Armored Transport, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 29, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 143 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

ARMORED TRANSPORT 143
Armored Transport, Inc. and Currency and Security
Handlers Association (CASHA) and United
Plant Guard Workers of America Amalgamated
Local No. 100, affiliated with the International
Union of Plant Guard Workers of America.
Cases 31–CA–23504, 31–CA–23505, 31–CA–
23624 (formerly 32–CA–16841), 31–CA–23625
(formerly 32–CA–16879), 31–CA–23908 (formerly
21–CA–33003), 31–CA–23728, 31–CA–23732,
31–CA–23748 (formerly 32–CA–17245), and 31–
CA–23749 (formerly 32–CA–17426)
May 29, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND TRUESDALE
On March 7, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Clifford
H. Anderson issued the attached decision. The Respon-
dent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Armored Transport, Inc.,
Bakersfield, Santa Maria, Fresno, Merced, and Temec-
ula, California, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs shall take the action set forth in the Order.

Nathan Laks, Atty., for the General Counsel.
Neil O. Andrus and Stephen N. Yang, Attys. (Jeffer, Mangels,
Butler & Marmaro), of San Francisco, California, for the
Respondent.
Scott A. Brooks, Atty. (Gregory, Moore, Jeakle, Heinen, Elli-
sion, Brooks & Lane), of Detroit, Michigan, for the Charg-
ing Parties.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard this case in trial on August 23, 24, and 25, 1999, in Los
Angeles, California. The matter arose as follows.
On August 17, 1998, Currency and Securities Handlers As-
sociation (CASHA) filed charges docketed as Cases 31–CA–
23504 and 31–CA–23505 against Armored Transport, Inc. (the
Respondent). On June 24, 1998, CASHA filed a charge dock-
eted as Case 32–CA–16841 against the Respondent, which was
thereafter transferred and designated as Case 31–CA–23624.
On July 16, 1998, CASHA filed a charge docketed as Case 32–
CA–16879 against the Respondent, which was thereafter trans-
ferred and designated as Case 31–CA–23625. On October 15,
1998, CASHA filed a charge docketed as Case 21–CA–33003
against the Respondent which was thereafter transferred and
designated as Case 31–CA–23908. The Regional Director for
Region 31 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
issued an order consolidating cases, consolidated complaint and
notice of hearing respecting these cases on December 29, 1998.
On February 11, 1999, the United Plant Guard Workers of
America Amalgamated Local No. 100, affiliated with the Inter-
national Union of Plant Guards Workers of America (Local 100
and, with CASHA, the Charging Parties) filed a charge dock-
eted as Case 31–CA–23728 against the Respondent. On Febru-
ary 12, 1999, Local 100 filed a charge docketed as Case 31–
CA–23732 against the Respondent. On February 16, 1999,
Local 100 filed charges docketed as Cases 32–CA–17245 and
32–CA–17246 against the Respondent which were thereafter
transferred and designated as Cases 31–CA–23748 and 31–
CA–23749. On April 29, 1999, the Regional Director for Re-
gion 31 of the Board (the Regional Director) issued an order
consolidating cases, second consolidated complaint and notice
of hearing respecting these cases. On July 20, 1999, the Re-
gional Director issued an order consolidating cases, third con-
solidated complaint and notice of hearing respecting these
cases. The Respondent filed timely answers to the complaints.
The consolidated complaint alleges that the Respondent’s
employees in appropriate bargaining units at each of its Bakers-
field, Santa Maria, Fresno, Merced, and Temecula, California
facilities had been represented by independent labor organiza-
tions until March and April 1998 at which time those labor
organizations affiliated with CASHA so that CASHA became
the individual labor organizations’ designated representative for
the purpose of collective bargaining. The complaint further
alleges that CASHA on or about December 10, 1998, affiliated
with International Union of Plant Guards Workers of America
becoming Local 100, the designated collective-bargaining rep-
resentative of the individual labor organizations representing
the Respondent’s unit employees at its Bakersfield, Santa
Maria, Fresno, Merced, and Temecula, California facilities.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent was requested to
recognize CASHA and thereafter Local 100 as the designated
representative of the five independent labor organizations rep-
resenting the Respondent’s unit employees at each of its Ba-
kersfield, Santa Maria, Fresno, Merced, and Temecula, Califor-
nia facilities by May 1988 and that at all times, on and after
June 11, 1998, the Respondent has failed and refused to so
recognize first CASHA and later, on and after February 10,
1999, Local 100, as such a representative thereby violating
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The complaint further alleges that on or about June 10, 1998,
the Respondent bypassed the Armored Transport Temecula
Employees Association and dealt directly with the Temecula
facility unit employees by soliciting the employees to sign a
contract between the Respondent and the Armored Transport
Temecula Employees Association and by entering into an
agreement purporting to be a contract between the Respondent
and the Armored Transport Temecula Employees Association
for the period June 1, 1998, through May 31, 2001.
334 NLRB No. 24
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 144
By amendment to the complaint at the hearing the General
Counsel further alleged that on about March 18, 1999, the Re-
spondent bypassed the Armored Transport Temecula Employ-
ees Association and Local 100 and dealt directly with the unit
by entering into an agreement purporting to be a collective-
bargaining agreement between Respondent and the Armored
Transport Temecula Employees Association for the period
April 1 1999, through March 31, 2002.
The Respondent in its answer denies that it has violated the
Act as alleged.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On the entire record herein, including helpful briefs from the
Respondent, the Charging Parties, and the General Counsel, I
make the following1
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, with offices and places of
business in Bakersfield, Santa Maria, Fresno, Merced, and Te-
mecula, California, has been engaged in the transportation of
cash and valuables for its customers. The Respondent in the
course and conduct of its business annually purchases and re-
ceives goods at its California facilities valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of California.
Based on the above, there is no dispute and I find the Re-
spondent is and has been at all times material an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
There is no dispute and I find that at all relevant times the
Armored Transport Bakersfield Employee Association, Ar-
mored Transport Santa Maria Employee Association, Armored
Transport Fresno Employee Association, Armored Transport
Merced Employee Association, Armored Transport Temecula
Employee Association, CASHA, and Local 100 are, and each
of them is, a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent operates a multistate armored car company
engaged in the business of transporting and warehousing cash
and other valuables for banks, retail stores, and similar busi-
nesses. At relevant times its president and chief executive offi-
cer was Richard Irvin and its director of labor relations was Joel
(Bud) Curnutt.
The Respondent has maintained facilities in Bakersfield,
Santa Maria, Fresno, Merced,2 and Temecula, California. Each
of these facilities employed at all relevant times employees in
the following individual facility bargaining units (the units):

1 As a result of the pleadings and the stipulations of counsel at the
trial, there were few disputes of fact regarding collateral matters.
Where not otherwise noted, the findings herein are based on the plead-
ings, the stipulations of counsel, or unchallenged credible evidence.
2 The Merced facility was apparently closed in or around June 1999
and the staff was transferred to a facility of the Respondent not in-
volved herein in Modesto, California.
All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time
driver/messenger guards and vault-driver messenger guards
employed by the Respondent excluding all other employees
and supervisors as defined in the Act.

There was no dispute and I find that the five individual facility
bargaining units were appropriate for collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. The Merced
facility has since closed.
The Respondent at various times in the 1990s, but in all
cases more than 6 months before the filing of any of the
charges in this proceeding, recognized and entered into separate
collective-bargaining agreements with the Armored Transport
Bakersfield Employee Association, Armored Transport Santa
Maria Employee Association, Armored Transport Fresno Em-
ployee Association, Armored Transport Merced Employee
Association, and Armored Transport Temecula Employee As-
sociation respecting the unit at each particular facility. There is
no dispute and I find, each of the five facility Employee Asso-
ciations became and thereafter continued to be the exclusive
representative of the Respondent’s unit employees at each re-
spective facility.
The record establishes that the Employee Associations were
not so much formed by employees as created by announcement
by the Respondent who presented the employee complements
at each facility with documents styled as collective-bargaining
agreements and obtained the agreement or acquiescence of the
employees to the documents in the name of the Association.
The Employee Associations were paradigms of informality.
There was no dispute that none of the Associations at any time
had ever had a constitution, bylaws, elected officers, initiations
fees, union dues, financial resource or obligations, or a mem-
bership different from or determined by other than unit em-
ployee status. The Associations never have had their own of-
fices, other locations or even storage areas, never maintained
records of any kind, never had a telephone or even acquired
letterhead stationary.
In addition to being amorphous, or as the General Counsel
contends “ghostly,” it is clear that the Associations had no ac-
tive ongoing role in workplace relations or even a coherent or
continuous existence. Testimony establishes that no formal
grievance was ever initiated, processed or supported by an As-
sociation. No formal or structured election or representative
selection process seems to have ever existed prior to the affilia-
tion procedures described, infra.
Seemingly the Associations were historically invoked or
brought into being by the Respondent in the period before each
triennial contract in each unit. The Respondent announced its
intentions respecting the terms of a new agreement to the em-
ployees and with some interemployee communication and lim-
ited negotiations with the Respondent the terms were agreed
on. In this manner, a contract was agreed to and the Associa-
tions, such as they were, disappeared or became quiescent until
the next contract cycle.
The most recent contracts between the Respondent and the
respective Employees Associations for the units noted below
are:

ARMORED TRANSPORT 145
Bakersfield—July 1, 1997, through June 30, 2000
Santa Maria—October 12, 1997, through October 31, 2000
Fresno—June 1, 1997, through June 2000
Merced—June 1, 1997, through June 2000
Temecula—June 30, 1996, through July 31, 19993

On or about March 23, 1998, the Armored Transport Santa
Maria Employees Association validly, and while observing due
process and preserving substantial continuity of the Associa-
tion, designated CASHA as its agent for collective bargaining.
On or about March 27, 1998, the Armored Transport Temecula
Employees Association validly, and while observing due proc-
ess and preserving substantial continuity of the Association,
designated CASHA as its agent for collective bargaining. On
or about April 1, 1998, the Armored Transport Fresno Employ-
ees Association validly, and while observing due process and
preserving substantial continuity of the Association, designated
CASHA as its agent for collective bargaining. On or about
April 2, 1998, the Armored Transport Merced Employees As-
sociation validly, and while observing due process and preserv-
ing substantial continuity of the Association, designated
CASHA as its agent for collective bargaining. On or about
April 3, 1998, the Armored Transport Bakersfield Employees
Association validly, and while observing due process and pre-
serving substantial continuity of the Association, designated
CASHA as its agent for collective bargaining. CASHA during
1998 represented the Respondent’s employees a several Cali-
fornia facilities other than those in issue herein. On about De-
cember 10, 1998, CASHA, while observing due process and
preserving substantial continuity of representation, affiliated
with the International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of
America and became Local 100 of the United Plant Guard
Workers of America.4
B. Events
1. Demands for recognition and refusal to recognize
On April 6, 1998, David Troy Nelsen, then-president of
CASHA, sent a letter on CASHA letterhead to the Respon-
dent’s president, Irvin, with the following text:

On March 27, 1998 the Armored Transport Temecula
Employees Association voted to affiliate with the Cur-
rency and Securities Handlers Association.
Please be advised that CASHA is now the bargaining
representative for the Armored Transport Temecula Em-
ployees Association.
CASHA will honor the existing contract between the
Armored Temecula Employees Association and Armored
Transport, Inc.
CASHA requests Armored Transport, Inc. to recognize
CASHA as the representative of the Armored Temecula
Employees Association.

3 Two subsequent contracts in Temecula are in contention, see the
discussion of Temecula events, infra.
4 The facts respecting the affiliations set forth in this paragraph were
stipulated by the Parties either on the record or in written stipulations
entered into evidence as Joint Exhibits.
Armored Transport, Inc. will conduct future bargain-
ing with the same representatives of the Armored Trans-
port Temecula Employees Association who conducted
such bargaining in the past.
Please respond to this request for recognition by April
20, 1998.

