Avigilon CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 18, 20212020002196 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/568,081 12/11/2014 Shaun P. Marlatt PATAVL134-US-ORG2 1005 22917 7590 08/18/2021 MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC. IP Law Docketing 500 W. Monroe 43rd Floor Chicago, IL 60661 EXAMINER AN, SHAWN S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2483 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/18/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USAdocketing@motorolasolutions.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SHAUN P. MARLATT, OREN SHIR, PETER W. NEUFELD, VAN C. NGUYEN, and SINA AFROOZE Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 Technology Center 2400 Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, BETH Z. SHAW, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Non-Final Rejection of claims 31 and 32, which constitute all pending claims. See Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest is Avigilon Corporation. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The invention relates to streaming multiple encodings of a source video stream. Abstr.; Spec.2 ¶¶ 2, 5, 37, 46, 48, 62, 65; Figs. 1, 5A, 5B. Claim 31, reproduced below, is representative3 of the claimed subject matter (emphases added): 31. A display system, comprising: a receiver adapted to receive a plurality of container frames over a network, each container frame comprising a plurality of virtual frames and one container timestamp common to each of the plurality of virtual frames, and at least one of the plurality of virtual frames in each container frame being encoded using a different coding standard than at least another one of the plurality of virtual frames in the respective container frame; a processor adapted to associate a first selected frame of the received plurality of virtual frames within each container frame with a first encoding, and to reconstruct a first virtual stream of the first selected frames according to the container timestamps; and a monitor adapted to display the first virtual stream to a user. Appeal Br. 24–25 (Claim Appendix). REFERENCES Prior art relied upon by the Examiner: Name Reference Date Caglar et al. US 2006/0146934 A1 July 6, 2006 Shivadas et al. US 2014/0359680 A1 Dec. 4, 2014 Miyazawa et al. US 2003/0161610 A1 Aug. 28, 2003 Mukherjee et al. US 2011/0276652 A1 Nov. 10, 2011 2 Specification, filed Dec. 11, 2014 (“Spec.”). 3 Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 18) and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness rejection of claims 31 and 32 on the basis of representative claim 31. Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 3 REJECTIONS Claims 31 and 32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, and Mukherjee. Non-Final Act. 3–5. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief. As discussed below, we are persuaded by Appellant’s contentions of Examiner error. In our analysis below, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis. In the Non-Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, and Mukherjee teaches the limitations of independent claim 31, and provides a reason to combine the teachings to result in claim 31. Non-Final Act. 3–5 (citing Caglar ¶¶ 59, 201, 238, 240– 243, 276, Figs. 16, 18; Shivadas ¶¶ 41, 56, Fig. 3A; Miyazawa Abst., ¶¶ 8, 10, 12, 47, 53, 125–127, Fig. 3; and Mukherjee ¶¶ 6, 12, 13, 47, 52, 69, 70, 88, 89, 102, 184, Figs. 3, 4, 6). Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding the combination of the cited references teaches the limitations of claim 31. Appeal Br. 13–16; Reply Br. 2–9. Appellant argues, inter alia, the Examiner’s combination of the references does not teach the claim 31 limitation “each container frame comprising a plurality of virtual frames and one container timestamp common to each of the plurality of virtual frames” (also referred to as “disputed limitation;” emphasis added). Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 4 The Examiner finds, although Caglar does not explicitly teach the disputed limitation, Shivadas or Miyazawa teaches the disputed limitation. Non-Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner finds Shivadas teaches video streaming system/method comprising a plurality of container files (comprises a plurality of container frames), wherein each container file/frame comprises one container timestamp common/applicable to each of the plurality of frames in order to allow for adaptive streaming of video content and trick play features, wherein frame structure comprises encoded video block for container files/frames, wherein using container files with container time stamps to stream video content enables various playback features with clear advantage (abs.; Fig. 3A; paras. [0041], [0056]). Id. at 3. The Examiner further finds, as an additional/supplemental support, Miyazawa teaches stream processing system comprising at least one container (composite contents, storage device, 3) timestamp (playback position information) applicable/common to each of a plurality of real streams and virtual streams of video data, in order to provide a stream processing system capable of selectively playing an arbitrary part of the real stream/frames in a simple manner (abs.; Fig. 3; paras. [0010], [0012], [0047], [0053], [0125-0127], [0008]). Id. at 3–4. Appellant argues the Examiner errs in interpreting the term “time stamp” in the disputed limitation and in applying the teaching of Shivadas and Miyazawa to the disputed limitation. Appeal Br. 13–14. According to Appellant, the referenced paragraphs of Shivadas describe that each container file “contains a block or segment of video” comprising a plurality of successive frames “in a time ordered sequence.” Id. at 13 (citing Shivadas ¶ 41). Appellant argues, while the Examiner cites to paragraph 41 Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 5 referencing a “time code” associated with the container files, this is not what is recited in claim 31. Id. According to Appellant, claim 31 recites that “each container file comprises one container timestamp common to each of the plurality of frames.” Id. Appellant argues the Shivadas container files comprise a sequential, time-ordered succession of frames, and there is no disclosure of a common timestamp associated with each frame in the container. Id. Appellant further argues that the Shivadas “time code” is not a “timestamp” as recited in the disputed limitation as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 14. According to Appellant: The Examiner’s cited paragraph of Shivadas states that a container file (i.e., a file comprising sequential, time-ordered frames) “includes a time code TC to indicate a duration of the video of the video encoded in the block of the container filed, and/or a position of the container file in the succession of container files.” Shivadas, at [0041] (emphasis added). Thus, the time code is merely indicative of the duration or position of the video segment encoded within the container. By contrast, claim 31 recites a timestamp which is common to each of the plurality of plurality of virtual frames. Since each virtual frame within the claimed container frame is “encoded from a source frame,” i.e., a same source frame, the common timestamp is indicative of a time associated with the frame. As noted above, associating a timestamp is not possible in Shivadas, given the sequential nature of frames within containers, and therefore the reference’s time code cannot disclose the claimed “timestamp” common to the plurality of frames. Id. Appellant argues Miyazawa also does not teach the disputed limitations and that the Examiner’s findings are conclusory. Id. Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 6 In the Answer, regarding Shivadas, the Examiner presents a “Note” asserting that “Applicant’s one container timestamp common to each of the plurality of virtual frames (Applicant: Fig. 5B, para. [0068]) are substantially the same or similar in concept with respect to Shivadas et al’s container files comprising one container timestamp common/applicable/correspond to each of the plurality of frames (Fig. 2; para. [0041]).” Ans. 7. Regarding Miyazawa, the Examiner reiterates the Non-Final Action findings. Id. at 7. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues Shivadas does not use the term “timestamp” but instead uses the term “time code,” for example, time codes are shown as TC1, TC2, and TC3 in Figure 3 of Shivadas. Reply Br. 1–5. According to Appellant, in Shivadas each encoded video block is assigned a time code that includes a start time and an end time among a successive chain of container frames and indicates where in that successive chain that particular video block should be, but there is no common timestamp that applies to each of the virtual frames. Id. at 3–4. Appellant argues the Specification, for example paragraph 37, additionally supports that a timestamp is a single point in time that is assigned to each container frame containing a number of frames of the different encodings. Id. at 4. According to Appellant, a timestamp is a unique point in time and, in contrast, what is described in Shivadas is an indication of an order of sequential frames, each having its own unique point in time. Id. Appellant argues in the claimed system, the frames in the container do not represent a sequential series of frames, but rather differently encoded frames representing the exact same point in time. Id. at 5. Regarding Miyazawa, Appellant argues Miyazawa is similar to Shivadas and does not teach the disputed limitation. Id. at 5–6. Appellant Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 7 argues Miyazawa, like Shivadas, teaches partitioning a video stream at prescribed time intervals so the streams can be played back in the correct order. Id. at 6 (citing Miyazawa, Fig. 3). According to Appellant, as explained in Miyazawa paragraph 47, upon which the Examiner relies, this real stream is a “continuous time series data such as video/audio/music data.” Id. Appellant argues, while each stream partition may have a unique identifier, Miyazawa paragraph 53, the unique identifier is not a common timestamp as recited in the disputed limitation. Id. As discussed below, on the record before us, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding the disputed limitation because the Examiner provides insufficient evidence to support the finding that Shivadas or Miyazawa teaches the disputed limitation. Appellant’s arguments are reasonable and are not fully addressed by the Examiner. During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although we interpret claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Our reviewing court states that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). However, the broadest reasonable interpretation differs from the broadest possible interpretation. In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is “an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 8 inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’” Id. at 1382–83 (quoting In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The disputed limitation recites “each container frame comprising a plurality of virtual frames and one container timestamp common to each of the plurality of virtual frames.” The timestamp in each container frame is common to each of the plurality of virtual frames. Spec. ¶ 37. The Examiner’s interprets the disputed limitation to apply to a sequential time ordered succession of frames. A sequential time ordered succession of frames, alone, does not teach the disputed limitation without a teaching that there is a common timestamp associated with each frame in the container. The Examiner has not sufficiently explained how the references teach the disputed limitation “each container frame comprising a plurality of virtual frames and one container timestamp common to each of the plurality of virtual frames” (emphasis added). We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Shivadas does not teach the disputed limitation because the sequential time codes of Shivadas indicate the duration or position of segments without teaching the timestamp in each container frame is common to each of the plurality of virtual frames. We are also persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Miyazawa does not teach the disputed limitation. In particular, the Miyazawa streams at prescribed intervals do not teach a timestamp in each container frame that is common to each of the plurality of virtual frames. Although we agree with the Examiner’s findings that Shivadas and Miyazawa teach partitioning streams utilizing time intervals and time codes, on the record before us, the Examiner does not sufficiently describe how either Shivadas or Miyazawa teaches the disputed limitation. Appeal 2020-002196 Application 14/568,081 9 Accordingly, the Examiner does not provide prima facie support for the rejection. “[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Therefore, on the record before us, we are constrained to conclude the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 31 and dependent claim 32 as obvious. In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of representative claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, and Mukherjee. We also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claim 32. CONCLUSION The rejection of claims 31 and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, and Mukherjee is reversed. Because our decision with regard to the disputed limitation is dispositive of the rejections made, we do not address additional arguments raised by Appellant. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 31, 32 103(a) Caglar, Shivadas, Miyazawa, Mukherjee 31, 32 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation