Armstrong Cork Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 2, 1953

103 N.L.R.B. 133 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 133
All our employees are free to become, remain , or refrain from becoming mem-
bers of the above-named union or any other labor organization except as aforesaid
to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
POINSETT LUMBER AND MFG. CO.,
Employer
Dated -------------------- By -------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY and LODGE No. 918, INTERNATIONAL Asso-
CIATION OF MACHINISTS, A. F. OF L., AS THE SUCCESSOR TO LODGE No.
1034, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, A. F. L.
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS, A. F. L. Cases Nos. 10-CA-1384 and 10-CA-1477.
March 2, 1953
Decision and Order
On October 14, 1952, Trial Examiner John H. Eadie issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also
found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint. Thereafter, the Respondent
and General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
supporting briefs.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in
the case ,2 and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner , with the following additions and modifi-
cations :
1. We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. In so finding, we
rely only on the following incidents as found in the Intermediate
3 Pursuant to the provisions of Section .1 ( b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Mem-
bers Houston and Murdock].
2 The Respondent 's request for oral argument is denied because the record and briefs
adequately present the issues and positions of the parties.
103 NLRB No. 20.
257965-54-vol. 103-10
134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Report : Foreman Smith's interrogation of employee Green on about
September 20, 1951; Smith's statement to employee McCollum, some-
time after October 5, 1951, indicating that a laid-off employee would
never work with the Respondent again because he had filed charges
against the Respondent; Master Mechanic Falls' interrogation of
employee Keene during January 1952; and Smith's interrogation of
employee Williams in January or February of 1952 and his statement
at that time to Williams and employee Keene that mechanical em-
ployees were losing pay raises because of the Union.
We also find a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) in Plant Manager
Worm's removal from the mechanical department of the pledge to
employees. This occurred on September 25, 1951, the day after the
Union had won the Board-directed election and immediately after
Worm addressed the mechanical employees and advised them that
he was "deeply hurt" by the results of the election and that "the pledge
under which we have operated has been nullified." Although the Trial
Examiner dismissed this alleged violation, we agree with the General
Counsel that in these circumstances Worm's removal of the pledge,
which outlined working conditions in the plant, was calculated to
and did have a coercive effect upon mechanical employees, because
it was tantamount to a threat to change working conditions due to
their selection of the Union as bargaining representative. The fact
that Worm also voiced the Respondent's willingness to bargain with
the Union does not alter the coercive nature and character of the threat
implicit in the removal of the pledge. Moreover, as found below,
conditions of employment were subsequently changed 3
2. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8 (a) (3), (5), and (1) of the Act by withholding
from the mechanical employees a promised wage increase. On July
3, 1951, the Respondent had announced a graduated wage increase of
9 to 14 cents per hour to all its employees, subject only to approval by
the Wage Stabilization Board. This promised increase thus became,
as the Trial Examiner found, a part of the terms and conditions of
employment of all the employees. However, on October 29 and again
on December 31, 1951, after the Union had been certified by the Board
as the collective-bargaining representative of the mechanical em-
ployees, the Respondent granted the promised wage increases to its
other employees only, but not to the mechanical employees. More-
over, no notice of its intention to deprive the mechanical employees
of these wage increases was given by the Respondent to the Union.
Thus, without notice to the collective-bargaining representative of
3 We find merit in the Respondent 's argument that its declared intention to replace
future strikers was not violative of the Act we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's
contrary finding.
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 135
the mechanical employees, the Respondent withheld from them wage
increases already announced, although, as the record shows and we
find, the Respondent admittedly would have granted them such
increases if the Union had lost the election.
The Respondent contends that it withheld these increases from the
mechanical employees because the Union had directed it to do so, and
therefore it would have been guilty of an unfair labor practice if it
had acted otherwise. We find no merit in this contention. True, on
October 11, 1951, the Union had demanded that no changes be made
in conditions of employment without consultation with it. But, like
the Trial Examiner, we find that this demand merely restated the
Respondent's legal obligation to recognize the Union's representative
status whenever the interests of the mechanical employees were to
be affected. The demand thus apprised the Respondent to make no
unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment whatso-
ever. The Respondent was not thereby relieved of its obligation to
consult with the collective-bargaining representative of the mechanical
employees before it changed their conditions of employment, particu-
larly by depriving them of the wage increases they were to have re-
ceived along with the other employees.
Under these circumstances, and upon the entire record, we find
that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act by
unilaterally withholding from the mechancal employees their prom-
ised wage increases' In addition, we find that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act by its disparate treat-
ment of the mechanical employees, in depriving them of the wage in-
creases they normally would have received but for their selection of
the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Armstrong Cork
Company, Macon, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors and assigns,
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Lodge No. 918, International
Association of Machinists, A. F. L., as the successor to Lodge No.
1034, International Association of Machinists, A. F. L., or Inter-
national Association of Machinists, A. F. L., or any other labor
organization of its employees, by discriminating in regard to their
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
4 Absent exceptions to the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent otherwise bar-
gained in good faith, we hereby adopt such finding.
136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with Lodge No. 918, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, A. F. of L., as the successor to
Lodge No. 1034, International Association of Machinists, A. F. L.,
as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate
unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.
(c) Interrogating its employees concerning their union member-
ship or activities or threatening them with reprisals because of such
activities.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist Lodge No. 918, International Association of
Machinists, A. F. of L., as the successor to Lodge No. 1034, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, A. F. L., or International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, A. F. L., or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any or all such activities, except to the extent that such rights may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organ-
ization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a)
(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Make whole each of the employees listed in Appendix A of
the Intermediate Report in the manner set forth in the section of the
Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with Lodge No. 918, Inter-
national Association of Machinists, A. F. of L., as the successor to
Lodge No. 1034, International Association of Machinists, A. F. L.,
as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate
unit, and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement.'
(c) Post at its plant in Macon, Georgia, copies of the notice attached
to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix B." o Copies of such
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region,
shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be
The Respondent moved to supplement the record to establish the fact that, after the
close of the hearing, the Respondent and Union reached an understanding which they
embodied in a signed agreement The motion is denied because such fact is immaterial
and irrelevant to the issues herein , but will be considered on the question of compliance
with our Order.
8 This notice , however , shall be, and it hereby is, amended by striking therefrom the
words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" and substituting in lieu thereof the
words "A Decision and Order ." In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree
of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant
to a Decision and Order " the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 137
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and main-
tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed by Lodge No. 1034, International Association of
Machinists, A. F. L., and International Association of Machinists, A. F. L,
herein collectively called the Union, or at times the Lodge and the International,
respectively, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, respec-
tively called herein the General Counsel and the Board, by the Regional Director
for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued an amended complaint dated
April 2, 1952,' against Armstrong Cork Company, herein called the Respondent,
alleging that the Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) and Section 2
(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the
A&
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the amended complaint alleges that
the Respondent (1) on or about September 24, 1951, and at all times thereafter,
refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of
its employees in an appropriate unit; (2) on or about October 5, 1951, discharged
J. B. Vaughn, and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate him, because of his
membership in and activities on behalf of the Union and because of his con-
certed activities with other employees; (3) on or about October 29, 1951, and
January 1, 1952, discriminatorily withheld pay increases from named mechani-
cal department employees; and (4) from on or about March 30, 1951, engaged in
certain acts which constituted interference, restraint, and coercion.
On or about April 21, 1952,2 the Respondent filed an answer to the amended
complaint, in which it admitted the jurisdictional allegations of the amended
complaint, but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Macon, Georgia, starting on April 7,
1952, and ending on May 9, 1952, before the undersigned Trial Examiner. The
General Counsel and the Respondent were represented by counsel, and the Union
by its representatives. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence bearing on the issues,
to argue the issues orally upon the record, and to file briefs, proposed findings
of fact, and conclusions of law. The General Counsel and the Respondent filed
briefs with the Trial Examiner. After the close of the hearing the General
Counsel flied a motion "for the Trial Examiner to take judicial notice of Wage
Stabilization Board, General Wage Procedural Regulation of September 20, 1951."
1 The original complaint in Case No. 10-CA-1384 was dated February 18, 1952. The
cases were consolidated by order of the Regional Director , issued on April 2 , 1952. At the
bearing the General Counsel made a number of motions to amend the amended complaint.
The motions were granted.
2 The Respondent filed an answer to the original complaint on about February 28, 1952.
138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Respondent objected to the motion. The objection is overruled and the
motion is granted. The General Counsel's motion and the Respondent 's answer
are marked Trial Examiner ' s Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 , respectively , and are received
in evidence.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal office at
Lancaster , Pennsylvania . It maintains and operates plants and offices throughout
the United States, including a plant at Macon, Georgia , herein called the Macon
plant, where it is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of insulating
board, insulating sheeting, insulating lath, panels, planks, and acoustical tile.
In the course and conduct of its business operations at the Macon plant during
the year 1951, the Respondent purchased raw materials, consisting principally of
pulp wood, rosin size, sulphate of aluminum , asphalt, emulsion , clay, starch,
pigments , cartons, and wrapping paper, and valued in excess of $750,000, of which
approximately 33 percent in value was purchased from sources outside the State
of Georgia. During the same period, the Respondent at its Macon plant sold
finished products valued in excess of $1,000,000, of which approximately 90
percent in value was shipped to customers outside the State of Georgia.
At the hearing the Respondent admitted that it is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Lodge No. 1034 , International Association of Machinists , A. F. L., and Inter-
national Association of Machinists , A. F. L., are labor organizations which admit
to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background ; sequence of events
The Respondent began operations at its Macon plant during the latter part
of February 1948. After the filing of petitions for certification and the holding
of representation hearings , the Board directed elections involving all the pro-
duction and mechanical employees at the Macon plant. The elections were
held on January 18 and 19, 1949 , and May 10, 1950. No labor organization
received enough votes in these elections to be certified.
On March 2 , 1951, the International requested recognition as the representative
of the employees in the mechanical department . After an exchange of letters
between the Respondent and the Union , the latter filed a petition with the Board
(Case No. 10-RC-1426), which was served upon the Respondent on May 17,
1951. A hearing in the matter was held at Macon on July 2, 1951
On July 3, 1951, the Respondent announced to all employees at the Macon plant
a graduated increase in wages of 9 to 14 cents an hour, effective upon approval
by the Wage Stabilization Board, hereinafter referred to as the WSB. On
August 8, the Respondent filed a petition with the WSB , requesting approval of
the announced increase . On September 6, the Respondent filed another petition
with the WSB , requesting approval of a 2.2 percent "cost-of-living increase" to be
applied against the amount originally requested.
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 139
On September 24, 1951, an election was conducted by the Board among the
mechanical employees. The Union won the election by a vote of 32 to 8, resulting
in its certification by the Board on October 2, 1951. On October 5, the Respondent
terminated the employment of employee J. B. Vaughn.
