that he returned from his vacation on the 12th
or 13th of July 1965, that he read the record, and reaffirmed
his evaluation of the case. The notices of reinstatement,
however, did not go out immediately as the attorney and his
client had earlier anticipated, and were not in fact mailed until
after the telephone conversation between the attorney and
Bruckner in which Bruckner advised that he expected the
employees to accept the offers of backpay without reinstate-
ment.
Circumstance No. 3 Though the reinstatement letters were
dated and dictated on July 23, 1965, and were signed by
Respondent's president who had to stay late until they were
typed because he was leaving the next day, neither letter was
posted until the following Monday, July 26. No explanation is
given for this delay in posting. The delay is significant in that it
added to the confusion by reducing the already short time
provided in the letter for each employee to make up his mind
whether he should accept. As relied upon here this circum-
stance adds (in small measure perhaps) to the likelihood the
employee would not seek reinstatement for if the short time
provided between the date of the letters July 23, and the last
day for acceptance-August 1, should be shortened more, as it
was by delayed mailing, the employees would be less likely to
work out the problems presented, such as termination of
present employment
Circumstance No 4: When Betts, president of Respondent
Company, was asked why he sent the offers of reinstatement
to the two employees he replied it was on advice of counsel.
He amplified this by saying he had no knowledge whatever as
to the actual existence of a vacancy. Again this circumstance in
and of itself would not be fatal to the validity of Respondent's
offer, for if the employees were found to be discrimmatonly
discharged Respondent would, under the law, be bound to
offer them jobs, vacancy or no vacancy, but as the record
stands, with the president testifying he made the offer on
advice of counsel and without any knowledge of a vacancy,
these circumstances tend to support the conclusion Respond-
ent felt when it made the offers, that jobs were not significant
because there was little likelihood any would be claimed In
any good-faith offer of reinstatement it seems likely the
employer would give enough consideration to the matter to
know if there was or was not a vacancy.
Circumstance No 5 The record also reveals that on August
12, 1965, less than 2 weeks following Respondent's offer of a
job, Mummey did apply for work with Respondent, for the
reason as he stated it, he had just learned that in his present
employment he would likely have to make an undesirable
move from his home in Hutchinson. The president of
BETTS BAKING CO
Respondent Company declined to give him a job but offered
no reason except that he felt his full obligation to reemploy
Mummey was discharged in the letter making the offer ending
August 1. If Respondent had intended in good faith to
reemploy Mummey as late as August 1 it seems it might well
have employed him less that 2 weeks later, especially absent
any evidence that any job available earlier had been filled, or
that some other circumstance had intervened to induce the
negative decision on Mummey's August 12 application
Circumstance No. 6 The attorney for the Board has
claimed the July 23 letters were inadequate offers of reinstate-
ment for one reason because they did not offer reemployment
at the increased rate of pay attaching to the classification after
the unlawful discharges Whether this alone would render the
notices defective is not decided. On July 7, 1967, however,
when Respondent reoffered Mummey reinstatement it was
considerably more specific than it was in the July 23, 1965
letters It eliminated the question of intervening pay increases
by stating "Our weekly salary for transport drivers is $136
and this would be your starting salary." In addition it was
specific in offering the job "with all rights and privileges held
by you prior to January 11, 1965,. . ." [the date of his
unlawful discharge] . Some weight is given to the evidence
provided in the later notice that Respondent was able to offer
reinstatement, in terms free of uncertainty as to prevailing pay,
and could also be specific as to rights and privileges attached to
the old employment.
Circumstance No 7. It is undisputed that the attorney for
Respondent made no mention, to the attorney negotiating the
settlement for Brown and Mummey, of the July 23 letters
until weeks later This failure, whether intentional or inadvert-
ent, should be charged against Respondent rather than the
wronged employees, to the extent it contributed in anyway to
either a contrived or an unfortunate misunderstanding on their
part. Normal dealing between counsel would seem to have
included mention of these notices. This would have undoubt-
edly occasioned discussion clearing up the real purpose of the
notices.
Circumstance No. 8 On July 15, 1965, counsel for
Respondent believed the settlement of the case was imminent
on the basis of his offer to give the employees full backpay on
rejection of the right to have their jobs back. On this date he
requested additional time for filing briefs in the original case
inasmuch as "negotiations make it appear settlement immi-
nent." Nothing of real consequence occurred by July 23 to
change this view of imminent settlement involving waiver of
reinstatement. This becomes significant in the light of other
circumstances noted, thus the question arises, if Respondent
thought the employees' waiver of reinstatement was "immi-
nent" why was it necessary to offer the jobs back9
One aspect of the instant case seems clear from all the
evidence that Mummey and Brown had good reason to assume
when each received the formal offer of reinstatement con-
tained in Respondent's letter, that it was only a formality and
a part of Respondent's previous oral offer which they had just
accepted by letter addressed to Bruckner. (Circumstance No.
1) Their agreement not to seek their old jobs was therefore
very fresh in these employees' minds This circumstance gives
the following sentence of the Board's decision in Burnup and
Sims, 157 NLRB at 368, special significance:
We are not persuaded that the August 23 offer was
intended, or understood by Davis to be a sincere one.
[Emphasis supplied.]
1021
Thus, it appears that when the Board decided that the notice
given to Davis (valid on its face as an offer of reinstatement to
the job from which he had been discriminatorily discharged)
did not in fact toll backpay, it recognized not only the
question of the employer's intention in writing the letter, but
also the understanding or interpretation placed upon the offer
by the employee. That same understanding of the employee in
Burnup and Sims exists in the instant case as evidenced by the
reasonable conclusion readily reached, both by Mummey and
Brown, that Respondent's written offer of reinstatement was
only a formality as previously stated, and part of the
mechanics of the pending settlement.
It appears that Burnup and Sims according to the facts as
they appear in the Board's decision, differs from the instant
case in that there the attorney for the Respondent had
conveyed word to the Board's agent that the Respondent
might settle the backpay claim of the employee Davis but only
in the event that Davis did not desire reinstatement This fact
was communicated to Davis and Davis had agreed, with the
Board, to accept the backpay offer because "there was no
chance for reinstatement." Thereafter with knowledge of these
developments as a background, Respondent's attorney tele-
phoned Davis, and according to the attorney's version of the
conversation, stated he understood Davis did not want to
return to work and upon receiving confirmation of this fact
from Davis made the offer of reinstatement which Davis
declined. Thus it appears from these facts in the cited case that
the Respondent "knew" when it made the offer of reinstate-
ment the employee would not accept it. In the instant case
Respondent's attorney had only been advised by the Board's
attorney as hereinafter appears, that he "expected" the
employees to waive the right to reinstatement.
This noted difference in the facts between the two cases
does not seem to constitute a legal distinction. The underlying
principal in Burnup and Sims seems to be that the Board will
not permit an offending employer to gain the advantage of
tolled backpay while engaging in endless litigation and settle-
ment bargaining, through an offer of reinstatement that
subjects him in no substantial way to the disadvantage (judged
from his viewpoint) of taking back onto his payroll an
undesirable employee. This principal underlies the instant case
as fully as it did Burnup and Sims. For here Respondent took
no substantial risk of the disadvantage of taking back onto its
payroll these two employees that it had seen fit to discharge
unlawfully, when it wrote the letters offering reinstatement, it
has utilized the intervening months-even years-in fruitless
settlement talk and extensive litigation; yet it now claims the
advantage, by reason of such letters, of freedom from accruing
backpay while it sought to avoid all liability or reduce it
through settlement. The difference in the two cases is not
really a substantial one. Even though the Respondent's
attorney in Burnup and Sims felt that he "knew" the
employee would not accept his offer when he made it, he
actually could not be sure, and Davis of Burnup and Sims,
notwithstanding his belief the job was not available, might well
have on receipt of the offer, reported for work. Respondent's
risk here in being confronted with unwanted employees was
not substantially greater than in Burnup and Sims. This is
demonstrated in the reaction of Mummey and Brown in
ignoring Respondent's offer. A significant similarity in the two
cases is the strong likelihood, in both, that the employees
involved would have claimed their old jobs but for the
settlement negotiations pending This probability perhaps
1022 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
should be the criteria for application of the Bumup and Sims
rule
In a backpay proceeding the Board has met its burden when
it establishes the gross amount of pay lost from the time of
discriminatory action to a valid offer of reinstatement. Any
diminution of this gross amount must be established by the
offending employer. I cannot say from the total record of
evidence in this case that this Respondent has met this burden
of proving the reduction; and I therefore find and conclude,
under the rule of Burnup and Sims, that respondent has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence that backpay
should be tolled as to either Brown or Mummey with the
offers of reinstatement contained in Respondent's July 23
letter to each employee
The other defenses of the Respondent to the Board's
specifications of backpay, having been eliminated at the trial,
it follows that backpay is due as specified by the board.
It. THE AMOUNT OF BACKPAY DUE
As herernbefore appears the National Labor Relations
Board issued its order directing this Respondent to reinstate
Bob Mummey and Robert Brown and to make them whole for
their losses resulting from the Respondent's unfair labor
practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
enforced this order of the Board. Also as previously indicated
herein, no defense directly involving the amount of money due
the two employees named, survived the trial of the case
excepting that one dealt with herein at length, whether
Respondent's July 23 letters offering the employees their jobs
back actually tolled backpay. Inasmuch as this issue has been
resolved against the Respondent I find and conclude from all
the evidence and from the amended backpay specifications
served and filed by the Board, as the latter are revealed in the
Appendices hereto attached, that the sums hereinafter speci-
fied are due the employees Bob Mummey and Robert Brown.
1 Bob Mummey
This employee's backpay period started January 11, 1965,
the date of his unlawful discharge, and ended on July 8, 1967,
when admittedly Respondent made a valid offer to reinstate
the employee in his old or an equivalent position with full
rights and privileges as herernbefore set out, which offer the
employee declined. Backpay with respect to this employee,
Mummey, was then effectively tolled I find and conclude that
the obligation of the Respondent, Betts Baking Company, its
officers, successors and assigns and each of them, will be
discharged as to the employee Mummey by the payment to
him of the sum of $3,679.98, minus tax deductions and with
interest, as hereinafter specified. (Appendix 1.)
2. Robert Brown
This employee's backpay period started February 5, 1965,
the date of his unlawful discharge, and has not yet ended
inasmuch as the Respondent had not made a valid offer of
reinstatement to him at the time of trial. I find and conclude
that the obligation of the Respondent, Betts Baking Company,
its officers, agents, successors and assigns and each of them,
will be discharged as to the employee Brown, from the date of
discrimination to the close of the trial of the backpay issues on
April 24, 1968, by the payment of the sum of $7,633.90,
minus tax deductions and with interest, as hereinafter speci-
fied, and that in addition to this sum, payment of the amount
he would have earned, (if he had not been discharged less net
interim earnings) from April 24, 1968, to the date a valid offer
of reinstatement shall have been made by Respondent to said
employee (Appendix 2.)
3. Interest and Tax Deductions
Interest at 6 percent per annum accrues on all backpay due
the employees, commencing with the last day of each calendar
quarter and continuing until the date of payment of all
backpay due, on the amount owing for the respective quarterly
period See Isis Plumbing & Heating Co , Inc, 138 NLRB 716.
Payment of all sums due, as herernbefore provided shall also
be less any taxes required to be withheld by the Respondent
under Federal or State law.
The motion of counsel for the Board to correct the
transcript in the particulars therein noted, to which no
opposition has been filed, is hereby granted and the transcript
is corrected as in said motion specified.
BETTS BAKING CO.
APPENDIX 1
Bob Mummey
1965 Gross
Backpay
Interim
Earningsl
Net
Backpay
1st Quarter $ 1,51200 $ 490.00 $1,022.00
2nd Quarter 1,648.00 1,260.00 388.00
3rd Quarter 1,703.00 1,330.00 373.00
4th Quarter 1,703.00 1,382.50 320.50
1966
1st Quarter 1,703.00 1,400.00 303 00
2nd Quarter 1,763.00 1,425 00 338 00
3rd Quarter 1,768.00 1,45000 318.00
4th Quarter 1,768.00 1,500.00 268.00
1967
1st Quarter 1,76800 1,55000 218.00
2nd Quarter 1,768.00 1,636.52 131 48
Totals $17,104.00 $13,424 02 $3,679.98
i Interim earnings shown here are gross interim earnings minus proper expense items related thereto, amounting in all to $22.50
respecting Mummey.
APPENDIX 2
Robert L. Brown
1965 Gross
Backpay
Interim
Earningsi
Net
Backpay
1st Quarter $ 1,000.00 $ 432 98 $ 567.02
2nd Quarter 1,635.00 819.51 815.49
3rd Quarter 1,690.00 1,312.70 377.30
4th Quarter 1,690.00 785.00 905.00
1966
1st Quarter 1,690.00 1,054.78 635.22
2nd Quarter 1,749.00 960.25 788.75
3rd Quarter 1,755.00 1,396.29 358.71
4th Quarter 1,755.00 1,51006 244.94
1967
1st Quarter 1,755.00 1,096.53 658 47
2nd Quarter 1,755.00 1,112.10 642.90
3rd Quarter 1,795.00 1,290.40 504.60
4th Quarter 1,807.00 1,286.42 520.58
1968
1st Quarter 1,807.00 1,298 08 508.92
2nd Quarter 412.00 306.00 106.00
(to 4/23/68
date trial
began)
Totals $22,295.00 $14,661.05 $7,633.90
1023
i Interim earnings shown here are gross interim earnings minus proper expense items related thereto , amounting in all to $35
respecting Brown.