Atlas Railroad Construction Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMay 30, 1974210 N.L.R.B. 1096 (N.L.R.B. 1974) Copy Citation 1096 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Atlas Railroad Construction Company and Local 935, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-7773 May 30, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On January 17, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Morton D. Friedman issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party and General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. We find, in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, that the General Counsel has not met his burden of proof that Respondent discriminatorily discharged the four alleged discriminatees; in so finding, however, we do not adopt his rationale. The prerequisite for finding a violation of Section 8(a)(3) in a case like this is union animus or discriminatory motivation. Such motivation may be found on the basis of direct or circumstantial evidence; thus, where warranted by the facts, discriminatory motiva- tion may be inferred. However, on this record, even assuming that Nate Daniels, who allegedly dis- charged the four alleged discriminatees,' was a supervisor or agent of Respondent, an issue we find unnecessary to reach in view of our disposition herein, we are unable to find either by direct evidence or inference that Respondent discharged the employees because of their union activity. As the Administrative Law Judge correctly pointed out, not only is the Respondent not antiunion but it has dealt with the Charging Party and other Laborers i The Administrative Law Judge found that Nate Daniels was not a supervisor or agent of Respondent and dismissed the complaint primarily on that ground 2 The Charging Party contends that Respondent's union animus was against it , Local 935, because if the International decided Local 935's contract and not Local 1274s contract applied to the Youngstown Sheet and Copperweld jobs it would cost Respondent substantially more to hire laborers However , even if this were accepted as true with regard to Respondent , its officers , and high echelon supervisors , the same motivation cannot be ascribed to Nate Daniels For if the Local 935 contract were applied instead of Local 1274's, Nate Daniels rate of pay would have been approximately $3 per hour more In sum , unlike Respondent, it was in Nate locals for years. In fact, on the very day the alleged discriminatees were purportedly discharged, the Respondent discussed and peacefully resolved with the Charging Party the issue of which Laborers contract applied to the Youngstown Sheet and Copperweld jobs, from which the four employees were allegedly discharged. And this issue was resolved before the discharges in issue occurred. Moreover, there is even less evidence from which to infer that Nate Daniels discharged the employees for discriminatory reasons. Nate Daniels, as a "pusher," was either a member of the Laborers or had signed a Local 1274 authorization card when he signed on for the Copperweld job; his rate of pay was determined by the Local 1274 contract.2 When the four alleged discriminatees left the job at 10:30 a.m. to go to the union hall, Nate Daniels, although he had earlier said he would drive them there himself, told the employees, in effect, they did not have permission to leave the job.3 There is no evidence of union animus on the part of Nate Daniels, who allegedly discharged the employees; in our opinion it is just as reasonable to infer that Nate Daniels was concerned about the fact that the four employees were leaving the job at a time when he as "pusher" could not afford to lose a full crew of workers.4 Put differently, it is more likely that Nate Daniels discharged the four discriminatees, assuming he had the authority to do so, because they had left the job without permission rather than for some discrimina- tory reason.5 Nor on this record are we able to find that Respondent ratified Nate Daniels' termination of the four employees for antiunion or other reasons. In the first place, as noted supra, we have no grounds for inferring such animus by Respondent. But, more significantly, we have no basis for finding Respon- dent was even aware that Nate Daniels had dis- charged the four employees. Stout, Respondent's vice president in charge of the Copperweld and Youngs- town Sheet jobs, testified without contradiction that he had never instructed anyone to discharge the employees and that he was not even aware of the purported discharges until he received a copy of the charge from the NLRB. Moreover, when Stout left the union hall on July 5 after resolving the issue of Daniels' interest that the Local 935 contract rates be applied to the Copperweld Job 3 Robert Daniels testified that when the four told Nate they were going to the union hall Nate asked if the Union was paying their salary and said, "If you go don ' t come back " 4 It should be noted that because it had to complete the Copperweld job while the Copperweld employees were on vacation , Respondent was working on three shifts , around the clock Faced with this time element, having enough employees to man full crews was a necessity 5 In this connection it seems highly unlikely that Nate Daniels who had worked under Laborers contracts for many years would possibly jeopardize his future employment by alienating the Union. 