Bancroft Manufacturing Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 29, 1974

210 N.L.R.B. 1007 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1007
Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc; Croft Alumi-
num Company, Inc.; Croft Ladders, Inc.; Croft
Metal Products , Inc.; Lemco Metal Products, Inc.
and Southern Council of Industrial Workers,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, AFL-CIO. Case 15-CA-4368
May 29, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On June 7, 1973 , Administrative Law Judge
Eugene E . Dixon issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding . Thereafter , Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief . In addition , Respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration regarding the revoca-
tion of its subpoena duces tecum . i The General
Counsel filed a motion to consolidate the instant
proceeding with Case 15-CA-4267, involving the
same parties now pending before the Board, and
Respondent filed a response in opposition to such
motion to consolidate.2
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three -member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
Unlike our dissenting colleague, we find in agree-
ment with the Administrative Law Judge that the
racial statements , discussed below , constituted nei-
ther an appeal to racial prejudice , nor an attempt to
inflame racial hatred . In our opinion , the statements
in question were nothing more than the expression of
a commonly held viewpoint that blacks, as a class,
are particularly vulnerable in the important areas of
economic security and job rights and that union
representation would serve to protect and promote
their best interests . In prior determinations , we have
recognized that comments of this nature do not fall
into the category of conduct which would warrant
setting aside an election.
In Sewell Manufacturing Company, 3 the Board
determined that statements which deliberately sought
to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by
irrelevant, inflammatory appeals have no place in an
election campaign. In Sewell, the antiunion cam-
paign was based on appeals to prejudice by excessive
publicizing of an AFL-CIO donation of money to
the Congress of Racial Equality to be used to support
freedom-ride projects in Alabama and Mississippi.
This publicizing also included the circulation of
photographs of a white AFL-CIO official dancing
with a black woman. Such material clearly was not
germane to the election but sought to overstress and
exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant and inflam-
matory appeals. At the same time, the Board in
Sewell went on to make clear that it was not
suggesting that any mention of race or racial issues
should be eliminated from the election campaign
process. Thus, although the distinction between the
permissible and the impermissible is not easily drawn
in the abstract, this Board has explained that the rule
laid down in Sewell was directed at campaign
arguments inflammatory in character which served
as nothing more than appeals to animosity, setting
race against race and not to noninflammatory
appeals designed to encourage solidarity among
racial minorities in order to promote their separate
social and economic interests.4 Thus, the Board has
refused to set aside elections where the campaign
consisted of racial propaganda designed to encour-
age racial pride and concerted action,5 and has
found that appeals to black solidarity through
unionism in facing barriers to equality with whites is
a lawful method of concerted action which all
employees may, under the protection of the Act, use
to better their lot in this society.6
Turning to the specific conduct in question here,
the record shows Union Organizer Hicks told certain
employees that "if blacks did not stay together as a
group and the Union lost the election all the blacks
would be fired." A rumor to the same effect
circulated in the plant. In response to questions
about possible future layoffs, Hicks told employees
that "Bancroft could layoff anybody he wanted and
could hire anybody he wanted. They didn't have any
protection on the job." Hicks further told employees
"that seemingly the trend was . . . that the blacks
were going to be laid off if they didn't stick together
and try to get the plant organized to where they
would have some protection, it could last forever."
The record also shows that there had been three
layoffs during or shortly before the campaign in
i Respondent's motion for reconsideration regarding the revocation of
its subpoena duces tecum B-97792 is hereby denied, as it raises nothing not
previously considered by the Board in its Order dated May 15, 1973
2 The motion by the General Counsel to consolidate the instant case with
Case I5-CA-4267 is hereby denied inasmuch these two proceedings were
tried separately and their consolidation at this time would serve no practical
purpose
3 138 NLRB 66
} The Baltimore Luggage Company, 162 NLRB 1230
5 The Archer Laundry Company, 150 NLRB 1427, and Aristocrat Linen
Supply Co, Inc, 150 NLRB 1448
6 Baltimore Luggage Company, supra at 1234 See also Hobco Mfg Co., an
Operating Division of Genesco, 164 NLRB 862.
210 NLRB No. 90
1008 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which the employees laid off were mostly black
employees.
It cannot be gainsaid that the impact of layoffs is a
matter of utmost concern to the economic well-being
of employees. It is equally clear that the Union's
viewpoint on the impact of future layoffs on black
employees is a matter relevant to the campaign,
particularly in view of the record evidence that there
had been three layoffs during or shortly before the
campaign in which the employees laid off were
mostly black employees. At no time was there any
suggestion that black employees were entitled to any
greater rights or benefits than other employees; or
could these comments be properly viewed as request-
ing a vote against the white employees. In this
context, it is reasonable to conclude that the
statements and discussions about the impact of
future layoffs were not "appeals to racial prejudice
on matters unrelated to election issues.' 17 On the
contrary, we consider the Union's viewpoint on the
impact of future layoffs on black employees to be
germane to the larger issue of the advantages and
disadvantages of the Union as a means of promoting
economic security and job rights.
Finally, we believe the rule in Sewell is applicable
only in those circumstances where it is determined
that the "appeals or arguments can have no purpose
except to inflame the racial feelings of voters in the
election." s For the reasons described above, we
consider the Union's viewpoint on the impact of
future layoffs on black employees to be germane to
the larger issue of the advantages and disadvantages
of the Union as a means of promoting equality for
black employees in economic security and job rights.
Furthermore, we do not consider this viewpoint to
have been unreasonably or intemperately presented
to the voters, especially in view of the record
evidence that there had been three layoffs during or
shortly before the campaign in which the employees
laid off were mostly black employees. In these
circumstances, we are at a loss to understand what
evidence could be presented to our dissenting
colleague which would establish the truthfulness of
the prediction of a future event by a party who has
no control over the event. We do not believe Sewell
imposes a burden on the Union to do so. The three
layoffs in the immediate past mace it appear likely
that the next layoff would likewise affect mostly
blacks, and the union statement was therefore
reasonably based in fact. At most, the Union's
viewpoint amounted to no more than an accusation
against the Respondent in the nature of campaign
propaganda which the employees were capable of
evaluating in choosing their representative.9
In addition to the foregoing, one further incident
requires discussion. The record shows that a rumor
circulated in the plant that a procompany black
employee, Butler, would have a car given to him to
help swing the black vote. A statement to that effect
was also made by a Reverend Buie , another black, in
a speech given at a union meeting . Union Organizer
Hicks asked several employees to check this rumor
for him. We are not persuaded that this incident
provides a basis for setting aside the election,
particularly since the rumor was not totally unfound-
ed and Butler was apparently dealing with the
Respondent for an automobile during the election
campaign. Furthermore, it does not seem uncommon
or unusual for employees who are supporting a union
to impugn the motives of fellow employees who are
opposing their efforts. There is no reason for treating
such conduct differently because the incident in-
volved employees of a racial minority.
Accordingly, for the aforestated reasons, we adopt
the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation
that this objection be overruled.
Subsequent to the issuance of the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision and the filing of exceptions
and briefs thereto, Respondent filed a motion to
reopen the record and hearing for the purpose of
presenting additional testimony on the matter of the
waiver of initiation fees. In support of its motion,
Respondent contends that the Administrative Law
Judge improperly excluded testimony by certain
witnesses on the matter of initiation fees at the
hearing and that in view of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Savair Manufacturing Company, 10 other
and additional witnesses -hould be allowed to testify
on this matter.
The record shows, as the Administrative Law
Judge found, that a rumor circulated in Respon-
dent's plants that those who voted for the Union
would have initiation fees waived while those who
did not vote for the Union would have to pay
initiation fees or penalties of up to $150 or $200.
None of the witnesses who described this rumor
identified any agent of the Union as the individual
who originated or specifically related this rumor to
them. The credited testimony further shows that
Union Representative Hicks told employees that
there would be no initiation fees, and that there
would be no incentive to charge an initiation fee or
fine people because in a right-to-work State the
Union had to represent the people whether they
belonged to the Union or not. Hicks further testified
7 Sewell Manufacturing Company, supra at 71
8 Ibrd
9 Kresge-Newark, Inc, 112 NLRB 869. See also Hobco Mfg. Co, supra at
871
10 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1009
that nobody had ever paid an initiation fee in his
local during his 17 years in that local. Moreover,
Respondent indicated in campaign speeches and
through extensive campaign material that no em-
ployee would ever have to join the Union to work in
its plants, even if the Union won the election.
After carefully reviewing the record evidence
related to the waiver of initiation fees, including the
offer of proof made by the Respondent at the
hearing, we are satisfied that the Administrative Law
Judge did not commit prejudicial error when he ruled
that further evidence on the waiver of initiation fees
would be cumulative and rejected Respondent's offer
of proof. Furthermore, inasmuch as Respondent
offers no indication as to the substantive content of
any newly discovered or previously unavailable
evidence it would offer, there are no matters which
require the reopening of the record. Accordingly,
Respondent's motion is denied.
Moreover, we are satisfied that the recent decision
by the Supreme Court in Savair Manufacturing
Company, supra, does not require a reversal of the
Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that
the objection be overruled on the merits. Savair is
directed at the coercive effects of requiring employ-
ees to designate the union as their representative
prior to the election or otherwise lose the economic
benefit of reduced or waived initiation fees or dues.
It is the potential impact and effect of requiring such
affirmative action by employees before the election
that the Supreme Court found interfered with
employees' free choice in the election. Unlike Savair,
there is no evidence in the instant case that the
Union conditioned the waiver of initiation fees on
affirmative action by employees prior to the Board
election. Accordingly, we adopt the Administrative
Law Judge's recommendation that this objection be
overruled. i i
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Bancroft Manufac-
turing Company, Inc.; Croft Aluminum Company
Inc.; Croft Ladders, Inc.; Croft Metal Products, Inc.;
and Lemco Metal Products, Inc., McComb, Missis-
sippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Administrative
Law Judge's recommended Order.
CHAIRMAN MILLER, dissenting:
I dissent from the findings of my colleagues
because I am of the view that the Administrative
Law Judge, whose Decision is being affirmed by my
colleagues, has departed from official Board preced-
ent in failing to follow the decision of this Board in
Sewell Manufacturing Company, 138 NLRB 66. In
that case, the Board considered carefully the position
it would take with respect to racial appeals in
election campaigns. Since the case issued over a
decade ago, it may be appropriate to set forth an
extensive quotation from the Board's rationale in
that case appearing at pages 71 and 72:
We take it as datum that prejudice based on
color is a powerful emotional force. We think it
also indisputable that a deliberate appeal to such
prejudice is not intended or calculated to encour-
age the reasoning faculty.
What we have said indicates our belief that
appeals to racial prejudice on matters unrelated
to the election issues or to the union's activities
are not mere "prattle" or puffing. They have no
place in Board electoral campaigns. They inject
an element which is destructive of the very
purpose of an election. They create conditions
which make impossible a sober, informed exercise
of the franchise. The Board does not intend to
tolerate as "electoral propaganda" appeals or
arguments which can have no purpose except to
inflame the racial feelings of voters in the
election.
This is not to say that a relevant campaign
statement is to be condemned because it may
have racial overtones. In Sharnay, supra, the
employer in a letter to employees made a
temperate, factually correct statement of the
petitioning union's position on integration. In
Allen-Morrison Sign Co., Inc., 138 NLRB 73,
decided this day, the employer also informed the
employees about the petitioning union's position
on segregation as well as on union monetary
contributions toward eliminating segregation. In
the view of Chairman McCulloch, and Members
Leedom and Fanning again the statement was
temperate in tone, germane, and correct factually.
We would be less than realistic if we did not
recognize that such statements, even when moder-
ate and truthful, do in fact cater to racial
prejudice. Yet we believe that they must be
tolerated because they are true and because they
pertain to a subject concerning which employees
are entitled to have knowledge-the union's
position on racial matters. As Professor Sovern
has pointed out: no one would suggest that Negro
it Although dissenting on other aspects, Chairman Miller would join his the record and hearing on the matter of the waiver of initiation fees.
colleagues in denying the Respondent's exceptions and motion to reopen
1010 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees were not entitled to know that the
union which seeks to represent them practices
racial discrimination.
So long, therefore, as a party limits itself to
truthfully setting forth another party's position on
matters of racial interest and does not deliberate-
ly seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings
by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals, we shall not
set aside an election on this ground. However, the
burden will be on the party making use of a racial
message to establish that it was truthful and
germane , and where there is doubt as to whether
the total conduct of such party is within the
described bounds, the doubt will be resolved
against him.
As indicated in the last paragraph of the above
quotation, the Board set forth a standard in that case
which required that any party setting forth another
party's position on matters of racial interest would
have to do so truthfully and could not deliberately
seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by
irrelevant, inflammatory appeals-and, if this stand-
ard was violated, the Board would set aside the
election. It will also be noted that the burden was
placed on the party making use of any racial message
to establish that it was truthful and germane.
In the instant case, as set forth in the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Decision, Union Organizer Hicks
told employees that "if the blacks did not stay
together as a group and the Union lost the election
all the blacks would be fired." Furthermore, the
record shows that there had been three layoffs during
or shortly before the campaign in which the
employees laid off were, principally, black employ-
ees. In a union meeting arranged by the Union
shortly after one of these layoffs, the union organizer
told the employees "that seemingly the trend was
... that the blacks were going to be laid off if they
didn't stick together and try to get the plant
organized to where they would have some protection,
it could continue forever."
Other employees testified to the same general
effect-i.e., that the union organizer specifically told
them that "if they did not vote the union in the
Company would lay off all the blacks and keep all
the whites."
In addition, at a union meeting, one Reverend Buie
stated:
It had been called to his attention that an
employee was to be given a car to swing the black
vote. He understood he was a soul brother and
the part that hurt him so bad was that it would be
a sold out soul brother.
It is abundantly clear that the Union injected the
racial issue into the campaign. It is equally clear that
the Union did not carry the burden laid down in the
Sewell case of establishing either that the message
with respect to predicted discharges of black employ-
ees or the allegation that a black employee was being
given an automobile in order to swing the black vote
was truthful or supported by any factual evidence
whatever.
Under these circumstances, unless we are to
abandon the rule of the Sewell case, I do not
understand how we can fail to set this election aside.
The Kresge-Newark, Inc. case relied upon by the
Administrative Law Judge is reported in Volume 112
and substantially preceded the issuance of the Sewell
case in 1962, which was reported in Volume 138. I
understand Sewell, not Kresge, to be the controlling
law.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EUGENE E. DIXON, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding which originated under Section 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act as amended (61 Stat. 136)
herein called the Act , was heard at McComb , Mississippi,
March 20, 21, and 22, 1973, pursuant to due notice to
Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., Croft Aluminum
Company, Inc., Croft Ladders, Inc., Croft Metal Products,
Inc., Lemco Metal Products , Inc., herein called the
Respondent.
On April 27, 1971, an RC petition (15-RC-4641) was
filed with the National Labor Relations Board (herein
called the Board ) by Southern Council of Industrial
Workers , United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Jointers of
America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. On July 1,
1971, an election was held which the Union won.
Thereafter, timely objections were filed by Respondent
Company which without a hearing were rejected by the
Board's Regional Director who issued a supplemental
decision certifying the Union as bargaining agent of
employees in an appropriate unit. Review was denied by
the Board as was a motion to reconsider the denial. Then a
bargaining demand was made by the Union and refused by
the Company.
Charges were filed February 9, 1972, and a complaint
(15-CA-4368) issued March 10, 1972, by the Regional
Director on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board
(herein called the General Counsel) alleging a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act . In its answer dated March 20,
1972, Respondent admitted the jurisdictional facts of the
complaint , the labor organization , the unit and the fact of
the election but denied in substance that the election had
permitted the employees a free and uncoerced choice and
in this connection reiterated its several objections to the
conduct of the election as affirmative defense.
There followed a motion by the General Counsel for
transfer of the case to the Board and for summary
judgment. An order to show cause why summary judgment
should not be granted was not answered and on June 2,
1972, the Board issued a decision and bargaining order. On
June 19, 1972, Respondent filed a petition for review of the
BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1011
Board's order in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. A
cross application for enforcement by the Board was filed
with the court on July 27, 1972. Thereafter, on September
19, 1972, the case was remanded by the Court to the Board
for reconsideration on the basis of a joint motion to stay
proceedings by the Board and Respondent.
On November 13, 1972, the General Counsel moved the
Board to vacate its decision and order of June 2 and issue
an order providing for "a full evidenciary hearing
pertaining to the question of interference with the
election ...." On January 5, 1973, the Board vacated its
decision and order and remanded the case to the Regional
Director "for further appropriate action." On January 29,
1973, the Regional Director under the title and case
number in the caption herein, issued a notice of hearing
pertaining to the question of interference with the election
"raised by Respondent' s answer ." On March 8, 1973,
Respondent moved that the Board clarify its notice of
hearing and to consider the hearing to be in the nature of
an RC hearing rather than as a complaint hearing. The
motion was denied on March 16, 1973.
As indicated the hearing then took place at McComb,
Mississippi, from March 20 to 22. Several procedural issues
were raised by Respondent at the hearing. My adverse
rulings were presented to the Board by interlocutory
appeal. On May 15, 1973, the Board affirmed my rulings in
these matters.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
Respondent Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., at
all times material has been a Mississippi corporation with
its principal place of business located at McComb,
Mississippi, where it is engaged in producing aluminum
windows, screens , and accessories. Respondent Croft
Aluminum Company, Inc., at all times material has been a
Mississippi corporation with its principal place of business
located in McComb, Mississippi, where it is engaged in
producing aluminum extrusions and ingots. Respondent
Croft Ladders, Inc., at all times material has been a
Mississippi corporation with its principal office located in
McComb, Mississippi, and place of business in Osyka,
Mississippi , where it is engaged in producing aluminum
ladders . Respondent Croft Metal Products, Inc., at all
times material has been a New York corporation with an
office and place of business located in McComb, Mississip-
pi, where it is engaged in producing aluminum windows
and doors. Respondent Lemco Metal Products, Inc., at all
times material has been a New York corporation with an
office located in McComb, Mississippi, and place of
business in Osyka, Mississippi, where it is engaged in
producing combination screen and storm windows and
combination doors and screen doors.
i The appropriate unit is comprised of all production and maintenance
employees employed at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka,
Mississippi , facilities , including plant clerical employees, interplant drivers,
and leadmen and leadwomen; excluding over-the-road truckdrivers, office
clerical employees, professional and technical employees, watchmen, and
Respondent Companies at all times material have been
affiliated businesses with common officers, ownership,
directors, offices, and operators and constitute a single
intergrated business enterprise with said directors and
operators formulating and administering a common labor
policy for Respondent Companies affecting the employees
of Respondent Companies.
During a representative 12-month period Respondent
Companies individually and collectively purchased and
received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
which were shipped directly to Respondent Companies
individually and collectively in Mississippi from points
located outside Mississippi. During the same period of
time, Respondent Companies individually and collectively
sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000
directly to customers located outside the State of Mississip-
pi. On the basis on the foregoing I find that Respondent at
all times material herein has been an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction herein.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
Southern council of Industrial Workers, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
On July 1, 1971 a majority of Respondent's employees in
a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act i designated
the Union as their representative for the purpose of
collective bargaining with Respondent in a secret ballot
election 2 conducted under supervision of the Regional
Director. The Union was certified as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of the employees in said unit on
October 20, 1971. On January 31, 1972, the Union
demanded bargaining of Respondent. On February 4,
1972, Respondent through its attorneys notified the Union
of its "intention ... to defer negotiations for the specific
purpose of testing the validity of the election through
judicial channels." At no time since has Respondent
bargained with the Union.
Countering this prima facie case Respondent put in
evidence which it claims shows that the Union in the
preelection campaign "acted improperly and in such an
objectionable way" as to deny "the employees ... a free
and uncoerced right of franchise." And further to the same
end that the Board agents acted improperly in the conduct
of the election. With respect to the Union's conduct
Respondent claims that the Union made an "appeal to
racial passion and the inflamation of racial feelings"; 3 that
it made "gross misrepresentations, which interfered with
the election and destroyed the laboratory conditions
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act
2 The Union won by a vote of 361 to 286 with 32 challenged ballots
3 At all times material , both before and after the election, the workforce
in Respondent's plants was approximately 43 percent black
1012 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
concerning it"; that employees "were physically threatened
by the Union" and threatened with loss of jobs; and that
the Union offered financial inducements to get employees
"to join, support and vote for the Union... .
A. Conduct of Board Agents
James E. Lewis, called by the General Counsel, testified
that at exactly 5 p.m. the Board agent announced that the
polls were closed and that no one else would be allowed to
vote. Two people who were in the voting area were allowed
to cast their ballots. About four or five people were coming
up to the polling place at the time the curtains were closed
and were not allowed to vote.
In addition to the foregoing alleged improper conduct
Respondent contends that the evidence shows "favoritism
toward the Union . . . by Board agents, implying an
endorsement by the government of their support for the
Union and in abuse of the employees' rights relative to
challenged ballots, etc.". In this connection Lillie McMil-
lan Conerly, whose name was on the eligibility list had her
vote challenged as being an excluded clerical. According to
her testimony she told the Board agent that her name was
on the eligibility list and "couldn't see why my vote was
being challenged, and he got real disturbed with me." The
Board agent had her stand aside and came back to her
later and told her that if she voted it would a challenged
ballot. She walked out at this point refusing to vote a
challenged ballot but returned later and voted a challenged
ballot telling the Board agent she "would do it his way."
According to the testimony of James Moak, an observer
for the Company, the Board agent became "rather rude"
with Mrs. Conerly Moreover, his rudeness was directed
toward Moak, too, telling Moak he would decide who was
going to vote and not vote.
Another matter relied on by Respondent involved the
group of employees who attempted to vote although their
names were not on the eligibility list. Company observer,
J.C. Butler, testified that the Board agent "wanted to know
how long they had been hired, and they told him the date
they were hired, and he told them they could not vote. And
some of them left, and came back, and told him they
wanted to vote as challenged votes, and he told them they
could vote a challenged vote but it wouldn't do any good.
He didn't see any sense in their voting a challenged vote
when they weren't eligible to vote in the election."
According to Butler, it "seemed" to him that at the time
the Board agent "became outraged" and his voice was
"loud enough" so that some of the people said "that if they
had to go through all that they wouldn't even vote" and left
without voting.4 Butler estimated that "15 or 20 or more
left. In his affidavit (which Butler testified was all true)
Butler had said that of this group not on the eligibility list
six or seven originally left and returned a few minutes later.
Of these returnees about three or four voted challenged
ballots and the others left again without voting. Butler's
affidavit also indicated that "the Board agent was real nice
to everyone, everyone who appeared in the voting area to
vote. And if for any reason a ballot was challenged the
Board agent explained the entire challenge procedure to
them. .."
Mabel Magee, a witness called by Respondent and
apparently one of the above group whose names were not
on the eligibility list, testified that when she went to vote
she was informed that she was not on the list. She left and
when she returned she was told she could vote a challenged
vote but that she was not eligible because she had not been
working long enough. She said, "I think I should vote."
According to Magee the Board agent, notwithstanding that
"he wasn't talking too loud," "got real kind of angry" but
not enough, apparently, to stop her from voting which she
did.
I see nothing in the foregoing conduct that could be said
to have impinged on the employee's free and uncoerced
choice in the election. The closing of the polls in the face of
four or five employees certainly had no effect on the other
employees whatsoever. And the loss of their ballots ( even if
added to the few who may have not voted in connection
with the matter of those whose names were not on the list
above) certainly would not affect the outcome of the
election. As for the alleged rudeness toward Conerly, it
seems clear that both Conerly and the company observer
were insisting on her right to vote an unchallenged ballot in
the face of a challenge. In this light it is understandable
that the Board agent could become somewhat provoked
and make an entirely justifiable comment that he was the
judge of who would vote and who would not vote. The
same observation applies to the Magee incident to some
extent with the added observation that apparently Magee
magnified the Board agent's displeasure into "kind of
angry."
B. Financial Inducements
There is no question that there were many rumors
circulating in Respondent's plants, among them one that
those that voted for the Union would have initiation fees
waived while those that did not vote for the Union would
have to pay initiation fees or penalties of up to $150 or
$200. There is no question that initiation fees were waived
by the Union. Union representative Hicks testified credibly
that he told the employees "There is going to be no
initiation fees. That after the Union was organized, in 90
days would be no initiation fees. Thereafter , dispensation
was available from (then) on."5 Hicks went on to testify
that he had been in the Union 17 years and that nobody in
his local had ever paid an initiation fee during that time.
According to Hicks' further credited testimony, when
questioned about initiation fees, fines , and assessments
that the Union would charge if voted into the plant Hicks
told the employees there would be no incentive to charge
an initiation fee or fine people because in a right to work
state the Umon had to represent the people whether they
belonged to the Union or not.
Logic would dictate that a union would be more
prejudiced than an employer by the insertion of such
propaganda in a campaign. In any event there is no
evidence that any agent of the Union represented to any
4 Another of Respondent's witnesses who was also a company observer, 5 This dispensation apparently referred to a provision in the Union's
Howard Alexander, described the Board agent only as being "a little upset constitution that provided for a $15 initiation fee unless dispensed with by
at that time " the international president
BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1013
employees that they would have to pay an increased
initiation fee if they did not join the Union prior to the
election . Moreover, the Respondent put out extensive
campaign material concerning the Union's policy regard-
ing dues and initiation fees and further such rumors were
effectively rebutted by Respondent's campaign speeches
and material clearly indicating that no employee would
ever have to join the Union to work in its plants even if the
Union won the election.
D.W. McCullough, an employee, testified that a strang-
er came up to him in a grocery store in McComb and
engaged him in a conversation about the Union asking if
he would be interested in making some money out of the
thing. McCullough did not think so. The stranger said if he
"could get about 10 to come to the meeting and 5 to loin
... it might be worth say $1,000 . . . or more" to
McCullough. McCullough said he was not interested and
left it at that. The next day, according to McCullough, he
told his supervisor Madison Brumfield about the offer. He
further testified that he told no one else about the matter.
There is no showing that the Union had anything to do
with the offer to McCullough. As for the waiver of
initiation fees the Board has stated:
There is no valid basis for concluding that an employee
who votes for the union in a secret ballot election must
be doing so in any substantial measure because of the
previously extended or promised waiver of initiation
fees. DIT-MCO, Inc., 163 NLRB 1019, 1022 (1967).
C. Threats
Respondent contends that threats, economic and physi-
cal, "totally destroyed" the laboratory conditions of the
election.
D. Physical Threats
William E. Smith, a black employee in the unit, testified
on direct that he went to a union meeting where union
representative Sylvester Hicks, also black, told him that if
he did not vote for the Union and it came in, his house
would be blown up and his car would be burned and all
blacks would be out of a job. Hicks also told him according
to Smith, that in a strike those who try to cross the picket
line "would be took out." On cross-examination Smith
testified at first that he was told that if the Union did not
come in his house would be bombed and his car destroyed.
Then he corrected this warning as being coupled with his
failure to vote for the Union. In his affidavit Smith stated
that he was told by Hicks (whom he constantly referred to
as Rowe) that if the Union was voted in and went on strike
employees who crossed the picket line could have their
houses bombed and their cars burned. He further stated
that the union representative asked him to vote for the
Union and did not say anything would happen to him if he
voted against the Union. Smith's statement further indicat-
ed that Hicks at no time had ever threatened him in any
way.
Smith further testified that he talked to no other
employee than one Joe Howell about the Union and there
is no indication that he related to Howell what he claims
was told him by Hicks. Hicks admitted talking to Smith
about the Union but denied telling or implying to any
employee that if he did not vote for the Union his house
and car would be destroyed. Smith also testified that fellow
employee Howell told him that if J. C. Butler, a black
employee who was campaigning for the Company, did not
vote for the Union he would get a whipping. Smith did not
reply to this but "just laughed at him."
J. C. Butler testified on direct that he received several
anonymous phone calls threatening to "get" him, "blow
[him ] up" or otherwise "hurt" him if he did not stop
campaigning for the Company. Butler also testified that his
cousin, Eddie J. Williams, a minister , said at a union
meeting that if Butler was against the Union he "should be
caught and beat up."
Another employee, Enoch Williams, testified about a
visit at his home by Union Representatives Hicks and
Peavy6 as follows:
Q. What if anything was said to you about
violence?
A. Violence? What are you speaking about, vio-
lence?
Q. Threats or anything else?
A. Well now, I had threats and I lost a gang of
friends by going with the Company, but I just took that
for my part, because I'm working for myself, and they
wasn't working for me.
