AU Optronics CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 16, 20212020005212 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/659,790 07/26/2017 Jia-Show HO 67507-119 4248 65358 7590 12/16/2021 WPAT, PC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ATTORNEYS 8230 BOONE BLVD. SUITE 405 VIENNA, VA 22182 EXAMINER NGUYEN, JIMMY H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2626 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/16/2021 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JIA-SHOW HO, CHE-CHIA CHANG, and MING-HUNG CHUANG Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 Technology Center 2600 Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, LARRY J. HUME, and JUSTIN BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–5, 7, and 9–12. Appellant has withdrawn claims 6 and 8 from consideration as being directed to a non- elected species. See Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as AU Optronics Corp. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The claimed subject matter is directed to “a pixel circuit, and in particular, to a switchable pixel circuit.” See Spec. 1:5. Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on Appeal (emphasis added to contested prior-art limitations): 1. A pixel circuit, comprising: a liquid crystal capacitor with a first end and a second end; a memory circuit, for storing a status signal; a driving circuit, for receiving a data voltage from a data line and outputting the data voltage to the liquid crystal capacitor and a mode-switching circuit according to a scan signal of a gate line; the mode-switching circuit, for outputting the data voltage to the memory circuit and outputting a display voltage to the liquid crystal capacitor according to a mode-switching signal; and a control circuit, electrically connecting to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit, connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node, and connecting to the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor, wherein the control circuit controls a voltage level of the first node corresponding to the status signal, and outputting the display voltage to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit when the mode-switching circuit is ON. 2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Feb. 6, 2020); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed July 1, 2020); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed May 1, 2020); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed July 9, 2019); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed July 26, 2017). Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 3 REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence: Name Reference Date Miyazawa et al. (“Miyazawa”) US 2001/0052890 A1 Dec. 20, 2001 Yokoyama US 2002/0036627 A1 Mar. 28, 2002 Nagai et al. (“Nagai”) US 2009/0141013 A1 June 4, 2009 REJECTIONS3 R1. Claims 1, 2, 5, and 9–12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Yokoyama. Final Act. 5. R2. Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Yokoyama. Final Act. 9. R3. Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Yokoyama and Miyazawa. Final Act. 11. R4. Claims 1 and 9–12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Nagai. Final Act. 12. R5. Claims 2–5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nagai. Final Act. 15. R6. Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Nagai and Miyazawa. Final Act. 19. 3 The Examiner withdrew the written description rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See Ans. 3. Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 4 ISSUES AND ANALYSIS Based upon our review of the record, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports particular arguments advanced by Appellant with respect to claim 1 for the specific reasons discussed below. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows. 1. § 102(a)(1) Rejection R1 of Claims 1, 2, 5, and 9–12 Issue 1 Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 11–13; Reply Br.11–16) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Yokoyama is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses “[a] pixel circuit” that includes, inter alia, “a control circuit, electrically connecting to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit, connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node, and connecting to the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,” as recited in claim 1? Principles of Law Anticipation of a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102 occurs when each claimed element and the claimed arrangement or combination of those elements is disclosed, inherently or expressly, by a single prior art reference. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). A reference inherently discloses an element of a claim “if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 5 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Therasense, 593 F.3d at 1332 (citing Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Analysis The Examiner finds Figure 1 of Yokoyama discloses “a control circuit comprising an element 120, electrically connecting to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor 21 via the element 45 of the mode-switching circuit, connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node [a node between the element 120/121 and the element 45], and connecting to the Vcom [signal A] line and the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor 21,” as recited in claim 1. Figure 1 of Yokoyama is replicated below: Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 6 “FIG. 1 is a circuit diagram of a liquid crystal display device to which this invention is applied.” Yokoyama ¶ 16. Appellant contends: Yokoyama fails to disclose or suggest, inter alia, connecting to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor (via the mode- switching circuit) and connecting to the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor, as specifically claimed. As claimed, the liquid crystal capacitor has a first end connecting to the control circuit via a mode-switching circuit and a second end connecting to the control circuit. See, inter alia, FIG. 1, liquid crystal capacitor (Clc), control circuit (180), and mode- switching circuit (160). Appeal Br. 11. Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as being anticipated by Yokoyama because the claimed invention “specifically requires the control circuit electrically connecting to a first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit and the control circuit electrically connecting to a second end of the liquid crystal capacitor, as claimed” and Yokoyama does not show this in Figure 1 or in any other figure, thus providing “a fundamental difference in structure from the teachings of Yokoyama.” Appeal Br. 12. The Examiner responds, “with respect to the comparison between Fig. 1 of the current application and Fig. 1 of the Yokoyama on page 12 of the [Appeal Brief], Examiner notes that the specification is not the measure of invention. Therefore, limitations contained therein can’t be read into the claims for the purpose of avoiding the prior art.” Ans. 4. In the Reply Brief, Appellant contends “[t]he Office has made technical errors mapping components to the claimed invention, and remains Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 7 deficient in showing this particular claimed feature.” Reply Br. 11. Appellant specifically argues: As claimed, the invention includes a liquid crystal capacitor having a first end connecting to the control circuit via the recited mode-switching circuit and a second end also connecting to the control circuit. See, inter alia, FIG. 1, liquid crystal capacitor (Clc), control circuit (180), and mode- switching circuit (160). Appellant maintains that the Office fails to show that Yokoyama connects to both sides of the liquid crystal capacitor in the same way (i.e., using the same paths) as the currently claimed invention. The Office fails to address the argument that the connection of the control circuit to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor must occur through the recited mode- switching circuit. The Office equates the claimed mode- switching circuit to transistors 42, 72, and 45 as disclosed by Yokoyama, FIG. 1 (inter alia, Final Office Action, Page 5, Lines 11–12). The Office alleged that the Appellant mistakenly analyses that Yokoyama's driving circuit does not electrically connect to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode switching circuit and not electrically connecting to a second end of the liquid crystal capacitor (Examiner's Answer, page 4, 3rd paragraph). Appellant respectfully submits that the Office seems to only focus and interpret the scope of claim 1 on the electrical connection, and ignores the fact that the claim 1 explicitly calls the connections to both ends of the liquid crystal capacitor with one connecting path via the recited mode- switching circuit. The control circuit (Yokoyama 120) does not connect to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor through these components 42/72/45. While the control circuit connects to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor through transistor component 45, there is no flow of signal through transistors 42 and 72; the transistors 42/72 connect directly to the equated “memory circuit” (Yokoyama: 110), instead. Appellant Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 8 respectfully asserts that the Office has made incorrect interpretation on the cited Yokoyama reference and in mapping Yokoyama' s structures to the recited mode-switching circuit along with other recited components, as claimed and described. Yokoyama reference explicitly defines that the structures 40 (41, 42) and 43 (44, 45) as two separate switching circuits for switching between analog and digital [display], the structure 110 (111, 112) as the retaining circuit (Yokoyama, paragraph 32), and the structure 120 (121, 122) as the signal selection circuit to provide the signals for driving the liquid crystal (Yokoyama, Fig. 1, paragraphs 30-35). Yokoyama discloses alternating two modes by controlling whether the liquid crystal capacitor 21 will receive signals from the structure 44 or the structure 45. Reply Br. 11–12. “The current invention specifically requires the control circuit electrically connecting to a first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the recited mode-switching circuit and the control circuit electrically connecting to a second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,” as claimed. Reply Br. 15. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because, upon review of the prior art and consideration of Appellant’s contentions, we find Yokoyama fails to disclose “a control circuit, electrically connecting to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit, connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node, and connecting to the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,” as required by claim 1, and as argued by Appellant. Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are persuaded of at least one error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art to disclose the disputed limitation of claim 1, such that we find error in the Examiner’s resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we do not Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 9 sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1. For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2, 5, and 9–12, depending from claim 1 and also rejected under Rejection R1. 2. § 102(a)(1) Rejection R4 of Claims 1 and 9–12 Issue 2 Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 18–21) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Nagai is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses “[a] pixel circuit” that includes, inter alia, “a control circuit, electrically connecting to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit, connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node, and connecting to the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,” as recited in claim 1? Analysis Similar to Rejection R1 of claim 1, supra, the Examiner finds Nagai in Figure 1 discloses the same disputed limitation. Final Act. 13. Appellant argues: The Office alleges Nagai discloses a “control circuit” (SW5, SW6) in FIG. 1. Similar to the discussion of Yokoyama, above, this “control circuit” (SW5, SW6) only connects to “liquid crystal capacitance” (LCC) 51 on a single side; the other terminal of the LCC 51 is connected to the common electrode 52 (again, roughly corresponding to Vcom, disclosed in the originally filed specification, inter alia, Page 5, Lines 16-23 and FIGS. 1-7). Although the “control circuit” SW5, SW6 disclosed Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 10 by Nagai connects to a first end of the capacitor via (an alleged equivalent) mode switching circuit SW2, SW4, this “control circuit” SW5, SW6 does not connect to a second end of the LCC 51. Appeal Br. 15. Figure 1 of Nagai is replicated below: “FIG. 1 is an equivalent circuit diagram showing the configuration of a pixel circuit of one sub-pixel in a liquid crystal display device according to a first embodiment of the present invention.” Nagai ¶ 47. In comparing the claimed invention to Nagai’s disclosure, Appellant argues: Parallel to the discussion of Yokoyama, no components of the Nagai system connect to the common electrode 52 that provides voltage to a second/opposite side of the LCC 51. Thus, Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 11 Nagai cannot be held to disclose that the control circuit, in any form, connects to both ends of the LCC 51; the claimed and described invention specifically includes a control circuit specifically connecting to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit, and connecting to the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor. Appeal Br. 16. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred because we find that Nagai fails to disclose a control circuit that connects to both ends of liquid crystal capacitor (LCC) 51, as required by claim 1. Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are persuaded of at least one error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art to disclose the disputed limitation of claim 1, such that we find error in the Examiner’s resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1 and claims 9–12 which depend from claim 1 and which are rejected under Rejection R4. 3. § 103 Rejections R2, R3, R5, and R6 of Claims 2–5, and 7 In light of our reversal of Rejections R1 and R4 of independent claim 1, supra, we also reverse obviousness Rejections R2, R3, R5, and R6 under § 103 of claims 2–5 and 7, which variously and ultimately depend from claim 1. On this record, the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited secondary Miyazawa reference overcomes the aforementioned deficiencies with Yokoyama and Nagai, as discussed above regarding Rejections R1 and R4 of claim 1. Appeal 2020-005212 Application 15/659,790 12 CONCLUSIONS We REVERSE the Examiner’s rejections. More specifically: (1) Appellant has persuasively argued that the Examiner erred with respect to anticipation Rejection R1 of claims 1, 2, 5, and 9–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) over Yokoyama, and we do not sustain the rejection. (2) Appellant has persuasively argued that the Examiner erred with respect to anticipation Rejection R4 of claims 1 and 9–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) over Nagai, and we do not sustain the rejection. (3) Based upon our reversal of Rejections R1 and R4 of claim 1, we reverse obviousness Rejections R2, R3, R5, and R6 of claims 2–5 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art combinations of record. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 5, 9–12 102(a)(1) Yokoyama 1, 2, 5, 9–12 3, 4 103 Yokoyama 3, 4 7 103 Yokoyama, Miyazawa 7 1, 9–12 102(a)(1) Nagai 1, 9–12 2–5 103 Nagai 2–5 7 103 Nagai, Miyazawa 7 Overall Outcome 1–5, 7, 9–12 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation