Best Yet Market

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 29, 2003

339 N.L.R.B. 860 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 860
A&E Food Co. 1, Inc., d/b/a Best Yet Market and
United Food and Commercial Workers, Local
1500, AFL–CIO. Case 29–CA–24995
July 29, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND ACOSTA
On January 14, 2003, Administrative Law Judge Ste-
ven Davis issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, A&E Food Co. 1, Inc., d/b/a
Best Yet Market, Astoria, New York, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order.

Tabitha Tyle, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Thomas V. Walsh, Esq. (Jackson Lewis, LLP), of White Plains,
New York, for the Respondent.
Patricia McConnell, Esq. (Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein,
P.C.), New York, New York, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon a
charge filed on June 19, 20021 by United Food and Commercial
Workers, Local 1500, AFL–CIO (Union), a complaint was
issued on August 28 against A&E Food Co. 1, Inc., d/b/a Best

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
See Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544, 544–545 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 Chairman Battista and Member Acosta agree with the judge that,
under the precedent of Wild Oats Community Markets, 336 NLRB 179,
180–182 (2001), Respondent violated the Act by imploring the property
manager, Elias Properties, to expel union representatives from Elias’
parking lot. They note, however, that the Respondent did not challenge
that precedent directly. In the absence of such a challenge, they accept
Wild Oats as controlling precedent and affirm the judge’s finding of a
violation. Such affirmance should not be construed as an endorsement
of that precedent.
1 All dates hereafter are in 2002.
Yet Market (Respondent or Best Yet), a supermarket located in
a shopping center in Queens County, New York.
The complaint alleges that on June 11, the Respondent’s
store manager, Jim Eriksen (a) directed union handbillers and
pickets to remove themselves from the shopping center parking
lot; (b) informed the owner of the shopping center about the
Union’s lawful picketing and handbilling where an object of so
informing the owner was to interfere with such activities; and
(c) caused the owner of the shopping center to issue a letter
seeking to cause the union handbillers and pickets to leave the
shopping center parking lot. The complaint further alleges that
on June 12, Eriksen threatened union handbillers and pickets
that he would call the police if they did not remove themselves
from the shopping center parking lot.
The Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of
the complaint, and on October 2, a hearing was held before me
in Brooklyn, New York. Upon the evidence presented in this
proceeding, and my observation of the demeanor of the wit-
nesses and after consideration of the briefs filed by the General
Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a domestic corporation, having an office
and place of business in Astoria, New York, has been engaged
in the operation of a supermarket. During the past 12-month
period it has derived gross annual revenues in excess of
$500,000 and has also purchased and received at its facility
goods and materials valued in excess of $5000 directly from
suppliers located outside New York State. The Respondent
admits and I find that it is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Respondent also ad-
mits and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Best Yet store involved in this matter is located in a
shopping center in Queens County, New York, which com-
prises one square block. Best Yet leases the store from Elias
Properties Astoria, LLC (Elias). The store is situated on the
north side of the shopping center, and is one of seven stores
occupying the center. The Best Yet store occupies an area
which is two-thirds that of the total area of all the stores in the
shopping center. The east side of the store is a few feet from
37th Street. That street is a roadway which has three entrances
across the sidewalk into the shopping center parking lot. Two
entrances are customer entrances having two lanes of traffic
each. One of the entrances is situated only about 10 feet from
the Best Yet building. The third entrance is a commercial en-
trance through which vendors bring goods for the Bet Yet store.
A main parking lot is situated to the south of the Best Yet store
and extends to 37th Street. The sidewalk separates the roadway
from the parking lot.
339 NLRB No. 104
BEST YET MARKET 861
B. The Picketing
The Best Yet store opened on May 23. On June 11, four Un-
ion pickets stood at each of the two customer entrances on the
sidewalk bordering 37th Street—two of the four pickets stood
on each side of each entrance with traffic passing between them
to and from 37th Street into and out of the parking lot. The
picket sign stated:
SHOPPERS
THIS EMPLOYER DOES NOT EMPLOY
MEMBERS OF UFCW LOCAL 1500
PLEASE DO NOT SHOP AT
“BEST YET”
BUY UNION
SHOP AT
STOP-N-SHOP
KEY FOOD MARKETS
PATHMARK
UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL
1500

A flyer distributed by the pickets advised that Best Yet is a
“non-union” store; its employees receive fewer benefits than
other food union workers in New York City; and Best Yet
“lowers the quality of life in your community by not providing
Union wages and benefits.” The flyer asked that calls be made
to the Best Yet store manager inquiring as to why the workers
do not receive the “best benefits.” The flyer also requested that
shoppers not shop at Best Yet and instead shop at other, union
stores.
John Mallen, the union organizer, did not stand on the side-
walk. Rather, he stood in an empty parking space at the end of a
row of spaces in the parking lot immediately adjacent to the
sidewalk abutting 37th Street. The space in which he was stand-
ing was the closest parking space to the parking lot entrance at
which the pickets stood, and was 2 to 3 feet from the sidewalk.
Mallen stood in that area during the picketing and handbill-
ing. He testified that other pickets also entered the lot in order
to give a flyer to the occupant of a vehicle. On such occasions,
the pickets gave a flyer to a vehicle which had traveled not
more than 5 to 6 feet into the lot.
Mallen denied seeing any signs in the lot prohibiting solicita-
tion or trespassing. Other witnesses testified about such signs,
which will be discussed below.
C. The Respondent’s Actions
Aviv Raitses, the Respondent’s president, testified that on
about June 11, Jim Eriksen, the store manager of Best Yet,
called and told him that pickets were present at the shopping
center, and that picketing and handbilling were being conducted
on the public sidewalk abutting 37th Street. Raitses told Erik-
sen to watch the picketing to see if it was being conducted in an
“orderly fashion” or if “there were unusual occurrences” such
as blocking of traffic by the pickets or harassment of customers.
In the first or a subsequent conversation, Raitses was told that
the pickets had entered the parking lot. Raitses then told Erik-
sen to ask the pickets to leave the property.
Mallen stood in the parking lot on June 11, and observed a
man leaving the Best Yet store carrying the Union’s flyer. The
man approached Mallen, told him that he was on private prop-
erty, and asked him to step onto the sidewalk. Mallen replied
that the parking lot was a “public space” located in a “public
shopping center” and refused to leave. The man repeated that
“it is private property” and said, “[W]e do not allow solicita-
tion.” Mallen asked him if he was the owner of the property,
and the man replied that he was not the owner but that he was
the store manager of Best Yet.2 Mallen asked if Best Yet
owned the property. The manager said it did not, but it rented
the store, and again said that Mallen was on private property,
and demanded that he get on the sidewalk. Mallen replied that
he could be removed only by the property owner. The man
answered that he would call the landlord. Mallen stood in the
parking space for the rest of the day until about 5 p.m.
After being informed by Eriksen of the picketing, Raitses
called Loraine Fruhwald, the office manager for Elias, and told
her that there were pickets in the parking lot. He asked for a
letter which would “reinforce our right in case we would need
to get the police involved to remove the picketers or in case
they would not accept our request [to remove them].” Raitses
testified that he did not ask for a letter specifically referring to
the police, but wanted a letter “reaffirming our rights as ten-
ant.” He also stated that he requested the letter in the event the
police refused to evict the pickets without authorization from
the landlord. Raitses mentioned to Fruhwald that picketing had
taken place at another store he owned in West Islip, New York,
in 1988, but that his request of the police that they be removed
was refused because only the property owner could ask that
they be evicted. Raitses obtained such a letter in the West Islip
case from the landlord’s agent, which was also Elias.
Fruhwald testified that on about June 11 she received a
phone call from a manager of the Respondent who told her that
there were pickets in the shopping center. He asked for a letter
which would prevent the pickets from trespassing in the center.
She prepared the following letter dated June 11 on the letter-
head of Elias:

To Whom It May Concern:

The owner, Elias Properties Astoria, LLC, forbids trespassing
on its property located at 1930–1950 37th Street, Astoria,
New York for the purpose of picketing and hereby gives per-
mission to the Police Department to enforce the above.

The following day, June 12, Mallen returned with the same
pickets. They stood in the same places with Mallen standing in
the same empty parking space he had stood in the day before.
At 11 a.m. the same man who had identified himself as the
Respondent’s store manager approached Mallen and told him
he must leave, and if he did not he would call the police.

2 I find that this man was Eriksen, the store manager.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 862
Mallen then stepped onto the sidewalk. The manager gave
Mallen the above letter. Raitses testified that according to Erik-
sen, the pickets were obstructing traffic and the Respondent’s
business. Eriksen did not testify.
Following June 12, Mallen did not stand in any parking
space in the parking lot, but rather stood on the sidewalk abut-
ting 37th Street. The Union continued to picket from Tuesday
through Saturday through the end of July. The police were not
called to the premises at any time during the picketing.
Fruhwald testified that Elias is not the owner of the property.
Rather it is the managing company. The lease executed by Elias
and the Respondent states that Elias is the agent for the owner.
Fruhwald stated that the parking lot is part of the common area
of the premises which includes the sidewalks and the rear of the
building. The lease also defines the “common areas” as “those
portions of the shopping center which are not, from time to
time, covered by buildings or structures, and are for the joint
use of all tenants of the shopping center, their customers and
invitees, and for the parking of motor vehicles in the areas des-
ignated as ‘parking area.’”
The common areas are not leased, but rather are shared by all
seven tenants of the shopping center. Fruhwald stated that the
Landlord is responsible for the maintenance of the common
areas—“we make sure it is clean. We repair anything that needs
to be repaired.” Each of the seven tenants is billed monthly for
a “common area maintenance” (CAM) charge pursuant to
which they share the costs of the maintenance and repair of the
common areas based upon their proportionate leasehold share
of the building space. Under this system, the Respondent pays
68.02 percent of the total CAM, which constitutes its leasehold
proportion of the entire property. Such maintenance and repair
include, according to the lease, cleaning, policing, drainage,
lighting, electric, signs and pylons, and snow, ice, and debris
removal. Tenants seeking services involving the common area
call Elias which then calls a contractor to perform the service.
For example, the Respondent called Elias to remove abandoned
cars from the parking lot.
Fruhwald stated that the shopping center does not have a pol-
icy concerning solicitation, and that she did not know what
right Best Way had to exclude individuals from its “leased
property.” She noted that the Respondent’s lease contained no
provisions restricting Best Way’s right to exclude individuals
from its leased property, nor does Elias have any rules regard-
ing the tenant’s ability to do so. She stated that if the Respon-
dent, under its lease, wanted to ask an individual to leave the
parking lot, it would not be required to call Elias first. Elias
erected two signs in the parking lot in June or July 2002. The
signs state:

Warning. Private parking lot. No overnight parking. No dou-
ble-parking. Parking for customers only while you are in this
establishment. You cannot leave the premises without your
vehicle for any reason or length of time. Violators will be
towed immediately. Rules are in effect 24 hours, 7 days. No
manager or employee can assist you.

The sign also set forth the name, address and phone number
of the towing company. Raitses stated that the signs were pre-
sent in the lot when the Respondent opened its store prior to the
picketing.
Raitses testified that he believes that Best Yet has the right,
as a tenant, to exclude individuals who are not its customers or
invitees from the common areas of the property. This belief is
based upon his “understanding from common sense” and from
his examination of the lease which contains no restrictions on
the Respondent’s right to remove such persons.
Raitses further stated that it is the Respondent’s policy that
only customers and individuals who are shopping in its store
and other stores of the shopping center and others who are in-
vited there by the stores are permitted in the parking lot. Raitses
conceded that this policy is not in writing and he had not asked
any other tenant of the shopping center if it agreed with this
policy.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
An employer’s exclusion of union representatives from pub-
lic property violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as long as the
union representatives are engaged in activity protected by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act protects the Union’s
peaceful area standards activity comprising picketing and leaf-
leting. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 206 fn. 42 (1978).
An employer’s exclusion of union representatives from pri-
vate property as to which the employer lacks a property right
entitling it to exclude individuals also violates Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 NLRB 437, 438 (1993).
The Board in Wild Oats Community Markets, 336 NLRB at
180, stated:

It is well established that an employer may properly
prohibit solicitation/distribution by nonemployee union
representatives on its property if reasonable efforts by the
union through other available channels of communication
will enable it to convey its message, and if the employer’s
prohibition does not discriminate against the union by
permitting others to solicit/distribute. See Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wil-
cox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). This precedent, however,
presupposes that the employer at issue possesses a prop-
erty interest entitling it to exclude other individuals from
that property. Therefore, in situations involving a pur-
ported conflict between the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act and private property rights, an em-
ployer charged with a denial of union access to its prop-
erty must meet a threshold burden of establishing that it
had, at the time it expelled the union representatives, a
property interest that entitled it to exclude individuals
from the property. If it fails to do so, there is no actual
conflict between private property rights and Section 7
rights, and the employer’s actions therefore will be found
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Indio Grocery
Outlet, 323 NLRB 1138, 1141–1142 (1997); Food for
Less, 318 NLRB 646, 649 (1995); Bristol Farms, Inc., 311
NLRB 437–438–439 (1993).

BEST YET MARKET 863
Accordingly, the Respondent must first establish that it had a
property interest in the parking lot which entitled it to exclude
the union representatives from the lot. In determining whether
an adequate property interest has been shown, it is appropriate
to examine the lease, other evidence and the relevant state law.
Bristol Farms, supra at 438–439; Johnson & Hardin Co., 305
NLRB 690, 695 (1991).
B. The Lease
The lease provides that the Landlord “leases to the Tenant
. . . in the building known as 1930 37th Street, Astoria, New
York 11105 (approx. 32,000 s.f.) to be used and occupied by
the Tenant as a supermarket.” The lease further provided that
“no vaults or space not within the property line of the building
are leased hereunder.”
As set forth above, the lease provides that the “common ar-
eas” refers to “those portions of the shopping center which are
not, from time to time, covered by buildings or structures, and
are for the joint use of all tenants of the shopping center, their
customers and invitees, and for the parking of motor vehicles in
the areas designated as ‘parking area.’” The Landlord maintains
and repairs the common areas and bills each of the tenants for
the costs involved in such work based upon the tenant’s propor-
tionate leasehold share of the property.
I cannot agree with Raitses that the Respondent has the right,
as a tenant, to exclude individuals who are not its customers or
invitees from the common areas of the property. His assertion is
that inasmuch as the lease does not restrict the Respondent
from removing such persons, the Respondent possesses such
right.
There is nothing in the lease which permits the Respondent
to remove individuals from the parking lot or other common
areas of the property. The lease does not give the Respondent
exclusive control over the lot or the ability to possess it to the
exclusion of the other tenants. Rather, the lease expressly pro-
vides that the Respondent had the “joint use” of the lot with the
other tenants. It is clear that the Respondent is leased only a
certain specified area of property which constitutes its store.
Pursuant to the lease, the landlord retains the right to maintain
and repair the parking lot. Giant Food Stores, 295 NLRB 330,
332 (1989); Polly Drummond Thriftway, 292 NLRB 331, 333
(1989). The Respondent possessed “parking privileges on the
property but not the right to exercise dominion over strangers
on it.” Polly Drummond, supra at 333, commenting on Barkus
Bakery, 282 NLRB 351 (1986).
In Food for Less, supra at 649–650, the shopping center ten-
ant’s lease had similar provisions as the Respondent’s: it pro-
vided that the tenant had a nonexclusive easement for parking
for its “customers, employees and invitees.” That respondent
also had a no-solicitation/no-trespassing and no-distribution
policy. Nevertheless, the Board found that the respondent only
had a nonexclusive easement for specified business purposes,
and lacked a property interest in the parking lot which entitled
it to expel the union’s handbillers. The Board held that at best it
had a nonexclusive easement interest for limited business pur-
poses, and that such an interest did not include the legal author-
ity to exclude the union agents from the shopping center prop-
erty.
The parking lot is the property of the owner, not the Respon-
dent. The rules restricting the use of the lot apply to the owner’s
rights and not the Respondent’s. Accordingly, Raitses’ testi-
mony that it is the Respondent’s policy that only shoppers and
invitees are permitted to use the parking lot is irrelevant, and
also does not take into account the rights of the other tenants.
Accordingly, the “Respondent has shown that at best it had a
nonexclusive easement interest for limited business purposes,
and it has not established that this interest carried the legal au-
thority to exclude.” Food for Less, supra at 650.
Notwithstanding Raitses’ hearsay testimony that Eriksen told
him that the pickets were obstructing traffic, that contention has
not been proven. The record does not contain any evidence that
the handbilling or picketing interfered with the Respondent’s
conduct of its business or any person‘s ingress to or egress from
the Respondent’s store.
C. New York Law
In Latrieste Restaurant & Cabaret, Inc. v. Village of Port
Chester, 212 A.D. 2d 668 (1995), leave to appeal denied 86
N.Y. 2d 837 (1995), the court held that “there is no First
Amendment right to picket or demonstrate on private property,
including private driveways and parking lots, against the wishes
of the property owner and/or tenant in possession.”
I cannot find that the Respondent was a tenant in possession
of the parking lot. In Turrisi v. Ponderosa, Inc., 179 A.D. 2d
956, 957 (1992), a case involving personal injury sustained in a
parking lot, the owner of the property agreed to maintain the
common area, including the parking lot, in good repair. The
plaintiff fell in the parking lot, a common area, and sued Pon-
derosa restaurant, a tenant in the shopping center. The court
held that “Ponderosa exercised no control over the parking lot
which is evident by its inability to exclude others from this
common area. Further, Ponderosa did not have a right of pos-
session to the parking lot, but only a right to use it.” See
Bridgham v. Fairview Plaza, 257 A.D. 2d 914 (1999).
Accordingly, I cannot find that the Respondent was a tenant
in possession of the parking lot. It did not possess the lot, oc-
cupy it, or have the exclusive right to possess it. The Respon-
dent merely had, according to the lease, the “joint use” of the
lot which it shared with the other tenants. Therefore, under
New York law, the Respondent did not have the right to ex-
clude persons from picketing or demonstrating in the parking
lot.
The cases cited by the Respondent are inapposite. Steltzer v.
Spesaison, 161 Misc. 2d 507 (1994), and Zwerin v. Geiss, 38
Misc. 2d 306 (1963), both involved tenants residing in residen-
tial apartment dwellings in New York City. It was held in those
cases that the tenants have exclusive possession and occupation
of their dwellings and their landlords had no authority to enter
their apartments without cause. In addition, Cary v. Fisher, 149
A.D. 2D 890 (1989), In re Cole, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 275 (1947), and
Brinn v. Slawson & Hobbs, 273 A.D. 1 (1947), involved issues
of possession of property by co-owners who owned the prop-
erty as tenants in common. Here, the Respondent does not own
the parking lot. The cases cited by the Respondent are far dif-
ferent from the instant facts where a tenant of a store seeks to
exclude persons from a shopping center parking lot. The Re-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 864
spondent does not have exclusive possession of any part of the
lot sufficient to exclude anyone from it, and it does not own the
lot.
D. Conclusions
Under the above principles, I cannot find that the Respon-
dent has established that it has any exclusory property interest
in the parking lot. The lease gives the Respondent a nonexclu-
sive right to use that common area jointly with the other ten-
ants. Neither the lease nor New York law gave the Respondent
the authority to attempt to remove anyone from the parking lot
or to take the actions that it did on June 11 and 12. “The lease
gave the Respondent parking privileges on the property but not
the right to exercise dominion over strangers on it.” Polly
Drummond, supra at 333.
Based upon the above, I find that the Respondent interfered
with the Section 7 rights of employees by its actions. I specifi-
cally find that store manager Eriksen’s demand on June 11 that
Mallen leave the parking lot property, and Eriksen’s further
demand on June 12 that he leave and if he did not Eriksen
would call the police, violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Food
for Less, supra at 647, 650; See Wild Oats Community Markets,
336 NLRB 179, 181– 182 (2001).
I accordingly find and conclude that, as alleged in the com-
plaint, the Respondent unlawfully directed union handbillers
and pickets to remove themselves from the shopping center
parking lot, and threatened union handbillers and pickets that it
would call the police if they did not remove themselves from
the shopping center parking lot.
I also find, as alleged in the complaint, that the Respondent
unlawfully informed the owner of the shopping center about the
Union’s lawful picketing and handbilling where an object of so
informing the owner was to interfere with such activities, and
caused the owner of the shopping center to issue a letter seek-
ing to cause the union handbillers and pickets to leave the
shopping center parking lot. These findings are consistent with
Wild Oats, above, in which the Board found that a shopping
center tenant unlawfully “initiat[ed] a chain of events” which
culminated in the removal of union agents from the center’s
parking lot. In that case, as here, the respondent tenant con-
tacted the shopping center manager to report the presence of
pickets. Thereafter, the manager, accompanied by the tenant’s
attorney, asked the pickets to leave the parking lot and the
manager asked the police to remove them. The Board found
that the respondent unlawfully engaged in an “indirect attempt
to expel the union representatives.” Here, as in Wild Oats, by
informing Elias of the picketing and requesting a letter which
would enable the police to remove the pickets, the Respondent
indirectly attempted, through Elias, to unlawfully remove the
pickets. As the Board noted in Wild Oats, the Respondent could
not accomplish indirectly that which it was prohibited from
doing directly.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By directing union handbillers and pickets to remove
themselves from the shopping center parking lot, the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By informing the owner of the shopping center about the
union’s lawful picketing and handbilling where an object of so
informing the owner was to interfere with such activities, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By causing the owner of the shopping center to issue a let-
ter seeking to cause the union handbillers and pickets to leave
the shopping center parking lot, the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By threatening union handbillers and pickets that it would
call the police if they did not remove themselves from the
shopping center parking lot, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended3
ORDER
The Respondent, A&E Food Co. 1, Inc., d/b/a Best Yet Mar-
ket, Astoria, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Directing union handbillers and pickets to remove them-
selves from the shopping center parking lot.
(b) Informing the owner of the shopping center about the
Union’s lawful picketing and handbilling where an object of so
informing the owner was to interfere with such activities.
(c) Causing the owner of the shopping center to issue a letter
seeking to cause the union handbillers and pickets to leave the
shopping center parking lot.
(d) Threatening union handbillers and pickets that it would
call the police if they did not remove themselves from the
shopping center parking lot.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.

3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
BEST YET MARKET 865
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Astoria, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since June 11, 2002.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this
notice.

WE WILL NOT direct union handbillers and pickets to remove
themselves from the shopping center parking lot.
WE WILL NOT inform the owner of the shopping center about
the Union’s lawful picketing and handbilling where an object of
so informing the owner was to interfere with such activities.
WE WILL NOT cause the owner of the shopping center to issue
a letter seeking to cause the union handbillers and pickets to
leave the shopping center parking lot.
WE WILL NOT threaten union handbillers and pickets that we
would call the police if they did not remove themselves from
the shopping center parking lot.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.

A&E FOOD CO. 1, INC., D/B/A BEST YET MARKET