Auto Workers Local 933 (Allison Gas)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1992

307 N.L.R.B. 1065 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

1065
307 NLRB No. 167
AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 933 (ALLISON GAS)
1 Charging Party Sallee has requested oral argument. The request
is denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties.
We have not considered the evidence submitted with Charging
Party Sallee’s exceptions and brief, which is outside the record.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
Regarding the first paragraph in sec. III,B, of the judge’s decision,
we note that Sallee was employed by the Allison Transmission Divi-
sion on June 18, 1984.
We note that there are no exceptions to the judge’s dismissal of
the complaint allegation regarding the Respondent’s request that
Robert Mitchell provide it with a copy of his sworn statement given
to the Board.
3 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order and notice to
conform to the violations found.
Local 933, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of America (UAW), AFL–CIO (Allison Gas
Turbine, Division of General Motors Corpora-
tion) and Paul A. Sallee and Robert Mitchell.
Cases 25–CB–6710, 25–CB–6935, 25–CB–6746,
25–CB–6767, and 25–CB–6782
June 30, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On January 17, 1992, Administrative Law Judge
Wallace H. Nations issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and Charging Party Paul Sallee filed exceptions,
a supporting brief, and an erratum. The Respondent
filed cross-exceptions, a supporting brief, and an an-
swering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs1 and has
decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Local 933, International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of American (UAW), AFL–CIO,
Indianapolis, Indiana, its officers, agents, and rep-
resentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order
as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
‘‘(a) Discriminatorily refusing to process a grievance
because an employee worked for a nonunion employer
or for other arbitrary reasons.’’
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily refuse to process a
grievance because an employee worked for a nonunion
employer or for other arbitrary reasons.
WE WILL NOT threaten employee Robert Mitchell or
any other employee that we will not represent them be-
cause of their involvement in intraunion activities.
WE WILL NOT attempt to cause or cause Allison Gas
Turbine, Division of General Motors Corporation, to
transfer Robert Mitchell or any other employee from
plant 8 to plant 5 because the employee filed charges
against us with the National Labor Relations Board
and WE WILL NOT offer to have the attempted transfer
or transfer rescinded if the charges are dropped.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
LOCAL 933, INTERNATIONAL UNION,
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA (UAW), AFL–CIO
Merrie Thompson and John Petrison, Esqs., for the General
Counsel.
Barry A. Macey, Esq., of Indianapolis, Indiana, for the Re-
spondent.
M. Beth Sax, Esq., of Detroit, Michigan, for the Party in In-
terest.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WALLACE H. NATIONS, Administrative Law Judge. Robert
Mitchell, an individual, filed charges against Local 933,
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Ag-
ricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) (the Union
or Respondent) on May 11 (Case 25–CB–6746), June 11
(Case 25–CB–6767), and June 27, 1990 (Case 25–CB–6782).
Paul A. Sallee filed charges against the Union on March 9,
1990 (Case 25–CB–6710), and March 29, 1991 (Case 25–
CB–6935). After a series of earlier complaints, the Regional
Director for Region 25 issued an order consolidating cases,
1066 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 At the outset of the hearing, the consolidated complaint also in-
cluded two cases, 25–CA–20695 and 25–CA–20729, wherein the
Respondent was Allison Gas Turbine, Division of General Motors.
These two cases were settled as the record opened and the General
Counsel asked that they be severed from the remaining cases for that
reason. This request was granted.
consolidated complaint and notice of hearing on May 6,
1991.1 This consolidated complaint consolidated all the
above-listed cases and alleged that the Union had engaged in
conduct in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act. The Respondent Union has
filed timely answers denying the commission of any unfair
labor practice.
Hearing on the consolidated complaint was held in Indian-
apolis, Indiana, on June 20 and 21, 1991. Briefs were filed
by Respondent and the General Counsel on October 1, 1991.
Based on the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the
briefs, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Party in Interest Allison Gas Turbine Division of General
Motors Corporation (Turbine or the Employer) has at all
times material to these cases engaged in the manufacture and
nonretail sale and distribution of gas turbine engines and re-
lated products from two plants located in Indianapolis, Indi-
ana. Both the Respondent and the Party in Interest admit and
I find that Allison Gas Turbine is now and has been at all
times material an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
All parties admit and I find that the Union is a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The consolidated complaint alleges that the Union violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act by:
a. On or about January 9, 1991, requesting of the Em-
ployer that it change the employment records of Paul A.
Sallee, including certain seniority records, with the intent and
purpose of adversely affecting said employee’s seniority
rights and attendant employment rights and to undermine the
grievance filed by Sallee regarding his seniority rights.
b. Since on or about September 9, 1990, and continuing
to date, refusing to process to arbitration the above-noted
grievance filed by Sallee.
c. On or about June 6, 1990, acting through its agent, Jerry
Williamson, threatening not to process the grievances of em-
ployees who opposed certain union officers in intraunion
elections.
d. On or about June 18, 1990, acting through Bill Collins,
threatening the employees of the Employer with refusal to
represent them if they filed unfair labor practice charges
against the Respondent with the Board, or if they cooperated
with the Board in the investigation of such charges.
e. On or about June 18, 1990, through consultation with
the Employer, attempting to cause and causing the Employer
to transfer Robert Mitchell from day shift work in the Em-
ployer’s Plant No. 8 to evening shift work in the Employer’s
Plant No. 5.
e. On or about June 18, 1990, acting through its agents
David L. Fenwick, A.S. McAtee and Dale Bastian, requested
and directed the employees of the Employer to provide the
Respondent with their copies of sworn statements, or the
contents thereof, given by the employees to the Board in the
investigation of charges in Case 25–CB–6710.
A. Background Facts
Allison Gas Turbine is an incorporated Division of Gen-
eral Motors Corporation and operates two facilities, Plant 5
and Plant 8 in the Maywood suburb of Indianapolis. General
Motors Corporation also maintains a facility called the Alli-
son Transmission Division in the Speedway suburb of Indi-
anapolis. Hereinafter, the two facilities will be referred to as
Turbine and Transmission, respectively. At one time, both
Allison Gas Turbine and Allison Transmission were under
common management and the employees of both divisions
were in one bargaining unit, represented by the involved
Union. At some point in 1983, General Motors Corporation
decided that each division should be separately operated and
managed. In furtherance of this end, General Motors and the
Union entered into an agreement (the ‘‘Split Memorandum’’)
on December 16, 1983, which placed the employees of each
division into separate bargaining units and governed the
treatment of employees after the split.
Both before and after the split, there were occasions when
employees have transferred from the Transmission Division
to the Gas Turbine Division and vice versa. Before the split,
such transfers were not accompanied by any loss or change
in seniority. After the split, if a production employee of one
division transferred to the other, the production employee’s
plant seniority transfers with him, and he retains recall rights
at the plant from which he transferred. Skilled trades em-
ployees who transferred from the Transmission Division to
the Gas Turbine Division bring their GM seniority with
them. Skilled trade employees also have a skill trades senior-
ity date. This date becomes important if a layoff of skilled
employees occurs, and it is obviously to one’s advantage to
have the earliest seniority date possible as the order of layoff
is governed by seniority.
With respect to the transfer of skilled trades seniority, the
Split Memorandum states in paragraph 11:
11. Those employees who are currently reduced or
laid off from a skilled trades classification or are re-
duced or laid off prior to the expiration of the 1982 Na-
tional Agreement, shall have recall rights to their origi-
nal classification as well as other skilled trades classi-
fications to which they have previously established
skilled trades status under the National Agreement, in
either plant. Those employees refusing such recall shall
surrender any further recall rights to that classification.
Those employees reduced from a skilled trades classi-
fication after the expiration of the 1982 National Agree-
ment will have recall rights to their original classifica-
tion within the plant from which they were reduced.
Paragraph 11 of the Split Memorandum was interpreted by
a letter dated May 17, 1988, which specifically supercedes
1067AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 933 (ALLISON GAS)
2 In 1982, Sallee had worked for a nonunion employer, Belcan,
who did some subcontract work for Gas Turbine. Union employees
at Turbine bitterly opposed this subcontracting, contending that the
work involved could and should be performed by union employees.
Employees of Belcan who were assigned to Turbine were viewed
with distain by the union employees there. Sallee, while an em-
ployee of Belcan, was assigned to work at Turbine for about 10
months in 1982. This facet of Sallee’s past employment was com-
mon knowledge among the some of the employees of Turbine.
3 The circumstances of Sallee’s hiring created the problem which
resulted in the subsequent filing of his grievance. Under the Split
Memorandum, Sallee should have been rehired only in the same skill
classification he held while working at Transmission or in a related
skill. He was not as neither the Union nor the Employer consider
the skills of grinder and jig bore operator to be related. This mistake,
which could occur only because Sallee had broad skill training,
would later serve to harm him under the Employer’s and the Union’s
interpretation of their various agreements respecting skill trades se-
niority.
4 As noted about, the records looked at by Plummer indicated that
Sallee was rehired at Turbine pursuant to the Split Memorandum.
Unless one noted that Sallee was not rehired into the same skill clas-
sification or a related skill classification to the one he held at Trans-
Continued
an October 23, 1984 interpretation. The May 17 letter reads
as follows:
Per our conversation, we have mutually agreed that
the provisions of Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of
Understanding regarding the division of the Bargaining
Unit at Allison Gas Turbine Division and Allison
Transmission Division dated December 16, 1983 is in-
terpreted as follows regarding the establishment of a
new date of entry:
(a) Skilled Trades employees who are laid off from
their home plant and are subsequently hired in a Skilled
Trades classification(s) at the secondary facility
(AGTD) or (ATD) by virtue of the special Area Hire
Pool provision set forth in said Memorandum of Under-
standing shall establish a new date of entry at the sec-
ondary facility pursuant to Appendix D-1 of the UAW-
GM National Agreement dated October 8, 1987. The
employees’ plant seniority will be transferred in accord-
ance with Paragraph 9 of the cited Memorandum of
Understanding and shall apply to National Agreement
benefits governed by plant seniority.
(b) Skilled Trades employees who have established
dates of entry subsequent to October 15, 1984 will have
these dates adjusted in accordance with Paragraph (a)
above.
Appendix D-1 provides, in relevant part:
1. Effective January 7, 1985, employees who are or
who become permanently laid off from any plant cov-
ered by the National Agreement who retain unbroken
seniority in any such plant on the date they acquire se-
niority in any other plant in accordance with Paragraph
(57) of the Agreement, will have a seniority date estab-
lished in that plant as follows:
(D) Journeymen or E.I.T.S. (employees-in-training)
employees with unbroken Skilled Trades seniority dates
or dates of entry of January 7, 1985 or before, who are
employed in the same or related Skilled Trades Classi-
fication, will establish a date of entry of January 7,
1985 in that classification.
B. Did Respondent Violate the Act by Refusing to
Process a Grievance filed by Paul Sallee
to Arbitration?
Paul Sallee testified that he has been employed by Allison
Gas Turbine since September 1986. He was employed by
Transmission on June 18, 1984, in the position of skilled
grinder until he was laid off in April 1986. In his initial em-
ployment with Transmission, he was a probationary em-
ployee for 90 days, and after completion of the 90-day pe-
riod he received a 10-cent-an-hour raise. Prior to his employ-
ment by Transmission, Sallee had been a journeyman tool
and die maker for 25 years.2
In September 1986, he was contacted by Turbine and told
to report for an interview under the area hire provisions. In
response he went to Plant 8 and met with General Foremen
Dick Roll and Luther Baker. At this time, Sallee believed he
might be recalled to Transmission and asked the foremen if
he had to accept a job with Gas Turbine. He was told by
them that under the area hire agreement he had to take the
job if offered. They asked about his experience as a jig bore
operator and Sallee informed them he was a journeyman tool
and die maker, though he had not held that position in his
employment with Transmission.
He was informed that he would be on probation for 30
days, which is standard under the area hire provisions. After
30 days, he received a 10-cent-an-hour wage increase. The
Employer’s personnel records relating to Sallee indicate he
was rehired pursuant to the Split Memorandum on September
15, 1986.3 In 1987, Sallee was told by some machine repair-
men that they had been on layoff from Transmission and
hired on at Gas Turbine and that they were not getting the
D-1 seniority date. The appendix D-1 date, January 7, 1985,
predated his date of employment with Turbine, September
1986, by about 20 months. Sallee believed he was entitled
to the earlier date and thus he spoke with his union com-
mitteeman, Skip May, about the situation. According to
Sallee, May told him that all but one grievance filed over the
situation had been withdrawn and all would be settled when
that one was settled, and his situation would be resolved at
that time.
By late spring 1989, having nothing happen to get him the
D-1 date, Sallee decided to go to management directly about
his seniority. He contacted Robert Plummer, company super-
visor of hourly employment, in May 1989. At this time, there
was an election scheduled for union offices. Many of the in-
cumbent elected union officials were being opposed by a
group of candidates running together on a slate called the
New Directions slate. Sallee testified that he was involved in
the elections, supporting the New Directions slate by wearing
a hat, buttons and passing out cards. As May was an incum-
bent, Sallee was opposed to his reelection, a fact of which
May was aware.
According to Sallee, he complained to Plummer that he
was getting the runaround from the Union about his senior-
ity, and Plummer said he would pull his files and look into
the situation. Plummer called him back later in the day and
said that he had reviewed the records and that Sallee was
correct.4 About 2 days later, Sallee saw May and told him
1068 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mission, and was intimately familiar with the provisions of the Split
Memorandum and appendix D-1, noted earlier, it would appear that
Sallee was indeed entitled to the D-1 seniority date.
5 The classification of tool-and-die maker encompasses a number
of more restrictive or as they are called, single-purpose skill classi-
fications, including the positions of grinder and jig bore operator. It
is the Company’s and the Union’s position that under the provisions
of appendix D-1, set out earlier in this decision, Sallee would have
had to transfer from Transmission to Turbine in the same or a re-
lated skill classification for which he held seniority at Transmission
in order to be entitled to the D-1 date. Sallee held seniority at Trans-
mission only in the grinder classification and was hired in at Turbine
in the jig bore operator classification. As these are different, and in
the minds of both company official and union officials, unrelated
single-purpose skill classifications, Sallee did not meet the require-
ments of appendix D-1. It is their consistent position that the fact
that these two single-purpose skill classifications, as well as a num-
ber of other classifications were combined into the broader classi-
fication of tool and die maker by a local agreement executed in
1988, does not make the single-purpose classifications held by Sallee
related as of the date of his hiring at Transmission. Although it is
not certain from the evidence, Sallee was evidently hired for a dif-
ferent skill trade at Turbine based on his status as a journeyman tool
and die maker. Although he did not have seniority in this broader
job classification with the Employer, he did have the training and
experience to qualify for this classification and thus, could be hired
to work in a number of single-purpose skilled classifications, includ-
ing jig bore operator, though such classification was not the same
or related to his previous job classification of grinder. The Employ-
er’s records do not reveal that any other skilled trade employee
transferring from Transmission to Turbine was hired into a different
skill classification than the one they worked in at Transmission. So
Sallee is in an apparently unique situation in this regard.
6 Turner testified that he spoke with Gorbett about Sallee’s griev-
ance about 2 days after it had been withdrawn. According to Turner,
Gorbett said he had withdrawn the grievance because Skip May had
told him that Sallee did not have anything coming to him, that he
had broken seniority and had worked for Belcan. All parties agree
that Sallee did not break seniority while on layoff status with Trans-
mission. Turner further testified that if you wanted to prejudice one
employee against another at Turbine, you would tie them to Belcan.
about his conversation with Plummer. Shortly thereafter, he
received another call from Plummer who said he spoken too
soon, that the Company was still waiting on word from the
International Union.
Plummer testified that in April or May 1989, Sallee called
him and said that he was a tool-and-die maker at Plant 8,
that he had transferred from Transmission where he had held
a single-purpose classification as a jig bore operator, that be-
cause of the 1988 local agreement which for the first time
included the jig bore single-purpose skill in the broader cat-
egory of tool and die maker, he felt entitled to the D-1
skilled trade seniority date. Plummer told him that he agreed.
However, Plummer testified that he changed his mind after
speaking with his supervisor and looking at Sallee’s records.
The records indicated to him that Sallee had gone from a sin-
gle-purpose skill trade at Transmission into another different
and separate single-purpose skill trade at Turbine.5 He in-
formed Sallee of this position within 2 weeks of Sallee’s ini-
tial call.
Immediately after the election, Sallee requested May to
file a grievance in his behalf, having been told by his alter-
nate committeeman, John Gorbett, that nothing could be
done about his problem unless a grievance was on file. Ac-
cording to Sallee, he told May that he was an area hire and
had been told by the union chairman at Plant 3 that area
hires were entitled to the D-1 seniority date. He also told
May that he was required to take the job with Transmission
or lose benefits under the area hire provisions. May had no
comment but did file a grievance dated July 12, 1989, which
stated:
I charge mgt. in violation of Appendix D-1 of the
N/A in as much as I was hired at Allison Gas Turbine
and I was laid off from Detroit Diesel Allison which
is now called Allison Transmission and I was not given
the seniority date that of 1-7-85 that is spelled out in
the National Agreement. I demand this condition be
corrected at once and mgt. abide by Appendix D-1 of
the N/A and I be given a seniority date that of January
7, 1985.
Under the portion of the grievance form entitled ‘‘Disposi-
tion by Foreman’’ is written: ‘‘No violation of Appendix D-
1 of the National Agreement in that the employee did not
hire in to a related classification.’’
This portion of the form was signed by Company Foreman
Ron Nardi and dated July 21, 1989.
Shortly after the filing of the grievance, Sallee was in-
formed that it had been withdrawn without prejudice. Having
been told by a fellow employee, Winfred Turner, that the
grievance was withdrawn allegedly because Sallee broke se-
niority by working for a company named Belcan while on
layoff status, Sallee confronted Gorbett and asked why no
one checked with him as he had not broken seniority.6
Gorbett indicated that the issue of Sallee’s seniority was still
being worked on and not to worry about it. Sallee then asked
May why the grievance had been withdrawn and May said
that he did not have the D-1 date coming. Sallee then said
that he had heard that May had given Gorbett another reason
for withdrawing the grievance and May responded, ‘‘Well,
you elected Gorbett.’’
May testified that Allison Gas Turbine has about 1200–
1300 skilled tradesmen employed. He was aware that some
skilled tradesmen transferred from Allison Transmission to
Allison Gas Turbine and some were given the January 7,
1985 D-1 skilled trade seniority date. The only such transfer-
ring employee of whom he is aware that did not receive that
date was Paul Sallee.
May testified that Gorbett withdrew Sallee’s grievance
while serving as his alternate while he was on a 1-day vaca-
tion. May was unaware of any other grievance concerning
seniority that had been settled at the first level of the griev-
ance process. May testified that he and Gorbett investigated
Sallee’s grievance by pulling Sallee’s records. Based on his
investigation, May decided that Sallee was not entitled to the
D-1 date because he was not hired in as a tool and die
maker; he was hired in as a jig bore operator at Gas Turbine,
and he was a grinder operator at Transmission.
Gorbett’s testimony is generally the same as May’s in this
regard. He testified that prior to the union election, Sallee
had told him of his seniority problem, explaining that he was
a tool and die operator at Transmission. Based upon this rep-
resentation, Gorbett encouraged Sallee to file a grievance. He
testified that after the election, May prepared and filed the
grievance on July 12. Gorbett then met with May about the
1069AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 933 (ALLISON GAS)
7 This is not correct because Sallee never broke seniority. How-
ever, Collins apparently believed he did and his statements to the ex-
ecutive board are consistent with the information fellow employee
Turner gave to Sallee, in that his previous employment with Belcan
played a part in the decision to withdraw his grievance.
8 Local Union President David Fenwick testified that if the mem-
bership had voted to overrule the executive board on Sallee’s appeal,
the Local would have reasserted the grievance with the Employer.
He held out little hope that the Employer would change its position
in this event. International Union Administrative Assistant
Ophelandus Brassfield testified that under the Union’s national
agreement with the Employer, this would not be the proper proce-
dure to follow. Rather, if the decision of executive board of the
Local is overturned by the membership, then that decision must be
reviewed by the International Union before the grievance could be
reactivated. This procedure is almost identical to the appeal proce-
dure afforded Sallee in the event that occurred, the vote to affirm
the executive board’s decision to deny Sallee’s appeal to it. The ap-
peal procedure will be discussed in more detail at a later point in
this decision.
grievance. He also learned that the Company had told Sallee
that he was entitled to the seniority date he sought. He and
May went to see Plummer, who told them he had spoken too
soon and that he had said the wrong thing to Sallee. Plum-
mer let Gorbett look at Sallee’s records and at that point,
Gorbett learned that Sallee had not held a tool and die maker
classification in his employment with GMC. At this point,
Gorbett changed his mind about the merits of Sallee’s griev-
ance and decided it did not have merit.
Gorbett testified that shortly thereafter, he and May told
Sallee of their beliefs with respect to the grievance and ad-
vised him of his appeal rights. With respect to the Belcan
issue, Gorbett testified that it was common knowledge in the
plant that Sallee had worked for Belcan, but denied that this
fact had any bearing on the decision to withdraw the griev-
ance.
Sallee then filed an appeal of the withdrawal with the
Local Union. The appeal was given to William (Bill) Collins,
who had just been elected to the position of chairman of the
bargaining committee as a member of the New Directions
slate and had taken office in July 1989. Collins testified that
prior to his election, he had no conversations with Sallee
about his entitlement to the D-1 date. After the grievance had
been withdrawn, he received Sallee’s appeal. In his elected
position it was his duty to investigate the grounds for the ap-
peal. In this regard, Collins testified that he contacted Union
Committeemen Steve Couch, Skip May, and John Gorbett
about the merits of the grievance. He decided that the griev-
ance did not have merit and presented that position the exec-
utive board when it ruled on the appeal. He told the execu-
tive board that Sallee was not hired into the same or related
trade when he was hired at Turbine, and that Sallee had bro-
ken seniority at the Transmission plant because he had re-
fused recall at that plant after being hired at Turbine.7 The
executive board ruled unanimously to deny the appeal.
The next step in the appeal process was its presentation to
the Union’s general membership, and accordingly, it was
taken up at a general membership meeting held on Sep-
tember 10, 1989.8 According to Sallee, when the topic of the
appeal came up, Collins stated that the recommendation of
the executive board was that the appeal be denied because
Sallee had broken seniority by working for Belcan. Sallee
stated to the membership that this was a lie and made some
derogatory comments about Don Newton, the immediate past
bargaining committee chairman, stating his belief that the
Union was fighting his effort to get the D-1. date, not the
Company. Newton then addressed the membership, stating
that Sallee was not an area hire, but rather a new hire. He
said he had discussed the matter with the International and
that Sallee did not deserve the D-1 date. Sallee admitted that
Newton had taken the same position about a year earlier
when he was bargaining committee chairman, and had been
approached by Sallee about his seniority problem..
At that point, the membership was told to vote on the ap-
peal and Sallee was not allowed to comment further. Sallee
then approached Newton, who had the Local’s sergeant-at-
arms escort Sallee to the back of the room in which the
meeting was being held. A voice vote was then taken on the
appeal and the leadership deemed the appeal denied.
Robert Mitchell, a millwright with Allison Gas Turbine,
testified that he had been a union member since 1974. He
was elected to the executive board of Local 933 in 1989,
running on the New Directions slate. He evidently partici-
pated in the executive board meeting at which Sallee’s ap-
peal was denied, but did not offer evidence about this meet-
ing. Mitchell testified that at the September 10 meeting Col-
lins told the membership that Sallee had broken seniority and
had worked for Belcan, recommending that Sallee’s appeal
be denied. He testified that Newton also spoke, mentioning
the same things, and added that Sallee was a liar and his
case had been checked with the International.
Collins testified that he told the membership at the Sep-
tember meeting, the same things he had told the executive
board and requested the appeal be denied. When asked
whether he referred to the fact that Sallee had worked for
Belcan, he answered, ‘‘Not to my knowledge.’’ He testified
that he heard Belcan mentioned from someone on the mem-
bership floor and did not hear any union official refer to
Belcan in connection with Sallee. He testified that in connec-
tion with Sallee’s appeal, Sallee first spoke on his own be-
half. Then Collins spoke and after finishing his presentation,
recognized Don Newton. According to Collins, Newton said
that Sallee was not a rehire, but was in fact a new hire at
Turbine and had no right to the D-1 date. The membership
then voted on the matter. According to Collins, Sallee then
approached Newton and a commotion ensued, which ended
with the Local’s sergeant-at-arms separating the two.
The official minutes of the September 10 meeting with re-
spect to Sallee read as follows:
The recording Secretary read the appeal of Brother
Paul Sallee. Brother Sallee spoke on his behalf. He
questioned why his D-1 date when he transferred to
Maywood was different than those of other employees.
He had worked in the tool room at Speedway. He was
classified as a Tool Die Maker at Maywood. He re-
ferred to the split memo and the National Agreement
concerning D-1 dates. Chairman Collins outlined the
circumstances to the Membership concerning the griev-
ance appeal. He stressed that he was not hired in as a
Tool Die Maker so he was not entitled to the January
7, 1985 D-1 date. He recommended that the Appeal be
denied. Former Chairman Don Newton also commented
on the Appeal. He also recommended that the Appeal
1070 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
9 Respondent contends that the complaint insofar as it seeks re-
dress for the withdrawal of Sallee’s grievance is barred by Sec.
10(b) of the Act as the withdrawal occurred on July 27, 1989, and
Sallee’s charge was not filed until March 9, 1990. However, the
matter complained of is not the withdrawal of the grievance, but the
actions of Respondent’s officials at the September 10 membership
meeting. This event occurred within the 6-month limitations period
prescribed by Sec. 10(b). Until the September 10 meeting, Sallee had
no proof that the withdrawal of his grievance was based at least in
part on unlawful grounds, and because he believed that May may
have had the grievance withdrawn for personal reasons, could have
expected he would receive fair treatment from the Local’s executive
board and membership.
be denied. It was moved that the Appeal be denied.
Seconded and Carried. The Appeal stands denied.
Sallee then decided to file his appeal with the International
Union and was told by the Local’s secretary that he had 60
days, which turned out to be incorrect. His initial appeal to
the International was turned down as being untimely. Sallee
filed his charge with the Board, and subsequently, his appeal
to the International was allowed, but denied for reasons
which will be discussed later.
The matter of Sallee’s grievance and its handling by the
Respondent has two distinct parts in my opinion. First, did
the Union violate the Act by the actions of its officers in the
presentation of Sallee’s appeal at the September membership
meeting, and second, if so, is Sallee entitled to the remedy
that the General Counsel seeks.9 That remedy involves an
Order that the Union process Sallee’s grievance through arbi-
tration and require it to pay for independent counsel for his
representation. I agree with the General Counsel that the
Local Union violated the Act by its treatment of Sallee’s
grievance as alleged in the consolidated complaint, but do
not find that the remedy requested is called for under the evi-
dence of record.
I credit the description of the general membership meeting
given by Sallee and Mitchell over that of Collins. Collins
was shown to be less than a candid witness in his testimony
relating to the complaint allegations surrounding Mitchell.
Newton did not testify, President Fenwick did not deny the
statements attributed to Collins and Newton nor did May. In-
deed, Collins did not deny the statements about Belcan at-
tributed to him, merely giving an answer akin to not remem-
bering. Sallee’s previous employment with Belcan had noth-
ing whatsoever to do with his grievance and tying the griev-
ance to that employment demonstrates to me that Collins was
unlawfully prejudiced in his consideration of the grievance
and in his presentation of the grievance to the membership.
Given the feeling of the members about Belcan, saying that
Sallee had broken seniority by working for Belcan surely
ruled out any chance for a honest vote on the merits of the
appeal.
The Respondent, when as here, acting in a statutory rep-
resentative capacity, is prohibited from action against any
employee on consideration or on the basis of classifications
that are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair. Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 NLRB 181 (1962). Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the Act pro-
scribes acts of disparate treatment or negligent conduct which
are motivated by hostile, invidious, irrelevant, or unfair con-
siderations, which may be characterized as arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or bad-faith conduct. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967). In finding a violation of the Act by a union in
its decision not to process a grievance to arbitration, the
Board held in Bottle Blowers Assn. Local 106 (Owens-Illi-
nois), 240 NLRB 324 (1979):
Where, as here, a union undertakes to process a griev-
ance but decides to abandon the grievance short of arbi-
tration, the finding of a violation turns not on the merit
of the grievance but rather on the whether the union’s
disposition of the grievance was perfunctory or moti-
vated by ill will.
I find that Collins’ reference to Sallee’s employment with
Belcan at the September 10 membership meeting is clear evi-
dence of ill will toward Sallee and was clearly hostile, invid-
ious, irrelevant, and unfair. By make such statements, Col-
lins, as an agent for the Respondent, engaged in conduct vio-
lative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and that conduct is
attributable to the Respondent.
However, on the question of remedies for this violation, I
must take into consideration the Board’s holding in Rubber
Workers Local 250 (Mack-Wayne Closures), 290 NLRB 817
(1988), that where the General Counsel has shown the griev-
ance is not wholly frivolous and the Union breached its stat-
utory duty, the Union must prove the grievance was not mer-
itorious. I believe it has done so. As discussed in detail
above, the provisions of the Split Memorandum, as inter-
preted by the letter of May 1988, and the relevant provisions
of appendix D-1 appear to require that for Sallee to be enti-
tled to the D-1 seniority date, he must have transferred to
Turbine or have been rehired by Turbine in either the same
or a related skill classification to the one in which he held
seniority at Transmission. This did not happen. That I find
this to be an absurd and irrational requirement under the cir-
cumstances of this case is really of no moment. This is how
the Employer and the Union interpret their agreements in ap-
parent good faith and their good-faith interpretations are what
count.
As will be demonstrated briefly below, the International
Union has afforded and is affording Sallee the recourse of
a fair and impartial review of his grievance. Thus far, the re-
view upholds the decision not to further process the griev-
ance for reasons which are consistent with the applicable
agreements and not tainted by any discriminatory motives.
As noted earlier, the proper procedure for reactivating
Sallee’s grievance would be approximately the same whether
the membership upheld or overruled the executive board’s
decision to deny Sallee’s appeal. Under either circumstance,
the decision on whether to reinstate becomes that of the
International Union. In these circumstances, and in the case
of Sallee, the International Union sends a team of responsible
retired members to investigate and make a written rec-
ommendation to the International executive board on whether
the grievance should be arbitrated or reactivated. That had
occurred by the time of hearing herein and their rec-
ommendation was that the grievance did not have merit
under a rather technical interpretation of the facts and the
controlling documents. In a nine-page written report which
sets out the facts relied upon, the team of retirees concluded:
Employment as a single purpose journeyman in one
plant and in a different single purpose classification in
another plant does not grant any superior right to appel-
1071AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 933 (ALLISON GAS)
lant (Sallee). He did not meet the test of having worked
as a Tool & Die Journeyman in any General Motors
plant until the effective date of the Local Agreement
combining single purpose classifications into the broad-
er classification. His claim to the earlier date does not
have solid foundation.
Their recommendation was then presented to an appeals
panel which upheld the above conclusion. A further appeal
is open to Sallee and he is pursuing it. The General Counsel
does not question the fairness or impartiality of the Inter-
national Union’s appeal process. However, he stresses that
had the grievance been urged at the local level without all
the acrimony which surrounded it, the Employer may well
have acceded to Sallee’s requested relief. That might have
happened, as changing Sallee’s seniority date costs the Em-
ployer nothing. On the other hand, the Union has a duty to
fairly represent all of the employees at Turbine, not just
Sallee. Changing his seniority date to an earlier one would
necessarily adversely affect at least one other employee.
Thus I believe it is incumbent upon the Union to make a fair
and reasoned decision as to whether Sallee’s claim has merit
before it proceeds with his grievance. The International has
shown that it has done so, has found that Sallee’s claim does
not have merit for reasons which are rational and reasonable
within the confines of the applicable agreements, and thus,
I find a make-whole remedy is not called for.
C. Did the Respondent on or About January 9, 1991,
Violate the Act by Requesting that the Employer
Change the Employment Records of Sallee?
As noted earlier in this decision, a notation in Sallee’s per-
sonnel records accompanying the September 15, 1986 hire
date indicates that Sallee was rehired pursuant to the Split
Memorandum and did not enter Turbine as a new hire. The
issue was significant because under the the Split Memo-
randum skilled trades employees could be recalled only to
their own classification or to another skilled trades classifica-
tion to which they have previously established skilled trades
status. This language is similar to the ‘‘related Skilled Trades
Classification’’ language of appendix D-1. Accordingly, to
be eligible for rehire under the Split Memorandum, an em-
ployee would likely be entitled to the D-1 date. Thus, the
presence of this notation in Sallee’s records appeared to
International Union Representative Ophelandus Brassfield,
who was in charge of the appellate procedure, to be incon-
sistent with the conclusion that Sallee was not entitled to the
D-1 date.
The Local had taken the position that Sallee was a new
hire at the Maywood plant. The Company’s position was also
that he was a new hire, not a rehire under the Split Memo,
and not entitled to the appendix D-1 date. Therefore, when
Brassfield was in Indianapolis in December 1990 or January
1991, he went to the local union hall and discussed the mat-
ter with Collins and Newton. He became convinced that the
Local’s position was correct so he contacted Plummer and
questioned him as to whether the company records were cor-
rect. Plummer responded that the records were in fact incor-
rect and Brasfield asked him for a letter confirming this in-
formation.
By letter dated January 14, 1991, the Company responded
as follows:
On January 9, 1991, we discussed correcting the
Kardex record of Paul Sallee. As you are aware,
Sallee’s record inaccurately reflected his entry status as
that of a rehire under the AGTD/ATD split memo-
randum. This error has been corrected to appropriately
reflect Sallee’s entry status as that of a new hire. In
making this correction, it is impossible to remove the
incorrect H15 code. Further, it is impossible to have 2
entry code reflected on the same action/effective date.
Therefore, the inaccurate H15 code has been moved
back to a 9/17/86 effective date. The proper code, H01,
has been entered on the correct hire date of 9/8/86. I
hope this will clarify the situation.
I cannot find that this action is in any way violative of the
Act. I do find that Brassfield was not acting out of any im-
proper motive and was in fact making an impartial investiga-
tion into the appeal of Sallee. The inquiry he made of Plum-
mer was logical and a request to correct the records logical
if they were incorrect. The records where not changed to
eliminate the earlier reference to Sallee being rehired, rather,
they had added to them a reference that he was a new hire.
Thus, what had been in the records before remained for any-
one to see and question. I would also note that the inquiry
was made subsequent to the hearing on the appeal before the
retiree panel.
Brassfield followed this inquiry by asking for an opinion
from the UAW’s General Motors department, a branch of the
International Union that is expert in matters pertaining to the
Union’s contracts With General Motors. This department
verified that the recommendation of the retirees was correct.
As I have not found that Brassfield’s actions violated the Act
as alleged, I recommend that the involved complaint allega-
tion be dismissed.
D. Did Respondent Violate the Act by Requesting or
Directing that Robert Mitchell Turn Over to it his
Sworn Statement Given to the National Labor
Relations Board?
After Sallee was unsuccessful in overturning the executive
board’s decision to deny his appeal at the September 10,
1989 membership meeting, and after the rejection of his ini-
tial appeal of that vote, Sallee filed his charge with the
Board. Executive board member Robert Mitchell was called
upon to give a statement to the Board about the September
10 meeting and did so. Mitchell testified that at a executive
board meeting held shortly thereafter in May 1990, the local
president, Fenwick, asked who had given a statement to the
Board. According to Mitchell, Fenwick was very upset and
commented that the statement was the reason that the Union
was going to lose Sallee’s case. He asked Mitchell for a
copy of the statement and Mitchell replied he did not have
one at that time. The Recording Secretary, McAtee asked
what right Mitchell had giving a statement to the Board.
After the meeting, Fenwick repeatedly asked for a copy of
the statement and Mitchell refused to supply it. They also
asked that he sign a release so the Board could supply the
statement to the Union’s attorney. He was asked on a num-
ber of occasions by the an employee of the Union and his
alternate committeeman, Dale Bastian, to sign the release.
Mitchell never told anyone who asked him that he refused
to turn over the statement.
1072 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
10 Robert Oatts is labor relations representative and skilled trades
coordinator for the Employer. In his position, Oatts is responsible for
placement of apprentices and employees in training. He was a mem-
ber of the apprentice committee during 1990. It has been the practice
of the Employer that this committee approve the movement of ap-
prentices from one location to another. As part of the apprentice pro-
gram for millwrights ( Mitchell’s classification), it is necessary that
they undergo heat treat training, a relatively hot and undesirable job.
Oatts did not transfer Mitchell and his transfer did not go through
the apprentice committee, the first such case of which Oatts was
aware. Oatts also testified that apprentices are given training in Plant
8, and thus, there was no apparent need to transfer Mitchell to Plant
5.
Fenwick testified that he was asked by the Union’s attor-
neys to obtain any statements given by the Union’s officials
in the Sallee matter so they could prepare for the case. He
admits asking Mitchell for a copy of his statement and testi-
fied that Mitchell said he would supply it, but never did. He
denied making more than one request for Mitchell’s state-
ment.
I cannot find a violation of the Act as alleged in this re-
gard. It is logical that the Union would want to see the state-
ment of any of its officers given to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) as such statements are attributable to the
Union. Mitchell never refused to turn over his statement so
it was logical that the Union would continue asking for it as
Mitchell claims it did. Even Mitchell does not allege that he
was in any way threatened or coerced in this regard. He was
in no way restrained from giving a statement to the Board
and a request to know what he said, given his official posi-
tion, was surely legitimate. I also do not find that the Union
violated the Board’s dictates in Johnnie’s Poultry Co., 146
NLRB 770 (1964). Unlike an employer, the Union has no
clear and apparent ability to adversely affect his working
conditions or even his continued employment. Thus an assur-
ance there would be no reprisals taken against him does not
seem necessary, especially in the absence of any coercive at-
tempt to force him to turn over the statement. The request
was made for Mitchell to voluntarily give his statement and
he did not refuse. In his position with the Union, he knew
the purpose of the request.
I will recommend that this complaint allegation be dis-
missed.
E. Did Respondent Violate the Act by Threatening not
to Process the Grievances of Employees who Opposed
Union Officers in Intraunion Elections?
In May 1990, Mitchell was given discipline by the Em-
ployer. He had been handbilling at the plant complaining
about the ethics of Zone Committeeman Couch. He reported
for work late and was told by his foreman that he was going
to have a disciplinary interview. He was then called to a
meeting with his foreman and Union Committeeman Jerry
Williamson. He was written up for reporting to work late on
the day he handbilled. After the writeup, Williamson told
him that the local union officials wanted him written up and
would be mad because he was going to represent him. A
grievance was filed over the discipline and the discipline was
rescinded within a week. On June 6, Williamson also indi-
cated to Mitchell that the union officials were upset because
Mitchell had supported the New Directions slate in the elec-
tion and had won over the incumbent executive board mem-
ber in his own race.
Williamson was alleged to be a statutory agent of the Re-
spondent and this status was admitted. Therefore his state-
ments are attributable to the Respondent. Williamson did not
testify and I can find no reason to find that the threats attrib-
uted to him were not made. Even though Mitchell’s griev-
ance was successfully processed, the threats made by
Williamson would certainly have the effect of restraining
Mitchell’s further participation in intraunion affairs, a pro-
tected activity. Thus I find that the statements made by
Williamson are violative of Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the Act. See
Steelworkers Local 1397, 240 NLRB 848 (1979).
F. Did Respondent Violate the Act by Threatening to
Cause and Causing Transfer of Mitchell?
In May and June 1990, Robert Mitchell filed unfair labor
practice charges against Respondent with the Board. In June
1990, Mitchell was shifted from his normal assignment in
Plant 8 to night work at Plant 5, performing heat treat. He
was told by his supervisor that the shift was for training as
he was still in his apprenticeship at the time. He responded
that the real reason was politics, and the supervisor agreed,
saying he should speak with the general foreman in the plant
about the transfer. The general foreman told him that he did
not really want to transfer him, but that it was out of his
hands as Robert Oatts was having it done.10 The general
foreman agreed that politics was behind the transfer.
Mitchell then went to the bargaining committee chairman,
Collins, and asked if he was aware of the transfer. Collins
said no. Mitchell then reminded him of an earlier threatened
transfer instigated by Union Committeeman Steve Couch for
political reasons. Collins had squelched that proposed trans-
fer by speaking with an executive with Turbine. Collins re-
sponded that he had stopped his transfer once, but was not
going to do it again, pointing to a copy of Mitchell’s Board
charges which were on his desk. Mitchell said the charges
should have nothing to do with his transfer. Collins then told
Mitchell that he would try to speak about the matter with an
official of the Employer, but was unsuccessful in his efforts
to reach one. He then told Mitchell that he would contact
him later that day.
After work, Mitchell and his wife went to Collins’ home
and asked Collins if he had spoken with anyone about the
transfer. Collins responded that he still had a problem with
the charges, and that he would stop the transfer only if
Mitchell would withdraw his charges.
When the transfer actually occurred, Mitchell spoke about
it with Oatts, who informed him that the apprentice com-
mittee had not made the transfer, that the transfer was polit-
ical and had been made by the Union’s shop committee.
Oatts could not remember making this statement, but again
noted that he did not move Mitchell. His transfer was to last
6 months, but it was shortened to 3 months by the Company
after charges were filed.
Collins acknowledged that he had on one occasion blocked
the transfer of Mitchell from Plant 8 to Plant 5 because he
believed the transfer was engineered by Zone Committeeman
Steve Couch out of political animosity. With respect to the
second attempt to transfer Mitchell, Collins testified that
Mitchell came by his office and complained about the sched-
uled transfer. Collins testified that he had Mitchell’s NLRB
charges on his desk and told Mitchell that he would make
1073AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 933 (ALLISON GAS)
11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
some phone calls to determine why he was being transferred.
After Mitchell left, he attempted to reach Company officials
about the move, but was unsuccessful. He later reached Max
Orr, a company official who he had convinced to block the
first attempted transfer of Mitchell. In the latest conversation,
Orr told him that the transfer was to further Mitchell’s ap-
prenticeship training and Collins dropped the conversation.
He testified that he later told Mitchell he was being trans-
ferred for training reasons.
Collins testified that prior to his conversation with Orr,
Mitchell came to his house and reiterated his request that
Collins block the transfer as it was politically inspired by
Couch. According to Collins, he told Mitchell at this point
that the move was for training and that if he could prove the
transfer was politically motivated, he would try to stop the
transfer. He acknowledged that Mitchell had told him that he
believed that the move was motivated by his filing of
charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
Upon being confronted with a tape recording of his meet-
ing with Mitchell, Collins admitted that he told Mitchell that
if he dropped the NLRB charges, he would try to stop the
transfer.
I believe the credible evidence establishes that Mitchell’s
transfer was engineered by Respondent because he filed
charges with the NLRB against Respondent. The argument
that the transfer was for training reasons does not hold up.
All transfers for training are supposed to go through the ap-
prentice committee. Mitchell’s did not. There is no need to
transfer an apprentice from Plant 8 to Plant 5 for heat treat
training as such training can be and is performed at Plant 8.
Although the Employer’s official in charge of apprentice
training, Oatts, testified, he offered no reason why the Em-
ployer would transfer Mitchell and disclaimed any involve-
ment with the move. As the Employer had no reason to
transfer Mitchell for its own legitimate reasons, the only con-
clusion I can draw is that the Union had him transferred. The
transfer came very shortly after Mitchell filed charges with
the Board and the Union offered no legitimate reason why
it would want Mitchell to receive heat treat training in Plant
5 rather than Plant 8. However, its bargaining committee
chairman did point out a connection between the transfer and
the filing of charges by Mitchell, and this is the only appar-
ent reason for the transfer to be found in the credible evi-
dence. In making this finding, I credit Mitchell’s testimony
over that of Collins as Collins was credible only when con-
fronted with proof he was not telling the whole truth. I do
not rely on the hearsay statements Mitchell attributes to em-
ployer representatives who did not testify nor or those Col-
lins attributes to Max Orr.
Having found that Respondent engineered the transfer to
restrain and coerce Mitchell from availing himself of the
Board’s processes, and then offering to stop the transfer if
Mitchell dropped the charges filed with the Board, I find that
Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(1)(a) as alleged in the
complaint. Painters Local 558, 279 NLRB 150 (1986). When
the very union officials who engineered the treatment com-
plained off are the ones who will handle a grievance filed
over the treatment, it seems to me to be a useless act and
one repugnant to the Act to require Mitchell to seek redress
through the Union’s grievance procedure before complaining
of his treatment to the Board. The Respondent’s arguments
along this line are not persuasive.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Allison Gas Turbine Division of General Motors Cor-
poration is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent Local 933, International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America (UAW) is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the Act
by:
a. Bargaining Committee Chairman William Collins refer-
ring to Paul Sallee’s employment with Belcan at the Sep-
tember 10 membership meeting in an attempt to convince the
membership to deny Sallee’s appeal of the withdrawal of his
grievance for reasons which are hostile, invidious, irrelevant,
and unfair.
b. Respondent’s statutory agent, Jerry Williamson, threat-
ening employee Robert Mitchell that the Respondent would
not represent him because of Mitchell’s involvement in
intraunion activities.
c. Respondent’s causing the Employer to transfer em-
ployee Robert Mitchell from Plant 8 to Plant 5 because
Mitchell filed charges against Respondent with the Board,
and by offering to have the transfer rescinded if Mitchell
dropped his charges.
4. The unfair labor practices found to have been commit-
ted by Respondent are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The Respondent is not found to have committed the
other unfair labor practices alleged in the consolidated com-
plaint.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(1)(a) of the Act, it is recommended that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and post appropriate notice. A
make-whole remedy for Sallee is not recommended for rea-
sons set forth at an earlier point in this decision.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended11
ORDER
The Respondent, Local 933, International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America (UAW), its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Considering or referring to Paul Sallee’s employment
with Belcan in an attempt to convince the membership to
deny Sallee’s appeal of the withdrawal of his grievance for
reasons which are hostile, invidious, irrelevant, and unfair.
(b) Threatening employee Robert Mitchell that the Re-
spondent will not represent him because of Mitchell’s in-
volvement in intraunion activities.
1074 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
(c) Causing or attempting to cause the Employer to trans-
fer employee Robert Mitchell from Plant 8 to Plant 5 be-
cause Mitchell filed charges against Respondent with the
Board, and by offering to have the transfer rescinded if
Mitchell dropped his charges.
(d) In any like or related manner coercing or restraining
in the exercise of rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its business offices and meeting places copies
of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’12 Copies of this
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 25, after being signed by Respondent Union’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by Respondent Union at
its business office immediately upon receipt and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
of the date of this Order what steps the Respondent Union
has taken to comply.