Autoprod, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 8, 1976

223 N.L.R.B. 773 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

AUTOPROD, INC
Autoprod , Inc. and Shopmen 's Local Union No. 455,
International Association of Bridge , Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 29-
CA-4186
April 8, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On October 22, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Joseph I. Nachman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and General Counsel
filed a reply brief and a brief in support of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order, as modified here-
in.
1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board 's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544 ( 1950), enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 In agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent unlaw-
fully terminated negotiations following the filing of the decertification peti-
tion , we rely on the fact that Respondent withdrew recognition in the con-
text of its unlawful conduct . Such conduct directly affected all unit
employees and could have reasonably been predicted to cause employee
disaffection . In these circumstances, the filing of the decertification petition
is not sufficient to justify Respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union.
Anvil Products Inc., 205 NLRB 709 (1973), reversed and remanded 496 F.2d
94 (C.A. 5, 1974), Supplemental Decision and Order 216 NLRB 158 (1975);
Warehouse Market, Inc., 216 NLRB 216 (1975).
Contrary to our dissenting colleague , we agree with the Administrative
Law Judge. that the addresses of the unit employees were necessary and
relevant for collective -bargaining purposes . Respondent 's plant is located in
a heavily populated area . Plant employees live throughout this area. It
would be unduly burdensome to require the Union to search for the ad-
dresses of the unit employees , particularly where , as here, there has been
substantial turnover of employees and a long lapse of time between the
Union's organizational campaign and commencement of bargaining. In
contrast , Respondent could prepare the requested information with relative
ease from its employment records, thereby facilitating the bargaining proc-
ess. Moreover , the fact that the Union may have been able to obtain the
addresses of the employees by other means does not diminish the obligation
of the Employer to furnish relevant information. For it is clear that Sec.
8(a)(5) imposes on an employer the duty to furnish a union with informa-
tion relevant to the union's intelligent performance of its representative
function . Acme Industrial Company, 150 NLRB 1463 (1965), enfd. 385 U.S.
432 (1967).
ORDER
773
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Autoprod, Inc., New
Hyde Park, New York, its officers , agents, succes-
sors , and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following paragraph for para-
graph 1(b) of the Administrative Law Judge's recom-
mended Order:
"(b) Unilaterally changing the wages, hours, or
any other terms and conditions of employment of
any employee in the unit for whom the aforesaid la-
bor organization is the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative; provided, however, that nothing
contained in this Decision shall require the Respon-
dent to vary or abandon any wages or other benefits
which the Respondent already has established, or
prejudice the assertion by the employees of any
rights previously acquired."
2. Delete paragraph 2(c) of the Administrative
Law Judge's recommended Order.
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
CHAIRMAN MURPHY, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part:
I agree with my colleagues that Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally
granting a wage increase, by terminating negotiations
with the Union, and by failing to bargain in good
faith. However, I do not agree with their finding that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
refusing to furnish the Union with the addresses of
the approximately 14 employees in the bargaining
unit.
An employer violates the Act by refusing to fur-
nish the collective-bargaining representative the ad-
dresses of unit employees only if such information is
necessary and relevant.' Such information is neces-
sary and relevant where it is established that the rela-
tionship between the collective-bargaining represen-
tative and the employees is such that the
collective-bargaining representative has no alterna-
tive means of effectively communicating with a sub-
stantial number of unit employees .4 In each case
where the Board has found that this was the case and
that, as a result, the employer was obligated to pro-
7 Standard Oil Company of California, Westerns Operations, Inc., 166
NLRB 343 ( 1967), enfd . 399 F.2d 636 (C.A . 9, 1968); Prudential Insurance
Company, 173 NLRB 792 (1968); Southern Counties Gas Company of Califor-
nia, 174 NLRB 19 (1969 ); The Western and Southern Life Insurance Compa-
ny, 188 NLRB 509 (1971).
4 Standard Oil Company, 166 NLRB at 345-346.
223 NLRB No. 101
774 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
vide the requested information, there was either a
large number of employees, multiple employer loca-
tions, irregular or infrequent reporting to the employ-
er location, or a combination of these and other fac-
tors which established that the collective-bargaining
representative was having difficulty communicating
with a large number of the employees it represented.'
In fact, the Board rejected the position that a bar-
gaining representative was entitled to such a list as a
matter of right.6 In contrast with the cited cases, here
the unit consisted of but 14 employees, all of whom
worked at a single accessible location. There is thus
no showing other than unfounded assumptions
drawn by the Administrative Law Judge that the
Union had any difficulty communicating with these
employees.' Therefore, it has not been established
that the requested information of employee address-
es is relevant and necessary for the Union to carry
out its bargaining obligation. Accordingly, I would
dismiss this allegation of the complaint.
s Magma Copper Company, San Manuel Division, 208 NLRB 329 (1974).
6 Id.
r The most that can be said is that some of the possible alternative meth-
ods of communicating with unit employees were not available . Where the
Union is nevertheless able to communicate readily with unit employees in
various other ways, the fact that not all means of communication are open
to it hardly is reason for finding that employee addresses are relevant and
necessary.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had the opportunity
to present evidence and state their positions , the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post this notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form , join , or help unions
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything to interfere with you
in the exercise of the aforementioned rights, and
all our employees are free to become or remain
members of Shopmen 's Local Union No. 455,
International Association of Bridge , Structural
and Ornamental Iron Workers , AFL-CIO, or
not to become or remain members of that or any
other union.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the wages,
hours, or any terms or conditions of employ-
ment of any employee in the unit for which Lo-
cal 455 is the exclusive collective-bargaining rep-
resentative.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with the aforesaid Local 455 as the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of our employ-
ees in an appropriate unit composed of all pro-
duction and maintenance employees, excluding
office clericals, professional employees, sales-
men, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act, with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, and if an under-
standing is reached reduce the same to a signed
written agreement.
As the National Labor Relations Board found that
we violated the law when we refused to supply Local
455 with the addresses of the employees in the afore-
said unit, we will, upon request of Local 455, prompt-
ly supply the latter with such information.
AUTOPROD, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPH I. NACHMAN, Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding heard before me at Brooklyn, New York, on Au-
gust 18 and 19,1 with all parties duly represented, involves
a complaint 2 pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act), which
alleges that Autoprod, Inc. (herein Respondent or Compa-
ny), violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by (a) fail-
ing and refusing to furnish information requested by
Shopmen's Local No. 455, International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-
CIO (herein the Union), the duly designated collective-bar-
gaining representative of Respondent's employees in a des-
ignated unit (b) unilaterally granting a wage increase, and
(c) bargaining with the Union in bad faith and with the
intention of avoiding agreement. By answer duly filed, Re-
spondent admitted certain allegations of the complaint, but
denied the commission of any unfair labor practice. For
reasons hereafter more fully detailed, I find the material
allegations of the complaint sustained by the evidence and
recommend an appropriate remedial order.
At the hearing all parties were permitted to introduce
relevant and material evidence, to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, to argue orally on the record, and to sub-
mit briefs. Oral argument by the General Counsel and lim-
ited remarks by counsel for Respondent are included in the
transcript. This argument, as well as briefs submitted by
This and all dates hereafter mentioned are 1975, unless otherwise indi-
cated.
2 Issued June 24, on a charge filed and served January 14, and amended
on February 26.
AUTOPROD, INC
the General Counsel and Respondent, respectively, has
been duly considered. Upon the pleadings, stipulations of
counsel, the evidence, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses while testifying, and the entire rec-
ord in the case , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT 3
I. BACKGROUND
By its Decision and Order issued February 5, 1973 (201
NLRB 597), the Board adopted the findings, conclusions,
and recommended Order of Administrative Law Judge
Janus who had found that, in the course of the Union's
organizational campaign among its employees , Respon-
dent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1), (3),
and (5) of the Act, and that under the Gissel rule (Gissel
Packing Co., Inc., 375 U.S. 575 (1969) ), Respondent as a
part of the remedy for such violations should be required
to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representa-
tive of the employees involved. On January 8, 1974, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en-
forced the Board's order in full. 489 F.2d 752.
One other fact found in the prior proceeding is of some
relevance to the issues in the instant case . Although deem-
ing it unnecessary to determine the exact number of em-
ployees involved, Administrative Law Judge Janus found
that there were either 12 or 14 employees in the unit and 11
of those employees had signed an authorization card for
the Union and that each card so signed had spaces which
provided the name of the employee, the name and address
of the employer, the job held and the rate of pay, as well as
the employees' residence address and telephone number.
201 NLRB at 598.
11. THE CURRENT UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
Following the court's judgment of enforcement, counsel
for Respondent wrote the Union on January 31 that the
Company desired to negotiate a contract and requested a
copy of an agreement which the Union would propose,
stating that upon receipt and study of such proposal coun-
sel would communicate with the Union for mutually con-
venient bargaining dates . The letter also stated that counsel
deemed it appropriate to advise the Union that the Re-
spondent had an established policy of granting wage in-
creases to the unit employees in January of each year; that
no increase had yet been granted for 1974; and that the
Company wished to maintain its policy and asked whether
the Union would object to the Company implementing and
effectuating its wage policy by granting the January 1974
increases . The Union replied by letter dated February 7
that it would object to the Company granting any wage
increase without first negotiating the same with the Union
and suggested that bargaining sessions be scheduled for
No issue of commerce or labor organization is presented . The complaint
alleges and the answer admits facts which establish these jurisdictional ele-
ments . Moreover, the Board asserted jurisdiction over Respondent in a prior
case , hereafter more fully discussed , which resulted in an order requiring it
to bargain with the Union, which order forms the basis for this proceeding.
775
February 14 or 15. Company counsel replied under date of
February 25,4 stating in effect that before meaningful bar-
gaining could take place it would be necessary for the
Union to submit a written comprehensive proposal in or-
der that the Union's demands could be properly evaluated.
Along with its letter dated March 4, the Union sent com-
pany counsel a proposed contract embodying its demands,
which was complete except for wage rates and classifica-
tions, stating those portions of its proposal would "follow
soon." 5 By letter dated March 6, the Union wrote compa-
ny counsel, referring to its March 4 letter and its contract
proposals submitted therewith, and added that, for purpos-
es of negotiations, "rates of pay and any [other] benefits
presently in effect" for the unit employees. The letter con-
cluded by saying that the Union hoped to have the request-
ed information "within the next few days." Receiving no
reply, the Union again wrote company counsel on March
14, calling attention to the fact that the information re-
quested in its March 6 letter had not been received, and
again asked that it be furnished.6
The Company furnished all the information requested
by the Union with its letter of April 15, except that the
addresses of the unit employees were not supplied. By its
letter to company counsel dated April 23, the Union called
attention to the fact that, although the Company had not
provided all the requested information, it wished to com-
mence negotiations promptly, asked for a meeting for that
purpose on April 30, and requested that in the meanwhile it
be furnished with the addresses of the unit employees.
Company counsel replied on April 26 that the suggested
date of April 30 for a meeting would not be convenient
because a principal officer of the Company who would
participate in the bargaining would be out of the country
from April 26 to May 10, and suggested that the first bar-
gaining session be held on May 15. The suggestion was
accepted by the Union, and the bargaining sessions began
on that date. Counsel's letter made no comment on the
Union's request for the addresses of 'the employees.
The May 15 meeting was devoted entirely to a discussion
of the contract proposals the Union had submitted to the
Company, except for economic issues which the parties
agreed to defer. Although agreement was reached on some
provisions, mostly of a minor nature, most produced dis-
agreement and brought about considerable discussion.
Thus there was disagreement on the language of the
preamble as well as on the scope of the unit. On union
security, the Company announced its opposition as a mat-
ter of principle and that it would also want a broad man-
agement prerogative provision. The Company also op-
posed the provision for shift differential, as well as for
daily overtime, saying that overtime should accrue only
after 40 hours of work in the week. On premium pay for
holidays, the Company objected to the Union's proposal
4 The reason for the lapse of time in replying to the Union' s letter of
February 7 is not explained in the record. Counsel's letter of February 25
seems to have been prompted, at least in part, by a telephone call made by
Union President Calavito on February 25, reference to which is made in
counsel 's letter.
5 The provisions of the Union's proposed contract, to the extent material,
are hereafter discussed.
6 With this letter the Union supplied its contract proposals for wages and
classifications , which had been omitted from its original submission.
776 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and advanced a proposal of its own. On the section on
grievances and arbitration , the Company opposed virtually
the entire proposal of the Union and regarding plant visits
by union officials proposed that a formal application for
such leave be filed. On promotions the Company opposed
the Union's entire proposal , urging that such matters
should be in the sole discretion of the Company. The
Union's proposal on leave of absences was also opposed by
the Company, and it objected to the language of the
Union's proposal on vacations. In addition, the Company
opposed the Union's proposal for a trust fund from which
vacation benefits would be paid. With respect to subcon-
tracting, the Company wanted to continue its then current
practice and opposed the Union's proposals for washup
and rest periods. The Company had its own program for
sick leave and proposed that such program be retained in-
stead of that proposed by the Union. The remainder of the
Union's proposals dealing with pensions , annuities, sick
leave and severance, the Company opposed. As the meet-
ing of May 15 was about to conclude, the Company an-
nounced that it was giving consideration to putting a wage
increase into effect , but did not state when this might be
done . Colavito protested that any wage increases should be
negotiated, and that such action by the Company, if taken
unilaterally, could only have the effect of undermining the
Union. Company Attorney Goldblatt stated that such was
his view, and for that reason he had advised against it, but
that company officers felt they had to proceed with that
action.
The next negotiating session was on June 4.' At the out-
set of this meeting the Company announced that a 10-per-
cent wage increase, retroactive to January 1, had been put
into effect . Colavito again protested this action , but the
Company insisted that conditions made it necessary, and
that in any event the increase had been fully accom-
plished .8 The remainder of this meeting was devoted to
further discussion of the Union's contract proposals relat-
ing to welfare and rates of pay for vacations. The Compa-
ny adhered to the positions it had taken at the meeting of
May 15 , and no agreements were reached . The parties then
agreed to and did meet on June 12.
At the June 12 meeting, the Company presented its
counterproposals, which the parties discussed. Colavito tes-
r Union President Colavito testified that the parties had agreed to meet
on some date in the latter part of May, but this was canceled by the Compa-
ny. The reason for the cancellation does not appear , nor is there any evi-
dence that the delay was not with the acquiescence of the Union.
B There is a conflict in the evidence as to when this increase was put into
effect . As indicated , Colavito's testimony was that he was informed at the
May 15 meeting that the Company was considering it, and at the June 4
meeting that the increase had been made effective. Maurer, an employee
witness called by Respondent , while not certain of the date , fixed it at 6
months after January 1 , "close to vacation time" or "close to summertime."
Company President Tropp testified that the increase was put into effect "the
end of March ." If Tropp was correct , then the company statements at the
meetings of May 1S and June 4 make no sense whatever , unless his purpose
was to mislead the Union , a question I need not decide . On the entire
record, I find that this increase was put into effect at some point between
May 15 and June 4. The General Counsel concedes that this increase cannot
be made on the basis of an independent unfair labor practice finding, be-
cause it occurred more than 6 months prior to filing of the initial charge
herein on January 14, 1975, but contended that it is indicia that
Respondent 's bargaining was, from its inception , in bad faith.
tified that while the counterproposals represented some
changes in the positions Respondent took at the prior
meetings, particularly in the area of holidays, sick leave,
and vacations, he informed Respondent that such changes
represented little of substance. He gave no testimony as to
the precise area of such changes in position. In addition,
the parties had further discussion on the Union's proposal
for union security, but the Company adhered to its position
voiced at the prior meetings that it considered it improper
to force any employee to maintain union membership, and
that it did not wish to do so. At the end of this meeting the
parties agreed to and did meet on June 19.
The June 19 meeting was devoted to a discussion of the
Union's proposals dealing with welfare, pensions, and clas-
sifications, including whether any classification system was
necessary in view of the small number of employees in the
unit. On welfare and pensions, the Company again rejected
the proposal that it participate in the Union's industrywide
plan and stated that it wished to continue with its existing
practice. Costs of these plans were also discussed, it being
agreed that under the Union's proposal the cost to the
Company would be about $60 a month per employee, and
under the Company's plan about $40 a month.
The next meeting was on July 24,9 and lasted about an
hour. The meeting opened with a statement by the Compa-
ny that on noneconomic issues, other than union security
and management prerogative, there would probably be no
difficulty in reaching agreement, but that on economic is-
sues the Company could not afford to pay more than it was
then paying, augmented by a 10-percent increase to be ef-
fective in January 1975, and a like increase in January
1976. The Union announced that it wanted an accountant
to examine the Company's books. Company counsel
agreed and stated that the accountant selected by the
Union could get together with company officials and ar-
range for the examination, but that pending the
accountant's report he saw no purpose in further negotia-
tions. There is no evidence that the Union objected to the
suspension of negotiations, or asked the Company to re-
sume or continue bargaining, pending the auditor's report.
At this meeting the Union again asked for the addresses of
the employees, and the Company again refused saying it
had no obligation to furnish such information and would
not do so.
On November 4, the Union wrote company counsel that
it was in receipt of its accountant's report, which in its view
indicated that the Company was operating at a profit, re-
quested resumption of negotiations, and stated that it
hoped to hear promptly with respect to an agreeable date.
The record does not show any written response from the
Company, but Colavito testified that a meeting was set up
for mid-December, which it became necessary for him to
cancel, and that he agreed on January 3, 1975, as the date
to resume negotiations. There is no evidence indicating
company responsibility for the fact that no bargaining oc-
9 Actually the parties had agreed to meet early in July, but that meeting
was canceled by the Company because of a conflict in dates with another
Board case in which company counsel represented a party, pending in Re-
gion 11 , and that Region declined to grant him a continuance . The parties
then agreed on July 24. There is no evidence that the Union objected to this
delay in negotiations.
AUTOPROD, INC
curred between July 24 and the following January 3.
At the meeting on January 3, the Union took the posi-
tion that the Company was operating at a profit and
should make a better economic offer than it had made. The
Company's only reply was that it needed its earnings for
growth. The parties then had some discussion regarding
job requirements, but no agreement was reached. The
Company then stated that it was considering giving the
employees a 10-percent wage increase. Colavito protested
that such action would be illegal; that more was required
for a meaningful wage offer, but that in any event both the
giving of the increase and the amount thereof should be
first negotiated. Colavito also again told the Company that
he still wanted the addresses of the employees, and compa-
ny counsel again responded that such would not be sup-
plied. The parties then agreed to meeting again on January
19.
In the meantime, on January 8 an RD petition was filed
by a group of employees, and on January 17 the Union
filed its initial charge herein, which was amended on Feb-
ruary 26.10
At the meeting on January 17, the Company announced
that the 10-percent wage increase, mentioned at the previ-
ous meeting, had been placed into effect, and Colavito
again protested that the Company's actions in that regard
were undercutting the Union. The parties stipulated that
this wage increase was granted by the Company on Janu-
ary 8 and was given to all unit employees. The parties also
discussed at this meeting such issues as vacations , holidays,
and premium pay, in each instance the Union modifying
its proposals and accepting the proposals submitted by the
Company, with some suggested modifications. However,
no agreements were reached. The parties then agreed on
January 24 as the date for the next meeting, but that date
was canceled and the parties met on January 27.11
At the January 27, 1975, meeting, the parties further dis-
cussed certain union proposals. According to Colavito,
considerable time was spent in discussing the union-securi-
ty proposal, the Union explaining that initially the Union
had not sought out the employees, rather the latter came to
the Union for assistance; that the Company then intimi-
dated the employee, which gave rise to the prior case, and
that the Company was not in good position to argue that it
merely was protecting the rights of the workers. The Com-
pany agreed to give consideration to the Union's argument
and also to consider the contract proposals which the
Union had agreed to modify. On this note the meeting
ended with an agreement to meet early in February, the
exact date being thereafter fixed as February 7. However,
10 The initial charge filed January 14 alleged that while the Company was
under an obligation to and was in fact bargaining with the Union, and
before an impasse was reached , the Company unilaterally changed terms
and conditions of employment . No mention was made of the failure and
refusal of Respondent to supply the addresses of the employees as requested
by the Union. The amended charge repeated the allegations of the original
charge and added the allegation that on various dates in the past 6 months,
and including among others on January 17 and 27, 1975, the Union request-
ed the names and addresses of employees in the unit and that the Company
refused to supply that information.
11 The record does not indicate who requested the postponement, or the
reason for it . In any event, if the Union did not request the postponement,
there is no evidence that it raised any objection thereto.
777
no further meetings were held because by letter dated Feb-
ruary 5 the Company declined to meet further by reason of
the pendency of the decertification petition filed by the
employees on January 8, saying that it would resume such
bargaining only if the Union was thereafter certified as the
collective-bargaining representative of the employees.12
Contentions and Conclusions
The General Counsel predicates his contention that
Respondent's bargaining violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act, on four basic points. He argues that (1) the failure to
furnish the Union with the addresses of the unit employ-
ees; (2) the January 1975 wage increase granted as it was
unilaterally, and after Respondent had refused the Union's
request for bargaining concerning the granting of the in-
crease and the amount thereof; (3) the termination of ne-
gotiations and refusal to meet with the Union, on or about
February 5; and (4) viewed in its entirety, the course of
conduct engaged in by Respondent in its negotiations with
the Union, constituted bad-faith bargaining." These con-
tentions will be discussed in order.
The Refusal to Provide Addresses of Unit Employees
The duty of an employer to supply information concern-
ing unit employees to a collective-bargaining agent has
been considered by the Board in a number of cases.14 The
12 My findings regarding the bargaining negotiations are based on the
uncontradicted and credited testimony of Colavito. The only witness called
by Respondent who attended the bargaining sessions was Tropp, who gave
no testimony relating to the bargaining sessions other than the practice of
granting wage increases and the Union 's request for the addresses of em-
ploTees.
1 The General Counsel also appears to argue that a refusal to bargain on
the part of Respondent should be found because there was too much delay
between meetings, referring particularly to the fact that there were no meet-
ings between July 24 and January 3, a delay of nearly 6 months, and that
the overall period of negotiations was unduly extended, lasting approxi-
mately a year after the initial request for bargaining . I find the evidence
insufficient to support such a conclusion . Although the initial request for
bargaining was in late January 1974, and the first bargaining session was on
May 15, the intervening time was spent in preparing proposals and it was
not until April 23 that the Union actually requested a negotiating meeting,
and while its proposed date of April 30 was not acceptable to the Company,
the latter suggested May 15 and the parties met on that day . There is no
showing that the Union did not voluntarily acquiesce in the requested ex-
tension . Although there were additional cancellations of proposed meeting
dates in late May and early July 1974, there is no evidence that the cancella-
tions were not for good and sufficient reasons, or that Union did not volun-
tarily acquiesce in what the Company requested. At the July 24, 1974, meet-
ing, when the Union requested an audit of Respondent's books, it seems to
have agreed that further bargaining was useless until the audit was complet-
ed, and it was not until November 4, 1974, that the Union notified Respon-
dent that the audit had been completed , and that it desired a resumption of
negotiations . Although the next meeting was not held until January 3, 1975,
the evidence shows that a scheduled meeting for mid-December was can-
celed by the Union because of the inability of its negotiator to attend on
that date. Under all the circumstances , I am unable to find that negotiations
were unduly delayed by Respondent for the purpose of frustrating or de-
feating agreement on contract terms.
14 See, i.e., Standard Oil Company of California, Western Operations, Inc.,
166 NLRB 343 (1968); Prudential Insurance Co., 173 NLRB 792 (1968),
enfd . 412 F.2d 77 (C.A. 2, 1969); Southern Counties Gas Company of Califor-
nia, 174 NLRB 19 (1969); General Electric Company, 176 NLRB 605 (1969);
United Aircraft Corporation, 181 NLRB 892 (1970), enfd. 434 F.2d 1198
(C.A. 2, 1970); Magma Copper Company San Manuel Division, 208 NLRB
Continued
778 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
basic thread running through the applicable decisions is
that the information sought by the collective-bargaining
agent must be relevant to discharging its statutory duty of
fair representation . In determining the relevancy of the in-
formation sought , the Board in Magma Copper, supra, 331,
said that it will give consideration to:
... such factors as the size of the unit ; the rate of
turnover ; the nature of the contractal union -security
clause , if any ; the union's ability to reach member and
nonmember employees , both at the plant and at their
homes , including the effectiveness of any steward sys-
tem, and the use of bulletin boards ; and the availabili-
ty of the information to the employer . In Standard Oil
and United Aircraft, the employers were required to
furnish the list in view of such facts as the relatively
low union membership in the unit , the absence of a
union-security clause in the collective -bargaining
agreement , the residential dispersion of the unit em-
ployees over a wide geographic area , the apparent in-
effectiveness of the steward system , the lack of ade-
quate exposure of unit employees to union bulletin
boards, the inefficiency of handbilling efforts , and the
ability of the company to compile the list with relative
ease.
In the instant case the evidence shows that the Union
had l 1 authorization cards from approximately 14 employ-
ees in the unit at the time of the initial hearing , each card
calling for the name, residence address, and telephone
number of the signing employee . There is nothing in the
evidence to indicate that the signed cards were not com-
pletely and accurately filled out. In addition to the three
employees who did not sign cards, two or three who did
sign are no longer employed by Respondent. Presumably
the latter group was replaced by new employees, thus leav-
ing the Union with 6 of 14 unit employees (over 40 percent)
for whom it did not, so far as the evidence shows, have an
address or telephone number, and as indicated the infor-
mation it had on the other 6 was over 2 years old when the
bargaining commenced . The Union's duty, however, was
to represent and bargain for all employees in the unit and
not just those who had signed cards. No contract between
the Union and the Company was in effect, hence no bene-
fits could accrue to the Union from a union-security
clause, from bulletin board privilege, or from other benefits
normally accruing to an incumbent union having the bene-
fit of a contract. Respondent's plant, located in New Hyde
Park, New York, a community on Long Island, is an exten-
sive area and rather heavily populated. To expect the
Union to search such a wide area, or even to resort to a
search of telephone books, which on Long Island has a
substantial duplication of names , is to impose a very heavy
burden on the Union compared to the ease which with
Respondent could prepare the information from books it is
required by law to keep.
Upon considerations of all applicable facts, and balanc-
329 (1974); and Viewlex, Inc. formerly known as Globe Albums, Inc., 204
NLRB 1080 ( 1973), where only the address of the employees appears to
have been involved.
ing the various factors involved, in light of applicable pre-
cedent, I find and conclude that the General Counsel has
made an adequate showing of the relevance of the address-
es of unit employees requested by the Union on numerous
occasions with 6 months prior to the filing of the charge
herein, and that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act when it refused the Union's request for such
information.
The Unilateral Wage Increase
As heretofore stated, at the meeting of May 15, 1974,
Respondent informed the Union that it was considering a
10-percent wage increase to the unit employees. Notwith-
standing the Union's protest that such an increase would
have the effect of undermining the Union, and in any event
should be negotiated between the parties, Respondent act-
ed unilaterally and put the increase into effect, retroactive
to early January, and at the June 4 meeting notified the
Union of the accomplished fact. Respondent followed the
same course with respect to the January 1975 increase. At
the meeting on January 3, 1975, it informed the Union that
it was considering an increase of 10 percent in wages paid
to unit employees. Again the Union protested, and accord-
ing to the evidence Respondent agreed to give consider-
ation to the Union' s arguments , but, acting unilaterally,
and without further consultation with the Union, informed
the Union at the meeting of January 17 that an increase of
10 percent had been put into effect as of January 8.
Respondent contends that the wage increase in January
1975 was not violative of the Act because it was granted
pursuant to its policy and practice to grant a wage increase
of about 10 percent to all employees during the first week
in January of each year, which policy had been in effect for
about 5 years and had been made known to all employees.
To support the existence of this policy and practice, Re-
spondent relies on the testimony of Maurer, an employee
witness called by Respondent, and that of Company Presi-
dent Tropp. Maurer's testimony I regard as quite unsatis-
factory and do not credit it. He was obviously testifying
from recollection, and his testimony as a whole indicates
that his memory was quite faulty. I also find myself unable
to place reliance on Tropp's testimony that there in fact
existed an established policy to grant annual wage increas-
es, or that such increases had in fact been granted for some
years in the past.
The best evidence of Respondent's practice with respect
to wage increases would be its books showing hours
worked, the rates of pay, the total wages due, and the
amounts deducted from the employee during each work-
week.ls Since records are required to be kept by lawful
authority (United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-125
(1941) ), such records must exist; but Respondent did not
produce them. Instead, it relies solely on the uncorroborat-
15 There are records required to be kept and preserved by the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. See 29
U.S.C. 211 (c) and Code of Federal Regulations , Title 29, Chapter V, sub-
part A. sec. 516.7, and subpart B, sec . 516.14. The allegations of pars. 3 and
4 of the complaint, which are admitted by the answer, make it clear that at
least some of Respondent 's employees are subject to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.
AUTOPROD, INC
ed testimony of Tropp,16 and the evidence of Maurer which
I have rejected as not credible. This I deem insufficient to
establish the existence of a plan or practice , as Respondent
seeks to do. As the Supreme Court said in Interstate Circuit
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939), "The production
of weak evidence when strong is available can lead only to
the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse."
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent failed
to establish that any plan or policy for granting of annual
wage increase in fact existed.
Respondent's statutory duty to bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of the unit employees exacts
"the negative duty to treat with no other," (May Depart-
ment Stores d/b/a Famous-Barr Company v. N.L.R.B., 326
U.S. 376 (1946); N.L.R.B. v. Katz, Benne, d/b/a/ Williams-
burg Steel Products Co., 369 U.S. 736 (1962) ).
Respondent's conduct here was, in practical effect, bar-
gaining with the employees individually in derogation of
the status of the majority representative to whom alone the
duty to bargain is owed. May Department Store, supra, and
Katz, supra. Indeed, in Katz the Supreme Court held that
an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act if he makes
unilateral changes in wages , hours, or working conditions
without first bargaining to an impasse with the majority
representative , regardless of his motive in effectuating such
changes.17
Accordingly, I find and conclude that by granting the
wage increase to unit employees on January 8, without first
bargaining with the Union concerning the same, Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The Termination of Negotiations in February 1975
As above detailed, at the conclusion of the bargaining
meeting on January 27 , the parties agreed to meet again
early in February, the exact date being thereafter set for
February 7. However, by letter dated February 5, Respon-
dent, confirming a telephone conversation of the same
date, notified the Union that it would no longer meet with
the latter because of the pendency of the decertification
filed by the employees on January 8, and would resume
such bargaining only in the event that the Union was there-
after certified by the Board as the representative of the
employees . No further negotiating meetings have been
held. I must and do agree with the General Counsel that,
on the facts of the instant case , Respondent had no valid
basis for terminating negotiations with the Union.
The authorities are clear that the filing of a decertifica-
16 It is worthy of note that not even Tropp, the only Respondent witness
who gave testimony on the bargaining negotiations , claimed that Respon-
dent told the Union during the actual negotiations that it had any custom or
practice of granting annual wage increase.
17 In the instant case , plainly no impasse in bargaining had been reached
when Respondent granted the January 1975 increase . Prior to the July 24,
1974, meeting , the parties had by agreement deferred considerations of eco-
nomic issues . When wages were brought up at the July 24, 1974 , meeting,
Respondent pleaded inability to pay, and further bargaining was suspended
until the Union completed its audit of Respondent 's records . The meeting
on January 3, 1975, was the first meeting when the parties resumed bargain-
ing, and plainly no impasse was reached at that meeting. At the next meet-
ing on January 17, Respondent told the Union that the increase had been
made effective on January 8.
779
tion petition by employees does not, standing alone , justify
an employer in refusing to bargain further with the Union.
To justify such a refusal there must be an affirmative show-
ing of facts demonstrating that reasonable grounds exist
for believing that the Union has in fact lost its majority.
Anvil Products Inc., 205 NLRB 709 (1973); Celanese Corpo-
ration of America, 95 NLRB 664 (1951); Rolich, Inc., 145
NLRB 1236 (1964). Moreover, the issue of loss of majority
by a union must not be raised by the employer in a context
of illegal conduct on his part. As the Board said in Cela-
nese, supra:
There must . . . be `some reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the Union lost its majority status' ... and
... the majority issue must not have been raised by
the employer in a context of illegal antiunion activi-
ties , or other conduct by the employer aimed at caus-
ing disaffection from the Union or indicating that in
raising the majority issue the employer was merely
seeking to gain some time in which to undermine the
Union.
In the instant case Respondent made no showing of any
facts-reasonable or otherwise-forming a ground for be-
lieving that the Union had lost its majority status . The only
showing it made was that a group of employees had filed a
decertification petition, and this, as the authorities hold, is
insufficient to justify Respondent's refusal to negotiate fur-
ther with the Union. Additionally, the facts strongly indi-
cate that employee disaffection from the Union here was
caused in no small part by Respondent's illegal activity.
Not only did Respondent, as I have found, commit unfair
labor practices by refusing to furnish the Union with the
addresses of the unit employees, by unilaterally granting
the employees a wage increase in January 1975, and as
hereafter detailed, by bargaining in bad faith with the
Union, but it is difficult to ignore the very salient fact that
the January 1975 wage increase was made effective by Re-
spondent on the very day that the decertification petition
was filed. In this posture it is difficult to ignore the distinct
probability that the wage increase was really the "frosting
on the cake" that brought about the final act by the em-
ployees to demonstrate their belief that the Union could no
longer do anything for them, and that all their demands
could be satisfied by their individual bargaining with the
employer. Cf. C & C Plywood Corporation, 148 NLRB 414
(1964).
Accordingly, I find and conclude that the filing of the
decertification petition did not justify Respondent' s termi-
nation of negotiations with the Union, and that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it did
SO.
The Alleged Bad-Faith Bargaining
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representative of his employees, and Section 8(d) de-
fines the term "bargain collectively" as: '
. .. the performances of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to
780 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment . . . but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession.
Although neither agreement to a specific proposal nor the
making of a concession is required , the statutory definition
does demand that the parties meet and confer in an honest
and sincere effort to reach agreement on mutually accept-
able terms. But "bad faith bargaining is prohibited though
done with sophistication and finesse" (N.L.R.B. v. Herman
Sausage Company, Inc., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (C.A. 5, 1960) ).
And as the same court pointed out, compliance with the
employer's statutory obligation:
... takes more than mere "surface bargaining," or
"shadow boxing to a draw," or "giving the union a
runaround while purporting to be meeting with the
Union for purpose of collective bargaining ," (id. at
232),
for to
... sit at a bargaining table , or to sit almost forever,
or to make concessions here and there , could be the
very means by which to conceal a purposeful strategy
to make bargaining futile or fail. (id 232.)
The standard for assessing whether or not a particular
course of bargaining meets the test of "good faith" was
well stated by Administrative Law Judge Leff , which the
Board adopted, in "M" System, Inc., Mobile Home Division
Mid-States Corporation, 129 NLRB 527 (1960), where it is
said (at 547):
Good faith , or the want of it, is concerned essential-
ly with a state of mind. There is no shortcut to a deter-
mination of whether an employer has bargained with
the requisite good faith the statute commands. That
determination must be based upon reasonable infer-
ence drawn from the totality of conduct evidencing
the state of mind with which the employer entered into
and participated in the bargaining process. The
employer's state of mind is to be gleaned not only
from his conduct at the bargaining table , but also
from his conduct away from it-for example , conduct
reflecting a rejection of the principle of collective bar-
gaining or an underlying purpose to bypass or under-
mine the union manifests the absence of a genuine
desire to compose differences and to reach agreement
in the manner the Act commands . All aspects of the
Respondent's bargaining and related conduct must be
considered in unity, not as separate fragments each to
be assessed in isolation.
Applying the foregoing principles to Respondent's
course of bargaining in the instant case, I am convinced,
and therefore find and conclude , that Respondent from the
inception of the bargaining did so in bad faith and with the
intent and purpose of avoiding agreement with the Union,
and hence violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. I reach this
conclusion based on the totality of the following consider-
ations:
1. Respondent's animus toward the unionization of its
employees is made plain by its unlawful conduct in the
prior case which , as the Board with court approval found,
made a fair election impossible and required the imposi-
tion of a bargaining order.
2. The Union's request for the names , addresses, classifi-
cations, and rates of pay on March 6 , which request was
repeated on March 14 , was completely ignored by Respon-
dent until April 15. Although all of the requested informa-
tion , except the addresses of the employees , was furnished
on the last mentioned date , Respondent has steadfastly re-
fused since that date to furnish the Union with the address-
es of the employees on its payroll . In view of the minimal
inconvenience the furnishing of the addresses of the em-
ployees would impose upon Respondent , it is reasonable to
infer , as I do , that the purpose of such refusal was to em-
barrass the Union, and to try to put a stumbling block into
the negotiations.
3. The wage increase granted by Respondent in late
May or early June 1974, which I have not herein found to
have been an unfair labor practice because of the provi-
sions of Section 10(b), I nonetheless find and conclude was
timed for and given with the intent and purpose of degrad-
ing the Union in the eyes of the employees , and to create a
major obstacle to agreement on contract terms . The wage
increase granted in January 1975, and which I have found
to have been an independent unfair labor practice (it hav-
ing occurred within 6 months of the filing of the charge), I
find and conclude was granted with the same intent and
purpose.
4. Although the Act recognizes the right of Respondent
to refuse to agree to a proposal or to make a concession,
yet it seems clear that , when it does so for the sole purpose
of frustrating agreement , its bargaining is in bad faith.
H. K. Porter Company, Inc. Disston Division -Danville
Works, 153 NLRB 1370 (1965), enfd . sub nom . United Steel-
workers of America v . N.L.R.B., 363 F.2d 272 (C.A.D.C.,
1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 851.18 Here the Union submit-
ted proposals for a complete contract , and the vast majori-
ty of these proposals were found objectionable by Respon-
dent, on one ground or another . Regarding many of these
Respondent did submit counterproposals, and both sets of
proposals were discussed by the parties at great length. By
the time of the January 1975 meetings , the Union had re-
ceded from its original position with respect to many of its
proposals on which agreement , by accepting Respondent's
proposal outright , or with proposed modifications . There is
no evidence that at any time during the negotiations did
Respondent significantly depart from its original opposi-
tion to any proposal or make a significant concession de-
signed to produce agreement. In short , all the movement
toward reaching agreement was on the part of the Union;
there was none on the part of Respondent . While the
Board has no power to sit in judgment on what terms the
parties to bargaining negotiations should , or should not
agree to, and I am not suggesting that it do so in the instant
is That decision did not reach the Supreme Court for review. A subse-
quent order of the Board, enforced by the court of appeals , did reach the
Supreme Court, the latter holding that the Board was without power to
order an employer to agree to a checkoff provision. See H . K. Porter Com-
pany, Inc., 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
AUTOPROD, INC
case, the Board if it "is not to be blinded by empty talk and
by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining .
must take some cognizance of the reasonableness of the
positions taken by an employer in the course of bargaining
negotiations" (per Judge Magruder in N.L.R.B. v. Reed &
Prince Manufacturing Company, 205 F.2d 131, 134, In. 3
(C.A. 1), cert. denied 346 U.S. 887). In view of the large
number of proposals on the bargaining table concerning
which agreement had not been reached, it is inconceivable
that there were not some areas in which it could either
totally or with modifications recede from positions previ-
ously taken, if it in fact had any reasonable desire to reach
agreement on mutually acceptable terms. However, the evi-
dence shows no such movement on the part of Respon-
dent. This is some evidence that Respondent's bargaining
was not in the requisite good faith.
5. Finally, and by no means of minimal importance,
there is the fact that on February 5 Respondent unlawfully
terminated negotiations with the Union and has refused
since that date to meet further with the Union.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I find that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, as alleged
in the complaint.19
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and the entire re-
cord in the case, I state the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Union is, and at all times material has been, the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, in an appropriate unit
composed of Respondent's production and maintenance
employees, excluding office clericals, professional employ-
ees, salesmen, guards and supervisors, as defined in the
Act.
19 Two other points were discussed on the record , concerning which I
refer to briefly . One was the adequacy of the charge , which referred only to
the January 8 wage increase and the failure to supply the addresses of the
employees , to support the complaint which also alleged bad-faith bargain-
ing; and the other is the necessity for another order requiring Respondent to
bargain with the Union when such an order, enforced by the court of ap-
peals, is presently in existence . Respondent's brief does not deal with either
point . As to the first point , the charge alleging a violation of Sec. 8 (a)(5) is
sufficient to support a complaint which alleges bad-faith bargaining, be-
cause the Board "is not precluded from dealing adequately with unfair labor
practices which are related to those alleged" in the charge . N.L.R.B. v. Fant
Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 309 (1959); N. L. R. B. v. Indiana & Michigan Elec-
tric Company et a!, 318 U.S. 9 (1943); Bob's Casing Crews, Inc., 192 NLRB I
(1971), enfd. 458 F.2d 1301, 1304 (C.A. 5, 1972). As to the second point,
even were I disposed to hold that the order presently outstanding is suffi-
cient for the General Counsel's purposes (Cf. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper
Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192-195), I am precluded by Board authority which I am
required to follow from doing so. The identical question was considered by
the Board in Rish Equipment Company, 173 NLRB 943 (1968), where the
Board announced the rule that , if the subsequent case involved conduct not
involved in the prior case, an order prohibiting the conduct involved in the
second case is appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Act, even though
the order in the prior case is broad enough in its terminology to reach the
conduct involved in the second case.
781
4. By (a) failing and refusing since July 24, 1974, to
comply with the Union's request for the addresses of the
employees in the aforesaid unit; (b) unilaterally changing
the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment
of the employees in the aforesaid unit, without first bar-
gaining with the Union to an impasse concerning the same;
(c) terminating bargaining negotiations with the Union be-
cause of the pendency of a decertification petition; and (d)
failing to bargain with the Union in good faith, all as here-
in found, Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent failed to bargain with the
Union in good faith which interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of their guaranteed
Section 7 rights, I conclude from the totality of that unlaw-
ful conduct that Respondent should be required to cease
and desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle
Manufacturing Company, 120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4 1941); Cali-
fornia Lingerie, Inc., 129 NLRB 912, 915 (1960).
Having also found that since on or about January 31,
1974, Respondent failed to bargain in good faith with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the employees in an appropriate unit, it will be recom-
mended that upon request Respondent bargain with the
Union as such representative, and if an understanding is
reached embody the same into a written signed agreement.
This obligation to bargain shall include, of course, the obli-
gation to furnish the Union, upon request, with the ad-
dresses of the employees in the unit, as well as any other
data needed by the Union for the proper performance of
its duties as collective-bargaining representative.
Having found that Respondent also violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally changing the wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment of unit
employees, it will be recommended that it be required to
revoke such changes, provided, however, that no such
change shall be revoked if the Union, within 30 days after
receipt of the order herein, requests Respondent, in writ-
ing, not to revoke a specified change.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and conclusions of
law and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Sec-
tion 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER20
Respondent, Autoprod, Inc., New Hyde Park, New
York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
20 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
Continued
782 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing or refusing upon request, to supply
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 International Association
of Bridge , Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-
CIO, the collective-bargaining representative of its employ-
ees in an appropriate unit, with the addresses of the em-
ployees in said unit, or any other data requested by the
aforesaid labor organization which is necessary for the
proper performance of its duty as collective -bargaining
representative for the aforesaid employees.
(b) Unilaterally changing the wages, hours, or any other
terms and conditions of employment of any employee in
the unit for which the aforesaid labor organization is the
exclusive collective -bargaining representative.
(c) Failing or refusing , upon request, to bargain collec-
tively with the aforesaid labor organization as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization , to form , join , or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection , or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request furnish the Union with the addresses
of all employees in the unit for which the Union is the
collective-bargaining representative , as well as all other in-
formation necessary for the Union's discharge of its bar-
gaining duties.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with the aforesaid
labor organization as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropri-
ate unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment and if an un-
derstanding is reached reduce the same to a signed written
agreement.
(c) Revoke and cease to comply with the changes in the
wages , hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment unilaterally promulgated by it, as herein found; pro-
vided, however, that Respondent shall not revoke any such
change which Local 455 shall, within 30 days from the date
of this Decision, notify Respondent in writing that it does
not wish revoked.
(d) Post at its premises in New Hyde Park, New York,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 21 Cop-
ies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 29 (Brooklyn, New York), shall, after
being signed by its authorized representative, be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by Respondent for 60 consecutive days there-
after, in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other ma-
terial.
(e) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to
comply herewith.
21 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."