Nelsen sent on the same day similar letters to Irvin for the
Fresno and Santa Maria Associations varying the text only to
refer to slightly different election dates respecting those units.
By letter dated May 18, 1998, Nelsen again wrote to Irvin
noting CASHA’s earlier demand for recognition and the Re-
spondent’s failure to respond. The letter added that “CASHA is
also demanding recognition for the following [Respondent]
branches for Merger Elections also held: Bakersfield and
Merced.” The letter threatened to file NLRB unfair labor prac-
tice charges alleging the Respondent’s refusal to bargain if a
response was not received by May 29, 1998.
On June 11, 1998, Nelsen and other CASHA agents met with
Irvin respecting collective-bargaining units of the Respondent’s
employees represented by CASHA not relevant herein. During
these meetings, Nelsen asked Irvin for a response to CASHA’s
April 6 and May 18, 1998 letters. Irvin told Nelsen that there
was no reason for the Respondent to recognize CASHA for
those units because there were no contracts due to expire.
On February 10, 1999, Nelsen, now president of Local 100,
sent Irvin a letter on CASHA—Local 100, United Plant Guard
Workers of America letterhead, with the following text:

On May 18, 1998 CASHA demanded recognition for
the following [Respondent] branches due to Merger Elec-
tions held:

1- Bakersfield
2- Fresno
3- Merced
4- Santa Maria

[The Respondent] did not respond.
As you know, CASHA has voted to affiliate with the
United Plant Guard Workers of America and is now
CASHA Local #100.
CASHA LOCAL #100 is now officially demanding
recognition in the following [Respondent] locations:

1- Bakersfield
2- Fresno
3- Merced
4- Santa Maria
Please respond a.s.a.p. with the Company’s position at
[telephone number of Local 100 omitted].

On or about the same date, the Respondent’s director of la-
bor relations, Curnutt, told Nelsen by telephone that the Re-
spondent’s position was unchanged, that the Respondent would
not recognize CASHA nor Local 100 in any capacity at any of
the facilities at issue herein absent an election conducted by the
National Labor Relations Board. Following that communica-
tion, the Charging Parties have received neither a change of
position regarding recognition from the Respondent nor a re-

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 146
quest for clarification of or questions regarding the demands of
CASHA and Local 100 as described above.
2. The events at the Temecula facility
On March 27, 1998, in the vote noted supra, eight Temecula
unit employees and hence Armored Transport Temecula Em-
ployees Association members cast their secret ballots unani-
mously for affiliation with CASHA. At that time there was in
place a Temecula agreement between the Respondent and the
Armored Transport Temecula Employees Association, which
was effective by its terms from June 30, 1996, through July 31,
1999.5
On April 23, 1998, 13 Temecula unit employees signed and
submitted to the Respondent a letter or petition with the follow-
ing text:

We the employees of Armored Transport Temecula, as a col-
lective bargaining group, would like to open our current wage
agreement to facilitate negotiations of a wage increase.

In apparent response, a mandatory meeting was held by the
Respondent at the Temecula facility on May 20, 1998, attended
by the Regional Vice President Carl Logrecco and Director of
Labor Relations Curnutt and the great majority of unit employ-
ees—the sign in sheet for the meeting bears 13 employee signa-
tures.
Phillip Williams, an employee of the Respondent employed
at the Temecula facility as a messenger/driver until just before
the hearing herein, testified respecting the meeting. He recalled
that Curnutt mentioned that the Respondent knew that there had
been an outside source contacting employees with information
that was not true. They had been telling employees what they
could do for the employees, but they cannot provide anything to
the employees, only the Respondent could.
Williams recalled Curnutt told them that it would probably
not be a good thing for the employees if they “went with
CASHA” because only the Respondent could give the employ-
ees more money. Curnutt discussed the fact that associating
with outsiders could involve a strike and that the employees
should know that a strike would be unsuccessful and be worse
for the employees than the Company.
Williams testified that Curnutt told the employees he was
prepared to offer them a contract. He stood before the employ-
ees with a document in his hand flipping through its pages ex-
plaining the terms to the employees. Curnutt told the employ-
ees:

I’d like you guys to go ahead and look it over, and this is as
good as it gets. It will be our last, best, and final, whatever.

Williams recalled that after Curnutt asked the employees to
take a minute and look at the contract, Williams asked if it
would be possible for the employees to take a day or two and
look at the contract and get back to Curnutt. Williams recalled
that Curnutt said: “[N]o, this is it right now because I wouldn’t
want this to get in to the wrong hands.”

5 Based on the terms of the contract received into evidence, the Gen-
eral Counsel moved to conform the complaint to the terms of the con-
tract. The motion is granted.
The employees were afforded a few minutes to consider the
contract offer. Carl Logrecco and Curnutt left the room and the
employees voted unanimously to accept the new contract and
12 employees and Curnutt signed it. The contract that had been
in place until that point had a term of June 30, 1996, through
July 31, 1999. The new contract offered higher wages, an addi-
tional paid holiday and extended through May 31, 2001.
Some 10 months later on March 18, 1999, the Temecula
employees attended a preannounced mandatory meeting at the
facility conducted by the Respondent’s vice president, Carl
Logrecco, Facility Manager Sean Logrecco, and Assistant Fa-
cility Manager Goldwurm. Carl Logrecco, in Williams’s recol-
lection, introduced himself to the employees many of who were
recent hires. Williams recalled further that Carl Logrecco:

Wanted to know if anybody had any problems in the branch
with management, employees, or anything, any complaints.
And talking about the Company recognizes you guys work
hard and blah, blah, blah. And would like to offer you guys
yet another contract. He said it’s out of the ordinary that we
do this, open a contract before it expires, but we would be
willing to open the contract for you people. And I have one
here, if you guys want to look at it and see if it something you
like . . . He took it out of his—had actually had it in his hand
and said you guys can look this over and, you know, if there’s
any questions I can explain to you about what’s in there.
Anything you don’t understand and this is a good thing for
you guys and you don’t need a union to get anything from the
Company. All you have to do is ask us.

Carl Logrecco explained, in Williams testimony, that the
new contract would immediately increase starting wages by $2
per hour. Some employees complained to him about being part
time and Logrecco instructed the facility manger to: “Look into
it, make them full-time.” The employees were generally
pleased by these events. Williams recalled: “After [Carl
Logrecco] gave us the contract, everyone looked it over. There
was a brief discussion. And we all signed the contract, and
gave it back to him.” The new contract extended by its terms to
March 31, 2002.
Respecting CASHA, Williams recalled that Carl Logrecco
said:

There are so many of you people here that are new and I basi-
cally would like to let you know that there is a union out there
by the name of CASHA. Don’t be fooled by anything they
tell you, and pretty much what Bud Count had reiterated on.
We can give you what it is that you want. They can’t. So
don’t be fooled by it.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
1. The issue of the Respondent’s refusal to recognize CASHA
and Local 100 as the collective-bargaining agent of the respec-
tive Associations regarding the units
a. Narrowing the issue and the arguments of the Parties
As a result of the pleadings and the stipulations and positions
taken at the hearing by the parties, the issue respecting the Re-
spondents obligations, if any, to recognize first CASHA and

ARMORED TRANSPORT 147
thereafter Local 100 is quite narrow. It is appropriate to ini-
tially note the matters that are not in dispute herein.
There is no dispute, the parties stipulated, and I have found,
supra, that the five individual Armored Transport Employee
Associations involved herein as well as CASHA and Local 100
are now, and have been at all relevant times, labor organiza-
tions. There is no dispute that the five individual Armored
Transport Employee Associations involved herein each have
and continue to represent the Respondent’s employees in the
units described supra. The appropriateness of each unit under
Section 9(a) of the Act is likewise not under dispute.
There is no dispute that each of the five individual Armored
Transport Employee Associations properly designated CASHA
as its agent for purposes of collective bargaining with the Re-
spondent regarding the unit it represented. Further there is no
dispute that CASHA properly affiliated with the International
Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America, and thus be-
came Local 100. Finally, there is no dispute that first CASHA
and thereafter Local 100 demanded that the Respondent recog-
nize them as agents of the individual Armored Transport Em-
ployee Associations for purposes of bargaining regarding the
units each represented and that the Respondent refused and
continues to refuse to so recognize the Charging Parties as such
representatives.
From the above agreements and stipulations, counsel for the
General Counsel and the Charging Parties argue a violation is
established. More specifically they argue as follows. There is
no dispute that the individual Associations at all times material
have each represented a unit of the Respondent’s employees.
Those labor organizations are entitled under the National Labor
Relations Act to designate another labor organization to act for
them in collective bargaining and each did so with respect to
CASHA. Therefore, on the dates noted above, CASHA be-
came each Association’s agent for bargaining. Thereafter,
consistent with the requirements of the Act, CASHA became
Local 100 and Local 100 then became the Associations’ bar-
gaining agent. The Respondent was therefore obligated to rec-
ognize and bargain with first CASHA and thereafter with Local
100 when asked to do so. The Charging Parties and the General
Counsel argue the Respondent well knew or should have
known all the above at the times that CASHA and Local 100
demanded recognition of it as the Associations’ bargaining
agent. Since the Respondent, at all times since those demands
were made upon it, has failed and refused to so recognize first
CASHA and thereafter Local 100, argue the Charging Party
and the General Counsel, the Respondent has wrongfully with-
held recognition in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) as al-
leged in the complaint.
The Respondent argues that at no time did it receive notice
from any, let alone all, of the five Associations that have repre-
sented its unit employees, that CASHA or Local 100 had be-
come that Association’s, or the Associations’ agent for bargain-
ing. Rather to the contrary, argues the Respondent, it received
subsequent information that such an agency designation was
being withdrawn. The Respondent specifically asserts that the
purported agents CASHA and Local 100 simply could not un-
der traditional rules of agency, and therefore did not, create
their own agency by informing the Respondent that the Asso-
ciations had designated them. All this being so, argues the Re-
spondent, at no relevant time did the Respondent have actual
knowledge nor could the Respondent be charged with construc-
tive knowledge of the agency designations of the Associations
and therefore no obligation to recognize such agents ever came
into being. There being no obligation to recognize the exis-
tence of such an agency relationship or designation, there was
no impropriety in the Respondent’s refusal to recognize either
CASHA or Local 100 at any material time as such an agent.
The Respondent offers as instructive Newell Porcelain Co.,
307 NLRB 887 (1992), petition for review denied sub nom.
Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1993). In
Newell, the employer was privileged to suspend bargaining
with a labor organization pending further clarification of the
identity of the party purporting to be the employees’ representa-
tive. The Respondent points out that the letters CASHA sent to
the Respondent asked that CASHA be “recognized” and that it
was seeking “recognition” based on “Merger Elections.” The
Respondent argues, on brief at 25:

These communications are not demands that [the Respondent]
bargain with the Employee Associations, affiliated with
CASHA. The[y] demand that CASHA be “recognized” and
aver that the Employees Associations have “merged” with
CASHA. As such, they are as ineffective to trigger a bar-
gaining obligation as were the communications in Newell
Porcelain.