On October 12, 1951, the Respondent requested the WSB to approve withdrawal
of its petitions for wage increases. Approval of this request was received by the
Respondent on October 29, That same day the Respondent granted a 2.81 percent
cost-of-living increase to its production employees, excluding employees in the
mechanical department. On November 30, 1951, the Respondent petitioned the
WSB for another increase for its production employees only. This increase was
made effective immediately upon receipt of approval from the WSB on
December 31.
From January 15, 1952, until March 27, 1952, a number of bargaining confer-
ences were held The Union filed a charge in Case No. 10-CA-1384 on October 16,
1951. After an amended charge was filed on January 21, 1952, the original com-
plaint was issued on February 18, 1952.
B. The refusal to bargain
1. The appropriate unit and representation of a majority therein
After an election conducted by the Board on September 24, 1951, the Board
certified the Union as the collective-bargaining agent for the employees in the
mechanical department In accordance with the Board's certification, the
amended complaint alleges and the Trial Examiner finds that a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b)
of the Act consists of :
All employees in the mechanical department of the Macon plant, excluding
all other plant employees, all salaried employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
The amended complaint alleges, the answer admits, and the Trial Examiner
finds that at all times since September 24, 1951, the Union has been the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in said unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
2. Unilateral actions of Respondent ; the negotiations
On July 3, 1951, the Respondent announced a wage increase of 9 to 14 cents for
all employees at the Macon plant, to become effective shortly after approval
of the WSB. The Respondent filed a petition for this increase on August 8.
In its letter of transmittal to the WSB, the Respondent stated that there was no
bargaining agent in the plant. On September 6 the Respondent filed another
petition with WSB, requesting approval of a wage increase of 3 cents without
prejudicing favorable action on the additional 7 cents an hour requested in its
petition of August 8, 1951. In this petition the Respondent stated that the
Union had filed a representation petition with the Board and that a hearing
had been held on July 2.
As related above, the Board conducted an election among the mechanical em-
ployees on September 24. For some few years before this date, there had been
in force at the Macon plant a "pledge" to employees. In substance, the pledge
outlined working conditions in the plant. On September 25, E. A. Worm, Jr.,
the plant manager, made the following speech to the mechanical employees :
You know the outcome of the election and you have expressed yourselves as
wanting the IAM to represent you for purposes of collective bargaining.
140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Naturally I am hurt, deeply hurt, by the decision the majority reached.
I cannot stand here and tell you otherwise . In that decision you have
changed the basis of our relationship by introducing a third party between
us. But I want you to know that my feeling toward each of you as an indi-
vidual remains unchanged.
Your decision to be represented for collective bargaining means that
the pledge under which we have operated has been nullified . That pledge,
which we gave voluntarily and freely to you, contained the broad statement
of principles that governed our relationship. Collective bargaining changes
that relationship and the pledge will be removed from the Mechanical
Department . We will bargain with the IAM.
To those who voted against representation I express my sincere appre-
ciation for your confidence in, and loyalty to, the Company , my associates
and me. I will always be grateful to you.
Immediately after his talk, Worm had the pledge removed from the bulletin
board in the mechanical department.
The Board certified the Union as exclusive bargaining representative of the
mechanical employees on October 2, 1951. Without any notification to the
Union,' on October 5, the Respondent laid off employee J. B. Vaughn , a carpenter
in the mechanical department , allegedly because of lack of work . At the request
of J. H. Howard, grand lodge representative of the Union , representatives of
the Respondent met with representatives of the Union on October 11 in order
to discuss Vaughn's layoff . Present for the Respondent were Worm, Assistant
Plant Manager James, and Personnel Director Wells. Present for the Union
were Howard, Vaughn, and employees Usery, Storey , Cecil Rhodes , and John
Rhodes.
During the discussion of Vaughn 's layoff, the Union wanted to know the reason
for the layoff and why Vaughn was not allowed to transfer to another job in
the plant in view of his high seniority rating and the Respondent's established
seniority policy. The Respondent in substance stated that the market for its
products was off, which resulted in less shipping ;' and that Vaughn had objected
to working other than as a carpenter , and had received reprimands . The Union
then requested that it be permitted to examine Vaughn's personnel record, includ-
ing his notice of termination , and the shipping records. The Respondent refused
these requests
The evidence discloses that working conditions in the mechanical department
were discussed briefly at the meeting on October 11. The testimony in this
connection is conflicting in some respects.
Howard testified :
And then I asked him ( Worm ) if he caused orders to be issued to take the
pledge down . And his reply was, yes. . . . I then told Mr. Worm that we was
asking him to restore the pledge on the bulletin board or ever where he had
it prior to that meeting and the notification to the men at the meeting on the
25th , for him to restore the pledge up there, and whether he did it or not,
that I was then and there formally informing him that we was requesting
that all working conditions , wages that was enjoyed by those men prior to
that to remain status quo , with the understanding that I understood that it
was-The Company had made application to the WSB for wage approval of
all employees and that we was requesting likewise if and when the Wage
The Respondent notified Vaughn of the layoff on October 1.
4 As a carpenter, most of Vaughn's work was connected with shipping.
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 141
Stabilization Board approved that petition that the men in our unit and
represented by us would be put in full force and effect at the same time if
any other employees was given-and if he would do that, that I would
assure him that the Union would not use in our negotiations the fact that
the Company had placed this wage into effect as to any charges against the
Company as a result of placing those wage rates into effect.
Usery testified :
Mr. Howard asked him (Worm), said : Well, I believe one point in there
about seniority . Said : You have taken the pledge down ; I am telling you
now we intend for you, whether the pledge is down or not, to give the em-
ployees the same thing that they did before you took the pledge down, be
treated the same as they were pertaining to working conditions for wages,
or whatever it might be, something similar to that. . . . He said that he had
heard that there was a wage increase promised and that he intended for us
to get everything that was got by production until the contract was
negotiated.
John Rhodes testified :
Mr. Howard said, "I hear you took the pledge down off the wall-off of the
bulletin board."
And he handed him (Worm) a reasonable facsimile of the pledge and
asked him if he would identify it as to the wording as to the pledge he had
on the wall.
He said it was to the same effect. It was of the same contents.
And dlr. Howard said that, "I intend for you to put the pledge back on the
wall and the conditions remain in the shop toward the men as they have been
in the past." . . . He says, "I understand you have submitted a request to
the Board (WSB) to an increase of nine or 14 spread for these boys." He
said, "I believe you intend to and I hope you intend to and I ask that you
do put this wage increase into effect for these men here." He said, "I cer-
tainly have no objection if you do.
Witnesses for the Respondent testified to the contrary insofar as mention of
the proposed wage increase was concerned. Worm was questioned and testified
as follows :
Q. (By Mr. Buerger) I direct your attention, Mr. Worm to this meeting
of October 11-Was anything said by the union representative at this meeting
about the Company changing existing wages, working conditions and the
like ?
A. Yes.
Q. What was said and by whom?
A. It was said by Mr . Howard.
Trial Examiner EAmE: Mr. Who?
The WITNESS : Mr. Howard. And it came up in connection with some
instructions that he stated that he was giving me and also some requests
that he had to make. He said that he wanted a copy of our plant rules
and he said he furthermore wanted it understood that he wanted no changes
made in conditions of employment , without consulting him and without him
being a party . He also stated that from this time forward , because the
International Association of Machinists now represented the men in the
department , that he was going to have plenty to say about conditions in
the plant and in the department. He stated that after we got into contract
142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
negotiations , he was not there to discuss contract that day, but after we got
into contract negotiations , if the Company , in discussing wages made a plea
of inability to pay, that he would insist on looking at the Company 's books.
Q. Aside from that reference you have just made to wages to be discussed
at a future date, were wages discussed at all at the conference of October
11th?
A. They were not.
Q. Was the existence of petitions with the Wage Stabilization Board for
increases discussed at all at the conference of October the 11th?
A. They were not.
Q. Was the question of paying mechanical department employees the
same increase as the production people might receive through the Wage
Stabilization Board discussed at all at the conference of October the 11th?
A. No.
James was questioned and testified as follows :
Q. At that time , was anything said by Mr Howard with respect to getting
a wage increase for members of the mechanical department?
A. He made it rather clear that the working conditions in the mechanical
department should not be changed.
Wells was questioned and testified as follows :
Q. Will you tell us what Mr. Howard said at that time?
A. It was not mentioned.
As shown above , there is a direct conflict in the testimony concerning the wage
increase . The witnesses for the General Counsel testified to the effect that
Howard stated that he had no objection to the increase and expected the
mechanical employees to receive it. Witnesses for the Respondent testified
that the increase was not mentioned at the meeting . The six witnesses whose
testimony is set forth above all impressed me as honest and sincere . Accordingly,
I find that the General Counsel failed to sustain the burden of proof in this
connection . Further, there is other evidence in the case which tends to support
the testimony of the witnesses for the Respondent . Howard did not hesitate
to write to the Respondent in order to state his position on what he considered
unfair or illegal actions on the part of Respondent . This is shown by his letters
to Worm, dated October 20 and November 10, 1951, in which he referred to the
Respondent 's refusal at the meeting of October 11 to produce Vaughn's personnel
record. Yet neither his letter of November 10, which was written 12 days after
the production employees received their first wage increase, nor subsequent let-
ters of the Union to the Respondent protested the failure to grant the increase
to the mechanical employees . If Howard had in fact stated the Union 's position
on the increase at the conference on October 11, it would seem that the Union
immediately would have protested upon learning that the increase had been
granted to production employees only.
On October 12, 1951, without any notice to the Union , the Respondent wrote
to the WSB requesting withdrawal of its petitions of August 8 and September 6.
On October 29, 1951, the Respondent received approval from the WSB, allowing
the petitions to be withdrawn . That same day under the then existing regu-
lations of the WSB the Respondent granted a general wage increase to its pro-
duction employees only. The Respondent did not offer the increase to the
mechanical employees , or consult or advise with the Union in the matter.
On November 30, 1951, the Respondent petitioned the WSB for another wage
increase for its production employees only. With the approval of the WSB, the
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 143
Respondent granted the increase to its production employees on December 31,
1951 This increase was not offered to the mechanical employees, and the
Union was not consulted.
The Union mailed a proposed contract to the Respondent on December 29,
1951. The proposal called for a 10 percent general wage increase.° The first
bargaining conference was held on January 15, 1952. John Carlton, grand lodge
representative of the Union, and a committee of employees appeared for the
Union at this meeting. At the start of the meeting, Worm stated that he wanted
it understood that there would be "no retroactive pay."
Carlton protested this by stating that "the employees were entitled to be given
any loss of pay that they had suffered as a result of coming into the Union" and
that the increase "had been promised to the employees and the Company should
carry out that promise." Worm stated that the Company should not be expected
to grant retroactive pay in view of the Union's long delay in asking for negoti-
ations. He then asked Carlton the reason for the Union's delay e Carlton told
Worm that the reason for the delay was "because the Union desired to get things
started off on a friendly basis without having to have any unfair labor practice
charges against the Company and . . . desired to get into negotiations without
having that confronting them."' During the afternoon session the Respondent
presented its contract proposal. The Respondent's wage proposal did not provide
for an increase to the mechanical employees.
The Union's checkoff proposal was discussed at the meeting on January 15.
Worm stated that there would be no checkoff of union dues at the Macon plant.
When Carlton called Worm's attention to the fact that the Company had the
checkoff provision at some of its other plants, Worm replied to the effect that he
was negotiating for the Macon plant "regardless of what the Company might have
somewhere else "
The next bargaining conference was held on January 22, 1952. At this meet-
ing Carlton called attention to the fact that certain of the Respondent's present
employee benefits, such as the health and welfare plan, were not included in the
Respondent's proposal. Worm replied, in substance, that the Company "volun-
tarily" had giN en benefits from time to time with no understanding that they
would be continued ; that the Company would take them away if it saw fit ; and
that the Company had no intention at that time of taking away any benefits.
Carlton stated at this meeting that the Union would like to discuss wages. Worm
replied, "we will go into the negotiation of wages when we have concluded the
other provisions of the agreement."
Between January 22 and March 27, 1952, 12 other bargaining conferences were
held. Conciliators were present at the meetings held during March. Both the
Union and the Respondent made a number of concessions,' but an impasse was
reached on the question of wages. The Union made a number of wage proposals,
but all were rejected by the Respondent. The Respondent offered wage increases
equal to those which production employees had received, but refused to make any
part of the offered increases retroactive. It appears that the question of retro-
active increases was the only serious bar to an agreement between the parties.
After September 24, 1951, and during the negotiations, the Respondent granted
14 merit increases to the mechanical employees. During the same period of time,
5 The general wage increases granted to the production employees on October 29 and
December 31, 1951, amounted to 7.61 percent
e Worm testified that wages were first discussed at a meeting on January 22.
The original charge in Case No 10-CA-1384 was filed on October 16, 1951.
s While the concessions made by the Respondent were minor for the most part, it indi-
cated that it would grant a checkoff of union dues.
144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
it also granted 1 promotional increase. The Union was not advised or consulted
concerning any of these wage increases.
3. Conclusions
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent's course of action since
September 24, 1951, shows a "complete disregard of its statutory obligation to
bargain in good faith." The Respondent contends that it bargained in good
faith, as evidenced by the 13 bargaining conferences, by its willingness to con-
fer whenever a request was made by the Union, and by its counterproposals and
concessions to union demands. In defense of its unilateral actions, Respondent
contends in its brief that it acted "in response to a Union demand on October
11 that all existing working conditions be continued in force."
I find that on October 29 and December 31, 1951, the Respondent acted uni-
laterally and in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act by granting
wage increases to its production employees only. The total increase had been
announced to all employees, including those in the mechanical department, on
July 3, 1J51. Such announcement made it a condition of employment. Under
the circumstances the Respondent was obligated to notify the Union before it
took the promised increase away from the mechanical employees. It is undis-
puted that the Respondent did not do this. Howard's statement at the con-
ference on October 11 does not constitute a defense of the Respondent's conduct.
He referred to Worm's action in removing the pledge from the bulletin board,
and stated, in substance, that the Union demanded that no changes be made in
the terms and conditions of employment. Keeping in mind the announcement of
July 3, Howard's statement could be construed to mean that no unilateral change
in the pending increase should be made. Accordingly, it did not relieve the
Respondent from its obligation to notify the Union.
It is also found that the Respondent by granting wage increases to its pro-
duction employees only on October 29 and December 31, 1951, discriminated
against its mechanical employees because of their adherence to the Union and
thereby violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act9 The Respondent con-
tends that the certification of the Union was an intervening circumstance, and
that the granting of the increases to the mechanical employees would have been
unilateral conduct in contravention of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. This con-
tention is rejected for the reason that the increase had been promised to the
mechanical employees before the election and before the certification of the
Union as the bargaining representative. Under these circumstances, and if the
increases had been granted, it is my opinion that a finding of unilateral action
in violation of the Act could not have been made unless the evidence showed that
the Union specifically objected to the announced increase. The announcement
of the increase differentiates the instant case from those cited in the Respond-
ent's brief. Here the Respondent took away something that had been promised
to the employees, a wage increase. Would it have been legal for the Respond-
ent to have taken away seniority or other rights and privileges of the mechani-
cal employees because they selected a bargaining agent for a unit separate from
the rest of the plant? It is clear that such action would have been discrimina-
tory. I am unable to distinguish between the promise of a benefit and one
already enjoyed, especially when the promise became real for the production
employees.
9 The names of the employees involved in this finding are set forth in Appendix A,
attached hereto.
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 145
I do not find that Worm's removal of the pledge per se, constituted a violation of
the Act, especially in view of his statement to the effect that the Respondent
would bargain with the Union. The evidence does not show any subsequent
change in the working conditions outlined in the pledge.
It is also found that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the
Act by granting merit increases to mechanical employees after September 24,
1951, without first advising or consulting with the Union. It is undisputed that
the Respondent had a policy of granting merit increases before the advent of the
Union ; and, as found above, on October 11 Howard demanded that there be no
change in the terms and conditions of employment. To some extent, merit in-
creases might be classed as part of the terms and conditions of employment in
Respondent's plant, as the Respondent apparently contends. But, as the word
suggests, they were not automatic, and were granted solely at the option of the
Respondent. Thus a merit increase would not be a condition of employment in
the accepted sense, particularly when not regulated by a collective-bargaining
agreement. That an employer by granting such increases unilaterally could
undermine a union's prestige and worth is axiomatic. Recognizing this threat
to the intent and purposes of the Act, the Board long has held such action
illegal.10
The General Counsel's contention that the Respondent did not bargain in good
faith is rejected. It is true that the Respondent ignored the Union in granting
or not granting wage increases, but in my opinion this evidence is not sufficient
to warrant such a finding. On the contrary, the facts disclose that the Respond-
ent bargained with the Union on all issues presented, including Vaughn's layoff
or discharge; and that the only bar to a contract between the parties was the
Respondent's unwillingness to make the offered wage increase retroactive.
While as the General Counsel contends almost all of the concessions made by
the Respondent during the negotiations were minor, this alone does not prove
bad faith on the part of the Respondent. Under the Act the Respondent was not
required to make concessions to the Union. Its refusal to incorporate into a
contract existing benefits in the mechanical department, or any benefits enjoyed
by other employees in the plant, might be indicative of a lack of good faith, but
the record does not disclose such evidence. It appears that before the bargaining
negotiations were concluded the Respondent offered substantially all existing
benefits.
C. The termination of J. B. Vaughn
Vaughn was hired by the Respondent as a second-class carpenter on January
19, 1948. Walter Williams, the other carpenter in the mechanical department,
was hired as a first-class carpenter on January 12, 1948. They were under the
supervision of Master Mechanic W. C. Falls, who had charge of the mechanical
department.
The main job of Vaughn and Williams was the repairing of pallets. This job
required most of their time. In addition to carpentry, they also performed some
mechanical work, mainly on the "dryer" on "down day." Vaughn performed
mechanical work when requested, but told his supervisors that he objected to it.
It does not appear that he was assigned to such work after the early part of 1951.
During March 1951, Vaughn was promoted to first-class carpenter. At the time
Falls told him that he and Williams were doing "good work."
Vaughn was an active supporter of union attempts to organize the plant. He
acted as an observer for the Rubber Workers, C. I. 0., at a Board election in
19 Dealers Engine Rebuilders , Inc , 95, NLRB 1009.
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
January 1949. Shortly before an election conducted by the Board on May 10,
1950, Assistant Labor Relations Director Edwards asked him why he wanted
a union in the plant. Vaughn stated his reasons Plant Personnel Manager
Wells was present at the time. On about March 1, 1951, Vaughn and other em-
ployees of the mechanical department met with a representative of the Union.
Vaughn signed an authorization card of the Union at the time. On September
23, Vaughn, as an employee-representative of the Union, attended a preelection
conference in which the Respondent participated During the week following
the election of September 24, Vaughn was chosen by the mechanical employees as
a member of a union committee.
During the day following the election, Personnel Director Wells went to the
carpenter's shop. He asked Vaughn and Williams where were the "flags and
banners" since the Union had won the election. Vaughn indicated that he was
very much in favor of the Union, and told Wells the reasons for his attitude.
During August 1951, the Respondent's Lancaster office decided to curtail pro-
duction at the Macon plant. It appears tht this decision was based on stock
inventory and a sales estimate for September. Production declined from an aver-
age of 12,500,000 sq. ft. in the first 5 months of 1951 to an average of 8,700,000
sq. ft. in September. On September 13, 1951, the Respondent decided that layoffs
were necessary and so advised Plant Manager Worm, recommending October 1
as the date for production curtailment. During September, 50 production
employees were laid off. On about September 21, 1951, Master Mechanic Falls
submitted the following memorandum to the personnel office : "
Due to the cut back in production fewer men will be needed in the mainte-
nance shop. Bill James, Fred Hoffeditz and I have just gone over the sched-
ule and due to the fact that 3 men have quit, we figure that for the time being
only 2 men will have to be laid off. We have two carpenters and two saw
filers now, but with the cut back it will be impossible to keep them all busy
on that work. #745, Mercer, who is one of the saw filers, is the only other
man in the department who can sharpen saws. He has also had considerable
mechanical experience and is a carpenter . For this reason , he will be kept on
and reclassified as a mechanic 2/c, and will be available as a relief saw
filer. #792, Fulcher , who is experienced only as a mechanic , will be laid off.
Vaughn, who is one of the two carpenters , has never wanted to do anything
but straight carpenter work. When we first started up we used both the car-
penters to change rolls in the dryer and help on dryer maintenance on down
days. They both objected, saying that it was mechanical work and not for
carpenters. When they were hired, I told them both that they would have
to do this. I reminded them of it when they objected and they remembered
it. Later on I had to take them off this work because they would never get
anything done. They objected to having to replace glass in the dryer doors.
They said that was a Glazier's job. I kept them on that but they would never
clean up the broken glass . They said that was a laborer's job. Vaughn
has had plenty of opportunity but has shown no desire to qualify on other
jobs. He hasn't even kept the carpenter shop clean because he felt that a
laborer should be furnished for that. Since he is not qualified to do anything
else and there is not enough work to keep 2 carpenters busy, Vaughn is to
be laid off.
Further reductions may be necessary.
"Assistant Plant Manager James testified that he previously had told Falls "to look
over his department , see just how many there was a possibility of laying off and still keep
the Mechanical Department in good function."
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 147
On October 1, 1951, Falls called Vaughn to his office and told him of his layoff,
effective October 5. During October, 5 production employees and 2 mechanical
employees (Vaughn and Fulcher) were laid off. During December, 22 produc-
tion employees and 1 mechanical employee were laid off.
There is a conflict in the testimony concerning the conversation at the time
of Vaughn's layoff. Vaughn testified, in substance, that Falls told him that he
was being laid off because the work had decreased ; that he asked Falls if his
seniority would permit him to transfer to some other job in the mechanical de-
partment or to some other job in the plant; that Falls replied, "Since you fel-
loii s expressed your interest for the company last week you have no damn
seniority" ; that he inquired if the layoff was permanent ; that Falls stated that
it was up to the company whether or not he would be rehired ; that he then asked
Falls if the Union could have had a lot to do with his layoff ; and that Falls re-
plied, "Yes, if that is the way you want to put it." Falls denied the remarks
attributed to him by Vaughn concerning the Union.
Vaughn did not impress me as a reliable or credible witness. There are a
number of contradictions in his testimony with respect to a statement he allegedly
made immediately after his conversation with Falls. Accordingly, Vaughn's
version of the above conversation is not credited.
At the time of his layoff, Vaughn talked to Assistant Personnel Director Bell.
Bell showed him a termination report, which had been made out by Falls on
October 1.12 Bell asked Vaughn to sign the report, but he refused. The report
noted that Vaughn's work was "at or above standard" and that the termination
was a "Lay-off." The body of the report reads as follows:
Lay off due to a cut back in production & shipping which will reduce the
amount of pallet work done by fhe carpenters & one man will be able to take
care of them. Johnny thinks he has seniority over enough people in the
dept. that he should stay. He said he could do mechanical work. I re-
minded him that he never wanted to work on the Dryer rolls & has never
thought he should install glass in Dryer doors. He has told me that he
was a carpenter & that was mechanical & glazier work.
In brief, the Respondent contends that there was not enough work in the plant
to keep two carpenters busy; that Vaughn was selected for layoff rather than
Williams because the latter had more seniority ; and that Vaughn was not
transferred to another job because-he had objected in the past to performing
mechanical work and because he was not a satisfactory employee in every respect.
The Respondent submitted in evidence memoranda reports which were signed by
Falls and his assistant, Feb. They are dated April 19, 1948, November 2, 1949,
November 10, 1949, and January 20, 1950. All but the November 2 memorandum
were signed by Falls. In substance they show that Vaughn objected to per-
forming mechanical work, and that he spent a lot of time talking instead of
working, about which Falls reprimanded him.
I find that the Respondent did not discharge or lay off Vaughn on October 5,
1951, because of his membership in or activities on behalf of the Union. The
preponderance of the reliable and credible evidence shows that the Respondent
laid off Vaughn because of a falling off of its business. There is considerable
evidence in the case concerning the amount of assistance that Williams re-
ceived after Vaughn's termination. There are conflicts in this evidence. I do
U2 The report was on a form entitled , "Report of Termination of Service," which was
received in evidence It provided for the signature of both the employee involved and the
supervisor This apparently was the paper referred to in the General Counsel's case as a
separation notice
148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not believe any purpose would be served by setting it forth in this report. It is
undisputed that Williams at times received assistance, but I am convinced and
find from the record as a whole that during the times material herein there was
insufficient work in the Respondent's plant to keep two carpenters busy.
D. Interference, restraint, and coercion
Respondent's production employees received an incentive bonus. By letter
dated February 12, 1951, the mechanical employees requested Plant Manager
Worm for a meeting in order to discuss with him the possibility of an incentive
bonus for their department. Worm met with the mechanical employees some
few weeks later. In substance he told them that at the time he did not know
of any way to figure an incentive plan for mechanical employees ; but that if
the "key" was ever found, they would receive it.
On March 2, 1951, the Union requested the Respondent to recognize it as the
bargaining agent of the mechanical employees. Thereafter, Worm announced
to the mechanical employees that they would receive an incentive bonus since
the Respondent had found the "key." The incentive bonus was instituted in
the mechanical department on April 10, 1951.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent's action in granting the bonus
was violative of the Act. This contention is rejected, both on the merits and
on the ground that the action complained of took place more than 6 months
before the filing and service of the original charge.
James Smith was foreman of the woodyard. On about September 20, 1951,
Smith asked Forrest Green, a mechanical employee, "how the Union was com-
ing" and what the employees expected to accomplish by organizing the Union. He
told Green that if the mechanical employees selected the Union, "you won't get
any pay for it." It is found that Smith's remark to Green constitutes inter-
ference since it contains a threat of reprisal.
During January or February 1952, Smith spoke to employee Williams. He
asked him how the Union was coming along and the amount of the union dues.
He told Williams and employee Keene, who also was present, that the mechani-
cal employees were losing the pay raises that other employees were getting by
belonging to the Union. It is found that Smith's remarks to Williams and
Keene constitute interference.
At sometime after Vaughn's discharge, Smith stated to employee McCollum,
"If Vaughn had acted right and hadn't filed suit against the Company, he would
have got to come back to work, but he will never work with Armstrong Cork
Company again." It is found that Smith's remark to McCollum constitutes in-
terference.
At a bargaining session on February 15, 1952, when the Union mentioned the
possibility of a strike, Edwards stated that mechanical employees who went on
strike would be replaced. As related above, the employee bargaining committee
was present at all bargaining conferences. Later the Union voted to strike and
so notified the Respondent. No date was set for the strike." On and after
March 14, the Respondent told its employees that they would be expected to
work in the event of a strike and that they would be replaced if they did not
come to work.
I find, as the General Counsel contends, that the Respondent's threat to re-
place strikers constitutes a violation of the Act. It is undisputed that the
Union contemplated a strike in order to enforce its economic demands. When
an economic strike takes place, an employer has the right to replace the strikers
13 As of the date of the hearing , the strike had not occurred.
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 149
and, in my opinion , has the right to inform his employees that he intends to
operate his establishment and to replace the strikers . However , in the instant
case it has been found that the Respondent discriminated against the mechanical
employees by not granting them the promised increase in wages, and that its
unilateral action in the matter constituted a refusal to bargain.
During January 1952 , Master Mechanic Falls questioned employee Keene con-
cerning his attitude toward the Union It is found that such interrogation
constitutes interference.
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent 's announcement of a
general wage increase on July 3, 1951 , was violative of the Act . This contention
is rejected . The facts in this connection have been related above. The an-
nouncement was made not only to the 43 mechanical employees , but also to
approximately 400 production employees . Further, the evidence shows that
during June and July 1951 , the Respondent announced or reached agreements
for general wage increases for all of its plants , covering approximately 10,000
employees . It approaches the absurd to argue that the Respondent made the
July 3 announcement at Macon in order to dissuade 43 employees from selecting
the Union as their bargaining agent.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section III, above , occurring
in connection with the operations of the Respondent set forth in section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, the
Trial Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent by its course of conduct on and
after October 21, 1951, refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of its employees in a unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining . Accordingly , it will be recommended that the
Respondent margain collectively, upon request , with the Union as the exclusive
representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and that
the Respondent embody any understanding reached in the course of such col-
lective bargaining , upon request , in a written agreement , signed by the parties
affected thereby.
It also has been found that the Respondent discriminated against its mechanical
employees by not granting them the general wage increases which were granted
to its production employees on October 29, 1951 , and December 31, 1951 . It will
be recommended that the Respondent make whole the employees whose names
are shown on Appendix A for the loss of pay they suffered by reason of the
Respondent's discrimination.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record
in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Lodge No . 1034, International Association of Machinists , A. F. L., and In-
ternational Association of Machinists , A. F. L., are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
257965-54-vol. 103--11
150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. By discriminating against the employees named in Appendix A, the Re-
spondent has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
4. All employees in the mechanical department of the Macon plant, excluding
all other plant employees, all salaried employees, guards, and supervisors, as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
5. Lodge No. 1034, International Association of Machinists, A. F. L., at all
times on and after September 24, 1951, has been the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act of all employees in the
aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
6. By refusing to bargain collectively with Lodge No. 1034, the Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
Appendix A
Mechanical Department
Frank B. Rigney
Cecil G. Rhodes
Walter R. Williams, Jr.
LeRoy A. Busbee
Jesse D. Gilley
Andrew M. Hare
James Barron King
Amon H. Shumate
James W. Beasley
Lonnie M. Minton
John B. Grizzle
Harvie It. Yates
Charles R. Wilson
Henry G. Rawls
William C. Thames
Louis A. Storey
John R. Rhodes
Adam L. Quinn
Forrest L. Green
George M. Keene
Willie J. Usery, Jr.
Wm. D. Hopkins, Jr.
Jackson E. Stevens
Howard B. Smith
Lamar Giddens
Daniel W. Mercer, Jr.
Marion C. Simmons
Rueben Bryant
William 0 McDermid
Madison H. Hortman
Jewett McKinney
Carl. D. Wive
Oliver C. Shreve
Thos. B. Sherwood, III
Ralph W. Chafin
Willie L. Lamb
Olin N. Fulcher
James W. Smallwood
Appendix B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 151
organizations , to join or assist LODGE NO. 1034, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF MACHINISTS , A. F. L, AND INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS,
A. F. L., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with LODGE No. 1034, as the
exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described
herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All employees in the mechanical department of the Macon plant, ex-
cluding all other plant employees, all salaried employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL make whole the employees named below for any loss of pay suf-
fered as a result of the discrimination.
Frank B. Rigney
Cecil G. Rhodes
Walter R. Williams, Jr.
LeRoy A. Busbee
Jesse D. Gilley
Andrew M. Hare
James Barron King
Amon H. Shumate
James W. Beasley
Lonnie M. Minton
John B . Grizzle
Harvie R. Yates
Charles R. Wilson
Henry G. Rawls
William C. Thames
Louis A. Storey
John R. Rhodes
Adam L. Quinn
Forrest L. Green
George M. Keene
Willie J. Usery, Jr.
Wm. D. Hopkins, Jr.
Jackson E . Stevens
Howard B. Smith
Lamar Giddens
Daniel W. Mercer, Jr.
Marion C. Simmons
Reuben Bryant
William O. McDermid
Madison H . Hortman
Jewett McKinney
Carl D. Wrye
Oliver C . Shreve
Thos . B. Sherwood, III
Ralph W. Chafin
Willie L. Lamb
Olin N. Fulcher
James W. Smallwood
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named
unions or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment against
any employee because of membership in or activity on behalf of any such labor
organization.
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY,
Employer
Dated -------------------- By -------------------------------------------
(Representative (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.