Bancroft Manufacturing Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMay 29, 1974

210 N.L.R.B. 1019 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

BANCROFT MFG. CO. 1019 Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc., Croft Alumi- num Company, Inc., Croft Ladders, Inc., Croft Metal Products , Inc., Lemco Metal Products, Inc. and Southern Council of Lumber and Plywood Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America , AFL-CIO. Case 15-CA-4267 May 29, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY On May 23, 1972, Administrative Law Judge 1 Paul E. Weil issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing: Thereafter, Respondent and the General Coun- sel filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Bancroft Manu- facturing Company, Inc.; Croft Aluminum Compa- ny, Inc .; Croft Ladders, Inc.; Croft Metal Products, Inc.; and Lemco Metal Products, Inc., McComb, Mississippi , its officers , agents, successors, and assigns , shall take the actions set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order. The title of "Trial Examiner " was changed to "Administrative Law Judge" effective August 19, 1972. 2 See Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Inc , et a!, 210 NLRB No. 90. National Labor Relations Act by terminating three employees, by the discriminatory initiation and enforce- ment of plant rules and by the issuance of written warning slips ; coerced and restrained its employees by threats and interrogations of its employees and refused to bargain by the unilateral institution or enforcement of the plant rules and warning system, by the unilateral grant of Memorial Day as an additional paid holiday, and by unilateral changes in its group life and hospital insurance plan after the Union demonstrated its majority status in an election conducted by the said Regional Director . By its duly filed answer Respondent admitted various facts and denied others and specifically denied the commission of any unfair labor practices . On the issues thus joined the matter came on for hearing before me at McComb , Mississippi, on March 7 and 8, 1972. All parties were represented by counsel and had an opportunity to call witnesses , examine and cross-examine them , and to adduce relevant and material evidence. The parties waived oral argument, briefs were received from the General Counsel and the Respon- dent. On the entire record in the case and in consideration of the briefs I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER The five named companies which comprise Respondent are operated as an integrated business enterprise engaged in the production of aluminum ingots and products including windows, screens , doors, various extrusions, and ladders in plants located in McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka, Mississippi . Each of the corporations annually receives goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from outside the State of Mississippi and ships its products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the State of Mississippi . Respondent admits and I find that it and each of its components are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PAUL E. WEIL, Trial Examiner: On October 13, 1971, Southern Council of Lumber and Plywood Workers, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, filed a charge with the Regional Director for Region 15 of the National Labor Relations Board , hereinafter called the Board, alleging that Bancroft Manufacturing Company, Croft Aluminum Company, Inc., Croft Ladders, Inc., Croft Metal Products , Inc., and Lemco Metal Products, Inc., hereinafter collectively called Respondent, violated the A. Background Prior to 1970 Respondent's five plants have never been organized by any labor organization . In 1969 an organiza- tional drive by the Steel Workers Union resulted in charges filed by the Carpenters Union who apparently followed the Steel Workers organizational drive when it failed. As a result of those charges a decision was issued by the Board adopting a decision of Trial Examiner Marion Ladwig that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . The Union herein filed a petition , apparently in the spring of 1971, for an election in a production and maintenance unit embracing all of the plants . The election was held on July 1 of that 210 NLRB No. 91 1020 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD year and won by the Union. The Employer filed objections after which the Regional Director issued a supplemental decision and certified the Union as the representative of the employees on October 20.1 Requests for review were filed and ultimately denied and Respondent refused to bargain with the Union contending that the certification was not validly issued. One of the divisions of Respondent involved in the election was the ladder plant operated under the name of Croft Ladders, Inc. At the time of the election the shipping department of the ladder plant in Osyka consisted of a supervisor, Gordon Holmes, and four employees, Vernal Ray Tate, Billy Hudson, Clarence (Bozo) Davis, and Eddie Coney. According to the testimony of Tate and Hudson, Supervisor Holmes interrogated them extensively both before and after the election concerning their feelings with regard to the Union. Tate testified that after the election Holmes told him that he thought that the other men were "pulling for the Union" and stated that he was going to lay them off because business was slow. Subsequently Hudson, Davis, and Coney were terminated. The General Counsel contends that their terminations are in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The General Counsel alleged that after the July 1 election Respondent promulgated a set of work rules together with written warnings and on August 6 distributed copies of the work rules to all employees with their paychecks. Respondent produced its records and the General Counsel stipulated that between the first of the year and July 1, 50 warning notices had been issued by Respondent, mostly because employees were tardy or absent and that after July 1, until October 1, Respondent issued 150 warning notices for the same reason. The parties in addition stipulated that one of the warning slips issued in January, before the election, made reference to the rule number which the employees allegedly violated. At the hearing I dismissed the complaint insofar as it alleged a violation in the initiation of the system of plant rules, inasmuch as the General Counsel by his stipulations proved that they had been initiated before January 1971, at least 10 months before the charge herein was filed. Moreover, with regard to the enforcement of the rules, I declined to dismiss the complaint at the hearing on the General Counsel's contention that the evidence reveals that after the election the Respondent discriminatorily enforced the work rules. I shall deal with that issue below. Finally the General Counsel contends that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment after the election although before the certification. The General Counsel contends that Respondent granted a sixth paid holiday, changed the insurance carrier, granted improved insurance benefits and unilaterally imposed the work rules as set forth in the paragraph above all without bargaining with the Union. Respondent admits that it did not bargain with the Union concerning the change in insurance or the additional paid holiday contending that the decision to make these changes antedated the election and indeed the petition and were a valid exercise of the Respondent's business judgment. Respondent contends with regard the imposition the changed work rules that this took place outside the 10(b) period and at a time when it had no duty to bargain with the Union or any other labor organization. B. Discussion and Conclusions The 8(a)(1) allegations Billy Hudson testified that he was a vigorous organizer on behalf of the Union while he was employed by Respondent and that he worked with union organizer Sylvester Hicks and with Reverend Bowie, a preacher who was assisting the Union to organize. Hudson stated that on the morning of the election he was standing near Supervisor Holmes ' office and Holmes asked him what he thought about the Union. Hudson said he did not know and Holmes said "you know if that union gets in here its going to mess our deal up back here . . . when work gets slack you will have to go home. My wife wouldn't want me sitting around the house, would yours?" Holmes went on to talk about a truckdriver who had told him about a man who had organized a union and a strike had ensued and the man had lost his house and his car. Holmes pointed out that strikers could not draw work- mens' compensation and nothing would be coming in while he was laid off. Later that morning, Hudson told Holmes that he was going to be an observer for the Union and had to leave at 10 o'clock. Holmes told him to go and tell Ray Booty who was in charge of the ladder division, Hudson did so and proceeded to the preelection conference. Vernal Ray Tate testified that a week to a week and a half before the election, as he was working outside Holmes' office, Holmes called him into the office and told him that he hoped that Tate would mark his ballot "no." Holmes said that if he marked it "yes" he was going to make it hard on everybody in the plant, it could be cut to a 20-hour week instead of a 40-hour week and it is hard to put bread on the table like that. Then Holmes pointed out that the Union could call a strike and Tate would be laid off from work and would not be called back and somebody would be hired in his place instead and times are too hard to find jobs. Holmes suggested that Tate get busy and get the other employees to do something about the Union, tell them not to join the Union. Tate answered that whatever the Company does is okay with him. On the day of the election Holmes called Tate into his office again, told him he wanted him to mark his ballot "no" and asked him whether he had talked to Billy and the other employees. Tate answered that Billy had a mind of his own and he could not tell him what to do. After the election, as Tate walked by Holmes' office coming from the polls, Holmes asked him if he had voted no and Tate said that he had. Holmes then said that the Company had the Union beat 100 percent. Tate answered, "That 's great." Holmes then asked how Tate thought the other employees voted and Tate said that he did not know. A week or two later Tate went to a union meeting where he saw Billy Hudson . About a week after the meeting Holmes asked him if he "had anything for him." Tate I All dates hereinafter are in the year 1971, unless otherwise specified BANCROFT MFG. CO. answered, "what do you mean?" Holmes said he wanted to know about the meeting at the courthouse the other night. Tate said that he did not go and Holmes asked if Tate hadn't heard anyone say anything about it. Tate said that he had not, because people didn't talk around him like they used to because he had been spending so much time in Holmes ' office. Holmes indicated that he knew that Hudson was there because Johnny Roy, a foreman at the Magnolia plant, had told him so. Holmes then pointed out that the other employees had gone to the meeting and Tate said that he wouldn't know, that he hadn't gone to it. A couple of weeks after this, according to Tate, Holmes called him into the office again and told him that he had heard that Bill and Bozo and the other employees were pulling for the Union. Tate said that he didn't know how they voted. Holmes said he was going to lay off Bill and Bozo and Eddie because business was slow and there wasn 't much to do but he was going to keep Tate to work with him and if he had more work than he could do they would pull employees off of the production line to assist him. Shortly after this all the employees in the shipping department were laid off except Tate. Holmes denied all the conversations attributed to him but stated that he spoke to Tate one time in his office about 2 weeks before the election and told him that he did not think the Company needed a union, that they have got a good job and they don't need any union in his opinion. He quoted Tate as answering, "Whatever the Company wanted to do he was for the Company." Counsel characterized this as a general conversation and Holmes stated that he had general conversations with the other employees. Holmes specifically denied asking Tate to check on his fellow employees with regard to how they felt about the Union or threatening that the employees would be cut from 40 to 20 hours or asking any employee how he voted or whether he had talked to the other employees about the Union. Holmes also testified that he had one conversation with Bill Hudson about 2 weeks before the election and he told him the same thing that he told Tate. Holmes denied that he said anything about "if the work got slack he would have to go home and his wife would not want him around the house or anything to that effect." He denied having any conversation with Hudson on the day of the election in which the Union was mentioned but stated that Hudson came to him and simply told him he had to leave without telling him why. Without asking Hudson why, Holmes sent him to see Booty. Holmes testified that Hudson left and that he did not know where he went but did not see him any more that day. I discredit Holmes' denial with regard both conversa- tions . I found that Holmes' testimony as a whole was unreliable, he showed great animosity toward Tate espe- cially, whom he accused of lying about him on the witness stand .2 On cross-examination Mr. Holmes was evasive and inconsistent , he displayed a most convenient memory, apparently being unable to recall anything that he deemed harmful to Respondent's case except those specific negatives required to controvert the testimony of General 2 Although a sequestration rule was in effect Holmes testified that at the close of the first day of the hearing Respondent's counsel told him what the 1021 Counsel's witnesses. I do not credit him except to the extent that his testimony was corroborated by the testimony of credible witnesses. Hudson and Tate on the other hand appeared to make an honest effort to testify in accordance with their recollection of the facts. Respondent characterizes Tate's testimony in virulant and vulgar terms but bases its argument on two factors. First Respondent claims that Tate is a self-confessed liar because he testified that when he was interrogated by Holmes regarding the union meeting, he told Holmes he had not attended a meeting, although he had done so. To reach this conclusion Respondent must credit Tate's testimony that Holmes interrogated him, although Holmes denied doing so. The Board recognizes the coercive effect of interrogation of an employee, such as asking him whether he or other employees attended a union meeting, and what took place there. Such an interrogation gives the employee only three alternatives, either to deny attending the meeting, to adrrut attending the meeting and incur the wrath of the interrogator by refusing to disclose what took place at the meeting, or to admit attending the meeting and disclose to the interrogator the union activities of the employee and his fellows. Under the circumstances here that the employees were well aware of Respondent's antiunion animus, I do not find Tate's credibility seriously impaired by his admission that he chose the least dangerous of the three alternatives presented him by Respondent's supervisor The other factor on which Respondent bases its argument that Tate is incredible is in his reaction on cross-examination to Respondent's demand that he recall the exact words used by Holmes, to which Tate answered that he could not recall the exact words, and gave his best recollection. The cross-examination of Tate was vigorously conducted, and I have considered that his credibility was considerably enhanced by the consisten- cy with which he met Respondent's counsel's attempts to change his testimony. I credit Tate and Hudson's testimo- ny concerning the interrogations by Holmes, and I find that Holmes not only coercively interrogated both Hudson and Tate, but that his interrogation included threats that they would lose their jobs or have their hours cut if the Union were voted in. These interrogations and threats, I find to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I shall recommend an order with regard thereto. 1. The plant rules and the warning slips The General Counsel adduced evidence that shortly after the election on July 1, notices containing the plant rules were posted in various spots around the plant, and that on August 6, copies of these notices were distributed to all employees. Respondent produced evidence that the plant rules were adopted in December or January, and first promulgated in January, by posting in certain spots around the plant where notices to employees are ordinarily posted. Respondent thereafter, on August 6, facing an increase in absenteeism, sent copies of the notices to all employees. The parties stipulated that warning slips were issued commencing in January, that 50 such slips were issued General Counsel 's witnesses had testified The General Counsel did not move to strike Holmes' testimony upon receipt of this information 1022 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD between January and July 1, that 50 more were issued during the month of July, and a decreasing number each month thereafter. The parties also stipulated that one of the warning slips issued in January referred by number to one of the rules on the posted notices. From this stipulation I infer that the rules were, in fact, in existence in January, and I credit the witnesses who testified that notices were posted in certain places as early as January. The General Counsel alternatively argues that Respon- dent increased its use of warning slips after the Union won the election, in order to punish the employees for voting for the Union. The General Counsel would have me infer from the fact that as many warning slips were issued in the month of July as had been issued in the entire 6 months prior thereto, that this was attributable to the union adherence of the employees. Respondent produced testi- mony that no change was made in instructions to the supervisors with regard to the issuance of such warning notices, and that the increase in the number of warning notices after the election gives nse to an inference that the incidence of absenteeism increased. The General Counsel did not call for the books or records of Respondent, nor did Respondent produce them, to test whether in fact absenteeism increased after July 1, as Respondent testified. It is the General Counsel's burden of proof to establish by substantial evidence, the affirmative proposition that Respondent was motivated in issuing a greater number of warning slips by its union animus. The General Counsel made no move to do this other than by "playing the numbers game." I believe that the evidence lends itself more readily to the inference suggested by Respondent, and I shall dismiss the complaint insofar as it is alleged that the increased number of warning slips were issued for discriminatory or coercive reasons. 2. The Discharge of Davis, Hudson, and Coney The General Counsel contends that three of the four employees working under Supervisor Holmes were dis- charged on August 27 because of their membership in, and activities on behalf of, the Union. Respondent admits they were discharged, but denies that they were discharged for discriminatory reasons, stating rather that they were discharged because of a decrease in orders for ladders, the product that they handled, and as a part of a department wide cut in forces. The General Counsel predicates his contention on the fact that Holmes told Tate that Davis, Hudson and Coney were believed to be union adherents, and in the next breath, that they were to be laid off because of lack of work. There is no showing that, in fact, Respondent knew that Davis was a union adherent. Hudson had been called to the preelection conference as a representative of the Union, and Coney had been identified as attendant at the union meeting after the election, but there is no evidence that Davis had been identified in any regard. On the contrary, it appears that Holmes was quite anxious to learn whether Davis was prounion or not. Respondent's eviden- ce, which is not controverted, reveals that the ladder department's production had exceeded its sales to such an extent that the inventory was approximately a third larger than normal, and that all of its warehouse space was filled. For a period of time before the layoffs, work had been slack, and employees had been sent from the shipping department to other departments to keep them busy. On August 27, not only were the three junior employees of the warehouse eliminated, but six other junior employees of the ladder department were terminated at the same time. Respondent's evidence reveals that business continued to worsen, and by December 11, all but two employees in the department had been laid off. Those who had been laid off after the August 27 date were all reinstated, most of them within five or six weeks. Vice President Smith testified, again without contradiction, that early in 1971 Respondent had come to the conclusion that when employees had to be laid off for periods in excess of 90 days they were informed that they were terminated, and would be rehired, if at all, as new employees, rather than that they were laid off with a continuing expectation of recall. Thus, a distinction was made between those laid off in August and those laid off in December, which has not been successfully attacked by the General Counsel. There is no evidence concerning the possible union adherence of the other six employees of the ladder department who were terminated on August 27. Tate was the only employee kept in the ladder warehouse, and Tate was the only employee with seniority greater than a year. The General Counsel argues that Holmes admitted to Tate that the layoff was for discriminatory reasons. However, Holmes did not say that they were laid off because of their union activities. He stated that they were suspected of union activity, and in the conversation stated that they would be laid off for lack of work. Under all of the circumstances in this case, I can infer only that they would have been laid off whether or not they had engaged in union activity, in view of the substantial reduction of business in Respondent's ladder department I find that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proof with regard to the 8(a)(3) allegations and I recommend that they be dismissed. 3. The refusal-to-bargain allegation The General Counsel alleges that Respondent refused to bargain with the Union by unilaterally changing working conditions after the employees had demonstrated their majority support for the Union. Respondent admits that the unit certified in Case 15-RC-4641 is an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, but denies that the certification is valid. The validity of the election is presently before the Board upon a motion for summary judgment. As the General Counsel pointed out in his brief, an employer who effects a unilateral change after an election, and before certification, without notice to or consultation with the Union, violates the Act.3 Respondent apparently does not disagree with the General Counsel's citation of the law. However, Respondent contends that the grant of Memorial Day and the change in the hospitalization plan were 3 The General Counsel cites N L.R B v. Laney & Duke Storage Master Appliance Corporation, 158 NLRB 1009, 1017 (1966), Tampa Crown Warehouse Co, 151 NLRB 248, modified 369 F.2d 859 (C A 5, 1965), affil Distributors, Inc, 121 NLRB 1622 (1958), Fleming Manufacturing Company, 424 F.2d 109 (C A. 5, 1966), Standard Oil Company (Ohio), 174 NLRB 174, Inc, I 19 NLRB 452 (1957). BANCROFT MFG. CO. management 's decision made before the Union's demand, and for valid business reasons, and the Company had no duty to bargain with the Union thereafter. With regard to the Memorial Day holiday, Vice President White testified that he had been directed in December or January to ascertain where Respondent stood with relation to other similar enterprises in the geographical territory in which it is located as to employee benefits. He ascertained that most such employers were at that time granting five paid holidays annually and that many of them were about to go to a sixth paid holiday. He recommended to the manage- ment team that a holiday be granted either for Memorial Day or for the employee's birthday. Thereafter, a manage- ment decision was made, apparently by President Ban- croft, that Memorial Day would be granted, but not until the year 1972. No publicity was given to the management decision until August, at which time the change in insurance was announced to the employees, for reasons that were not explicated by Mr. White. With regard to the insurance, White testified that the Liberty Mutual Hospitalization insurance policy, which covered the employees had a termination date of August 1, 1971, and that in contemplation of the termination, he was directed to obtain bids from different insurance carriers to make sure that the employees continued to have coverage. He asked for bids from a number of carriers, but could not state definitely when, and by August 1, had not received adequate answers to enable management to select the carrier whose contract would be acceptable. Therefore, the Liberty Mutual Company was asked to extend a policy for an additional month, which they did. Thereafter, during the course of the month of August, enough bids were received. Liberty Mutual was given an opportunity to meet the lowest bid, which was that of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield Company, and declined to attempt to meet it, wherefore the Blue Cross-Blue Shield policy was accepted, effective September 1. Certain changes resulted from the change in carriers, including a provision for double coverage , which is to say that if two members of a family each had family coverage under the terms of the Blue Cross policy, they could recover double the amount that they could recover under either one of the policies alone. This was not available under the Liberty Mutual policy. There were other changes that were not explicated on the record for the most part attributable to the format of the Blue Cross policy as distinguished from that of the Liberty Mutual policy. Although the General Counsel produced a witness who testified that the cost to him went from 90 cents a month to $2 a month, it appears that the difference in cost was due to the fact that he had been covered singly under the original policy and took a family coverage under the Blue Cross policy, which necessitated the raising of the fees with regard to him. The evidence indicates that he would have paid the same fees to Liberty Mutual if he had taken the family coverage with that company. There is no doubt that a change was affected in the insurance coverage, and that the carrier was changed. The Board has long held that such changes are bargainable when the employees are represented by a labor organiza- 1023 tion. The Respondent obviously made no determination that the policy would be changed from Liberty Mutual to the Blue Cross policy before it received a letter from Liberty Mutual, dated August 19, stating that Liberty Mutual would not attempt to meet the Blue Cross puce, as it had obviously been asked to do. Accordingly, this is the point at which management's decision to make a change must have taken place, and there is no question that this was after the election when a duty to bargain came into existence. With regard to the additional holiday, until some public announcement was made of the holiday, Respon- dent retained the capability of granting or not granting it. Respondent claims that it made a decision, which it held as it were, in pectore, until such time as it chose to divulge it to the employees who would be affected by it. Respondent relies on a decision of the Board in United Buckingham Freight Lines, 168 NLRB 684, for the proposition that the grant of these benefits was not unlawful. In that case, however, the Board found that there was no duty on the part of Respondent to recognize the Union in the first place, and accordingly, Respondent had no duty to bargain concerning a changed dental insurance plan. The decision of the Trial Examiner in that case dealt with the situation of an employer who had made a final agreement with the insurance company a month before the initial demand of the Union for recognition. Were this, in fact, the law of the case, the case is inapposite to the situation we have here where no final agreement was made by the Respondent and the insurance carrier until more than a month after the demonstration by the Union of its majority in a Board-conducted election. The administra- tive decisions of the General Counsel cited by Respondent not only are not authoritative, but are distinguishable on the minimum quotation of facts on which they are based. Finally Respondent's reliance on the Board's decision in Sam Leiter, d/b/a Leiter Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 843, is misplaced. That case must be distinguished on the basis that it is predicated on the fact that the Union had not proved it was the statutory representative at the time of the grant of benefits and Respondent accordingly had no reason to believe it had a duty to bargain. In the instant case Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by granting the improved benefits without consulting the representative union, notwithstanding the fact that Res- pondent is presently contesting the propriety of the Board's certification in the prior representation case.4 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth above, occurring in connection of the operations of the Respon- dent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and com- merce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. * Tyler Pipe and Foundry Co, 171 NLRB 308, Olson Bodies, Inc, 181 NLRB 1063. 1024 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in certain unfair labor practices , I shall recom- mend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. 2 The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees em- ployed at Respondent's McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka, Mississippi, facilities , including plant clerical employees, interplant drivers, and leadmen and leadwomen but excluding over -the-road truckdrivers , office clerical em- ployees, professional and technical employees , watchmen and guards , and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. On July 1, 1971, the majority of the Respondent's employees in the unit described above designated and selected the Union as their collective -bargaining represent- ative for purposes of collective bargaining, and on October 20, 1971, the Union was certified the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of the employees described above. 5. By announcing to its employees a grant of an additional paid holiday , and by changing the insurance carrier and the terms and conditions of the health and life insurance afforded to its employees , without giving the Union an opportunity as the collective-bargaining repre- sentative of the employees to negotiate concerning such changes in wages, hours, and working conditions of the employees in the unit set forth above. Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, and has thereby interfered with, restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thus engaging in unfair labor practices within Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. By coercively interrogating its employees regarding their and other employees ' concerted and union activities, by attempting to interfere with their employees in their decision whether to designate the Union as their collective- bargaining representative , and by threatening that the employees ' working hours would be shortened , or that they would be terminated if the Union was voted in, Respon- dent interfered with , restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights protected in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices effect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 8. Respondent has not committed other unfair labor practices as set forth above. Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDERS Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning their and other employees' union membership, activities, and desires, or threatening its employees with termination or with a cut in their working hours, if the Union were voted in the plant, or interfering with its employees' decisions whether to support the Union. (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of employment, or unilaterally changing wages, hours or other terms and conditions of employment without giving the Union an opportunity to bargain on behalf of the employees. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Upon request bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in their bargaining unit, herein before described as appropriate, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding which may be reached. (b) Post at its plants in McComb, Magnolia, and Osyka, Mississippi, copies of the attached noticed marked "Ap- pendix."s Copies of said notice, on forms to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 15, shall, after being duly signed by a representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision and recommended Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. The complaint is dismissed in regard those allegations found above unsupported by the evidence. 5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 6 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " BANCROFT MFG. CO. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial in which all sides had a chance to give evidence , the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this notice: The Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization. To form , loin, or help unions. To bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing. To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. To refrain from any or all these things. WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with, restrains , or coerces employees with respect to these rights. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees regarding their union activities or the union activities of other employees , nor threaten them with loss of work because of their union activity. WE WILL NOT change our employees' wages, 1025 hours or working conditions without bargaining over such changes with Southern Council of Lumber and Plywood Workers, United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Dated By BANCROFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., CROFT ALUMINUM COMPANY, INC., CROFT LADDERS, INC., CROFT METAL PRODUCTS, INC., LEMCO METAL PRODUCTS, INC. (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, T 6024 Federal Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70113, Telephone 504-527-6361.