The General Counsel and the Charging Party meet this ar-
gument in several ways. They both argue at some length that
the asserted “no knowledge” defense of the Respondent is sim-
ply a sham defense to cloak its bad-faith refusal to recognize
the Charging Parties. Each argues that the Respondent’s entire
course of conduct in this matter reveals that the Respondent
was seeking to subdue the employees involved and avoid hav-
ing to bargain with their designated bargaining agent.
The Charging Party argues that, when faced with an ambigu-
ous demand for recognition of the type the Respondent argues
it was presented with, an employer may not as the Respondent
has done simply refuse to recognize the union citing Parkview
Manor, 321 NLRB 477 (1996). In Parkview the Board found
an employers reliance on the doctrines of Newell Porcelain,
supra, inadequate noting at footnote 2, page 477: “By contrast,
the Respondent here made no attempt to clarify the ambiguity
and ascertain the relationship between [the two Unions in-
volved].” See also RTP, Co., 323 NLRB 15, 22 fn. 15 (1997).
The General Counsel also argues that the Respondent could
easily have approached the unit employees at its facilities who
were by definition the members of the Associations involved
and inquired about CASHA’s demand. The General Counsel
further asserts on brief at 19: “That the Respondent failed to do
so, in even a single instance, speaks volumes about the credibil-
ity of its position. [Footnote omitted.]”
The General Counsel argues further that the Respondent was
not ignorant of the situation at all relevant times. At each facil-
ity involved herein there were election notices, employee dis-
cussions and post election result conversations of employees. In
essence the General Counsel and the Charging Party argue that
under a “small shop” type theory the Respondent may easily be

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 148
found to have been aware of what had transpired respecting the
Associations’ relationship to CASHA.
The General Counsel advances the testimony of Candelario
Carrizales, a unit employee with over 25 years service at the
Bakersfield facility. Carrizales testified that he was, in essence,
the Bakersfield Employees Association representative and in
late June 1999, the Respondent’s regional manager, Kurt
Eimer, and Curnutt asked him: “Is the Union going to be your
representative or represent you?” and he told them: “[Y]es.”
Thus, argues the General Counsel, even when the Associations
did in fact tell the Respondent’s agents that the Union was their
agent for bargaining, the Respondent continued to deny Local
100 recognition as such. The Charging Party emphasizes on
brief at 5 that the Respondent, even after it had stipulated at the
hearing to the facts of the Union’s selection as the Associa-
tions’ agent, continued and continues to withhold recognition
from and refuses to bargain with Local 100 as the Associations’
designated agent.
b. Analysis and conclusions
It is appropriate to deal initially with the government’s open-
ing argument. The General Counsel asserts, in effect, that the
individual Employee Associations were sham unions created by
the Respondent as “ghostly” entities without more than the
vaguest amorphous identity. They were created and main-
tained, argues the General Counsel, to serve the Respondent’s
desire for simple rubber-stamping of the Respondent’s desired
schedule of wages and working conditions in the form a pur-
ported contract. Thus, the Government at least at some level
challenges the Respondent’s conduct as a continuing course of
illegal or improper domination.
I reject the argument to the extent that it seeks to challenge
the legitimacy of either the Associations, the recognition af-
forded them or the conduct of the Respondent which occurred
more than 6 months before the filing of the charges herein. The
Associations—as alleged in the compliant and stipulated by all
the parties—meet the statutory definition of the term labor or-
ganization. The Respondent’s recognition of the Associations
and entrance into collective-bargaining agreements with them6
occurred more than 6 months before the filing of the charges
herein. These two facts together simply defeat the General
Counsel’s claim. Bryan Mfg. v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960);
Garment Workers (Bernhard-Altmann Tex. Corp.) v. NLRB,
342 U.S. 731 (1969). The Associations are labor organizations
properly recognized as representing certain units of employees,
no more, no less.
The General Counsel has pled and the parties have stipulated
that the Associations remain the 9(a) representatives of unit
employees and that they had selected CASHA as their agent for
collective bargaining and that CASH later became Local 100.
If the Respondent knew or may be charged with knowledge of
these facts, it would clearly have been obligated to recognize
CASH and later Local 100 as such an agent. I reject the Gen-
eral Counsel’s argument however that the Respondent had to
take CASHA’s and Local 100’s word for the agency designa-
tion because the “Employee Associations were Headless and
Inoperative” (the GC Br. at 22). An organization that could take
the action of designating a bargaining agent could take the fur-
ther action of notifying the Respondent that it had done so.
There is no basis for finding that the Associations could act, but
could not announce the actions it had taken.

6 Again deferring the Temecula contracts for further discussion, in-
fra.
Thus, I find the Employee Associations were not simply by
virtue of their highly informal nature relieved of the traditional
obligation to notify the Respondent of their agency designa-
tions before holding the Respondent to an obligation to bargain
with their designated agent. Repeating, I do not find that under
some doctrine of necessity, the actions of CASHA and Local
100 informing the Respondent of the agency designation must
be taken as sufficient notice of the event simply because of the
headless or radically informal nature of the Associations in-
volved. Rather, the entire factual circumstances as they pertain
to the Respondent’s knowledge and the actions it took in that
setting must be considered to fairly determine if the Respon-
dent received sufficient actual or constructive notice of the
Associations’ bargaining agent designations to create in it a
duty to recognize and bargain.
Considering the entire series of events, including the history
of the relationship—as limited supra, the occurrence of elec-
tions at each facility and the fact that the Respondent and
CASHA and later Local 100 were engaged in bargaining re-
specting other units and facilities of the Respondent, I find that
the written notification of the Respondent by CASHA, quoted
supra, of the agency designation and its request for recognition
did not rise to the level of charging the Respondent with actual
knowledge of the fact of designation.
Rather, I find that the entire circumstances created on behalf
of the Respondent a duty to inquire further of CASHA and the
Associations regarding any questions it had or ambiguities it
perceived, before it could properly deny or withhold recogni-
tion based on such a lack of clarity or ambiguity. Such a fur-
ther inquiry would not have been difficult. The Respondent
knew and had regular contacts with CASHA agents. Agents of
the Respondent were supervising each Association facility.
Contact and communications with the employee/Association
members was possible on virtually any workday. The Respon-
dent argued on brief at footnote 17, page 28: “The record is
clear that the Employees Associations were in fact perfectly
capable of communicating with Armored Transport when the
need arose.” Inquiries would thus have been quite simple to
make. The record is clear that at least initially, the Respondent
did not make any.
It is also true that the Associations did not initiate such con-
tacts with the Respondent. In the situation and circumstances
presented herein however, the Respondent’s naked reliance on
the proposition that an agent cannot create his own agency does
not support or justify its refusal to recognize CASHA and
thereafter Local 100 without the Respondent making further
inquiry. Thus, I find it was constructively charged with the
knowledge that its inquiry would have provided, i.e., that the
agency designations and the subsequent transmutation of
CASHA to Local 100 had occurred and were proper and legally
correct and sufficient.