Q. The question was, what if anything was said by
Mr. Hicks and Mr. Peavy to you about threats?
A. Well now, Mr. Hicks and Mr. Peavy they didn't
give no threats.
Q. Was anything mentioned about a picket line?
A. Yeah, they said all them that went for the
Company, and the Company strike, and when they
strike somebody be walking the picket lines, and such
fellows that went for the Company daresn't come up
there, they said we would get it, they didn't say what,
but I had an idea what it would be.
Eva Mae Jackson testified about hearing "a rumor" a
"few times" that "the Union was going to bomb peoples
houses, and all kinds of stuff like that." Knox Cothern
testified how a fellow employee, J.C. Barrow, told how he
had belonged to a union in a steel mill where the people
would go out on strike and "blow porches off and blow
houses off, and stuff like that "
Levi Deer testified about a conversation with Peavy in
which Peavy threatened, "I'll whip you ass" because Peary
thought Deer had caused his discharge by Respondent.
During the same argument that lasted about 30 minutes
Peavy also tried to get Deer to sign a union card. Johnnie
M. Smith testified how a woman came up to her in the
plant and told her that if she did not join the Union when
they walked the picket line they would whip her.
Assuming that the foregoing evidence offered by
Respondent is all true, I do not see how it can be said that
it is of enough significance or pervasiveness in a unit of
about 700 people to have had any effect on their free and
uncoerced choice in the election. But I have serious doubts
a Peavy, also black, was a local man hired by Hicks at a weekly salary to
chauffeur him and otherwise aid him in his campaign efforts As such I find
that Peavy was an agent of the Union
1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about the truth of it all. Willie Smith's testimony and his
sworn statement revealed such uncertainties and discre-
pancies that make it suspect of its face. Considering the
fact that this is the only physical threat attributed to Hicks
in the entire campaign I am inclined to credit his denial of
threatening anyone as described by Smith. As for Peavy's
threatening to beat up Levi Deer, there is no showing that
the threat was connected with anything but Peavy's
assumption that Peavy had caused Deer's discharge.
E. Economic and Other Threats
Lillie McMillan Conerly testified that Union Organizer
Betty Neusbaum visited her at her home where for about 2
hours they engaged in a pleasant conversation about
unions. Mrs. Conerly made it clear that she was not
interested in the Union. When leaving Neusbaum told
Conerly that if the Union won the election and "were
dissatisfied with [Conerly's] work, and found out that [she]
had voted against the Union [she] could be fired." On
cross-examination Conerly denied ever talking to her boss
Donald Rayburn about the Union. Then she admitted she
"might have" mentioned to him her conversation with
Neusbaum and finally was definite that she did so the next
day. After equivocating as to what Rayburn told her she
admitted in effect that he put her mind at rest about what
Neusbaum had told her.
Enoch Williams also testified that in the conversation
with Union Organizers Hicks and Peavy at his home they
told him that if the Union came in such fellows as he
would "have nojob."
Edward Andrews testified about hearing rumors in the
plant "that if everybody didn't vote for the Union, and if
the Union got in, they would be laid off."
Levi Deer also testified that Hicks on another occasion
told him that he was "trying to help the colored people"
and that if they didn't get the Union" they are going to lay
off the blacks and keep all the white." Later Deer asked his
white foreman if such a thing was true and was assured
that it was not true.
In his testimony Hicks denied making such threats. I
deem it unnecessary to determine whether he did or did
not make them since the Board has held that statements of
this kind do not warrant setting aside an election reasoning
that even if called "threats" they were not statements that
the employees could not evaluate as campaign propaganda
nor were they within the Union's power to carry out. Rio de
Oro Uranium Mines, Inc., 120 NLRB 91, 94 (1958).
Johnny R. Morgan and James McCue, both leadmen,
attempted to attend a union meeting at the Magnolia
courthouse and were turned away because, they were told,
they were supervisors. At the time they were also told that
if they did attend the meeting charges would be filed
against them "immediately." They left. There is some
question as to whether this was before or after the election.
Before or after it is of no significance as a threat or
otherwise in this matter.
F. Racism
J. C. Butler testified that union organizer Hicks told
him that if the blacks did not stay together as a group and
the Union lost the election all the blacks would be fired.
Willie Smith testified substantially the same. In addition
several people testified that such a rumor was circulating in
the plant. Hicks did not specifically deny telling Smith this
but did deny telling it to Butler. According to Hicks he
"commented to him that [he] felt like the black people
should stick together. That it had been called to [his]
attention that the blacks didn't stick together and if they
didn't they wouldn't have any showing at Croft Metal."
Hicks testified that there had been three layoffs during or
shortly before the campaign involving mostly blacks. As a
result of these layoffs employees came to talk to him about
them telling him that "they felt if the Union lost . . . there
wouldn't be any blacks left because of what would
happen" His comment to the employees was that
"Bancroft could layoff anybody he wanted and could hire
anybody he wanted. They didn't have any protection on
the fob" On the occasion of one of these layoffs, according
to Hicks, a meeting was arranged for the employees. At
this meeting he told them "that seemingly the trend was
... that the blacks were going to be laid off if they didn't
stick together and try to get the plant organized to where
they would have some protection, it could continue
forever."
Another black, Enoch Williams, also testified that Hicks
and Peavy came to him at his home where, among other
things, they told him that if he did not join the Union and
it came in "there wouldn't be anybody working there but
the Joiners, and the colored working there but the Joiners,
that I wouldn't have no job." This was not directly denied
by Hicks. Levi Deer also testified that Hicks had asked him
about a layoff-whether it was on account of a card or
something like that. Deer said he didn't know. Hicks said,
"You know I am trying to help the colored people . . . if
you don't get the Union, they are going to layoff all the
blacks and keep all the whites." This was denied by Hicks.
According to Deer's further testimony, Peavy also told him
the Company was going to get rid of all the blacks if the
Union did not come in. Peavy did not testify.
In addition to the foregoing Respondent points to
matters pertaining to the black procompany employee, J.
C. Butler, as further indication of the Union's attempt to
stir racial passions in the campaign. Thus there was a
rumor going around the plant that Butler (who apparently
was dealing with the Company for an automobile) would
have the car given to him if the Company won the election;
if the Company lost he would have to pay for it.7
In a speech at a union meeting by a Rev. Buie , another
black, Buie was reported as having said that:
It had been called to his attention that an employee
was to be given a car to swing the black vote. He
understood he was a soul brother and the part that hurt
him so bad was that it would be a sold-out soul brother.
The further evidence shows that Butler was referred to as
r Respondent claims that Hicks, by asking several employees to check racially inflamatory statement to the employees "
out this rumor for him, was in effect "making a misrepresentative and
BANCROFT MFG. CO.
an Uncle Tom by union officials or agents, both to his face
and to other employees. Whether Hicks was as discrimina-
tory in his remark about the employment status of blacks
viz a viz the union campaign as he testified is immaterial
since the Board has held that a union's statement that if an
employer wins the election, all blacks will be laid off so
they must vote for the Union to save their jobs is not a
reason for setting aside an election . Kresge-Newark, Inc.,
112 NLRB 869. As for the other aspects of Respondent's
contention that racial passions were inflamed, I don't view
an appeal to blacks to vote as a unit for the Union as an
"appeal to racial passion and the inflammation of racial
feelings" any more than an appeal to any group red, white,
yellow, black or mixed to vote for the Union-a legitimate
and legal protected right.
Respondent further contends "that the Union's organiz-
ers attempted to inject ethnic as well as racial diversion
among the employees" by somehow getting a rumor
started in the plant that President Bancroft "was sending
money to Israel to a Jewish relief fund" that should have
been going to the employees as wages. There is not much in
the evidence to show any ethnic flavor to the rumor. Willie
Smith at first testified that he had heard that Bancroft was
sending money to Japan. Asked if he was sure it was
Japan, Smith thought it might be Italy or Japan. When he
was asked if the contribution was "to any certain fund"
Smith indicated that no fund was identified. Johnny Roy
Morgan testified that "it seems like [he] did hear
something about them sending a little bit of money to some
country, and it should have been given to these people." In
any event, there is no convincing evidence showing that the
Union instigated this rumor.
G. Misrepresentations
Respondent claims that "the Union originated, emanat-
ed and perpetuated a . . . statement . . . that money Mr.
Bancroft gave to a local hospital impliedly was coming
from the employees' pay and should not have been done."
Besides the fact that such a contribution had been made
and was publicized in the local newspaper, there is no
evidence that the statement was originated by the Union.
Even if it had been it seems to me that it was a perfectly
legitimate campaign statement. Certainly if Respondent's
owner could make outside charitable contributions the
employees could rightfully feel that instead of such largess
the money should have gone to the employees in better
wages . After all, "chanty begins at home."
Respondent also cites as a misrepresentation by the
Union the above discussed rumor of the contribution by
Bancroft to an Israel relief fund. Two observations here:
One, there is no evidence that the Union started or
perpetuated this rumor. Two, there is no denial by
Respondent that such a contribution was in fact made.8
Enoch Williams testified that he was told by Hicks and
Peavy that if the employees went for the Union they would
get a raise every 3 months and that if they did not go for
the Union they would get no raises at all. This is the kind
8 About this matter Busby testified as follows.
Q. Now, I ask you, to your knowledge, as Vice President of the
Company, do you have any knowledge of the Company sending money
to Israel?
1015
of material that the Board has repeatedly found to be
within the ability of employees to evaluate purely as
campaign propaganda and not detrimental to their free
and uncoerced voice in an election.
Another rumor that was going around the plant was that
Respondent was having union labels put on its products
after leaving the plants . Again there is no showing that the
Union was responsible for this rumor . Respondent would
attribute responsibility for the rumor to the Union on the
basis that the Union made no denial of its truth after
informing a union meeting that the matter would be
checked out for its authenticity. Whether the Union can be
charged with responsibility for the rumor on this basis or
not, I see no significant interference with the employees
free choice on the basis of it.
A few days before the election the Union had the
following announcement broadcast over the local radio:
Attention Croft workers . . . attention Croft workers
you are being mislead about union security from
Bancroft . . . the Iowa Supreme Court recently told
workers such as yourself that if they wanted true job
security, they had better join a union rather than rely
on the so-called right to work law. Use your protected
right by the federal government . . . vote yes for the
UBC and you will see that better things are possible for
you through organized labor . . . why is Bancroft
spending thousands of dollars to keep you from
obtaining a chance at a better future? Vote for your
future . . . vote yes for the UBC . . . this message paid
for by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters.
Elmo H. Busby was the only official of the Company to
testify. He "was responsible for the Company's coordina-
tion of the campaign." He testified that he heard the
broadcast and that the words "Iowa Supreme Court"
sounded to him like "our Supreme Court." He reported the
matter to the company attorney who made a check of the
Mississippi Court reports but was unable to find such a
decision. Although subpoenaed for a copy of the decision
the Union had not been able to produce it by the close of
the hearing. I indicated that I would close the hearing
subject to receipt in evidence of a copy of the decision
later. A copy of that decision, Ludwig V. Armour and
Company, 158 N.W.2d, 646, was submitted after the
hearing closed and is hereby received in evidence as
General Counsel's Exhibit 12. Also received in evidence at
this time as Respondent's Exhibit 11 is Respondent's letter
of April 11, 1973 to me together with a copy of the same
Iowa case attached.
In that case (decided in 1968) Armour had a "master
agreement" with the United Packing House Food and
Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, covering among others packing
plants it was operating in West Point and Omaha,
Nebraska . The master agreement contained a union shop
provision valid by its terms only where permitted by state
law. It also provided that in the event that Armour closed
the plant and replaced it with another, "employees with
seniority rights in the closed plant shall be offered
A. Not of the Company sending money to Israel , no, sir.
Q. Do yop have any knowledge of Mr Bancroft sending money to
Israel, of your personal knowledge?
A Not of my personal knowledge.
1016 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employment at the replacement plant in order of seniority
... The replacement plant shall be covered by the terms
of the master agreement."
In late 1967 and early 1968 Armour closed the plants in
West Point and Omaha. Thereafter Armour acquired an
existing plant in the Sioux City, Iowa (determined under
the master agreement to be a replacement plant), whose
employees were not covered by a collective-bargaining
agreement . Iowa has a right-to-work law.
When Armour employees from the closed plants decided
to exercise their seniority under the master agreement and
displaced the unrepresented employees of the former
owner of the Sioux City plant, the displaced employees
brought suit on the grounds that the result produced by the
master agreement was per se illegal and in violation of the
Iowa right to work law. The case was decided against them,
the court holding that "this is job security by reason of
length of service not union security by compulsory
membership." The court also stated that the right to work
law "prohibits management and unions from entering into
agreements which would force an individual to join a
union against his will in order to keep his job. It does not
guarantee employees of a nonunion plant the same job
security which might be obtained through legitimate
collective bargaining." The court also stated that "it is
difficult to see how a provision which requires an
opportunity to be given employees whether union or not to
transfer under certain conditions, requires membership as
a condition of employment."
Respondent contends that "there is nothing in this case,
whatsoever, that can be interpreted according to [the
Union's ] radio spot announcement which announcement is
a patent and a blatant misrepresentation of the case."
According to Respondent "the case in it.; ultimate analysis,
asserts a holding, in fact, which is directly contrary to the
import of the radio announcement" I disagree. In my
opinion Respondent misreads the case. I would not call
this a misrepresentation by the Union. Nor would I call the
Union characterization of the case as "recent" a misrepre-
sentation as claimed by Respondent.
Another claimed "patent and blatant attempt by the
petitioning Union to imply to the employees before the
election in question, that the United States Government
was endorsing the Carpenters Union" is alleged by
Respondent by the following pamphlet (printed under a
picture of Uncle Sam) distributed to the employees by the
Union:
My name is Uncle Sam. I don't work for Croft Metals,
but I do represent each and every one of their
employees, for it is my job to protect their rights as
American citizens. A long time ago I found out that the
individual worker was helpless in dealing with its
employer. This is why I passed the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT. The law which gives the working
people the right to organize a UNION. This one law
has helped more working people in more ways than any
other dozen laws ever passed. But, if the people who
work for Croft Metals don't want to use this right,
which I have given them, then that is their right also
. . . IT IS ALSO THEIR LOSS!
COLOR ME-RED, WHITE AND BLUE!
As with the Iowa Supreme Court case I believe that
Respondent misreads the Union's message in this pam-
phlet. Similarly , I believe Respondent has misinterpreted
the Union's use of sample ballots as being contrary to
Board policy.
The foregoing evidence , in my opinion , is not sufficient
to establish that in an election of this size the employees
were denied a free and uncoerced choice . Accordingly, I
find that the Union was properly certified as a collective-
bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate unit
and that by refusing to bargain with the Union , Respon-
dent has violated and is violating Section 8 (a)(l) and (5) of
the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom, and upon request, bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative
of all employees in the appropriate unit , and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., Croft Alu-
minum Company, Inc., Croft Ladders, Inc., Croft Metal
Products, Inc., and Lemco Metal Products, Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Southern Council of Industrial Workers, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka,
Mississippi , facilities, including plant clerical employees,
interplant-drivers and leadmen and leadwomen; excluding
over-the-road truckdrivers, office clerical employees, pro-
fessional and technical employees, watchmen, and guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act , constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Since October 20, 1971, the above-named labor
organization has been and now is a certified and exclusive
representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate
BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1017
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on or about February 4, 1972, and at all
times thereafter , to bargain collectively with the above-
named labor organization as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees of Respondent in the
appropriate unit , Respondent has engaged and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respondent has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced, and is interfering
with , restraining , and coercing , employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, and
thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., Croft Alumi-
num Company, Inc., Croft Ladders, Inc., Croft Metal
Products, Inc., Lemco Metal Products, Inc., its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment with Southern Council of Industrial Workers,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its
employees in the following appropriate unit
All production and maintenance employees employed
at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka,
Mississippi , facilities, including plant clerical employ-
ees, interplant-drivers, and leadmen and leadwomen;
excluding over-the-road truckdrivers, office clerical
employees, professional and technical employees,
watchmen, and guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act-
(a) Upon request bargain with the above-named labor
organization as the exclusive representative of all employ-
ees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its McComb and Osyka, Mississippi, facilities
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies
of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 15, after being duly signed 'ny Respondent's
representative , shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt of thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places , includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in
writing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
10 In the event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively concern-
ing rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment with Southern Council of
Industrial Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit
described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above-
named Union, at the exclusive representative of all
employees in the bargaining unit described below, with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, and, if an understand-
ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees
employed at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia,
and Osyka, Mississippi, facilities, including plant
clerical employees, inter-plant drivers, and lead-
men and leadwomen; excluding over-the-road
truckdrivers, office clerical employees, profes-
sional and technical employees, watchmen, and
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
BANCROFT MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC CROFT
ALUMINUM COMPANY, INC.,
CROFT LADDERS, INC.,
CROFT METAL PRODUCTS,
INC., AND LEMCO METAL
PRODUCTS, INC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
anyone. its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1001
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days Howard Ave, Plaza Tower, Suite 2700, New Orleans,
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, Louisiana 70113, Telephone 504-527-6361.
or covered by any other material.