Ashley, Hickham--Uhr Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 12, 1974

210 N.L.R.B. 32 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

32 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AaLIey, Il> --Ubr Co. and Roderick Meyers
MWwr Local Union No, 1102, United Brot er-
hoo d of Carpontm and Joiners of Ameba,
AFL-CIO and Roderick Mey Cases
7-CA-9649 and 7-CB-2647
April 12, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On February 22, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Lloyd Buchanan issued the attached Decision in the
above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respon-
dents had engaged in the unfair labor practices
alleged in the consolidated complaint and recom-
mending that they take specific action to remedy
such unfair labor practices. Thereafter, the Respon-
dent Union filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
contending, inter alia, that the Administrative Law
Judge erred by refusing to allow the Respondent
Union, as part of its defense to the unfair labor
practice charges alleged, to present evidence with
respect to its motive and/or purpose in demanding
that Union Steward Frontera be hired by Respon-
dent Company as a steward on the job here involved.
On June 13, 1973, the Board issued an order
remanding the proceeding for further hearing before
the Administrative Law Judge for the purpose of
receiving the excluded evidence and to afford the
parties an opportunity to present evidence relevant
thereto.
Pursuant to the Board's remand order, the General
Counsel and the Respondent Union waived further
hearing and entered into a stipulation of facts
consisting substantially of the facts advanced by the
Respondent Union in its offer of proof at the original
hearing. On December 28, 1973, the Administrative
Law Judge issued the attached Supplemental Deci-
sion in which he adhered to, affirmed, and adopted
his original Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent
Union filed exceptions to that decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the entire record and the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision and Supple-
mental Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to adopt the Administrative Law
Judge's findings of fact, but not his conclusions and
recommendations.
Briefly, the facts are as follows . The Respondent
Company is engaged in the cons sale,
distribution, and repair of heavy equipment. The
Respondent Company bid successfully for a job at a
Columbia Township, Michigan, jobsite, and thereaft-
er hired a foreman and three millwrights who began
working at the jobsite on June 26, 1972.1 On June 24
and 26, Respondent Union's business manager,
Spano, and its business representative , Beschoner,
respectively, told representatives of Respondent
Company that an experienced steward would be sent
to the jobsite from the union hall. On June 26,
Respondent Company's superintendent, Smith, told
Beschoner that, if Respondent Union sent a steward
to the jobsite, he (Smith) would have to lay off one of
the millwrights previously hired . Beschoner replied
that a steward would nevertheless be sent. The same
day Foreman Currier asked Spano which of the three
millwrights on the job he wanted laid off. Spano
answered that he didn't want anyone laid off, that he
was sending a steward, and that the Respondent
Company should hire more millwrights. The next
day, Frontera, the steward designated by Respon-
dent Union, reported to work at the jobsite.
Thereupon, Currier laid off Meyers, the Charging
Party, "due to replacement by steward from union
hall." 2
Respondent Union's asserted reason for wanting
Frontera to act as steward, as stipulated by the
parties, was that Frontera had served as steward on a
jobsite where Respondent Union had jurisdictional
disputes with other craft unions; that it expected
similar problems with the same craft unions on the
Columbia Township jobsite which was virtually
identical to the jobsite at which Frontera had served
as steward; and that Frontera, as a strong militant
steward familiar with its collective-bargaining agree-
ment, would enforce Respondent Union's jurisdic-
tional claims without involving it in any unlawful
conduct.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent Union's motive in seeking Frontera's appoint-
ment as steward was irrelevant since it was aware
that Frontera's appointment as steward would cause
Respondent Company to lay off another employee.
He therefore found that Respondent Union violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by causing the
layoff of Meyers and that Respondent Company, by
acquiescing in the latter employee's layoff, violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. We disagree.
i All dates are in 1972 . shall be chosen from among the employees on the job, "pursuant to the
2 Art IX in the collective-bargammg agreement between the Respon- working rules of the Union " The working rules, however, in providing that
dents provides that Respondent Union's business agent or his representative the business agent has the right to appoint or select a steward on all jobs, do
has the right to appoint a steward on all jobs , and that millwright stewards not limit the selection to those employees on the job.
210 NLRB No. 1
ASHLEY, HICKHAM-UHR CO.
Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we
believe that Respondent Union' s reasons in seeking
Frontera's appointment as steward are material and
relevant and, indeed, critical to the issue of whether
it thereby committed an unfair labor practice. Not
every encouragement of union membership is unlaw-
ful, and the mere acquiescence of an employer in a
demand of a union is not unlawful encouragement
per se, as the Administrative Law Judge seems to
have concluded. Thus, when the circumstances do
not involve an objective of furthering, requiring, or
conditioning employment on union membership as
such, the illegality, if any, must be found in those
actions by a union that impinge upon the employ-
ment relationship which are arbitrary, invidious, or
irrelevant to legitimate union interests .3
In the instant case, the parties have stipulated that
Respondent Union's action was, in effect, in further-
ance of a legitimate and valid concern for placing an
experienced steward on a potentially troublesome
jobsite. Whether the action was or was not consistent
with the meaning and intent of the collective-
bargaining agreement at the time in effect is not, as
the Administrative Law Judge seems to imply,
controlling, nor need that issue be decided in this
forum, although the Respondent Union has at least a
colorable argument that the agreement was intended
to permit the precise kind of action taken here, in
that it leaves the Union free to designate the steward.
General Counsel joined in the stipulation above
referred to, and made no attempt to show that the
concerns of the Union expressed therein were
pretextual or were a mask for unlawful motivation.
The key issue is whether Respondent Union's action
herein was arbitrary, invidious, irrelevant, and thus a
mask for discriminatory motivation. We find that
General Counsel has failed to establish that it was,
and therefore conclude that Respondent Union's
conduct in demanding Frontera's hire as its steward
has not been shown to constitute an unfair labor
practice, notwithstanding that it may have foreseen
that his hire would result in the displacement of
another of its members who had less relevant steward
experience on this type of job .4 We likewise find that
there is a similar failure of proof to establish any
violation of the Act by Respondent Company in
laying off the Charging Party after its compliance
with the Union's request to hire Frontera had
resulted in a surplus of millwrights on the job.
Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint against
both Respondents.
ORDER
It is hereby ordered that the consolidated com-
33
plaint in Case 7-CA-9649 and Case 7-CB-2647 be,
and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
3 See, e .g., Chicago Federation of Musicians, Local 10, American
Federation of Musicians (Shield Radio & T V. Productions, Inc.), 153 NLRB
68, 83-84. Member Fanning finds it unnecessary to rely on these descriptive
terms . In his opinion , the contract clearly gives the Union the right to
designate a steward on the job and the Union 's motivation , if unlawful is a
matter of affirmative proof to be established by the General Counsel
4 See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No
525, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Nelson Construction Co, Inc.), 193
NLRB 724
DECISION
LLOYD BUCHANAN, Administrative Law Judge: The
comsolidated complaint herein (issued October 3, 1972;
both charges filed June 28, 1972) alleges that the Company
has violated Section 8(axl) and (3) and the Union Section
8(b)(1XA) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, 73 Stat. 519, in that the Union demanded that
the Company hire an additional employee when the Union
knew that such hiring would result in the displacement of
an employee , that this violated the collective-bargaining
agreement between the Company and the Union, and that
as a result of the Union's demand the Company laid off
Meyers.' The Union's answer denies the allegations of
violation.2
The case was tried before me at Detroit, Michigan, on
November 2, 1972. Briefs have been filed by the General
Counsel and the Union, the time to do so having been
extended.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR) AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The facts concerning the Company's status as a Texas
1 At the opening of the trial , the General Counsel stated that the
Company had not filed an answer but that an attorney had telephoned him
and informed him that he would not appear at the trial but would file an
answer (although the time to do so had expired), and that the Company
would rely on the Union to litigate the matter fully I pointed out at that
time that under the Board 's rules the allegations of the complaint were
deemed admitted by the Company. In response to my question , the General
Counsel declared that the proof would be addressed to the allegations
against the Company as well as those against the Union
After all of the testimony had been received, and during closing
argument by the Union, the General Counsel received a telegraphic answer
from the Company. This was dated the afternoon before and was addressed
to the Board, attention the Chief Administrative Law Judge, in care of the
General Counsel , who was trying the case That answer was patterned after
the Union's answer , and was now submitted to me by the General Counsel.
Noting on the record the presumptuousness of such procedure, I marked the
document Co. Exh. 1, copies being prepared by the General Counsel. On
November 6 , 1 received from the General Counsel a copy of a "formal
answer" apparently received by him on November 3 1 have marked this Co.
Exh 2. 1 would not condone and thereby encourage such flouting of the
Board 's rules or such procedural discourtesy I have placed Co. Exhs. I and
2 in the rejected exhibit file.
2 As for answer by the Company , see In I.
34 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
corporation, the nature and extent of its business in design
and construction, as well as the manufacture, sale,
distribution, and repair of heavy equipment, and its
engagement in commerce within the meaning of the Act
are admitted; I find and conclude accordingly. I also find
and conclude that, as admitted, the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Agreements now in effect and since 1970, and covering
the Company and the Union, provide inter aha:
ARTICLE IX-STEWARDS
(A) The Business Agent or his Representative will
have the right to appoint or select the Steward on all
jobs or to change the Steward at any tune.
(B) There shall be a Millwright Steward on each job,
chosen from the employees on said job , pursuant to the
Working Rules of the Union.
It was stipulated that section A of article IX did not appear
in agreements prior to that of 1970-72. The issue here is
not the Union's right to appoint or select a steward on the
job, but the Union's insistence that another man be hired
when it was informed that this would result in a layoff of
one of the employees.
The Union sets up a straw man in its argument that it
"did not `demand,' `request,' `insist,' `suggest,' or 'ask' the
Employer to discharge Meyers or any other millwright."
This is not alleged.
The Union's working rules provide inter alias
STEWARDS
(A) The first man on the job, other than the foreman
shall act as Steward until four or more are employed,
when they must elect a Steward. All Stewards must be
journeymen and have been members of this Local
Union not less than four (4) years and familiar with the
Working Rules and contract and a member of Local
1102 for twelve consecutive months prior to acting as
Steward. The Business Agent shall have the power to
remove a Steward for cause. The Secretary or Business
Agent will have the right to appoint or select a Steward
on all jobs. The Representative of the Union shall have
the right to visit the job during working hours to
interview the Employer, Steward or men at work, but in
no way hinder the progress of the work.
According to Spano, the Union's business manager, he
had a conversation on Saturday, June 24, with Currier, the
Company's foreman on this job and a longtime member of
the Union, in which they discussed the question of a
steward at this job, Currier declaring that he would be on
the job on Monday, Spano replying that he had an
experienced steward whom he wanted to send out, and
Currier then promising that this would constitute no
problem: he would call Spano for a steward. Currier,
denied that he had promised to call the Union for a
steward when he needed one. I credit Currier.
On Monday, June 26, Beschoner, the Union' s business
representative, had a conversation with the Company's
superintendent, Smith, in the company trailer on the site.
According to Currier, Beschoner told Smith that a man
was coming from the hall, "and that was it" ; Beschoner did
not give Smith a chance to reply. Still according to Currier
(neither Smith nor Beschoner testified), Beschoner then
said to Currier in Smith's presence outside the trailer that a
union steward would have to come from the union hall;
Currier then asked whether Beschoner could pick a
steward from the men who had already been hired, all of
them being qualified. as stewards; Beschoner replied in the
negative and repeated that the steward would have to come
from the union hall; Currier's reply was that he would then
have to lay one off because he had been told that the job
would call for only three millwrights and himself as
foreman. Beschoner's Parthian shot, emphasized by a
vulgarity, was that, regardless of what Currier might do, a
steward would be there on Tuesday morning.
If, with Currier himself working with tools on the job
and three men already hired, as he informed Beschoner,
union knowledge that one would be discharged when the
Union sent another to the job to be the steward is not
presumed, the fact was made clear to Beschoner when
Currier told him that he would have to lay one man off.
Thus, if knowledge of such a result be necessary or relevant
when, as we shall see, the demand that a man be hired in
fact causes the displacement, such knowledge was clearly
brought home to the Union by Currier's statement to
Beschoner.
Currier had hired three men to work on the job in
addition to himself. All three had arrived together that
Monday morning, and told Currier that they had elected
one of their number, Cummins, as stewards. This was in
compliance with the working rules, the testimony indicat-
ing without contradiction that all three were qualified to be
steward under the working rules. If the Union, as it claims,
wanted a "strong" steward, it could not lawfully cause the
displacement of a man already employed.
After Beschoner left, Currier and Smith discussed the
situation. Although the latter first told Currier to do what
he thought was best with respect to laying off one man, he
pointed out that somebody would have to be laid off
because the job did not call for five: it had been bid for
three men and a foreman, not for four. Smith hardly left it
up to Currier as they considered the Union's working rules
which provide in section K under the heading "Foremen":
No Foreman or General Foreman shall work with
his tools when there are four millwrights or more on the
job.
Smith did not instruct Currier whom to lay off. The
offense would have been as great had one of the others
been laid off instead of Meyers. To all of this Spano added
that Currier telephoned him sometime on June 26 and,
saying that he had three men on the job, asked whom
Spano wanted as steward. To this Spano's reply was that
they had talked about it on Saturday and that he would
send a man out. When Currier then asked whom Spano
wanted laid off, the latter replied that he did not want
ASHLEY, HICKHAM-UHR CO. 35
Currier to lay anybody off but that he would nevertheless
send a millwright to the site. Another man, Frontera, now
designated by the Union to be steward in violation of the
working rules , arrived at the site in midmorning of June 27
and went to work.
That afternoon Currier laid Meyers off, telling him that
he was sorry to do that after only 2 days but that there was
not enough work. When Meyers asked for a layoff slip,
Currier gave him one, the reason first noted thereon being
"Lack of work"; this was stricken and the reason noted as:
"Due to replacement of [sic] steward from union hall."
If, although Currier denied this, he told Spano on June
24 that he would call Spano for a steward (the fact remains
that Currier did not do that), neither Smith nor Currier on
June 26 earned through on any such commitment. But,
whatever the respective equities between the Union and the
Company, and whatever claim the former might base on
such alleged commitments, the latter as far as we are here
concerned had the legal right to decide how many men it
would employ on June 26, and the Union had no claim
against any employee or the right to effect his discharge.
Of the issues posed and recognized, the Union was
informed and knew that its demand that the Company hire
another employee as steward would result in the discharge
of one of the three already hired; the Union's right to select
a steward does not include the right to cause the
displacement or discharge of another employee; it is clear
that Meyer and the two others hired with him were
qualified to act as stewards; and the hiring of Frontera at
the Union's demand resulted in Meyers' discharge.
It is naive to say that the Union did not actually request
that Meyers or any other employee be laid off. With
knowledge that a discharge would result from hiring of
another man as steward, the Union by its demand that an
additional man be hired did in effect or constructively
demand and cause Meyers' discharge. In the words of the
complaint, the Union made its demand "knowing full well
that such hiring would result in the displacement of an
employee already in the Respondent-Employer employ.
Were Smith's recognition of the need or advisability to
discharge one of the rank-and-file millwrights not clear
enough, it is clear that he authorized Currier to take such
action. Beyond that, the latter was himself a company
supervisor and agent, and his act in discharging Meyers
was the Company's. That the action was prompted by the
Union's demand that Frontera be hired is clear. Neither
the Company nor Currier was willing, as the latter had
informed Beschoner, to prevent Currier from continuing to
work with tools as would otherwise be required under the
working rules cited in the contract were a fourth rank-and-
file man hired.
Thus in acceding to the Union's demand to hire Frontera
when it did not want an additional man, the Company
discriminatorily discharged Meyers in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1); I so find and conclude. I further find and
conclude that the Union caused the Company so to
discriminate, and thereby violated Section 8(b)(2) and
(1)(A). The contract and the working rules, themselves
valid, do not authorize and are contrary to what was done
3 Chicago Federation of Musicians, Local 10 (Shields Radio & T.V.
Productions, Inc.), 153 NLRB 68, 83-84
here. Whatever the Union's right to appoint a steward
within its rules, it may not thereby cause the discharge of
another employee as was here accomplished. Even if,
regardless of section B of article IX of the contract and
section A of the working rules provisions concerning
stewards, the Union may appoint a steward from among
people not working on the job, the issue here is not the
Union's right to select a steward but its right to cause the
discharge of an employee.
Chicago Federation of Musicians,3 cited by the Union at
the trial and in its brief, is not in point. Other cases noted
offer no greater support. We do not here undertake to
weigh the wisdom of the Union's objective. Without
consideration of the propriety of that objective, the
Union's action was unlawful.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
LLOYD BucHANAN, Administrative Law Judge: After my
Decision of February 22, 1973, in this case, I received on
July 9 a letter from the General Counsel, dated July 5,
1973, concerning an Order Reopening the Record and
Remanding the Proceeding for Further Hearing. On
request made to the office of the Executive Secretary, I
thereafter received a copy of the Board's remand order.'
So that this Supplemental Decision will be clear without
reference to other papers, I shall append hereto copies of
relevant documents except my original Decision, which
was itself brief. With respect to that Decision, I shall refer
merely to the now necessary relevant portions. The Board's
remand order of June 13 is attached hereto and marked
"Appendix A" [omitted from publication]. "Appendix B"
is my letter of July 9 calling for the Respondent' s statement
of position, and indicating that on receipt of that I would
ask the General Counsel for a statement of his position
[omitted from publication].
In fact, I was quite aware of the Respondent's position, it
having been stated in its offer of proof at the trial. Nor did
I believe that the General Counsel was in a position to
controvert the proof offered. That my impression in those
connections was correct is indicated by the stipulation
hereinafter referred to.
"Appendix C" is a self-explanatory letter dated July 25
from counsel for the Union. "Appendix D" is my letter of
August 20 addressed to counsel for the Union. [Both
omitted from publication.]
It was my expectation that we would be able to close the
trial without a second appearance by counsel and the
Administrative Law Judge. Of course I would neither
ignore nor violate the Board's remand order of June 13
directing further hearing anymore than I would be denying
the right to a trial were I, on the basis of opening argument
or statements of position at the opening or reopening of a
trial, to close the trial and issue a Decision without hearing
witnesses . The respective statements of position, I expect-
ed, would be equivalent to statements of position at the
beginning of any trial, and would themselves warrant a
1 I was apparently correct in my most recent Decision when I stated that
I "could anticipate a Board remand had I . . confined the testimony to
those relevant issues ..
36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
decision without further proceedings and without hearing
witnesses?
Going to Detroit and through the motions of reopening
the trial would provide two advantages over the procedure
which I here intended to follow:
1. The explanation, which I trusted would persuade
the Board, would be unnecessary.
2. From a public relations or political point of
view, the Union, if not now persuaded, might feel that
it had had its "full day in court" even were it not
satisfied with the decision.
Neither reason or "advantage" appeared to me to warrant
what would be , as I have indicated, extension of this case
and further use of Board processes for a second trial.
On August 24, I received a Stipulation of Facts and
Waiver of Further Hearing , which I have marked Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Exhibit 1, and which is attached hereto
as "Appendix E" [omitted from publication]. The facts
now stipulated were noted by the Union at the trial in
connection with its offer of proof , which I rejected. (Had
they not been offered at the trial, they could not be made
the subject of a further hearing.)
Whatever the Union 's motive, I pointed out in my
Decision that:
The issue here is not the Union 's right to appoint or
select a steward on the job , but the Union's insistence
that another man be hired when it was informed that
this would result in a layoff of one of the employees.
The Union sets up a straw man in its argument that
it "did not `demand,' `request,' 'suggest' or 'ask' the
Employer to discharge Meyers or any other mill-
wright."
The contract between the Company and the Union
provides for the Union naming a steward only if four or
more millwrights are employed ; that one of three or fewer
millwrights would "act as steward" provided he meets
certain standards (there is no issue in the latter connection,
as I pointed out in my Decision ); and that when the Union
insisted (regardless of its motive) that it would send
another millwright to be steward it was in advance
informed that one of the three at that time employed would
thereupon be laid off since "the job would call for only
three millwrights" All of this was also pointed out in my
Decision.
Whatever the Union's motives and however good its
reasons from in organizational point of view , it thus
appears from the record and without charging the Union;
with unlawful or improper motive in wanting to designate
another steward, and again regardless of such motive or
reason, there were fewer than four millwrights at all times,
both before the Union sent another man to the job and
afterward.
The Union acted without authority and indeed in
violation of the contract executed presumably to protect its
members. In my Decision after the trial, I declared:
We do not here undertake to weigh the wisdom of the
Union's objective. Without consideration of the pro-
priety of that objective, the Union's action was
unlawful.
I did not find that the Union was guilty of fell intent; its
intent I deemed and still deem to be irrelevant. To repeat,
and as I pointed out, the finding of violation was based on
the Union's acts, which I found to be violative regardless
of intent.
My Decision of February 22 found violative the Union's
act in insisting that Frontera be hired after it had been
assured that the Company would have only four men on
the job and that, if compelled to employ Frontera in
addition to the men already on the job , it would discharge
Meyers, as it had the right to do, all of this explained in my
earlier Decision.
The terms of the agreement between the Company and
the Union, Meyers' qualifications for the job and steward-
ship, and his right to serve as steward were also fully
analyzed in my original Decision. The stipulation of
August 22 adds nothing to what was properly offered and
as properly rejected at the trial; nor is there any different
or newly discovered reason or evidence.
I accept the statements in the stipulation. Fully respect-
ing the Board 's remand order, I now issue a supplemental
decision based on the entire record , including the stipula-
tion.
We need not now be concerned with the issue of whether
any acts themselves constitute independent interference or
whether they would, standing alone, tend to interfere
unlawfully or to discriminate in the absence of the
agreement between the Company and the employees'
representative, and in the absence of the other facts noted.
The issue is the Union 's action which itself caused or
attempted to cause an employer to discriminate within the
terms of Section 8(bX2) of the Act.
I have not and do not question the Union's opinion that
Frontera was better qualified to handle whatever steward-
Y Cf. Darlington Manufacturing Company, 141 NLRB 241, 332, 335, 336,
where, after a motion to dismiss, it appeared that a personal complaint did
not state a cause of action as a matter of law; and the complaint was
thereupon dismissed on the stated positions of counsel and without
testimony by witnesses.
Cf. also Alton Box Board Company, 173 NLRB 744, where, after the
Trial Examiner dismissed the allegation of violation of Sec 8(aX5), the
Board, at the Union's instigation and the General Counsel's request, in the
face of the established law which, as pointed out in the Intermediate Report,
had controverted the allegation of violation of Sec. 8 (a)(5), directed that the
hearing be reopened on that issue ; the Trial Examiner, asking the Board for
guidance whether , at the now imminent remand hearing, the stated reason
for disnussal theretofore cited by the Board and followed by the Trial
Examiner in his dismissal was now to be reversed , or whether the mason for
dismissal for the established reason was to be adhered to with the result that
the Trial Examiner would have no alternative but to repeat his original
Decision , after a delay of 8 months after the Intermediate Report was
issued , the Union requested withdrawal of its unfair labor practice charges
to avoid frustration of the desires of the employees; and the Board
thereupon issued its decision without further hearing.
A different situation faced the Board in Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 50,
IBT, (Shaw Contractors and Builders), 199 NLRB No. 186 , in which the
Board found no violation of Sec 8(bX2) where the Union did not seek
discharge of a driver but rather maintained that there was in fact enough
work for two.
ASHLEY , HICKHAM-UHR CO. 37
sly problem the Union anticipated might conceivably
develop on this job. But even if that be a fact , such fact,
under the agreement between the Union and the Company
and under the Union's working rules would no more justify
the action by the Company which the Union compelled
against Meyers than would the Union 's opinion.
I have here added nothing to my Decision of February
22, merely repeating portions relevant to the remand.
Having said and restated this, we need not tractate here.
By a process of calcareous ooze, we may yet build up a
weighty, if not impressive , problem.
on the WpWatbM of the and on the entire record
in t cm adhere to* aa