ARMORED TRANSPORT 149
The Respondent argues further that the answer of its agent
Irvin to CASHA and later Local 100’s president, Nelsen, that
there was no reason for the Respondent to recognize CASHA
because there were no contracts due to expire was not a refusal
to bargain because there was nothing to bargain about. I reject
that argument however because the role of a bargaining agent is
not limited to that of negotiating new collective-bargaining
agreements. Indeed in the quoted demand, Nelsen made it
clear that contracts would be honored, but sought recognition
nonetheless. The Respondent’s consistent pattern of conduct
was a specific and ongoing refusal to recognize or bargain with
CASHA or Local 100.
Having found the Associations had a right to designate a
bargaining agent, that each did so and that the Respondent was
obligated under the Act to recognize and bargaining with the
agent, but did not do so, it follows that the Respondent’s failure
to do so violated the Act. I find therefore that the Respondent’s
failure and refusal to timely recognize and offer to bargain with
CASHA in response to CASHA’s letters of April 6 and May
18, 1998, and subsequent communications by Local 100 vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The Respondent argues that, even if its initial refusals to rec-
ognize and bargain with CASHA and Local 100 were improper,
the subsequent actions of the Associations in Fresno and Te-
mecula validly rescinded whatever bargaining authority had
been delegated. Temecula is discussed, infra.
The Respondent introduced a petition submitted to it by a
majority of the unit employees in Fresno represented by the
Fresno Employees Association dated June 6, 1999, the text of
which reads:

To whom it may concern: We are not represented by
CASHA or United Plant Workers Association nor do we
intend to join, We are A.T. I/ Fresno Employees Associa-
tion.
We intend to represent our members now as we have
in the past. Attached is a list of our members that repre-
sent the majority.

The Respondent argues that this document constitutes a
withdrawal or recission by the Fresno Employees Association,
at all time the recognized representative of the Fresno unit em-
ployees, of any earlier agency designation of either CASHA or
Local 100 as its agent for purposes of bargaining. Thus, argues
the Respondent, on and after that June 6, 1999, there was no
longer an obligation to deal with CASHA or Local 100 respect-
ing Fresno unit employees and no bargaining order remedy
should lie respecting that unit since the Respondent has at all
times recognized the Associations, including the Fresno Asso-
ciation, as the statutory representatives of the unit employees
in their respecting areas.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party argue that there
were factual circumstances which tainted the efforts of the em-
ployees in Fresno reflected in the above quoted memo and ren-
ders the memo an inadequate defense to the Respondent’s obli-
gation to recognize CASHA and Local 100 as the representa-
tive of the Fresno Association. The Respondent challenged this
assertion.
The General Counsel also argued however, that as a matter
of law, if the Respondent had been wrongfully failing to bar-
gain with the Fresno Association by refusing to recognize the
Fresno Employees’ designated bargaining agents, first CASHA
and thereafter Local 100, as alleged in the complaint, for over a
year before the June 1999 events at issue here, the Fresno As-
sociation could not rescind its agency appointment and the
Respondent could not rely on a recission occurring during such
a period citing Hearst Corp., 281 NLRB 764 (1986), enfd. 837
F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1988), and Fabrick Warehouse, 294
NLRB 189 (1989), enfd. 902 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1990).
The General Counsel argues that the cases stand for the
proposition that employees may not seek to decertify a union
that was wrongfully being denied recognition and bargaining
by an employer during the period of the employer’s wrongful
refusals. The principle to be applied to the instant case, argues
the Government, is that an employer should not be able to de-
fend against its own wrongdoing based on employee actions
taken as a result of its own earlier wrongdoing in failing to
comply with the provisions of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The
employer may not properly so thwart employees in their lawful
right to designate a labor organization to represent them the
employees abandon their seemingly futile efforts to the em-
ployers benefit.
The Respondent challenges the General Counsel’s and the
Charging Parties’ theory as fundamentally flawed for it con-
fuses the institutional rights of labor organizations with the
Section 7 rights of employees and mischaracterizes the nature
of the dealings of the Respondent with the employees who
constitute the Fresno Association. Thus, the Respondent argues
it is always proper for an employer to contact the union that is
the representative of its employees and that a labor organization
must be free to govern its own affairs within its statutory man-
date including the right to change its earlier designations of
agents. The cases cited by, the arguments advanced by and the
analysis suggested by the General Counsel, argues the Respon-
dent, treat the constituent body that is the Fresno Association
incorrectly as if it was simply statutory employees and this
produces an absurd and improper result.
These arguments are set forth in greater detail respecting the
Temecula Employees, infra. Based on my analysis and conclu-
sions set forth there, I find that the Respondent’s argument is
without merit within the factual setting presented herein and
further find that the line of cases cited by the General Counsel
above, is applicable to the facts presented by the record as a
whole. I ruled at the trial, and reaffirm that finding here, that
the Fresno Association could not rescind its agency designation
in June 1999 in the manner described in the record—the exis-
tence of tainting conduct or no—if the Respondent was im-
properly and in violation of the statute failing and refusing to
recognize and bargain with that designated agent of the Asso-
ciation. I further ruled at trial and again reaffirm here that it is
therefore unnecessary to inquire into the contested facts re-
specting the events and circumstances of the Fresno recission. I
simply find the June 1999 events do not provide the Respon-
dent with a defense to its earlier incurred bargaining obligation
or its wrongful withholding of such recognition and bargaining.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 150
2. The issue of the subsequent Temecula events
The General Counsel’s complaint, as amended at the hear-
ing, alleges that the Respondent’s entrance into collective-
bargaining contracts with the employees at the Temecula facil-
ity in the spring of 1998 and the spring of 1999 was conduct
improperly bypassing the Temecula Association and its desig-
nated agents CASHA and Local 100 and therefore violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. On brief, the General Coun-
sel contends further that the actions also rise to the level of
independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act which,
although unalleged in the complaint, were fully litigated at the
hearing and should therefore also be found to be violations of
that section of the Act.
The Respondent emphasizes that the Temecula employees
were the Temecula Association—one and the same—and there-
fore it was dealing at all relevant times with the Association—
the labor organization that it has at all relevant times recog-
nized at the exclusive bargaining agent of its employees—not
simply the employees represented by a labor organization. As
such, argues the Respondent, it was at all times privileged to
contact, propose, negotiate and reach agreement with the Asso-
ciation. The agreement of the Association to consider, negoti-
ate and reach a new bargain with the Respondent respecting a
modified collective-bargaining agreement was in and of itself a
recission of its earlier agency designation, however temporary,
of CASHA and Local 100 as their agent.
It is absurd, even bizarre, argues the Respondent, and stands
the doctrine of agency on its head, that the principal - the Te-
mecula Association here—was somehow limited in its rights
and authority to negotiate or to put in abeyance its earlier
agency designation by virtue of that earlier designation of an
agent. The Respondent may not be fairly criticized for bargain-
ing with the representative of its employees. Thus there could
not be any possible violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Further, in such a setting, the Act’s protections of employees
simply do not apply and the Government’s allegations of
wrongful conduct in that respect should be dismissed.
Counsel for the Respondent is correct when he argues in ef-
fect that, had the actions the Respondent is accused of in the
complaint regarding the Temecula Association been undertaken
in a meeting with a more traditional labor organization at its
union hall, the Government’s theory of a violation of Section
8(a)(5) would be unsustainable. Thus, the decisional law is
clear that an employer does not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act by making threats or promises of benefit to labor organiza-
tion officials. And, as the Respondent argues, supra, a labor
organization, which represents an employer’s employees,
should always be approachable about taking action respecting
the employees it represents.
However, the Respondent was not dealing with a labor or-
ganization in an institutional sense separate and apart from
employees. The Board has long interpreted the Act to protect
employees who act both as employees and as agents of the
representing labor organization. For example, the case law is
replete with holdings finding violations of the Act when em-
ployers improperly deal with employee job stewards in their
roles as agents of such labor organizations.
What is relevant to the analysis herein, in my view, is that
the Respondent did not deal with the Temecula employees as
the representing Association or labor organization. Rather the
Respondent at all times material herein treated the employees
as employees. Thus, it commanded attendance at mandatory
meetings, offered financial gain conditioned on the employees
not having continued dealings with CASHA or Local 100, and
in effect corralled the employees and rushed them to approve
the offers the Respondent advanced. In such a setting, the
Respondent clearly treated the group as employees and its con-
duct will be judged in that context. In this setting the asserted
defenses of the Respondent fail on the facts.
Further, as I found in the case of the Fresno Employees As-
sociation, supra, the fact that the Respondent’s failure to rec-
ognize the Temecula Association’s agency designation oc-
curred before the alleged recission by the Temecula employees
renders the employee conduct unavailable to the Respondent as
a defense to its continuing refusal to recognize the original
agency designation.
Given that the Respondent clearly bypassed the designated
representative of the Temecula Association by its actions de-
scribed above, I find as alleged in the complaint that the Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The General Counsel moved on brief to amend the complaint
to allege violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the Re-
spondent’s agents at the Temecula meetings. The posthearing
amendment is advanced in part because the General Counsel
contends that the issues were fully litigated. I do not agree.
The issues of an employer violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
during bargaining with employees who constitute the associa-
tion that represents its employees in the context presented here
are in some ways similar to those discussed regarding Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. They are not identical, however, nor are
they similar to the other issues raised by the pleadings. The
complaint is otherwise free from independent 8(a)(1) allega-
tions.
Given this context, the Respondent may not be said to have
had an opportunity to consider the General Counsel’s theory of
a violation at the trial and adduce any and all evidence it felt
material to its defense on the issue. Certainly, the Respondent
was afforded no opportunity to brief the issue. Further the
counsel for the General Counsel at the hearing amended his
complaint after the facts at issue were adduced, but limited his
proposed amendments to augmenting the 8(a)(5) allegations of
the compliant. Given all the above, I find it inappropriate to
grant the General Counsel’s motion on brief to amend the com-
plaint. I therefore deny the motion. The amendment having
been denied, there is no need to determine if the Act was vio-
lated by the conduct alleged in the rejected amendment.
REMEDY
Having found Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action necessary
to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act including the
posting of a remedial notice consistent with the Board’s deci-
sion in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996). I
shall leave to the compliance stage the determination of the

ARMORED TRANSPORT 151
proper application of the directed remedy to the closed Merced
facility.
The remedy for the Respondent’s failure to bargain with the
designated agent of the Temecula Association and its wrongful
direct dealing with the Temecula employees in the renegotia-
tion of the contract in 1998 and 1999 shall include recission of
the wrongfully extended agreements and restoration of the pre-
vious contract terms save that all increases in wages and bene-
fits and other conditions of employment implemented shall be
maintained by the Respondent until it has notified and bar-
gained with the Temecula Association’s designated agent and
reached agreement or valid impasse in bargaining respecting
new contract terms.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On the basis of the above findings of fact and on the entire
record herein, I make the following conclusions of law.
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Armored Transport Bakersfield Employee Associa-
tion, Armored Transport Santa Maria Employee Association,
Armored Transport Fresno Employee Association, Armored
Transport Merced Employee Association, Armored Transport
Temecula Employee Association, CASHA, and Local 100 are,
and each of them is, labor organizations within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following labor organizations represent the Respon-
dent’s employees in the unit following their names, each of
which is appropriate for bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9 of the Act:

(i) Armored Transport Bakersfield Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Bakersfield facility excluding all
other employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(ii) Armored Transport Santa Maria Employee Asso-
ciation,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Santa Maria facility excluding all
other employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(iii) Armored Transport Fresno Employee Association,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Fresno facility excluding all other
employees [] and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(iv) Armored Transport Merced Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Merced facility excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(v) Armored Transport Temecula Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Temecula facility excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

4(a) CASHA since on or about March and April 1998 was
designated by the Associations as their agent for purposes of
collective bargaining with the Respondent respecting the
above-described units. On or about December 10, 1998,
CASHA became Local 100. CASHA from March and April
1998 until its transmutation to Local 100 in December 10,
1998, and Local 100 thereafter was at all times the designated
agent of the Associations for purposes of collective bargaining
with the Respondent respecting the above described units.
(b) At all times on and after April 1998 respecting CASHA
and at all times on and after February 10, 1999, respecting Lo-
cal 100, the Respondent knew or should have known of the
agency designations of the Associations described above.
(c) At all times since on or about April 1998 respecting
CASHA and at all times on and after February 10, 1999, re-
specting Local 100, the two labor organizations have de-
manded recognition of the Respondent as the designated agent
of the Associations for purposes of collective bargaining re-
specting the units described above.
5. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act on or about April 1998 respecting CASHA and at all times
on and after February 10, 1999, respecting Local 100 when it
failed and refused to recognize these entities as agents of the
Associations for purposes of collective bargaining regarding the
Respondent’s employees in the above described units…
6. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act on May 20, 1998, and on March 18, 1999, by dealing di-
rectly with the Temecula unit employees bypassing Local 100
the designated agent of the Armored Transport Temecula Em-
ployees Association by negotiating and entering into purported
collective-bargaining agreements with the employees.
7. The unfair labor practices described above is an unfair la-
bor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
On the forgoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the
entire record, I issue the following7
ORDER
The Respondent, Armored Transport, Inc., Bakersfield,
Santa Maria, Fresno, Merced, and Temecula, California, its
owners, agents, successors and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with
CASHA and Local 100 as properly designated agents of the
following labor organizations who are the recognized exclusive
collective-bargaining representatives of the employees in the

7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections shall be waived for all purposes.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 152
bargaining units appearing below each labor organization’s
name:

(i) Armored Transport Bakersfield Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Bakersfield facility excluding all
other employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(ii) Armored Transport Santa Maria Employee Asso-
ciation,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Santa Maria facility excluding all
other employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(iii) Armored Transport Fresno Employee Association,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Fresno facility excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(iv) Armored Transport Merced Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Merced facility excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(v) Armored Transport Temecula Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Temecula facility excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(b) Cease and desist from dealing directly with the unit em-
ployees of the Temecula facility bypassing CASHA and Local
100, the designated representative of the Armored Transport
Temecula Employee Association, which represents the unit
employees.
(c) In any like or related manner violating the provisions of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action that is necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and meet and bargain on request with Local
100 as the designated agent for purposes of collective bargain-
ing of the Armored Transport Bakersfield Employee Associa-
tion, the Armored Transport Santa Maria Employee Associa-
tion, the Armored Transport Fresno Employee Association, the
Armored Transport Merced Employee Association, and the
Armored Transport Temecula Employee Association respecting
the bargaining units set forth above.
(b) At the Local 100’s request, acting as agent of the Ar-
mored Transport Temecula Employees Association, restore the
terms of the original June 30, 1996, through July 31, 1999 con-
tract save for the increased wages and other terms and condi-
tions of employment currently in effect, and continue to main-
tain such conditions unless and until agreement has been
reached with Local 100 respecting their modification or discon-
tinuance or a new contract has been reached or until proper
changes have been made following a genuine impasse in bar-
gaining.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at each
of its Bakersfield, Santa Maria, Fresno, Merced, and Temecula,
California facilities and any other facilities at which unit em-
ployees are regularly employed, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”8 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 31, in English and such
other languages as the Regional Director determines are neces-
sary to fully communicate with employees, after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted
by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed a facility involved in these proceed-
ings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own ex-
pense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at the closed facility
any time after March 1998.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Currency and Security Handlers Association (CASHA) had
been the designated agent for purposes of collective bargaining
of the listed labor organizations respecting the listed bargaining
units until CASHA became United Plant Guard Workers of
America Amalgamated Local No. 100, affiliated with the Inter-
national Union of Plant Guard Workers of America (Local
100).

Local 100 is now the designated agent for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining of the below listed labor organizations respect-
ing the listed bargaining units each of which is appropriate for
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act:

8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”

ARMORED TRANSPORT 153
(i) Armored Transport Bakersfield Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Bakersfield facility excluding all
other employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(ii) Armored Transport Santa Maria Employee Asso-
ciation,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Santa Maria facility excluding all
other employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(iii) Armored Transport Fresno Employee Association,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Fresno facility excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(iv) Armored Transport Merced Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Merced facility excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(v) Armored Transport Temecula Employee Associa-
tion,

All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/mes-
senger guards and vault-driver messenger guards employed
by the Respondent at its Temecula facility excluding all other
employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

Based upon all the above, we give you the following assur-
ances:

WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to recognize and bargain
with CASHA and Local 100 as properly designated agents of
the listed labor organizations for the noted bargaining units.
WE WILL NOT bypass Local 100, the designated agent of
the Armored Transport Temecula Employee Association, by
dealing directly with the unit employees of the Temecula facil-
ity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner violate the
Act.
WE WILL recognize Local 100 as the designated agent for
purposes of collective bargaining of the listed labor organiza-
tions respecting the listed bargaining units they represent.
WE WILL at Local 100’s request acting as agent of the Ar-
mored Transport Temecula Employees Association, restore the
terms of the original June 30, 1996, through July 31, 1999 con-
tract save for the increased wages and other terms and condi-
tions of employment currently in effect, and continue to main-
tain such conditions unless and until agreement has been
reached with Local 100 respecting their modification or discon-
tinuance or a new contract has been reached or until proper
changes have been made following a genuine impasse in bar-
gaining.

ARMORED TRANSPORT, INC.