210 NLRB No. 164 ATLAS RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION CO. 1097 which contract would govern the jobs, he saw the four employees but said nothing about their being discharged. Likewise, according to Respondent's customary practice the alleged discriminatees did not receive final payment "field checks" at the time of discharge or shortly thereafter, as is normally the case when employees are discharged. Rather, they received regular weekly pay checks on July 5 or 6 and on July 12 or 13.6 The Charging Party contends, however, that Stout's claim of ignorance with respect to the discharges is incredible since the four men composed the entire crew working under Nate Daniels and it is highly improbable that their absence would not be called to Stout's attention . However , given the nature of the job and the employees involved, the hiring procedures employed by Respondent, and the time limitation on the job , it is not clear that their absence would have been called to Stout's attention. Respon- dent had 120 employees at Copperweld. Stout testified without contradiction that absenteeism was very high and that most of the men on such jobs come and go-they work for a few days, leave for a few days, and return. Respondent's employees do not generally report when they will be absent from work.? In sum , there is no record evidence which shows that Stout or any other of Respondent's officials ratified the Nate Daniels' termination of the four employees for any reason. In conclusion, we have no basis on the record before us for finding that the four discriminatees were discharged, if in fact they were, because of union activity or any other protected concerted activity.8 As the General Counsel has not met his burden of proof, we shall accordingly dismiss the complaint. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. on July 5. Robert E . Daniels began on June 27 and worked 8 hours; he worked I I hours on June 28 , 6 hours on June 29 , did not show on June 30, and July 1, worked 21 hours on July 2 , 5 hours on July 3, did not show on July 4 , and worked 4 hours on July 5. Lowery Daniels worked from June 27 to July 5 on a daily basis except for July 4. 8 Although the complaint alleged alternatively that the discharges were violative of Sec . 8(a)(I) (other concerted activity ) the case was tried primarily on an 8(a)(3) theory . However , the alleged discriminatees apparently had no complaint with regard to their wages or other conditions of employment . They merely left the Jobsite , without permission, at the Union agent's request that they come to the union hall to review the contract , although at the time the request was made the union agent did not even know which contract would be applicable . On this record we are unable to find that the alleged discnmmatees' unauthorized absence from their work was protected concerted activity. As with the 8(aX3) allegation the General Counsel has not met his burden of proof. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MORTON D. FRIEDMAN , Administrative Law Judge: Upon a charge filed on July 12, 1973, by Local 935, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, herein called Local 935 or the Charging Party, the Regional Director for Region 8 of the National Labor Relations Board , herein called the Board , issued a complaint on August 24, 1973, on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board, against Atlas Railroad Construction Company, herein called the Respondent or Atlas, alleging violations of Section 8(aX3) and ( 1) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. The complaint alleges, in substance , that the Respondent terminated the employ- ment of four employees and failed and refused to reinstate them until a certain date because they had engaged in union or other concerted , protected activities . In its duly filed answer , the Respondent, while admitting certain allegations of the complaint , denied the commission of any unfair labor practices in that it did not , in fact, terminate the employment of the four individuals named in the complaint. Pursuant to notice , a hearing in this case was held before me at Warren, Ohio , on October 23, 1973 . All parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be heard , to introduce relevant evidence , to present oral argument, and to file briefs . Oral argument was waived. Briefs were filed by counsel for the Respondent and the Charging Party. Upon consideration of the entire record herein , and upon my observation of each witness appear- ing before me, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT 6 On the other hand Daniel Evans, one of the alleged discriminatees, who returned to work on July 19 and was discharged on July 20 for reasons not alleged to be discriminatory , was paid off on July 20 by final payment "field check " r For example the work records of the four alleged discriminatees are as follows: Daniel Evans was hired on June 19 and worked 6 hours ; on June 20 through June 25 he "did not show" up for work, he worked 8 hours on June 26 but did not show on June 27; he worked I I hours on June 28 and 6 hours on June 29 but did not show on June 30, July 1, or July 2; on July 3 he worked 9 hours, "did not show" on July 4, and worked 4 hours on July 5 James Magby began on June 28 and worked I I hours, he worked 6 hours on June 29, 11-1/2 hours on June 30, 14 hours on July 1, "did not show" on July 2, worked 9 hours on July 3, did not show July 4, and worked 4 hours The Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation, with its principal office and place of business in Bentleyville, Pennsylvania , is engaged in railroad track construction, rehabilitation and maintenance throughout the eastern half of the United States . During the year immediately preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, a repre- sentative period, the Respondent has been engaged in construction projects at cites located in Warren and Youngstown, Ohio, and in the course of conducting such operations at said locations received material valued in 1098 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD excess of $50,000 , directly from points located outside the State of Ohio. It is admitted, and I find , that the Respondent is an Employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED It is admitted, and I find, that Local 935, the Charging Party, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts As noted above, the Respondent is engaged in the business of installing, maintaining, and repairing railroad trackage. Much of its work is performed for large industrial plants which have railroad tracks within their facilities. About half of the Respondent's work is performed in the construction of new trackage and the other half is performed in maintenance and repair. In its operations, the Respondent normally brings to each job its own job superintendents, individuals who have been with the Respondent for some years and who understand all of the aspects of track laying and track maintenance and repair. In addition, many of the older hands who have worked with Respondent for some years will also follow the Respondent from job to job. These individuals are skilled employees although not of the caliber of job superintend- ents . In the area of the various jobsites , the Respondent either obtains employees from Laborers' International Union locals or has its superintendents , who are responsi- ble for both hiring and discharge, among their other duties, recruit employees who reside in the area. Some of the superintendents , from time to time , instruct the more skilled and older employees to bring various individuals, whom these employees may know, to the various jobsites for hiring by the superintendents. In May 1973,1 the Respondent contracted to perform repair and maintenance work at the plants of Copperweld Specialty Steel Company in Warren, Ohio, and at Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company in Youngstown, Ohio. The Respondent had operated in past years in this area and when it had worked in Trumbull County, in which Warren is located, had been a party to a labor agreement with Local 935, the Charging Party herein. However, on May 31, before actually starting work on the Copperweld and the Youngstown Sheet jobs, the Respon- dent entered into an agreement with Local 1274, of Springfield, Illinois. This agreement, negotiated by William M. Stout, vice president of the Respondent, is an adaptation of the National Rail Maintenance Agreement provided by the Laborers' International Union and, evidently, entered into between the various rail mainte- nance contractors and locals. The work assumed by the i All dates herein are in 1973 unless otherwise noted. 2 All of the foregoing from the credited testimony of William Stout Stout's forthright attitude and demeanor in answering the questions put to him by both his own counsel and on cross-examination convinces me that Stout was endeavoring in all of his testimony to portray events as they actually occurred. Additionally, much of what Stout testified to was Respondent for both Copperweld and Youngstown Sheet was maintenance work, as contrasted to new construction work which was the work performed in earlier years by the Respondent under contract with Local 935. It is also evident, from the record herein, that the maintenance contract with Local 1274 provided for lower wage rates than the construction contract offered by Local 935.2 Thus, when the Respondent began the manning of the Copperweld and Youngstown Sheet jobs, it offered the rates set forth in adaptation of the National Rail Maintenance Agreement entered into with Local 1274. However, when work on the jobs started up, especially the Copperweld work, Edward B. Garvin, the business manager of Local 935, saw Stout who told Garvin about the Respondent's contract with Local 1274. Thereupon, Garvin requested that Stout come down to the Union's business office in Warren in order to talk the matter over with an International representative. Garvin, on behalf of Local 935, contended that its contract was to be applied; Stout contended that the Local 1274 International contract had to be honored. In any event, a meeting was called for July 5, as set forth below. Before that meeting, however, Nathaniel Daniels, an old and experienced employee of the Respondent, whom the Respondent termed a "pusher" or "straw boss," was asked by Job Superintendent James A. Rupert to procure employees to work at the jobs. As a result, Nathaniel Daniels, herein referred to as Nate, obtained for the Copperweld job his nephews, Lowery D. Daniels, and Robert E. Daniels. Before bringing them down to the job, Nate Daniels told his nephews that they would receive the maintenance rate of $4.35 an hour, but did not explain further details to them. This was evidently acceptable to the two men and they accompanied Nate down to the job where they were formally hired and signed in by Vice President Stout, who had them sign The necessary W-4 and other required forms and also had them each sign a form applying for membership in Local 1274. This form also authorized the said local to represent them and also authorized the Respondent to make dues deductions on behalf of Local 1274. The hiring of Lowery Daniels and Robert Daniels took place on June 27. It should be noted in connection with such hiring that Lowery Daniels had worked for the Respondent at various jobs in various parts of the country for 6 years off and on preceding the date of the latest hiring. Thus, Lowery Daniels at least, was well acquainted with the manner in which the Respondent operated at its various jobs. Additionally, Robert Daniels had also worked for the Respondent at a prior time. Additionally, Job Superintendent Rupert hired Daniel Evans on June 19 and James Magby on June 27, at the Younstown Sheet job. However, on July 5, Evans, Magby, corroborated by witnesses called by the General Counsel and the Respondent Moreover, careful examination of Stout's testimony reveals no evident inconsistencies or apparent subterfuges normally contained in the testimony of witnesses who disregard the truth or whose recollection is faulty ATLAS RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION CO. 1099 and Robert and Lowery Daniels were all working at the Copperweld job in Warren.3 As noted above, Local 935 Business Agent Garvin had arranged a meeting at the Copperweld plant with William Stout and two International union officials, Lawrence O. Scott and Thomas Arconti. However, when these three individuals representing the Union came to the Copper- weld jobsite early on the morning of July 5, William Stout was not present because he had overslept. When the Union representatives observed some men working and asked who was in charge, Nate Daniels spoke up and said he was in charge. However, the record reveals that what he was ,.in charge" of was a work gang consisting of himself, the four alleged discriminatees herein, namely Evans, Magby and the two Daniels' brothers and one other employee. Arconti asked Nate Daniels to have the men come down to the union hall for a meeting so he could explain to them their contract rights. Nathaniel Daniels replied that there was some slag on a track that had to be moved or the mill could not operate. Arconti asked how long it would take to move the slag and Daniels replied that it would take a couple of hours. Arconti then said, "Okay, we will let you go ahead and move the slag. Will you see that the men go down to the union hall at 11 o'clock?" Daniels answered, "I will not only see that they come down; I will bring them down." Thereafter, the three union representatives, Garvin, Scott, and Arconti went to the Youngstown Sheet job where they contacted the representatives of the Youngs- town and Laborers' Union local and all of them then proceeded back to the union hall of Local 935, in Warren. When they arrived there they found William Stout, who apologized for having overslept. All of these individuals then proceeded into the union office on the second floor and had a meeting concerning which contract should govern the jobs at Copperweld and Youngstown Sheet. Meanwhile, the four alleged discriminatees, Evans, Magby, and the two Daniels brothers, at approximately 10:30 a.m. on the morning of July 5, in accordance with the agreement made by Nathaniel Daniels with the union officials, left the job and proceeded to go to the union hall. Before they left, Lowery Daniels approached Job Superin- tendent John Topolski, and asked if the latter was going to the union hall. Topolski's answer was a question to Lowery Daniels as to whether the Union was paying the employ- ees' wages. Lowery Daniels then went to Nate Daniels. Nate Daniels answered Lowery in much the same manner as did Topolski. When Lowery Daniels reminded Nate Daniels what the latter had told the union representatives earlier that day, Nathaniel Daniels answered that he did not care, he was only worried about his money, that he was getting paid anyway. Lowery Daniels then left the job with James Magby and, evidently, Robert Daniels and Daniel Evans followed. When the four employees arrived at the union hall they were told by the secretary to wait downstairs, that they 3 All of the foregoing from credited portions of the testimony of Robert Daniels , Lowery Daniels, James Rupert and William Stout 4 All of the foregoing from credited portions of the testimony of Lowery Daniels, Robert Daniels, and William Stout 5 All of the foregoing from credited testimony of Lowery Daniels as supported by the testimony of Robert Daniels would be called when the officials were ready for them. Evidently the meeting between Stout and the union officials lasted until approximately 4 p.m. When Stout came out of the meeting and down the steps of the union hall into the waiting room he saw the four alleged discriminatees. Stout then asked the four something to the effect of whether they were all off that day. According to Lowery Daniels, as he was proceeding to the union hall earlier that day, Stout passed them in his car and saw the men walking toward the union hall. Stout, in testifying, stated that he could not remember seeing the men but that he could have inasmuch as he did drive down that street on his way to the union hall.4 In any event, after Stout left the union hall the men were called into a meeting with the union officials and it was explained to them what rights they had under the contract which was sanctioned by the International and which the Respondent had entered into with the Springfield, Illinois, Local No. 1274. They were told that it was decided at the meeting between Stout and the union officials that that contract was the one which would prevail for the two jobs, at least until a ruling was made by the Laborers' International Union. Before the four employees left the hall, however, International Representative Arconti told them to report to work the following morning. Arconti further instructed the four that if there was any trouble to get in touch with Garvin at the union hall and that Garvin would then contact Arconti. After leaving the union hall the four employees went to Nathaniel Daniels' house because the latter had told the employees that he would pick up their paychecks for them. However, on the way, they saw Nate Daniels going to employee Cleveland Freeman's home and they followed him there. When they arrived at Freeman's home, Nathaniel Daniels told them that he wanted their helmets or hard hats "because Billy Stout didn't want to see our faces on the job any more." When the men asked the reason for this, Nate Daniels told them it was because they had walked off the job. When Lowery Daniels told Nate that the latter had given them permission to go, Nate told the employees, "I am not worried about it." Then he repeated his earlier statement to the effect that he did not care because he would get his money anyway.5 What happened next is somewhat unclear from the record, but from a reconstruction of events as garnered from the testimony of Lowery and Robert Daniels and Job Superintendent James Rupert, it is clear that Nathaniel Daniels did not have the men's paychecks with him at the time he ordered them to turn in their hard hats. Either that evening or the next evening,6 the men were given their paychecks for the week preceding the week in which they were allegedly discharged. This was a regular paycheck and not a final paycheck. According to the testimony of both Stout and Rupert, whom I fully credit in this respect, and whose testimony was supported at least in part by that of Robert Daniels, it was the custom of job superintend- 6 Although there is a conflict in the testimony of the Daniels' brothers as contrasted with the testimony of Rupert as to whether the events following took place on the same day, Thursday, July 5, or the following day, Friday, July 6, the determination of the exact date upon which the men were paid is not critical to the resolution of the issues presented 1100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ents to issue field checks to any man who was discharged. In other words, any employee who is discharged is paid in full by the Company by issuance by a job superintendent of all of the monies due an employee up to and including the moment of discharge. The manner in which this is done, according to Rupert and Stout, is that the job superintendent, upon discharging an employee, calls the home office of the Respondent to find out what deductions are to be made from the employees' paycheck and then the final amount is totaled and told to the superintendent who immediately pays the discharged employee in full with a field check for all salary and wages due the discharged employees up to the moment of discharge. Rupert credibly testified that this was not done in the case of the four alleged discriminatees herein because, in fact, at the time he gave them their weekly paychecks, either on Thursday or Friday, July 5 or 6, he had not been informed that they were discharged; he had not been told to discharge them, nor has he ever been informed or told that these employees were discharged. He further testified that he never discharged these employees or told anyone to discharge them or had any cause to do so except in the case of Daniel Evans, who came back to work several weeks later and was discharged by Rupert on July 20, for reasons not alleged to be discriminatory. The following Thursday or Friday, July 12 or 13, the alleged discharges appeared at the jobsite and were paid for the work performed the preceding week. They have never been given a final discharge field check. According to Rupert, whom I credit, the checks given to the alleged discriminatees on Friday, July 13, were regular weekly payroll checks sent from the home office and not final payment field checks given to discharged employees. Additionally, Vice President Stout testified, without con- tradiction, that he had never given anyone instructions to discharge the four alleged discriminatees and certainly did not do so himself. In this respect he was supported by the testimony of both Lowery Daniels and Robert Daniels who admitted that when they saw Stout downstairs at the union hall on July 5, the latter did not state anything about the employees being discharged. Additionally, Rupert testified, again without contradiction, that when he gave the employees the checks on July 5 and again on July 13, they did not give him any indication to the effect that Nathaniel Daniels or anyone else had discharged them. It should also be noted, in connection with the foregoing, that Lowery Daniels had worked for the Respondent in a number of places and on a number of jobs for some years before the events herein. Accordingly, it must be assumed that he would know the procedures and policies followed by the Respondent in paying off discharged employees in full with field checks upon their discharge. B. The Status of Nathaniel Daniels Because the Respondent 's primary defense is that the Respondent never discharged the four alleged discrimina- tees as alleged in the complaint , and because both Lowery and Robert Daniels testified that they were discharged, as heretofore set forth , by Nathaniel Daniels, it is necessary to determine what status Nathaniel Daniels possessed at the time he allegedly discharged the employees here involved. Respondent denies that Nathaniel Daniels was in any way a supervisor, and, furthermore, contends that if Nathaniel Daniels did, in fact, inform the alleged discriminatees that the Respondent no longer wanted to employ them, he did so without authority because he was an employee and not a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. According to both Lowery and Robert Daniels, Nathan- iel Daniels hired them and discharged them as set forth above in this Decision. When questioned further as to the duties and responsibilities of Nathaniel Daniels, both of the Daniels brothers testified in almost exact terms. They testified that Nathaniel Daniels instructed employees on the manner in which the work was to be performed, told them what to do on the job. They also explained that they were in the crew headed by Nathaniel Daniels and that Nathaniel Daniels, when in need of additional employees in his crew, would go to another work crew on the jobsite and tell men in the other work crew to come over to his work crew to assist in performing his crew's work. Additionally, Lowery Daniels testified that when a person desired to leave early he would ask permission to leave of Nathaniel Daniels. Lowery Daniels also testified that he once observed Nate Daniels discharge an employee. The foregoing constitutes the complete summation of the testimony presented by the General Counsel in support of the General Counsel's contention that Nathaniel Daniels was a supervisor cloaked with the authority to hire and discharge employees. However, the testimony presented by the Respondent for the most part contradicts the foregoing testimony. I have heretofore set forth the supervisory hierarchy of the Respondent according to the testimony of Vice President Stout. According to Stout, supported by Job Superintendent Rupert, the only individuals employed by the Respondent who have supervisory authority on the jobs are the job superintendents whose duties consist of directing the work to be done on each job, to recruit, hire and discharge employees and generally run the job. With regard to men occupying the status of Nathaniel Daniels, Stout testified that they are considered "pushers" or "straw bosses." In testifying, Stout detailed the responsibilities of the pushers or straw bosses such as Nathaniel Daniels. He stated that Nate Daniels, and others like him, were manual workers and were not in a responsible capacity. However, these individuals are more skilled. For this reason, these older, skilled employees received higher wage rates than the other employees and do, in the course of their work, explain what has to be done by way of job performance to the other less skilled employees. In the course of his work, an employee in this category, might say to an unskilled employee, "come along and do this." However, these skilled employees, like Daniels, possess no significant directive or supervisory authority. They cannot hire, they cannot fire and they cannot discipline. In conjunction with the foregoing testimony, it should be noted that both Lowery Daniels and Robert Daniels testified that they had sought work at the Copperweld jobsite before the work was begun and that Nathaniel Daniels had told them that when the work commenced and the Respondent was ready to hire he would bring them to the job. This he did. However, Stout maintained that it was ATLAS RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION CO. he who formally hired the Daniels brothers at the Copperweld jobsite. In connection therewith, as noted above, both Stout and Rupert testified that when they are ready to hire on the Respondent's jobs they often seek the assistance of the pushers such as Nate Daniels in recruiting men by asking these skilled employees to bring prospective employees to the job. Both Stout and Rupert maintained that the actual hiring is done either by Stout or one of the job superintendents. It should also be noted that Stout testified , without contradiction, that he assigned three superintendents to the Copperweld job. Stout himself was in overall charge of the work. With regard to work crews, both of the Daniels brothers testified that there were only four or at the most five men in the crew working with Nathaniel Daniels and that this was the typical size of a work crew. The foregoing, in sum, is the testimony relied on by the Respondent to support its contention that Nathaniel Daniels was not a supervisor when and if he told the four alleged dischargees to turn in their helmets and that Stout did not want to see their faces on the job any more. It is the burden of the General Counsel to prove by a preponder- ance of the credible evidence that Nathaniel Daniels was a supervisor vested with the authority to discharge the alleged discriminatees. I have heretofore set forth the testimony with regard to this issue presented by the General Counsel and that presented by the Respondent. I conclude that there is nothing in the testimony of either Vice President Stout or Job Superintendent Rupert which is necessarily inconsistent with the testimony of the Daniels brothers. I further conclude that the testimony of all of the witnesses with regard to this issue is credible. Therefore, I find and conclude that although Nathaniel Daniels did bring the Daniels brothers to the Copperweld job, they were hired not by Nathaniel Daniels, but by Vice President Stout. Furthermore, although I credit the Daniels brothers to the effect that to an extent, at least, Nathaniel Daniels directed that work, I further conclude that he did so only as a more skilled employee in relation to less skilled employees. The Board has long held that where an experienced employee observes or reports or directs the work of less skilled employees, such a relationship is the hallmark of the skilled to the less skilled and is wholly nonsupervisory.7 Nor is the fact that the senior man can, under certain circumstances, permit an employee to take time off of any great significance.8 Additionally, it would seem that the direction of the work assigned to the less senior employees by the employees in Nathaniel Daniel's category is of a routine nature entailing little discretion and not requiring the use of independent judgment.9 Finally, I note that the crews 7 Southern Bleachery and Print Works, Inc, 115 NLRB 787, 791-792; Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268, West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co, 122 NLRB 738, 746 8 G C Murphy Co, 171 NLRB 370, 371, Carey Transportation, Inc, 119 NLRB 332, 334 Lowery Daniels did not indicate whether Nate Daniels could permit an employee to leave work at Nate's discretion, or whether Nate had to first consult with the job superintendent in charge 9 Phalo Plastics Corporation, 127 NLRB 1511, 1513, New England Transportation Co, 90 NLRB 539, Capital Transit Company, 98 NLRB 141, 143-145 10 American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation, 119 NLRB 171f, 1718 1101 working with each of the so-called straw bosses consist of no more than four or five men. In view of the more or less routine type of work involved and performed by the employees in the work groups, the ratio of supervisors to employees would seem to be quite out of line if it were to be held that these straw bosses were supervisors.10 Thus, I find and conclude that the older, more skilled employees such as Nathaniel Daniels, who are designated as straw bosses or pushers by the Respondent are none other than leadmen whom the Board normally does not regard as supervisors.ii Thus, these more skilled employees are neither in name or in substance genuine supervisors as envisioned by the Act. Although these people are charged with some leadership responsibilities, the direction of the work, as noted above, is routine in nature and does not require to any extent the use of independent judgment. Accordingly, I conclude that these employees are not supervisory and are not clothed with the authority to hire, fire, or discharge any other employees. The Charging Party presents one more argument with regard to this supervisory issue . The Charging Party contends that, as noted in the record, the Respondent admits that it knows the whereabouts of Nathaniel Daniels although Nathaniel Daniels left the Respondent's employ because of illness sometime in August, 1973. The Charging Party contends that, therefore, the testimony with regard to the supervisory status of Nathaniel Daniels presented by the Respondent cannot be credited because the Respon- dent could have produced Nathaniel Daniels and his testimony would have been the best testimony with regard to his status as a supervisor or as a nonsupervisor. However, Lowery Daniels was called in rebuttal by the Respondent and testified that on the morning of the hearing he was driven to the hearing in his automobile by Nathaniel Daniels. Thus, it is clear and apparent that Nathaniel Daniels was also equally available as a witness to the Charging Party and to the General Counsel as well as to the Respondent. If Nathaniel Daniels would have testified differently than did Stout or Rupert, the Charging Party, and more importantly, the General Counsel, could have produced Daniels as a witness since it is the General Counsel, as mentioned above, who has the burden of proving that Nathaniel Daniels was a supervisor at the time of the events involved in this proceeding. According- ly, I reject the contention of the Charging Party and find that the General Counsel has not met his burden of proof with regard to this issue.i2 C. Concluding Findings Having found that Nathaniel Daniels was not a 11 Southern Bleachery and Print Works, Inc, 115 N LR B 787, 791. i2 With regard to the testimony of Lowery Daniels to the effect that a year or so before the events with which this proceeding is concerned he witnessed Nathaniel Daniels discharge an employee at another job of the Respondent, I conclude that the testimony was too vague to be relied on as evidence that Nathaniel Daniels had authority to discharge Lowery Daniels did not mention either the job, the date, the name or place of the alleged discharge of the other individual at that earlier time Nor did he testify as to whether Nate Daniels exercised his own discretion at that time or was merely a conduit for relaying the decision of a higher up Accordingly, I do not give this testimony probative weight 1102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD supervisor and had no specific authority to discharge the four alleged discriminatees, it becomes necessary to determine whether, as contended by the Charging Party, that he possessed apparent authority. Since I have found that Nathaniel Daniels was not a supervisor, the Charging Party's contention must, therefore, be based upon some theory of agency. Of course, a supervisor is an agent. However, an agent need not be a supervisor. And, an apparent agent may be anyone who by the actions of the Respondent is cloaked with apparent authority. Although the Act, Section 2(13) has, to a certain extent, diminished the strict requirement of authorization or ratification as controlling as a test for apparent agency in proceedings under the Act, I do not find that the case at bar presents even the minimal requirements to satisfy the foregoing Section of the Act and establish apparent authority on the part of Nathaniel Daniels to discharge employees. The mere fact that Nathaniel Daniels could direct the work of fellow employees in a routine fashion or could, possibly, permit an employee to leave the job early does not cloak Nathaniel Daniels as an agent of the Respondent with apparent authority to discharge employees. While Section 2(13) of the Act diminishes the quantity and quality of proof necessary to determine agency, it does not confer upon a rank-and-file leadman the apparent authori- ty to discharge employees when such a leadman takes it upon himself without consultation with his superiors to separate an employee from his employment. While Section 2(13) was designed to prevent employers from escaping their responsibilities for violative acts committed by minor supervisors and minor management representatives, it was not intended to subject employers with liability for the unauthorized acts of rank-and-file employees. According- ly, I find and conclude that when Nathaniel Daniels told the four alleged discriminatees herein that they were no longer wanted on the job, he did so without any authority, real or apparent. Accordingly, it follows, that the Respon- dent cannot be held responsible for Nathaniel Daniels' conduct in this matter. Moreover, the Respondent in no way ratified or adopted in any manner the actions of Nathaniel Daniels. As noted above, the employees were not paid off with final field checks as is uniformly the case where Respondent's employees are discharged. Furthermore, I can find nothing in the record to show that any individual supervisor, job superintendent, or officer of the Respondent in any manner condoned, or in any way adopted or ratified this action by Nathaniel Daniels. The Respondent has never, according to the credited testimony of both Vice President 13 By reason of the disposition of this case on the basis found above, I do not find it necessary to discuss the alternate defense of the Respondent to the effect that even if the alleged discriminatees were discharged by the Respondent, such discharge was lawful within the purview of the applicable contract that Respondent had signed with Local 1274 and to which the employees were subject. Stout and Job Superintendent Rupert, either instructed Daniels to discharge these employees nor did any such individual have any knowledge of such discharge until the charge herein was filed. Accordingly, I find and conclude that the General Counsel has not established his burden of proof that the Respondent in any manner, through any of its supervisory hierarchy, or any agent, discharged discriminatorily the four individuals as alleged in the complaint or, for that matter, discharged them at all. In further support of this conclusion I note that the Respondent has dealt with the Charging Union and other locals of the Laborers' International for many years. It is not an antiunion employer, at least insofar as is shown by the record herein. As a matter of fact it was in the act of conciliatorily discussing with the Charging Union the question of which contract applied to the Copperweld and Youngstown Sheet jobs just before the employees herein were allegedly discharged and this question was settled before the discharges occurred. The basis for finding discriminatory motivation, therefore, if not completely lacking on the basis of the record herein, is so tenuous as to be of no probative value. I shall, accordingly, recommend that the complaint herein be dismissed in its entirety.i3 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 935 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Nathaniel Daniels was not a supervisor or an agent at material times herein within the meaning of Section 2(11) or Section 2(13) of the Act. 4. The Respondent did not discharge the alleged discriminatees herein and has not discriminated against them within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record herein , and pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER 14 It is hereby ordered that the complaint herein be, and the same hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. ' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes it U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1975 0-550-248 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation