Asghar Haqq, Appellant,v.Bill Richardson, Secretary, Department of Energy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 8, 1999
01981727 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 8, 1999)

01981727

03-08-1999

Asghar Haqq, Appellant, v. Bill Richardson, Secretary, Department of Energy, Agency.


Asghar Haqq, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01981727

) Agency No. 92(53)HQ

Bill Richardson, )

Secretary, )

Department of Energy, )

Agency. )

_________________________________)

DECISION

Appellant filed the instant appeal on December 22, 1997 alleging

that the agency breached the priority consideration provision in the

settlement agreement entered into by the parties on September 2, 1993.

The provision at issue provided:

[The agency] will provide [appellant] priority consideration for the

next available GM-14 position in the Office of Civil Rights for which

he is deemed qualified.

By letter dated October 3, 1995 appellant alleged that the agency

breached the priority consideration provision of the September 2, 1993

settlement agreement. The agency issued a decision dated October 20,

1995 in response to appellant's breach allegation raised in the October 3,

1995 letter. In the October 20, 1995 decision the agency found:

[I]n or about December of 1993, a selection was made for the position of

Program Analyst, GS-14, Vacancy Announcement No. 94-ED-049. In accordance

with the agreement, you were provided priority consideration for that

position when your application was considered by the selecting official

(concurrently with the applications of two other individuals possessing

priority consideration status) prior to consideration of any other

applications. As you are aware, you were nonselected for that position,

in favor of one of the competing individuals with priority consideration.

Therefore, the terms of the agreement have been fully executed and there

has been no breach of that agreement.

The October 20, 1995 decision provided appeal rights to the Commission.

There is no indication in the appellate record or in Commission records

showing that appellant ever filed an appeal from the October 20,

1995 decision.

By letter dated November 4, 1997 appellant informed the agency that the

agency had breached the priority consideration provision of the September

2, 1993 settlement agreement. Appellant stated in the November 4,

1997 letter:

On or about October 8, 1997, [appellant] had a conversation with

[Person A], a co-worker, who was one of the two other individuals who

had priority consideration status for this position. [Person A] informed

[appellant] that he had learned through the EEO process that there was,

in fact, no priority consideration process followed for this position.

Therefore, given that [appellant] just recently discovered that he was

not in fact given priority consideration for this position, he is timely

in making this claim of breach.

By letter dated November 18, 1997 the agency responded to appellant's

November 4, 1997 letter. In the November 18, 1997 letter the agency

stated:

Please be advised that [appellant] raised the same allegation of breach

on October 3, 1995. By letter dated October 20, 1995, we responded

. . . As [far] as we can determine, [appellant] chose not to appeal

that decision.

. . . .

I hope the foregoing proves helpful.

The November 18, 1997 agency letter did not provide appellant with any

appeal rights. The November 18, 1997 agency letter did not reconsider

whether the agency breached the agreement.

Appellant filed the instant appeal from the agency's November 18,

1997 letter. On appeal appellant argues:

The basis for this appeal is that the agency erred in finding that

[appellant] raised the same allegation of breach on October 3, 1995

as he raised on November 4, 1997. The allegation of breach raised by

[appellant] on October 3, 1995 concerned announcement number 94-ED-50

. . . In contrast, the allegation of breach raised by [appellant]

on November 4, 1997 concerned announcement number 94-ED-49 . . .

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties shall be

binding on both parties. If the complainant believes that the agency

has failed to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement, then the

complainant shall notify the EEO Director of the alleged noncompliance

"within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of

the alleged noncompliance." 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a). The complainant

may request that the terms of the settlement agreement be specifically

implemented or request that the complaint be reinstated for further

processing from the point processing ceased. Id.

Settlement agreements are contracts between the appellant and the agency

and it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, and not

some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(Aug. 23, 1990); In re Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 94 F.2d 296 (7th

Cir. 1938). In reviewing settlement agreements to determine if there is

a breach, the Commission is often required to ascertain the intent of the

parties and will generally rely on the plain meaning rule. Wong v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05931097 (Apr. 29, 1994) (citing

Hyon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (Dec. 2,

1991)). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and

unambiguous on its face, then its meaning must be determined from the

four corners of the instrument without any resort to extrinsic evidence

of any nature. Id. (citing Montgomery Elevator v. Building Engineering

Service, 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984)).

In the instant appeal appellant is alleging that the agency breached

the priority consideration provision of the settlement agreement.

The agency found in the October 20, 1995 decision that it did not breach

the priority consideration provision. This is not a situation where the

agency found that it had yet to comply with the priority consideration

provision; rather, the agency found in the October 20, 1995 decision

that appellant had been granted priority consideration for a particular

position (94-ED-049) and that the terms of the agreement had been

"fully executed." Thus, the issue of whether the agency has fully

complied with the priority consideration provision of the settlement

agreement was decided by the agency on October 20, 1995. Appellant has

not and is not appealing the October 20, 1995 decision.

Appellant may not now make a separate claim that the agency breached a

provision of the agreement after the agency previously found that the

agency had completed its compliance with that provision. The Commission

finds that the agency's November 18, 1997 letter is effectively a

dismissal of appellant's breach allegation raised in the November 4,

1997 letter. Because the issue of priority consideration was decided

in the October 20, 1995 decision we find that the agency properly stated

in the November 18, 1997 letter that the agency had previously found

that the agency had complied with that provision of the settlement

agreement. The Commission shall not entertain appellant's attempt to

relitigate the same claim that has been decided by the agency. Cf. 29

C.F.R. �1614.107(a) (requiring dismissal of a complaint stating the same

claim that has been decided by the agency).

The agency's November 18, 1997 dismissal of appellant's breach allegation

is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 8, 1999

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations