AURORA FLIGHT SCIENCES CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 1, 2021

2020000730 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/280,992 05/19/2014 ADAM WOODWORTH 331350-00130 2505
144767 7590 03/01/2021
Aurora Flight Sciences / McAndrews, Held & Malloy
500 WEST MADISON STREET
SUITE 3400
CHICAGO, IL 60661
EXAMINER
WANG, MICHAEL H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3642
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/01/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Mehra.Ifica@aurora.aero
mhmpto@mcandrews-ip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ADAM WOODWORTH and
JAMES PEVERILL
Appeal 2020-000730
Application 14/280,992
Technology Center 3600

Before JOHN C. KERINS, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, and
CARL M. DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEFRANCO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–27, which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Aurora
Flight Sciences Corporation, a subsidiary of The Boeing Company. Appeal
Br. 1.

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2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s claimed invention relates generally to systems and
methods for increasing the safety and flight space of tethered unmanned
aerial vehicles (“UAVs”). Spec. ¶ 2. Of the pending claims, claims 1, 3,
and 11 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claims on appeal:
1. A safety method for use with a tethered aerial vehicle
having a tether with a tether power cable, the safety method
comprising the steps of:
transmitting electrical power from a ground station to the
tethered aerial vehicle through the tether power cable;
transmitting from the ground station to the tethered aerial
vehicle a test electrical signal having a predetermined
characteristic, wherein the tethered aerial vehicle generates a
tether line condition electrical signal in response to the test
electrical signal and communicates the tether line condition
electrical signal via the tether;
listening, with a listening device disposed at the ground
station, for the tether line condition electrical signal from the
tethered aerial vehicle to determine whether the tether line
condition electrical signal is at a predetermined acceptable level,
wherein the predetermined acceptable level is a function of the
test electrical signal;
if the tether line condition electrical signal is determined
to be at the predetermined acceptable level, retransmit the test
electrical signal and listen for the tether line condition electrical
signal;
if the tether line condition electrical signal is determined
to be below the predetermined acceptable level or is not received
at the ground station, determine whether the tether is severed,
wherein the tether is determined to be severed when the tether
line condition electrical signal is not received;
if the tether is determined to be not severed, instruct the
tethered aerial vehicle to (i) land at the ground station and (ii)
reset the listening device;
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if the listening device resets, retransmit the test electrical
signal and listen for the tether line condition electrical signal;
if the listening device does not reset, continue to land the
tethered aerial vehicle at the ground station;
if the tether is determined to be severed, (i) cut the
electrical power to the tether power cable at the ground station,
(ii) initiate a safe-fall mode at the tethered aerial vehicle, and
(iii) reset the listening device at the ground station;
if the listening device resets, retransmit the test electrical
signal and listen for the tether line condition electrical signal;
if the listening device does not reset, continue to cut the
electrical power to the tether power cable and continue in the
safe-fall mode.

Appeal Br. A1–A2 (Claims App.) (emphases added).

EVIDENCE OF RECORD

EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS2
Claims 1, 2, 13–15, 21, and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Nugent and Cornwell. Final Act. 4–9, 19–21.
Claims 3–9, 11, 12, 17–20, 25, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Nugent, Cornwell, and Grieser. Id. at 9–14,
15–19.

