Bancroft Manufacturing Co., Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMay 29, 1974210 N.L.R.B. 1007 (N.L.R.B. 1974) Copy Citation BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1007 Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc; Croft Alumi- num Company, Inc.; Croft Ladders, Inc.; Croft Metal Products , Inc.; Lemco Metal Products, Inc. and Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Case 15-CA-4368 May 29, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On June 7, 1973 , Administrative Law Judge Eugene E . Dixon issued the attached Decision in this proceeding . Thereafter , Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief . In addition , Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the revoca- tion of its subpoena duces tecum . i The General Counsel filed a motion to consolidate the instant proceeding with Case 15-CA-4267, involving the same parties now pending before the Board, and Respondent filed a response in opposition to such motion to consolidate.2 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three -member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. Unlike our dissenting colleague, we find in agree- ment with the Administrative Law Judge that the racial statements , discussed below , constituted nei- ther an appeal to racial prejudice , nor an attempt to inflame racial hatred . In our opinion , the statements in question were nothing more than the expression of a commonly held viewpoint that blacks, as a class, are particularly vulnerable in the important areas of economic security and job rights and that union representation would serve to protect and promote their best interests . In prior determinations , we have recognized that comments of this nature do not fall into the category of conduct which would warrant setting aside an election. In Sewell Manufacturing Company, 3 the Board determined that statements which deliberately sought to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals have no place in an election campaign. In Sewell, the antiunion cam- paign was based on appeals to prejudice by excessive publicizing of an AFL-CIO donation of money to the Congress of Racial Equality to be used to support freedom-ride projects in Alabama and Mississippi. This publicizing also included the circulation of photographs of a white AFL-CIO official dancing with a black woman. Such material clearly was not germane to the election but sought to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant and inflam- matory appeals. At the same time, the Board in Sewell went on to make clear that it was not suggesting that any mention of race or racial issues should be eliminated from the election campaign process. Thus, although the distinction between the permissible and the impermissible is not easily drawn in the abstract, this Board has explained that the rule laid down in Sewell was directed at campaign arguments inflammatory in character which served as nothing more than appeals to animosity, setting race against race and not to noninflammatory appeals designed to encourage solidarity among racial minorities in order to promote their separate social and economic interests.4 Thus, the Board has refused to set aside elections where the campaign consisted of racial propaganda designed to encour- age racial pride and concerted action,5 and has found that appeals to black solidarity through unionism in facing barriers to equality with whites is a lawful method of concerted action which all employees may, under the protection of the Act, use to better their lot in this society.6 Turning to the specific conduct in question here, the record shows Union Organizer Hicks told certain employees that "if blacks did not stay together as a group and the Union lost the election all the blacks would be fired." A rumor to the same effect circulated in the plant. In response to questions about possible future layoffs, Hicks told employees that "Bancroft could layoff anybody he wanted and could hire anybody he wanted. They didn't have any protection on the job." Hicks further told employees "that seemingly the trend was . . . that the blacks were going to be laid off if they didn't stick together and try to get the plant organized to where they would have some protection, it could last forever." The record also shows that there had been three layoffs during or shortly before the campaign in i Respondent's motion for reconsideration regarding the revocation of its subpoena duces tecum B-97792 is hereby denied, as it raises nothing not previously considered by the Board in its Order dated May 15, 1973 2 The motion by the General Counsel to consolidate the instant case with Case I5-CA-4267 is hereby denied inasmuch these two proceedings were tried separately and their consolidation at this time would serve no practical purpose 3 138 NLRB 66 } The Baltimore Luggage Company, 162 NLRB 1230 5 The Archer Laundry Company, 150 NLRB 1427, and Aristocrat Linen Supply Co, Inc, 150 NLRB 1448 6 Baltimore Luggage Company, supra at 1234 See also Hobco Mfg Co., an Operating Division of Genesco, 164 NLRB 862. 210 NLRB No. 90 1008 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD which the employees laid off were mostly black employees. It cannot be gainsaid that the impact of layoffs is a matter of utmost concern to the economic well-being of employees. It is equally clear that the Union's viewpoint on the impact of future layoffs on black employees is a matter relevant to the campaign, particularly in view of the record evidence that there had been three layoffs during or shortly before the campaign in which the employees laid off were mostly black employees. At no time was there any suggestion that black employees were entitled to any greater rights or benefits than other employees; or could these comments be properly viewed as request- ing a vote against the white employees. In this context, it is reasonable to conclude that the statements and discussions about the impact of future layoffs were not "appeals to racial prejudice on matters unrelated to election issues.' 17 On the contrary, we consider the Union's viewpoint on the impact of future layoffs on black employees to be germane to the larger issue of the advantages and disadvantages of the Union as a means of promoting economic security and job rights. Finally, we believe the rule in Sewell is applicable only in those circumstances where it is determined that the "appeals or arguments can have no purpose except to inflame the racial feelings of voters in the election." s For the reasons described above, we consider the Union's viewpoint on the impact of future layoffs on black employees to be germane to the larger issue of the advantages and disadvantages of the Union as a means of promoting equality for black employees in economic security and job rights. Furthermore, we do not consider this viewpoint to have been unreasonably or intemperately presented to the voters, especially in view of the record evidence that there had been three layoffs during or shortly before the campaign in which the employees laid off were mostly black employees. In these circumstances, we are at a loss to understand what evidence could be presented to our dissenting colleague which would establish the truthfulness of the prediction of a future event by a party who has no control over the event. We do not believe Sewell imposes a burden on the Union to do so. The three layoffs in the immediate past mace it appear likely that the next layoff would likewise affect mostly blacks, and the union statement was therefore reasonably based in fact. At most, the Union's viewpoint amounted to no more than an accusation against the Respondent in the nature of campaign propaganda which the employees were capable of evaluating in choosing their representative.9 In addition to the foregoing, one further incident requires discussion. The record shows that a rumor circulated in the plant that a procompany black employee, Butler, would have a car given to him to help swing the black vote. A statement to that effect was also made by a Reverend Buie , another black, in a speech given at a union meeting . Union Organizer Hicks asked several employees to check this rumor for him. We are not persuaded that this incident provides a basis for setting aside the election, particularly since the rumor was not totally unfound- ed and Butler was apparently dealing with the Respondent for an automobile during the election campaign. Furthermore, it does not seem uncommon or unusual for employees who are supporting a union to impugn the motives of fellow employees who are opposing their efforts. There is no reason for treating such conduct differently because the incident in- volved employees of a racial minority. Accordingly, for the aforestated reasons, we adopt the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that this objection be overruled. Subsequent to the issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and the filing of exceptions and briefs thereto, Respondent filed a motion to reopen the record and hearing for the purpose of presenting additional testimony on the matter of the waiver of initiation fees. In support of its motion, Respondent contends that the Administrative Law Judge improperly excluded testimony by certain witnesses on the matter of initiation fees at the hearing and that in view of the recent Supreme Court decision in Savair Manufacturing Company, 10 other and additional witnesses -hould be allowed to testify on this matter. The record shows, as the Administrative Law Judge found, that a rumor circulated in Respon- dent's plants that those who voted for the Union would have initiation fees waived while those who did not vote for the Union would have to pay initiation fees or penalties of up to $150 or $200. None of the witnesses who described this rumor identified any agent of the Union as the individual who originated or specifically related this rumor to them. The credited testimony further shows that Union Representative Hicks told employees that there would be no initiation fees, and that there would be no incentive to charge an initiation fee or fine people because in a right-to-work State the Union had to represent the people whether they belonged to the Union or not. Hicks further testified 7 Sewell Manufacturing Company, supra at 71 8 Ibrd 9 Kresge-Newark, Inc, 112 NLRB 869. See also Hobco Mfg. Co, supra at 871 10 414 U.S. 270 (1973). BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1009 that nobody had ever paid an initiation fee in his local during his 17 years in that local. Moreover, Respondent indicated in campaign speeches and through extensive campaign material that no em- ployee would ever have to join the Union to work in its plants, even if the Union won the election. After carefully reviewing the record evidence related to the waiver of initiation fees, including the offer of proof made by the Respondent at the hearing, we are satisfied that the Administrative Law Judge did not commit prejudicial error when he ruled that further evidence on the waiver of initiation fees would be cumulative and rejected Respondent's offer of proof. Furthermore, inasmuch as Respondent offers no indication as to the substantive content of any newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence it would offer, there are no matters which require the reopening of the record. Accordingly, Respondent's motion is denied. Moreover, we are satisfied that the recent decision by the Supreme Court in Savair Manufacturing Company, supra, does not require a reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that the objection be overruled on the merits. Savair is directed at the coercive effects of requiring employ- ees to designate the union as their representative prior to the election or otherwise lose the economic benefit of reduced or waived initiation fees or dues. It is the potential impact and effect of requiring such affirmative action by employees before the election that the Supreme Court found interfered with employees' free choice in the election. Unlike Savair, there is no evidence in the instant case that the Union conditioned the waiver of initiation fees on affirmative action by employees prior to the Board election. Accordingly, we adopt the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that this objection be overruled. i i ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Bancroft Manufac- turing Company, Inc.; Croft Aluminum Company Inc.; Croft Ladders, Inc.; Croft Metal Products, Inc.; and Lemco Metal Products, Inc., McComb, Missis- sippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order. CHAIRMAN MILLER, dissenting: I dissent from the findings of my colleagues because I am of the view that the Administrative Law Judge, whose Decision is being affirmed by my colleagues, has departed from official Board preced- ent in failing to follow the decision of this Board in Sewell Manufacturing Company, 138 NLRB 66. In that case, the Board considered carefully the position it would take with respect to racial appeals in election campaigns. Since the case issued over a decade ago, it may be appropriate to set forth an extensive quotation from the Board's rationale in that case appearing at pages 71 and 72: We take it as datum that prejudice based on color is a powerful emotional force. We think it also indisputable that a deliberate appeal to such prejudice is not intended or calculated to encour- age the reasoning faculty. What we have said indicates our belief that appeals to racial prejudice on matters unrelated to the election issues or to the union's activities are not mere "prattle" or puffing. They have no place in Board electoral campaigns. They inject an element which is destructive of the very purpose of an election. They create conditions which make impossible a sober, informed exercise of the franchise. The Board does not intend to tolerate as "electoral propaganda" appeals or arguments which can have no purpose except to inflame the racial feelings of voters in the election. This is not to say that a relevant campaign statement is to be condemned because it may have racial overtones. In Sharnay, supra, the employer in a letter to employees made a temperate, factually correct statement of the petitioning union's position on integration. In Allen-Morrison Sign Co., Inc., 138 NLRB 73, decided this day, the employer also informed the employees about the petitioning union's position on segregation as well as on union monetary contributions toward eliminating segregation. In the view of Chairman McCulloch, and Members Leedom and Fanning again the statement was temperate in tone, germane, and correct factually. We would be less than realistic if we did not recognize that such statements, even when moder- ate and truthful, do in fact cater to racial prejudice. Yet we believe that they must be tolerated because they are true and because they pertain to a subject concerning which employees are entitled to have knowledge-the union's position on racial matters. As Professor Sovern has pointed out: no one would suggest that Negro it Although dissenting on other aspects, Chairman Miller would join his the record and hearing on the matter of the waiver of initiation fees. colleagues in denying the Respondent's exceptions and motion to reopen 1010 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees were not entitled to know that the union which seeks to represent them practices racial discrimination. So long, therefore, as a party limits itself to truthfully setting forth another party's position on matters of racial interest and does not deliberate- ly seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals, we shall not set aside an election on this ground. However, the burden will be on the party making use of a racial message to establish that it was truthful and germane , and where there is doubt as to whether the total conduct of such party is within the described bounds, the doubt will be resolved against him. As indicated in the last paragraph of the above quotation, the Board set forth a standard in that case which required that any party setting forth another party's position on matters of racial interest would have to do so truthfully and could not deliberately seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals-and, if this stand- ard was violated, the Board would set aside the election. It will also be noted that the burden was placed on the party making use of any racial message to establish that it was truthful and germane. In the instant case, as set forth in the Administra- tive Law Judge's Decision, Union Organizer Hicks told employees that "if the blacks did not stay together as a group and the Union lost the election all the blacks would be fired." Furthermore, the record shows that there had been three layoffs during or shortly before the campaign in which the employees laid off were, principally, black employ- ees. In a union meeting arranged by the Union shortly after one of these layoffs, the union organizer told the employees "that seemingly the trend was ... that the blacks were going to be laid off if they didn't stick together and try to get the plant organized to where they would have some protection, it could continue forever." Other employees testified to the same general effect-i.e., that the union organizer specifically told them that "if they did not vote the union in the Company would lay off all the blacks and keep all the whites." In addition, at a union meeting, one Reverend Buie stated: It had been called to his attention that an employee was to be given a car to swing the black vote. He understood he was a soul brother and the part that hurt him so bad was that it would be a sold out soul brother. It is abundantly clear that the Union injected the racial issue into the campaign. It is equally clear that the Union did not carry the burden laid down in the Sewell case of establishing either that the message with respect to predicted discharges of black employ- ees or the allegation that a black employee was being given an automobile in order to swing the black vote was truthful or supported by any factual evidence whatever. Under these circumstances, unless we are to abandon the rule of the Sewell case, I do not understand how we can fail to set this election aside. The Kresge-Newark, Inc. case relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge is reported in Volume 112 and substantially preceded the issuance of the Sewell case in 1962, which was reported in Volume 138. I understand Sewell, not Kresge, to be the controlling law. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE EUGENE E. DIXON, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding which originated under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended (61 Stat. 136) herein called the Act , was heard at McComb , Mississippi, March 20, 21, and 22, 1973, pursuant to due notice to Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., Croft Aluminum Company, Inc., Croft Ladders, Inc., Croft Metal Products, Inc., Lemco Metal Products , Inc., herein called the Respondent. On April 27, 1971, an RC petition (15-RC-4641) was filed with the National Labor Relations Board (herein called the Board ) by Southern Council of Industrial Workers , United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Jointers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. On July 1, 1971, an election was held which the Union won. Thereafter, timely objections were filed by Respondent Company which without a hearing were rejected by the Board's Regional Director who issued a supplemental decision certifying the Union as bargaining agent of employees in an appropriate unit. Review was denied by the Board as was a motion to reconsider the denial. Then a bargaining demand was made by the Union and refused by the Company. Charges were filed February 9, 1972, and a complaint (15-CA-4368) issued March 10, 1972, by the Regional Director on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board (herein called the General Counsel) alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act . In its answer dated March 20, 1972, Respondent admitted the jurisdictional facts of the complaint , the labor organization , the unit and the fact of the election but denied in substance that the election had permitted the employees a free and uncoerced choice and in this connection reiterated its several objections to the conduct of the election as affirmative defense. There followed a motion by the General Counsel for transfer of the case to the Board and for summary judgment. An order to show cause why summary judgment should not be granted was not answered and on June 2, 1972, the Board issued a decision and bargaining order. On June 19, 1972, Respondent filed a petition for review of the BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1011 Board's order in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. A cross application for enforcement by the Board was filed with the court on July 27, 1972. Thereafter, on September 19, 1972, the case was remanded by the Court to the Board for reconsideration on the basis of a joint motion to stay proceedings by the Board and Respondent. On November 13, 1972, the General Counsel moved the Board to vacate its decision and order of June 2 and issue an order providing for "a full evidenciary hearing pertaining to the question of interference with the election ...." On January 5, 1973, the Board vacated its decision and order and remanded the case to the Regional Director "for further appropriate action." On January 29, 1973, the Regional Director under the title and case number in the caption herein, issued a notice of hearing pertaining to the question of interference with the election "raised by Respondent' s answer ." On March 8, 1973, Respondent moved that the Board clarify its notice of hearing and to consider the hearing to be in the nature of an RC hearing rather than as a complaint hearing. The motion was denied on March 16, 1973. As indicated the hearing then took place at McComb, Mississippi, from March 20 to 22. Several procedural issues were raised by Respondent at the hearing. My adverse rulings were presented to the Board by interlocutory appeal. On May 15, 1973, the Board affirmed my rulings in these matters. Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS Respondent Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., at all times material has been a Mississippi corporation with its principal place of business located at McComb, Mississippi, where it is engaged in producing aluminum windows, screens , and accessories. Respondent Croft Aluminum Company, Inc., at all times material has been a Mississippi corporation with its principal place of business located in McComb, Mississippi, where it is engaged in producing aluminum extrusions and ingots. Respondent Croft Ladders, Inc., at all times material has been a Mississippi corporation with its principal office located in McComb, Mississippi, and place of business in Osyka, Mississippi , where it is engaged in producing aluminum ladders . Respondent Croft Metal Products, Inc., at all times material has been a New York corporation with an office and place of business located in McComb, Mississip- pi, where it is engaged in producing aluminum windows and doors. Respondent Lemco Metal Products, Inc., at all times material has been a New York corporation with an office located in McComb, Mississippi, and place of business in Osyka, Mississippi, where it is engaged in producing combination screen and storm windows and combination doors and screen doors. i The appropriate unit is comprised of all production and maintenance employees employed at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka, Mississippi , facilities , including plant clerical employees, interplant drivers, and leadmen and leadwomen; excluding over-the-road truckdrivers, office clerical employees, professional and technical employees, watchmen, and Respondent Companies at all times material have been affiliated businesses with common officers, ownership, directors, offices, and operators and constitute a single intergrated business enterprise with said directors and operators formulating and administering a common labor policy for Respondent Companies affecting the employees of Respondent Companies. During a representative 12-month period Respondent Companies individually and collectively purchased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped directly to Respondent Companies individually and collectively in Mississippi from points located outside Mississippi. During the same period of time, Respondent Companies individually and collectively sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Mississip- pi. On the basis on the foregoing I find that Respondent at all times material herein has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION Southern council of Industrial Workers, United Brother- hood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES On July 1, 1971 a majority of Respondent's employees in a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act i designated the Union as their representative for the purpose of collective bargaining with Respondent in a secret ballot election 2 conducted under supervision of the Regional Director. The Union was certified as the collective-bar- gaining representative of the employees in said unit on October 20, 1971. On January 31, 1972, the Union demanded bargaining of Respondent. On February 4, 1972, Respondent through its attorneys notified the Union of its "intention ... to defer negotiations for the specific purpose of testing the validity of the election through judicial channels." At no time since has Respondent bargained with the Union. Countering this prima facie case Respondent put in evidence which it claims shows that the Union in the preelection campaign "acted improperly and in such an objectionable way" as to deny "the employees ... a free and uncoerced right of franchise." And further to the same end that the Board agents acted improperly in the conduct of the election. With respect to the Union's conduct Respondent claims that the Union made an "appeal to racial passion and the inflamation of racial feelings"; 3 that it made "gross misrepresentations, which interfered with the election and destroyed the laboratory conditions guards and supervisors as defined in the Act 2 The Union won by a vote of 361 to 286 with 32 challenged ballots 3 At all times material , both before and after the election, the workforce in Respondent's plants was approximately 43 percent black 1012 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD concerning it"; that employees "were physically threatened by the Union" and threatened with loss of jobs; and that the Union offered financial inducements to get employees "to join, support and vote for the Union... . A. Conduct of Board Agents James E. Lewis, called by the General Counsel, testified that at exactly 5 p.m. the Board agent announced that the polls were closed and that no one else would be allowed to vote. Two people who were in the voting area were allowed to cast their ballots. About four or five people were coming up to the polling place at the time the curtains were closed and were not allowed to vote. In addition to the foregoing alleged improper conduct Respondent contends that the evidence shows "favoritism toward the Union . . . by Board agents, implying an endorsement by the government of their support for the Union and in abuse of the employees' rights relative to challenged ballots, etc.". In this connection Lillie McMil- lan Conerly, whose name was on the eligibility list had her vote challenged as being an excluded clerical. According to her testimony she told the Board agent that her name was on the eligibility list and "couldn't see why my vote was being challenged, and he got real disturbed with me." The Board agent had her stand aside and came back to her later and told her that if she voted it would a challenged ballot. She walked out at this point refusing to vote a challenged ballot but returned later and voted a challenged ballot telling the Board agent she "would do it his way." According to the testimony of James Moak, an observer for the Company, the Board agent became "rather rude" with Mrs. Conerly Moreover, his rudeness was directed toward Moak, too, telling Moak he would decide who was going to vote and not vote. Another matter relied on by Respondent involved the group of employees who attempted to vote although their names were not on the eligibility list. Company observer, J.C. Butler, testified that the Board agent "wanted to know how long they had been hired, and they told him the date they were hired, and he told them they could not vote. And some of them left, and came back, and told him they wanted to vote as challenged votes, and he told them they could vote a challenged vote but it wouldn't do any good. He didn't see any sense in their voting a challenged vote when they weren't eligible to vote in the election." According to Butler, it "seemed" to him that at the time the Board agent "became outraged" and his voice was "loud enough" so that some of the people said "that if they had to go through all that they wouldn't even vote" and left without voting.4 Butler estimated that "15 or 20 or more left. In his affidavit (which Butler testified was all true) Butler had said that of this group not on the eligibility list six or seven originally left and returned a few minutes later. Of these returnees about three or four voted challenged ballots and the others left again without voting. Butler's affidavit also indicated that "the Board agent was real nice to everyone, everyone who appeared in the voting area to vote. And if for any reason a ballot was challenged the Board agent explained the entire challenge procedure to them. .." Mabel Magee, a witness called by Respondent and apparently one of the above group whose names were not on the eligibility list, testified that when she went to vote she was informed that she was not on the list. She left and when she returned she was told she could vote a challenged vote but that she was not eligible because she had not been working long enough. She said, "I think I should vote." According to Magee the Board agent, notwithstanding that "he wasn't talking too loud," "got real kind of angry" but not enough, apparently, to stop her from voting which she did. I see nothing in the foregoing conduct that could be said to have impinged on the employee's free and uncoerced choice in the election. The closing of the polls in the face of four or five employees certainly had no effect on the other employees whatsoever. And the loss of their ballots ( even if added to the few who may have not voted in connection with the matter of those whose names were not on the list above) certainly would not affect the outcome of the election. As for the alleged rudeness toward Conerly, it seems clear that both Conerly and the company observer were insisting on her right to vote an unchallenged ballot in the face of a challenge. In this light it is understandable that the Board agent could become somewhat provoked and make an entirely justifiable comment that he was the judge of who would vote and who would not vote. The same observation applies to the Magee incident to some extent with the added observation that apparently Magee magnified the Board agent's displeasure into "kind of angry." B. Financial Inducements There is no question that there were many rumors circulating in Respondent's plants, among them one that those that voted for the Union would have initiation fees waived while those that did not vote for the Union would have to pay initiation fees or penalties of up to $150 or $200. There is no question that initiation fees were waived by the Union. Union representative Hicks testified credibly that he told the employees "There is going to be no initiation fees. That after the Union was organized, in 90 days would be no initiation fees. Thereafter , dispensation was available from (then) on."5 Hicks went on to testify that he had been in the Union 17 years and that nobody in his local had ever paid an initiation fee during that time. According to Hicks' further credited testimony, when questioned about initiation fees, fines , and assessments that the Union would charge if voted into the plant Hicks told the employees there would be no incentive to charge an initiation fee or fine people because in a right to work state the Umon had to represent the people whether they belonged to the Union or not. Logic would dictate that a union would be more prejudiced than an employer by the insertion of such propaganda in a campaign. In any event there is no evidence that any agent of the Union represented to any 4 Another of Respondent's witnesses who was also a company observer, 5 This dispensation apparently referred to a provision in the Union's Howard Alexander, described the Board agent only as being "a little upset constitution that provided for a $15 initiation fee unless dispensed with by at that time " the international president BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1013 employees that they would have to pay an increased initiation fee if they did not join the Union prior to the election . Moreover, the Respondent put out extensive campaign material concerning the Union's policy regard- ing dues and initiation fees and further such rumors were effectively rebutted by Respondent's campaign speeches and material clearly indicating that no employee would ever have to join the Union to work in its plants even if the Union won the election. D.W. McCullough, an employee, testified that a strang- er came up to him in a grocery store in McComb and engaged him in a conversation about the Union asking if he would be interested in making some money out of the thing. McCullough did not think so. The stranger said if he "could get about 10 to come to the meeting and 5 to loin ... it might be worth say $1,000 . . . or more" to McCullough. McCullough said he was not interested and left it at that. The next day, according to McCullough, he told his supervisor Madison Brumfield about the offer. He further testified that he told no one else about the matter. There is no showing that the Union had anything to do with the offer to McCullough. As for the waiver of initiation fees the Board has stated: There is no valid basis for concluding that an employee who votes for the union in a secret ballot election must be doing so in any substantial measure because of the previously extended or promised waiver of initiation fees. DIT-MCO, Inc., 163 NLRB 1019, 1022 (1967). C. Threats Respondent contends that threats, economic and physi- cal, "totally destroyed" the laboratory conditions of the election. D. Physical Threats William E. Smith, a black employee in the unit, testified on direct that he went to a union meeting where union representative Sylvester Hicks, also black, told him that if he did not vote for the Union and it came in, his house would be blown up and his car would be burned and all blacks would be out of a job. Hicks also told him according to Smith, that in a strike those who try to cross the picket line "would be took out." On cross-examination Smith testified at first that he was told that if the Union did not come in his house would be bombed and his car destroyed. Then he corrected this warning as being coupled with his failure to vote for the Union. In his affidavit Smith stated that he was told by Hicks (whom he constantly referred to as Rowe) that if the Union was voted in and went on strike employees who crossed the picket line could have their houses bombed and their cars burned. He further stated that the union representative asked him to vote for the Union and did not say anything would happen to him if he voted against the Union. Smith's statement further indicat- ed that Hicks at no time had ever threatened him in any way. Smith further testified that he talked to no other employee than one Joe Howell about the Union and there is no indication that he related to Howell what he claims was told him by Hicks. Hicks admitted talking to Smith about the Union but denied telling or implying to any employee that if he did not vote for the Union his house and car would be destroyed. Smith also testified that fellow employee Howell told him that if J. C. Butler, a black employee who was campaigning for the Company, did not vote for the Union he would get a whipping. Smith did not reply to this but "just laughed at him." J. C. Butler testified on direct that he received several anonymous phone calls threatening to "get" him, "blow [him ] up" or otherwise "hurt" him if he did not stop campaigning for the Company. Butler also testified that his cousin, Eddie J. Williams, a minister , said at a union meeting that if Butler was against the Union he "should be caught and beat up." Another employee, Enoch Williams, testified about a visit at his home by Union Representatives Hicks and Peavy6 as follows: Q. What if anything was said to you about violence? A. Violence? What are you speaking about, vio- lence? Q. Threats or anything else? A. Well now, I had threats and I lost a gang of friends by going with the Company, but I just took that for my part, because I'm working for myself, and they wasn't working for me. Q. The question was, what if anything was said by Mr. Hicks and Mr. Peavy to you about threats? A. Well now, Mr. Hicks and Mr. Peavy they didn't give no threats. Q. Was anything mentioned about a picket line? A. Yeah, they said all them that went for the Company, and the Company strike, and when they strike somebody be walking the picket lines, and such fellows that went for the Company daresn't come up there, they said we would get it, they didn't say what, but I had an idea what it would be. Eva Mae Jackson testified about hearing "a rumor" a "few times" that "the Union was going to bomb peoples houses, and all kinds of stuff like that." Knox Cothern testified how a fellow employee, J.C. Barrow, told how he had belonged to a union in a steel mill where the people would go out on strike and "blow porches off and blow houses off, and stuff like that " Levi Deer testified about a conversation with Peavy in which Peavy threatened, "I'll whip you ass" because Peary thought Deer had caused his discharge by Respondent. During the same argument that lasted about 30 minutes Peavy also tried to get Deer to sign a union card. Johnnie M. Smith testified how a woman came up to her in the plant and told her that if she did not join the Union when they walked the picket line they would whip her. Assuming that the foregoing evidence offered by Respondent is all true, I do not see how it can be said that it is of enough significance or pervasiveness in a unit of about 700 people to have had any effect on their free and uncoerced choice in the election. But I have serious doubts a Peavy, also black, was a local man hired by Hicks at a weekly salary to chauffeur him and otherwise aid him in his campaign efforts As such I find that Peavy was an agent of the Union 1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD about the truth of it all. Willie Smith's testimony and his sworn statement revealed such uncertainties and discre- pancies that make it suspect of its face. Considering the fact that this is the only physical threat attributed to Hicks in the entire campaign I am inclined to credit his denial of threatening anyone as described by Smith. As for Peavy's threatening to beat up Levi Deer, there is no showing that the threat was connected with anything but Peavy's assumption that Peavy had caused Deer's discharge. E. Economic and Other Threats Lillie McMillan Conerly testified that Union Organizer Betty Neusbaum visited her at her home where for about 2 hours they engaged in a pleasant conversation about unions. Mrs. Conerly made it clear that she was not interested in the Union. When leaving Neusbaum told Conerly that if the Union won the election and "were dissatisfied with [Conerly's] work, and found out that [she] had voted against the Union [she] could be fired." On cross-examination Conerly denied ever talking to her boss Donald Rayburn about the Union. Then she admitted she "might have" mentioned to him her conversation with Neusbaum and finally was definite that she did so the next day. After equivocating as to what Rayburn told her she admitted in effect that he put her mind at rest about what Neusbaum had told her. Enoch Williams also testified that in the conversation with Union Organizers Hicks and Peavy at his home they told him that if the Union came in such fellows as he would "have nojob." Edward Andrews testified about hearing rumors in the plant "that if everybody didn't vote for the Union, and if the Union got in, they would be laid off." Levi Deer also testified that Hicks on another occasion told him that he was "trying to help the colored people" and that if they didn't get the Union" they are going to lay off the blacks and keep all the white." Later Deer asked his white foreman if such a thing was true and was assured that it was not true. In his testimony Hicks denied making such threats. I deem it unnecessary to determine whether he did or did not make them since the Board has held that statements of this kind do not warrant setting aside an election reasoning that even if called "threats" they were not statements that the employees could not evaluate as campaign propaganda nor were they within the Union's power to carry out. Rio de Oro Uranium Mines, Inc., 120 NLRB 91, 94 (1958). Johnny R. Morgan and James McCue, both leadmen, attempted to attend a union meeting at the Magnolia courthouse and were turned away because, they were told, they were supervisors. At the time they were also told that if they did attend the meeting charges would be filed against them "immediately." They left. There is some question as to whether this was before or after the election. Before or after it is of no significance as a threat or otherwise in this matter. F. Racism J. C. Butler testified that union organizer Hicks told him that if the blacks did not stay together as a group and the Union lost the election all the blacks would be fired. Willie Smith testified substantially the same. In addition several people testified that such a rumor was circulating in the plant. Hicks did not specifically deny telling Smith this but did deny telling it to Butler. According to Hicks he "commented to him that [he] felt like the black people should stick together. That it had been called to [his] attention that the blacks didn't stick together and if they didn't they wouldn't have any showing at Croft Metal." Hicks testified that there had been three layoffs during or shortly before the campaign involving mostly blacks. As a result of these layoffs employees came to talk to him about them telling him that "they felt if the Union lost . . . there wouldn't be any blacks left because of what would happen" His comment to the employees was that "Bancroft could layoff anybody he wanted and could hire anybody he wanted. They didn't have any protection on the fob" On the occasion of one of these layoffs, according to Hicks, a meeting was arranged for the employees. At this meeting he told them "that seemingly the trend was ... that the blacks were going to be laid off if they didn't stick together and try to get the plant organized to where they would have some protection, it could continue forever." Another black, Enoch Williams, also testified that Hicks and Peavy came to him at his home where, among other things, they told him that if he did not join the Union and it came in "there wouldn't be anybody working there but the Joiners, and the colored working there but the Joiners, that I wouldn't have no job." This was not directly denied by Hicks. Levi Deer also testified that Hicks had asked him about a layoff-whether it was on account of a card or something like that. Deer said he didn't know. Hicks said, "You know I am trying to help the colored people . . . if you don't get the Union, they are going to layoff all the blacks and keep all the whites." This was denied by Hicks. According to Deer's further testimony, Peavy also told him the Company was going to get rid of all the blacks if the Union did not come in. Peavy did not testify. In addition to the foregoing Respondent points to matters pertaining to the black procompany employee, J. C. Butler, as further indication of the Union's attempt to stir racial passions in the campaign. Thus there was a rumor going around the plant that Butler (who apparently was dealing with the Company for an automobile) would have the car given to him if the Company won the election; if the Company lost he would have to pay for it.7 In a speech at a union meeting by a Rev. Buie , another black, Buie was reported as having said that: It had been called to his attention that an employee was to be given a car to swing the black vote. He understood he was a soul brother and the part that hurt him so bad was that it would be a sold-out soul brother. The further evidence shows that Butler was referred to as r Respondent claims that Hicks, by asking several employees to check racially inflamatory statement to the employees " out this rumor for him, was in effect "making a misrepresentative and BANCROFT MFG. CO. an Uncle Tom by union officials or agents, both to his face and to other employees. Whether Hicks was as discrimina- tory in his remark about the employment status of blacks viz a viz the union campaign as he testified is immaterial since the Board has held that a union's statement that if an employer wins the election, all blacks will be laid off so they must vote for the Union to save their jobs is not a reason for setting aside an election . Kresge-Newark, Inc., 112 NLRB 869. As for the other aspects of Respondent's contention that racial passions were inflamed, I don't view an appeal to blacks to vote as a unit for the Union as an "appeal to racial passion and the inflammation of racial feelings" any more than an appeal to any group red, white, yellow, black or mixed to vote for the Union-a legitimate and legal protected right. Respondent further contends "that the Union's organiz- ers attempted to inject ethnic as well as racial diversion among the employees" by somehow getting a rumor started in the plant that President Bancroft "was sending money to Israel to a Jewish relief fund" that should have been going to the employees as wages. There is not much in the evidence to show any ethnic flavor to the rumor. Willie Smith at first testified that he had heard that Bancroft was sending money to Japan. Asked if he was sure it was Japan, Smith thought it might be Italy or Japan. When he was asked if the contribution was "to any certain fund" Smith indicated that no fund was identified. Johnny Roy Morgan testified that "it seems like [he] did hear something about them sending a little bit of money to some country, and it should have been given to these people." In any event, there is no convincing evidence showing that the Union instigated this rumor. G. Misrepresentations Respondent claims that "the Union originated, emanat- ed and perpetuated a . . . statement . . . that money Mr. Bancroft gave to a local hospital impliedly was coming from the employees' pay and should not have been done." Besides the fact that such a contribution had been made and was publicized in the local newspaper, there is no evidence that the statement was originated by the Union. Even if it had been it seems to me that it was a perfectly legitimate campaign statement. Certainly if Respondent's owner could make outside charitable contributions the employees could rightfully feel that instead of such largess the money should have gone to the employees in better wages . After all, "chanty begins at home." Respondent also cites as a misrepresentation by the Union the above discussed rumor of the contribution by Bancroft to an Israel relief fund. Two observations here: One, there is no evidence that the Union started or perpetuated this rumor. Two, there is no denial by Respondent that such a contribution was in fact made.8 Enoch Williams testified that he was told by Hicks and Peavy that if the employees went for the Union they would get a raise every 3 months and that if they did not go for the Union they would get no raises at all. This is the kind 8 About this matter Busby testified as follows. Q. Now, I ask you, to your knowledge, as Vice President of the Company, do you have any knowledge of the Company sending money to Israel? 1015 of material that the Board has repeatedly found to be within the ability of employees to evaluate purely as campaign propaganda and not detrimental to their free and uncoerced voice in an election. Another rumor that was going around the plant was that Respondent was having union labels put on its products after leaving the plants . Again there is no showing that the Union was responsible for this rumor . Respondent would attribute responsibility for the rumor to the Union on the basis that the Union made no denial of its truth after informing a union meeting that the matter would be checked out for its authenticity. Whether the Union can be charged with responsibility for the rumor on this basis or not, I see no significant interference with the employees free choice on the basis of it. A few days before the election the Union had the following announcement broadcast over the local radio: Attention Croft workers . . . attention Croft workers you are being mislead about union security from Bancroft . . . the Iowa Supreme Court recently told workers such as yourself that if they wanted true job security, they had better join a union rather than rely on the so-called right to work law. Use your protected right by the federal government . . . vote yes for the UBC and you will see that better things are possible for you through organized labor . . . why is Bancroft spending thousands of dollars to keep you from obtaining a chance at a better future? Vote for your future . . . vote yes for the UBC . . . this message paid for by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters. Elmo H. Busby was the only official of the Company to testify. He "was responsible for the Company's coordina- tion of the campaign." He testified that he heard the broadcast and that the words "Iowa Supreme Court" sounded to him like "our Supreme Court." He reported the matter to the company attorney who made a check of the Mississippi Court reports but was unable to find such a decision. Although subpoenaed for a copy of the decision the Union had not been able to produce it by the close of the hearing. I indicated that I would close the hearing subject to receipt in evidence of a copy of the decision later. A copy of that decision, Ludwig V. Armour and Company, 158 N.W.2d, 646, was submitted after the hearing closed and is hereby received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 12. Also received in evidence at this time as Respondent's Exhibit 11 is Respondent's letter of April 11, 1973 to me together with a copy of the same Iowa case attached. In that case (decided in 1968) Armour had a "master agreement" with the United Packing House Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, covering among others packing plants it was operating in West Point and Omaha, Nebraska . The master agreement contained a union shop provision valid by its terms only where permitted by state law. It also provided that in the event that Armour closed the plant and replaced it with another, "employees with seniority rights in the closed plant shall be offered A. Not of the Company sending money to Israel , no, sir. Q. Do yop have any knowledge of Mr Bancroft sending money to Israel, of your personal knowledge? A Not of my personal knowledge. 1016 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employment at the replacement plant in order of seniority ... The replacement plant shall be covered by the terms of the master agreement." In late 1967 and early 1968 Armour closed the plants in West Point and Omaha. Thereafter Armour acquired an existing plant in the Sioux City, Iowa (determined under the master agreement to be a replacement plant), whose employees were not covered by a collective-bargaining agreement . Iowa has a right-to-work law. When Armour employees from the closed plants decided to exercise their seniority under the master agreement and displaced the unrepresented employees of the former owner of the Sioux City plant, the displaced employees brought suit on the grounds that the result produced by the master agreement was per se illegal and in violation of the Iowa right to work law. The case was decided against them, the court holding that "this is job security by reason of length of service not union security by compulsory membership." The court also stated that the right to work law "prohibits management and unions from entering into agreements which would force an individual to join a union against his will in order to keep his job. It does not guarantee employees of a nonunion plant the same job security which might be obtained through legitimate collective bargaining." The court also stated that "it is difficult to see how a provision which requires an opportunity to be given employees whether union or not to transfer under certain conditions, requires membership as a condition of employment." Respondent contends that "there is nothing in this case, whatsoever, that can be interpreted according to [the Union's ] radio spot announcement which announcement is a patent and a blatant misrepresentation of the case." According to Respondent "the case in it.; ultimate analysis, asserts a holding, in fact, which is directly contrary to the import of the radio announcement" I disagree. In my opinion Respondent misreads the case. I would not call this a misrepresentation by the Union. Nor would I call the Union characterization of the case as "recent" a misrepre- sentation as claimed by Respondent. Another claimed "patent and blatant attempt by the petitioning Union to imply to the employees before the election in question, that the United States Government was endorsing the Carpenters Union" is alleged by Respondent by the following pamphlet (printed under a picture of Uncle Sam) distributed to the employees by the Union: My name is Uncle Sam. I don't work for Croft Metals, but I do represent each and every one of their employees, for it is my job to protect their rights as American citizens. A long time ago I found out that the individual worker was helpless in dealing with its employer. This is why I passed the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT. The law which gives the working people the right to organize a UNION. This one law has helped more working people in more ways than any other dozen laws ever passed. But, if the people who work for Croft Metals don't want to use this right, which I have given them, then that is their right also . . . IT IS ALSO THEIR LOSS! COLOR ME-RED, WHITE AND BLUE! As with the Iowa Supreme Court case I believe that Respondent misreads the Union's message in this pam- phlet. Similarly , I believe Respondent has misinterpreted the Union's use of sample ballots as being contrary to Board policy. The foregoing evidence , in my opinion , is not sufficient to establish that in an election of this size the employees were denied a free and uncoerced choice . Accordingly, I find that the Union was properly certified as a collective- bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate unit and that by refusing to bargain with the Union , Respon- dent has violated and is violating Section 8 (a)(l) and (5) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations de- scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit , and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., Croft Alu- minum Company, Inc., Croft Ladders, Inc., Croft Metal Products, Inc., and Lemco Metal Products, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees em- ployed at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka, Mississippi , facilities, including plant clerical employees, interplant-drivers and leadmen and leadwomen; excluding over-the-road truckdrivers, office clerical employees, pro- fessional and technical employees, watchmen, and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act , constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. Since October 20, 1971, the above-named labor organization has been and now is a certified and exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1017 unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on or about February 4, 1972, and at all times thereafter , to bargain collectively with the above- named labor organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of Respondent in the appropriate unit , Respondent has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced, and is interfering with , restraining , and coercing , employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDERS Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., Croft Alumi- num Company, Inc., Croft Ladders, Inc., Croft Metal Products, Inc., Lemco Metal Products, Inc., its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit All production and maintenance employees employed at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka, Mississippi , facilities, including plant clerical employ- ees, interplant-drivers, and leadmen and leadwomen; excluding over-the-road truckdrivers, office clerical employees, professional and technical employees, watchmen, and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act- (a) Upon request bargain with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representative of all employ- ees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its McComb and Osyka, Mississippi, facilities copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being duly signed 'ny Respondent's representative , shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt of thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places , includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 10 In the event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively concern- ing rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above- named Union, at the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understand- ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees employed at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka, Mississippi, facilities, including plant clerical employees, inter-plant drivers, and lead- men and leadwomen; excluding over-the-road truckdrivers, office clerical employees, profes- sional and technical employees, watchmen, and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. BANCROFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC CROFT ALUMINUM COMPANY, INC., CROFT LADDERS, INC., CROFT METAL PRODUCTS, INC., AND LEMCO METAL PRODUCTS, INC (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) 1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD This is an official notice and must not be defaced by Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with anyone. its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1001 This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days Howard Ave, Plaza Tower, Suite 2700, New Orleans, from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, Louisiana 70113, Telephone 504-527-6361. or covered by any other material. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation