Avigilon Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 18, 2021

2020002196 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/568,081 12/11/2014 Shaun P. Marlatt PATAVL134-US-ORG2 1005
22917 7590 08/18/2021
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC.
IP Law Docketing
500 W. Monroe
43rd Floor
Chicago, IL 60661
EXAMINER
AN, SHAWN S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2483
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/18/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USAdocketing@motorolasolutions.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SHAUN P. MARLATT, OREN SHIR,
PETER W. NEUFELD, VAN C. NGUYEN, and
SINA AFROOZE

Appeal 2020-002196
Application 14/568,081
Technology Center 2400
Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, BETH Z. SHAW, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Non-Final Rejection of claims 31 and 32, which constitute all pending
claims. See Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest is
Avigilon Corporation. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2020-002196
Application 14/568,081
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to streaming multiple encodings of a source
video stream. Abstr.; Spec.2 ¶¶ 2, 5, 37, 46, 48, 62, 65; Figs. 1, 5A, 5B.
Claim 31, reproduced below, is representative3 of the claimed subject
matter (emphases added):
31. A display system, comprising:
a receiver adapted to receive a plurality of container
frames over a network, each container frame comprising a
plurality of virtual frames and one container timestamp common
to each of the plurality of virtual frames, and at least one of the
plurality of virtual frames in each container frame being encoded
using a different coding standard than at least another one of the
plurality of virtual frames in the respective container frame;
a processor adapted to associate a first selected frame of
the received plurality of virtual frames within each container
frame with a first encoding, and to reconstruct a first virtual
stream of the first selected frames according to the container
timestamps; and
a monitor adapted to display the first virtual stream to a
user.

Appeal Br. 24–25 (Claim Appendix).
REFERENCES
Prior art relied upon by the Examiner:
Name Reference Date
Caglar et al. US 2006/0146934 A1 July 6, 2006
Shivadas et al. US 2014/0359680 A1 Dec. 4, 2014
Miyazawa et al. US 2003/0161610 A1 Aug. 28, 2003
Mukherjee et al. US 2011/0276652 A1 Nov. 10, 2011

2 Specification, filed Dec. 11, 2014 (“Spec.”).
3 Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 18) and our discretion under
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness rejection of
claims 31 and 32 on the basis of representative claim 31.
Appeal 2020-002196
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REJECTIONS
Claims 31 and 32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, and Mukherjee. Non-Final
Act. 3–5.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has
erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the
Appeal Brief. As discussed below, we are persuaded by Appellant’s
contentions of Examiner error. In our analysis below, we highlight and
address specific findings and arguments for emphasis.
In the Non-Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of
Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, and Mukherjee teaches the limitations of
independent claim 31, and provides a reason to combine the teachings to
result in claim 31. Non-Final Act. 3–5 (citing Caglar ¶¶ 59, 201, 238, 240–
243, 276, Figs. 16, 18; Shivadas ¶¶ 41, 56, Fig. 3A; Miyazawa Abst., ¶¶ 8,
10, 12, 47, 53, 125–127, Fig. 3; and Mukherjee ¶¶ 6, 12, 13, 47, 52, 69, 70,
88, 89, 102, 184, Figs. 3, 4, 6).
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding the combination of the
cited references teaches the limitations of claim 31. Appeal Br. 13–16;
Reply Br. 2–9. Appellant argues, inter alia, the Examiner’s combination of
the references does not teach the claim 31 limitation “each container frame
comprising a plurality of virtual frames and one container timestamp
common to each of the plurality of virtual frames” (also referred to as
“disputed limitation;” emphasis added).
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The Examiner finds, although Caglar does not explicitly teach the
disputed limitation, Shivadas or Miyazawa teaches the disputed limitation.
Non-Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner finds Shivadas teaches
video streaming system/method comprising a plurality of
container files (comprises a plurality of container frames),
wherein each container file/frame comprises one container
timestamp common/applicable to each of the plurality of frames
in order to allow for adaptive streaming of video content and
trick play features, wherein frame structure comprises encoded
video block for container files/frames, wherein using container
files with container time stamps to stream video content enables
various playback features with clear advantage (abs.; Fig. 3A;
paras. [0041], [0056]).

Id. at 3.
The Examiner further finds,
as an additional/supplemental support, Miyazawa teaches
stream processing system comprising at least one container
(composite contents, storage device, 3) timestamp (playback
position information) applicable/common to each of a plurality
of real streams and virtual streams of video data, in order to
provide a stream processing system capable of selectively
playing an arbitrary part of the real stream/frames in a simple
manner (abs.; Fig. 3; paras. [0010], [0012], [0047], [0053],
[0125-0127], [0008]).

Id. at 3–4.
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in interpreting the term “time
stamp” in the disputed limitation and in applying the teaching of Shivadas
and Miyazawa to the disputed limitation. Appeal Br. 13–14. According to
Appellant, the referenced paragraphs of Shivadas describe that each
container file “contains a block or segment of video” comprising a plurality
of successive frames “in a time ordered sequence.” Id. at 13 (citing
Shivadas ¶ 41). Appellant argues, while the Examiner cites to paragraph 41
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referencing a “time code” associated with the container files, this is not what
is recited in claim 31. Id. According to Appellant, claim 31 recites that
“each container file comprises one container timestamp common to each of
the plurality of frames.” Id. Appellant argues the Shivadas container files
comprise a sequential, time-ordered succession of frames, and there is no
disclosure of a common timestamp associated with each frame in the
container. Id.
Appellant further argues that the Shivadas “time code” is not a
“timestamp” as recited in the disputed limitation as would be understood by
one of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 14. According to Appellant:
The Examiner’s cited paragraph of Shivadas states that a
container file (i.e., a file comprising sequential, time-ordered
frames) “includes a time code TC to indicate a duration of the
video of the video encoded in the block of the container filed,
and/or a position of the container file in the succession of
container files.” Shivadas, at [0041] (emphasis added). Thus, the
time code is merely indicative of the duration or position of the
video segment encoded within the container.
By contrast, claim 31 recites a timestamp which is
common to each of the plurality of plurality of virtual frames.
Since each virtual frame within the claimed container frame is
“encoded from a source frame,” i.e., a same source frame, the
common timestamp is indicative of a time associated with the
frame. As noted above, associating a timestamp is not possible
in Shivadas, given the sequential nature of frames within
containers, and therefore the reference’s time code cannot
disclose the claimed “timestamp” common to the plurality of
frames.

Id.
Appellant argues Miyazawa also does not teach the disputed
limitations and that the Examiner’s findings are conclusory. Id.
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In the Answer, regarding Shivadas, the Examiner presents a “Note”
asserting that “Applicant’s one container timestamp common to each of the
plurality of virtual frames (Applicant: Fig. 5B, para. [0068]) are
substantially the same or similar in concept with respect to Shivadas et al’s
container files comprising one container timestamp
common/applicable/correspond to each of the plurality of frames (Fig. 2;
para. [0041]).” Ans. 7. Regarding Miyazawa, the Examiner reiterates the
Non-Final Action findings. Id. at 7.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues Shivadas does not use the term
“timestamp” but instead uses the term “time code,” for example, time codes
are shown as TC1, TC2, and TC3 in Figure 3 of Shivadas. Reply Br. 1–5.
According to Appellant, in Shivadas each encoded video block is assigned a
time code that includes a start time and an end time among a successive
chain of container frames and indicates where in that successive chain that
particular video block should be, but there is no common timestamp that
applies to each of the virtual frames. Id. at 3–4. Appellant argues the
Specification, for example paragraph 37, additionally supports that a
timestamp is a single point in time that is assigned to each container frame
containing a number of frames of the different encodings. Id. at 4.
According to Appellant, a timestamp is a unique point in time and, in
contrast, what is described in Shivadas is an indication of an order of
sequential frames, each having its own unique point in time. Id. Appellant
argues in the claimed system, the frames in the container do not represent a
sequential series of frames, but rather differently encoded frames
representing the exact same point in time. Id. at 5.
Regarding Miyazawa, Appellant argues Miyazawa is similar to
Shivadas and does not teach the disputed limitation. Id. at 5–6. Appellant
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argues Miyazawa, like Shivadas, teaches partitioning a video stream at
prescribed time intervals so the streams can be played back in the correct
order. Id. at 6 (citing Miyazawa, Fig. 3). According to Appellant, as
explained in Miyazawa paragraph 47, upon which the Examiner relies, this
real stream is a “continuous time series data such as video/audio/music
data.” Id. Appellant argues, while each stream partition may have a unique
identifier, Miyazawa paragraph 53, the unique identifier is not a common
timestamp as recited in the disputed limitation. Id.
As discussed below, on the record before us, we are persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments regarding the disputed limitation because the
Examiner provides insufficient evidence to support the finding that Shivadas
or Miyazawa teaches the disputed limitation. Appellant’s arguments are
reasonable and are not fully addressed by the Examiner.
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although we interpret
claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless
must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re
Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Our reviewing court
states that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). However, the broadest reasonable
interpretation differs from the broadest possible interpretation. In re Smith
Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The correct inquiry in
giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
specification is “an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the
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inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation
that is ‘consistent with the specification.’” Id. at 1382–83 (quoting In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
The disputed limitation recites “each container frame comprising a
plurality of virtual frames and one container timestamp common to each of
the plurality of virtual frames.” The timestamp in each container frame is
common to each of the plurality of virtual frames. Spec. ¶ 37. The
Examiner’s interprets the disputed limitation to apply to a sequential time
ordered succession of frames. A sequential time ordered succession of
frames, alone, does not teach the disputed limitation without a teaching that
there is a common timestamp associated with each frame in the container.
The Examiner has not sufficiently explained how the references teach the
disputed limitation “each container frame comprising a plurality of virtual
frames and one container timestamp common to each of the plurality of
virtual frames” (emphasis added).
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Shivadas does not
teach the disputed limitation because the sequential time codes of Shivadas
indicate the duration or position of segments without teaching the timestamp
in each container frame is common to each of the plurality of virtual frames.
We are also persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Miyazawa does not
teach the disputed limitation. In particular, the Miyazawa streams at
prescribed intervals do not teach a timestamp in each container frame that is
common to each of the plurality of virtual frames.
Although we agree with the Examiner’s findings that Shivadas and
Miyazawa teach partitioning streams utilizing time intervals and time codes,
on the record before us, the Examiner does not sufficiently describe how
either Shivadas or Miyazawa teaches the disputed limitation.
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Accordingly, the Examiner does not provide prima facie support for
the rejection. “[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the
prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Therefore, on the record before us, we are constrained to conclude the
Examiner errs in rejecting claim 31 and dependent claim 32 as obvious.
In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of representative
claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, and
Mukherjee. We also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claim 32.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 31 and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, and Mukherjee is reversed.
Because our decision with regard to the disputed limitation is
dispositive of the rejections made, we do not address additional arguments
raised by Appellant.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
31, 32 103(a) Caglar, Shivadas,
Miyazawa,
Mukherjee
31, 32
REVERSED