2 The Final Action indicates the Examiner rejected claims 3, 11, and 21
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, however, the Examiner later
withdrew the rejection in an Advisory Action dated Sept. 21, 2017.
Name Reference Date
Cornwell US 4,389,694 June 21, 1983
Grieser US 6,471,160 B2 Oct. 29, 2002
Burnham US 7,905,463 B2 Mar. 15, 2011
Blumer US 8,109,711 B2 Feb. 7, 2012
Abrahamson US 2010/0318475 A1 Dec. 16, 2010
Nugent WO 2013/052178 A2 Apr. 11, 2013
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Claims 10 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Nugent, Grieser, and Burnham. Id. at 14–15.
Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Nugent, Cornwell, and Blumer. Id. at 21–22.
Claim 23 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Nugent, Cornwell, and Abrahamson. Id. at 22–23.
Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Nugent, Cornwell, Grieser, and Abrahamson. Id. at 23.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner relies on Nugent as a primary reference to reject each
of the pending claims. See Final Act. 4–23. In doing so, the Examiner finds
that Nugent discloses the use of a tether power cable for transmitting
electrical power from a ground station to an unmanned aerial vehicle. Id. at
4–5. In particular, the Examiner cites paragraphs 81 and 82 of Nugent as
disclosing the claim limitations reciting, first, that the tethered aerial vehicle
“land at the ground station” if the tether is determined to be “not severed,”
and, second, that the tethered aerial vehicle initiate a “safe-fall mode” if the
tether is determined to be “severed.” Final Act. 5, 11 (“the safety system
may respond to an unsafe condition by causing the aerial platform 120 to
return to the base unit and land immediately”).
Acknowledging that Nugent does not disclose transmitting “a test
electrical signal” through the tether, as recited in independent claim 1, or “a
tether line condition electrical signal” through the tether, as recited in
independent claims 3 and 11, the Examiner nonetheless finds that Cornwell
teaches transmitting a “monitoring signal” through an electrical cable for
detecting a “fault condition” within the cable and preventing “hazards from
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shock” at a remotely connected machine. Id. at 6 (citing Cornwell 4:57–66).
As such, the Examiner concludes that a skilled artisan would have deemed it
obvious “to modify Nugent using the teachings of Cornwell in order . . . to
detect damage in the tether to prevent hazards from shock.” Id. The
Examiner also acknowledges that neither Nugent nor Cornwell discloses “a
descent stabilization device” in the safe-fall mode, as recited by independent
claims 3 and 11, but finds that Grieser teaches such a device in the form of a
parachute, and that it would have been obvious to modify Nugent to include
a parachute “in order to further protect the aircraft and its surroundings
during descent and landing.” Id. at 12, 17 (citing Grieser 3:63–65).
We find the Examiner’s reasoning persuasive. At the outset, we
cannot overlook the resemblance between Appellant’s purported invention
and Nugent’s tethered aerial vehicle, as illustrated below in the side-by-side
comparison of Nugent’s Figure 8A (reproduced below left) and Appellant’s
Figure 4b (reproduced below right).

Nugent Fig. 8A Appellant’s Fig. 4b
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Each of the above figures depicts a pair of UAVs tethered in series to
a ground station, with a higher-altitude UAV being tethered to a lower-
altitude UAV, which, in turn, is tethered to the ground station.
Noting that each of the Examiner’s rejections “relies upon Nugent as a
primary reference,” Appellant argues that “the Examiner has failed to
establish that Nugent constitutes prior art.” Appeal Br. 7; see also Reply
Br. 2–5, 9–10.3 Appellant also argues that “the Examiner has failed to
establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on the cited combination
of references, which fails to teach or suggest all of the elements of
independent claims 1, 3, and 11.” Appeal Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 5–9.
We address each of Appellant’s arguments below.
A. Whether Nugent Qualifies as Prior Art
We begin by noting that Appellant’s present application is a divisional
of U.S. Patent Application No. 13/413,696, filed March 7, 2012. Nugent, on
which the Examiner relies as a primary reference, has a publication date of
April 11, 2013, and a filing date of June 9, 2012, both of which fall after the
March 7, 2012 filing date of the present application. But Nugent is based on
U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/495,174 (“Nugent Provisional” or
“Nugent Prov.”), filed June 9, 2011, which is before the filing date of the
present application. So the issue becomes whether Nugent is effectively
entitled to the date of its earlier provisional application. If not, Nugent does
not qualify as prior art.
“A reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing
date of its provisional application if the disclosure of the provisional

3 Although the Reply Brief is paginated A-1 through A-10, we omit the “A”
prefix when citing pages of the Reply Brief.
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application provides support for the claims in the reference patent in
compliance with [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 1.” Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l
Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
Although Nugent is not a patent but rather a published application, the
holding in Dynamic Drinkware applies nonetheless to both issued patents
and published applications. See Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s finding of nonobviousness where
“Appellants . . . did not proffer any evidence showing that the provisional
applications contained representative species or common structural elements
sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement for the [subject
matter] claimed in the PCT applications.”). Thus, while the Nugent
Provisional may antedate the present application, Nugent itself constitutes
prior art only if: (1) the subject matter of Nugent relied upon in the
Examiner’s rejection is shown to be properly supported by the Nugent
Provisional in accordance with § 112, first paragraph; and (2) at least one
claim in Nugent is adequately supported by the Nugent Provisional in
compliance with § 112, first paragraph.
1. Whether the Nugent Provisional provides adequate written
description support for the Examiner’s reliance on Nugent’s
disclosure
In rejecting the independent claims, the Examiner cites paragraph 81
of Nugent as disclosing the claim limitation reciting that the tethered aerial
vehicle “land at the ground station” if the tether is determined to be “not
severed.” Final Act. 5, 11 (“the safety system may respond to an unsafe
condition by causing the aerial platform 120 to return to the base unit and
land immediately”). The Examiner similarly cites paragraph 81 of Nugent
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as disclosing the claim limitation reciting that the tethered vehicle initiate a
“safe-fall mode” if the tether is determined to be “severed.” Id.
Appellant responds that the Nugent Provisional fails to provide
adequate written description support for either of the above aspects of
Nugent relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims. See Appeal
Br. 7–10; Reply Br. 2–5. According to Appellant, although the Nugent
Provisional indisputably discloses that the aerial vehicle lands safely in the
event of a power failure, the Nugent Provisional nonetheless fails to provide
support for the disclosure in Nugent that the aerial vehicle “return to the
base unit and land immediately.” Appeal Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 2–3.
Similarly, Appellant contends that the Nugent Provisional fails to provide
support for “a safe-fall mode,” despite its disclosure in Nugent. Appeal
Br. 10; Reply Br. 4–5. Aside from questioning the Nugent Provisional’s
disclosure of those two aspects of Nugent, Appellant does not further dispute
that the Nugent Provisional provides support for the other aspects of Nugent
relied upon by the Examiner, including its disclosure of transmitting optical
power via a tether from a ground station to an aerial vehicle for propelling
the vehicle. See Appeal Br. 7–10; Reply Br. 2–5.
To begin, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
Nugent Provisional lacks support for Nugent’s disclosure of causing the
aerial platform “to return to the base unit and land immediately.” See
Appeal Br. 9 (citing Nugent Prov., at 7–8). In particular, like the Examiner,
we note the Nugent Provisional’s disclosure that “[i]n the case of failure, the
energy storage elements may provide sufficient energy to allow the platform
[i.e., the aerial vehicle] to descend and land safely. Ans. 3 (citing Nugent
Prov., at 6, ¶ 2 (emphasis added)). As for where the vehicle lands, the
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Examiner points to the Nugent Provisional’s disclosure that the tether is
deployed “via a winch, a drum or reel” for the purpose of “reducing the
amount to which the cable might wander or move horizontally, . . . and/or
providing data for use in controlling the position, attitude and height of the
aerial platform.” Ans. 3 (citing Nugent Prov., at 4, ¶¶ 7, 11). From those
disclosures, the Examiner finds that the cable’s attachment to the tensioning
winch, drum, or reel “would inherently cause the cable to retract as the
platform descen[d]s and lands, which would automatically pull the platform
toward the ground station, . . . [and] would therefore inherently land at the
ground station to which the tether is attached.” Id.
We discern no error in the Examiner’s finding. Importantly, the
Examiner notes the Nugent Provisional’s disclosure that the tether cable is
used for “providing data for use in controlling the position” of the tethered
aerial vehicle. Ans. 3 (quoting Nugent Prov., at 4, ¶ 11) (emphasis added).
That disclosure of transmitting navigational data to the aerial vehicle via the
tether amounts to instructing the tethered vehicle as to its flight route, which
necessarily would include a landing spot, be it at the ground station or
elsewhere. And so long as the aerial vehicle is attached to the ground station
via the tether, the most logical landing spot would be the location from
whence it was deployed, rather than some random location. Indeed, as the
Examiner explained, a skilled artisan reasonably would have understood the
Nugent Provisional’s disclosure of a winch or reel for the tether as including
the capability to reel the aerial vehicle back in to the ground station as the
vehicle descends. See Ans. 3. Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments to the contrary, as they focus on “other embodiments” in the
Nugent Provisional not relied upon by the Examiner. See Reply Br. 2
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(focusing on Nugent Provisional’s “other embodiments” that do not include
a deployment mechanism).
Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Nugent
Provisional fails to provide support for a “safe-fall mode” in the event the
tether cable loses power. Pointing to the Specification, Appellant argues that
a skilled artisan would understand that the “safe-fall mode” means the aerial
vehicle “fall[s] to the ground safely without requiring an onboard power
supply.” Reply Br. 5. Appellant contrasts that meaning of a “safe-fall
mode” with the Nugent Provisional’s description of an onboard power
supply for permitting the aerial vehicle to land safely in the event of a power
failure, and from there, argues that the Nugent Provisional’s description “is
irreconcilable with the safe-fall mode as claimed.” Id. (quoting Nugent
Prov., at 6).
We disagree for the simple reason that Appellant applies an unduly
narrow meaning to the term “safe-fall mode.” At the outset, we note that
none of the independent claims include the negative limitation—“without
requiring an onboard power supply”—that Appellant improperly attempts to
inject from the Specification into the claims. Indeed, the Specification belies
Appellant’s overly narrow definition by expressly disclosing that the “safe-
fall [mode] could comprise an onboard power storage device” in the event of
a power failure. Spec. ¶ 92. Thus, consistent with the Specification, “safe-
fall mode” encompasses a method of landing the aerial vehicle safely that
either requires an onboard power supply (e.g., actuating a battery) or does
not require an onboard power supply (e.g., deploying a parachute). See
Spec. ¶¶ 89–93. As such, we agree with the Examiner that the Nugent
Provisional’s description of using “energy storage elements” to land the
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vehicle safely in the event of a power failure constitutes a safe-fall mode for
the vehicle. See Ans. 3–4.
Because Appellant does not further fault the Nugent Provisional as
failing to provide support for any other aspect of Nugent relied upon by the
Examiner in rejecting the claims, we turn now to the additional requirement
under Dynamic Drinkware that at least one claim in Nugent find support in
the Nugent Provisional.
2. Whether the Nugent Provisional provides written description
support for at least one claim of Nugent
Appellant argues that, even if the two disputed features of Nugent find
support in the Nugent Provisional, the Examiner nonetheless fails to address
the additional requirement that at least one claim of Nugent also finds
support in the Nugent Provisional. See Appeal Br. 11–12; Reply Br. 9–10
(citing Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378). We are not persuaded that
the Examiner failed to meet his burden with respect to this additional
requirement. The Examiner cites specific pages and paragraphs of the
Nugent Provisional, the totality of which provides clear and indisputable
support for at least claim 1 of Nugent. See Ans. 3–4.
More specifically, Nugent’s claim 1 recites a system comprising five
basic elements—
(1) “an optical transmission element;”
(2) “an optical power source coupled to an end of the
optical transmission element . . . ;”
(3) “an aerial platform;”
(4) “an optical power receiver attached to the aerial
platform and . . . operable to receive optical power and convert
at least a portion of the optical power into a second form of
power;” and
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(5) “a propulsion element operable . . . to propel the
aerial platform.”
Nugent, at 24 (claim 1).
Throughout their exchange, the Examiner and Appellant demonstrate
an understanding of the Nugent Provisional as disclosing each of those five
basic elements. For instance, both the Examiner and Appellant reference
“page 6, paragraph 2 of the Nugent Provisional,” which indisputably
discloses an “aerial platform” equipped with a “receiver” for receiving
“power from the cable” (i.e., tether), which in turn is attached to “the
transmitter” on the ground. See Appeal Br. 9–10; Ans. 3–4. As for the
element requiring “a second form of power,” both the Examiner and
Appellant note the Nugent Provisional’s disclosure that “[i]n other possible
embodiments, at least some of the transmitted power may be in the form of
high voltage electricity.” See Ans. 4 (citing Nugent Prov. at 2 ¶ 5); Reply
Br. 5–6 (acknowledging the Nugent Provisional’s disclosure that “the cable
could include one or more electrical conductors, and power could be
delivered as electrical current flow”). Indeed, the Examiner expressly
discusses the Nugent Provisional’s disclosure of transmitting both optical
and electrical power to the aerial platform as meeting “claim 15 of Nugent,”
which ultimately depends from Nugent’s claim 1. And as plainly clear from
the face of the Nugent Provisional, it is beyond dispute that the aerial vehicle
includes a propulsion element.
That both the Examiner and Appellant understood the Nugent
Provisional as disclosing those basic elements of a tethered UAV amounts to
a showing by the Examiner that the Nugent Provisional provides adequate
support for at least claim 1 of Nugent, if not also claim 15. Once it was clear
from the Examiner’s analysis that the Nugent Provisional satisfied at least
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claim 1 of Nugent, which is its broadest claim, the burden appropriately
shifted to Appellant to come forward with evidence and argument
supporting a contrary position, which, at a minimum, entails identifying
what, if any, feature of Nugent’s broad claim was missing from the Nugent
Provisional. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–80 (addressing the
“shifting burdens” in establishing prior art status of an asserted reference).
Appellant fails to do anything of the sort, arguing simply that “the Examiner
has failed to even address this requirement, let alone satisfy it.” Appeal Br.
12; see also Reply Br. 9–10 (same). That the Examiner may not have
labeled his analysis in terms of the Dynamic Drinkware framework does not
mean he did not satisfy its requirements. As discussed above, the Examiner
satisfied his initial burden of production by means of his detailed discussion
of the Nugent Provisional. When that burden shifted to Appellant, however,
it fell short.
In sum, we determine that Appellant fails to meet its burden of
producing evidence and/or argument that the Nugent Provisional lacks at
least one of the five basic elements of Nugent’s broad claim 1. And because
we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s analysis of the Nugent
Provisional as providing adequate support not only for the disputed features
of Nugent relied on by the Examiner but also the broadest claim of Nugent,
we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Nugent qualifies as prior art in
rejecting the claims.
B. Whether the Claimed Invention Would Have Been Obvious Over the
Nugent-based Rejections
Appellant raises essentially three arguments in dispute of the
Examiner’s obviousness rejections of the claims. Appeal Br. 12. In doing
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so, Appellant argues independent claims 1, 3, and 11 together and does not
argue any of the dependent claims separately. Id. at 12–19. The Examiner
rejected claim 1 as obvious over Nugent and Cornwell, and claims 3 and 11
as obvious over Nugent, Cornwell, and Grieser. See Final Act. 4, 9, 15.
In disputing the Examiner’s obviousness rejections, Appellant argues
that Nugent fails to disclose “transmitting electrical power from a ground
station to the tethered aerial vehicle through the tether power cable,” as
required by independent claims 1, 3, and 11. Appeal Br. 13; see also Reply
Br. 5–6 (making essentially same argument). According to Appellant,
Nugent “teaches transmission of light through optical fiber” and “is
incapable of conducting electrical power because it is not fabricated from an
electrically-conductive material.” Appeal Br. 13–14 (citing Nugent,
Abstract, Figs. 6A, 6B). In that same vein, Appellant argues that “Nugent
teaches away the disclosures of Cornwell, which relates to an electrical cable
monitoring system (a feature that is forbidden by Nugent).” Id. at 14–15.
We disagree with Appellant’s assertions. Although Nugent discloses
that “[t]ransmitting the power in the form of light is preferable in many cases
to transmitting electric power, because electrical conductors are generally
heavier than optical fibers, and are hazardous in the presence of lightning or
a high-voltage power line,” nowhere does Nugent discourage the use of
electrical conductors or otherwise suggest that they cannot be used in place
of optical fiber. Nugent ¶ 8. Rather, Nugent expressly contemplates that the
tether may comprise various components “for transmitting either signals or
power . . . includ[ing] metallic wires 332, coaxial cables 334, and optical
fibers 310.” Id. ¶ 49 (emphasis added), Fig. 3C. Elsewhere, Nugent
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acknowledges that the use of “a tether containing electrical conductors” is a
well-known form of powering UAVs and cites several examples. Id. ¶ 4.
Those disclosures clearly support the Examiner’s finding that Nugent
discloses transmitting electrical power through a tether comprising an
electrical conductor. That Nugent discusses the benefits of using one form
of power transmission (fiber-optic tethers) over another form of power
transmission (electrical-conductor tethers) does not mean that a skilled
artisan would have been dissuaded from using an electrical-conductor
altogether in Nugent’s tether, especially given Nugent’s express recognition
that electrical-conductor tethers are well-known and may be used in certain
circumstances (i.e., where lightning and power lines do not present a safety
hazard). See id. ¶¶ 4, 49, Fig. 3C. Because Appellant ignores Nugent’s
express teachings, we are not the least bit persuaded by Appellant’s
argument that Nugent fails to disclose, or otherwise teaches away from,
transmitting electrical power to the tethered aerial vehicle, as called for by
claims 1, 3, and 11. See Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 5–6.
Appellant’s next argument faults the Examiner for failing to
demonstrate that Nugent and Cornwell are “analogous prior art.” Appeal Br.
17. According to Appellant,
the Examiner has failed to indicate why a skilled artisan looking
to solve a problem with light-driven aerial vehicles would look
to monitoring systems for insuring the integrity of electrical
cables as are used to energize equipment, e.g., mining equipment
especially when Nugent would dissuade a person of ordinary
skill in the art from using electrical conducting tethers.

Id.; see also Reply Br. 7–8 (making essentially same argument).
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner articulated sufficient
reasoning with factual underpinning for why a skilled artisan would have
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looked to Cornwell’s cable monitoring system as a safety system in
Nugent’s tether, i.e., to maintain the integrity of the tether, to detect damage
in the tether, and, ultimately, to prevent hazardous shocks in the event of a
severed tether. See Final Act. 6 (quoting Cornwell, 4:57–66; Nugent ¶ 85).
Indeed, Nugent itself provides “a safety system . . . to detect one or more
unsafe conditions,” which “may include a hardware fault, such as a break in
the tether.” Nugent ¶¶ 81–82. Explaining further, Nugent describes that the
safety system “may employ technologies known in the art,” such as “power
measurements, to detect damage . . . in the tether.” Id. ¶ 85. Cornwell
teaches one such safety system, recognizing expressly that its cable
monitoring system is ideally suited “for insuring the integrity of such cables
as are used to energize equipment . . . employed in remote and/or dangerous
locations,” which is exactly the environment in which Nugent’s remotely-
powered aerial vehicle operates. Cornwell, 1:6–10; see also id. at 1:37–39
(“To prevent hazards from shock at the mobile machines, the integrity of the
ground wire must be maintained.”). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that
Cornwell is reasonably pertinent to the problem of electrical power
transmission to remote vehicles faced by Appellant and that modifying
Nugent to use the known safety technology from Cornwell would have been
an obvious solution for preventing hazardous shocks from Nugent’s tether.
See Final Act. 6; Ans. 4–5.
Finally, Appellant argues that “[t]he Examiner failed to establish a
prima facie case of obviousness.” Appeal Br. 18. But aside from reciting
the relevant law of obviousness, Appellant provides no meaningful
explanation as to how the Examiner erred in selecting and combining the
asserted references. See id. To the extent Appellant is referencing purported
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failures of the Examiner discussed earlier in its brief, we reject Appellant’s
assertion for the reasons discussed above.4
CONCLUSION
We sustain the Examiner’s rejections of independent claims 1, 3, and
11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). And because Appellant does not argue
dependent claims 2, 4–10, and 12–27 separately, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejections of those dependent claims for the same reasons we sustain the
rejection of the independent claims.

4 Appellant raises a new argument in its Reply Brief faulting the Examiner’s
reason for why a skilled artisan would have known to use the parachute of
Grieser as a descent stabilization device in Nugent’s aerial vehicle. See
Reply Br. 8–9. Absent showing of good cause, we reject this belated
argument as improper. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (2017). In any event,
we agree with the Examiner that a skilled artisan would have readily
understood that Grieser’s teaching of using a parachute as a descent
stabilization device in an aerial vehicle would have been equally applicable
to Nugent’s aerial vehicle in order to safely protect it during descent and
landing in the event of a power failure. See Final Act. 12.
Appeal 2020-000730
Application 14/280,992

18
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 13–15,
21, 26
103(a) Nugent, Cornwell 1, 2, 13–15,
21, 26

3–9, 11, 12,
17–20, 25,
27
103(a) Nugent, Cornwell,
Grieser
3–9, 11, 12,
17–20, 25,
27

10, 16 103(a) Nugent, Grieser,
Burnham
10, 16
22

103(a) Nugent, Grieser,
Blumer
22
23 103(a) Nugent, Grieser,
Abrahamson
23
24 103(a) Nugent, Cornwell,
Abrahamson, Grieser
24
Overall
Outcome
1–27

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED