Apple Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 1, 2022

2021001224 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/174,658 02/06/2014 Daniel Andreas Steffen 4860P17463 3664 45217 7590 03/01/2022 WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP/ APPLE INC. Attn: IP Docketing P.O. Box 7037 Atlanta, GA 30357-0037 EXAMINER WHEATON, BRADFORD F ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2193 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/01/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): FIP_Group@bstz.com PTO.MAIL@BSTZ.COM PTO.MAIL@BSTZPTO.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DANIEL ANDREAS STEFFEN and KEVIN JAMES VAN VECHTEN ____________ Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JENNIFER S. BISK, JOHN A. EVANS, and JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of Claims 1-21, all pending claims. App. Br. 4. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE.2 1 Appellant states the real party in interest is Apple Inc., Cupertino, CA. App. Br. 2. 2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of the Appellant and the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed June 17, 2020, “App. Br.”), the Reply Brief (filed December 7, 2020, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed October 5, 2020, “Ans.”), the Final Action (mailed September 19, 2019, “Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed February 6, 2014, “Spec.”) for Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The claims relate to a method and apparatus that schedules and manages a background task for a device. See Abstract. INVENTION Claims 1, 10, 14, and 20 are independent. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of illustrative Claim 1, which is reproduced below: 1. A non-transitory machine-readable medium having executable instructions to cause one or more processing units to perform a method to schedule a background task for a device, the method comprising: receiving an execution criteria for a background task for a device, the execution criteria indicates one or more criteria for launching the background task and the execution criteria based on a component status of the device; monitoring a running state of the device for an occurrence of the execution criteria; determining an available device headroom to run the background task, when the execution criteria occurs; and requesting a launch of the background task based on a comparison of the available device headroom and a background task importance and the background task importance is a measure of how important it is for the device to run the background task and the background task importance changes to have a plurality of different values during a grace period that occurs after the executing criteria occurs and prior to the requesting of the launch of the background task, wherein the background task is executed by a processing unit of the device after being launched. their respective details. Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 3 Prior Art Name3 Reference Date Rajkumar US 2003/0061260 A1 Mar. 27, 2003 Samson US 2004/0139359 A1 July 15, 2004 Pal US 2010/0095330 A1 Apr. 15, 2010 Tunning US 2011/0246996 A1 Oct. 6, 2011 Romagnino US 2012/0209650 A1 Aug. 16, 2012 Lin US 2012/0226940 A1 Sept. 6, 2012 Zhang US 2014/0179272 A1 June 26, 2014 REJECTIONS4 AT ISSUE 1. Claims 1, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhang, Rajkumar, and Tunning. Final Act. 2-8. 2. Claims 2-5 and 15-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning, and Samson. Final Act. 8-9. 3. Claims 6, 11, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning, and Romagnino. Final Act. 10-11. 4. Claims 7, 18, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning, and Pal. Final Act. 11- 12. 5. Claims 8 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning, and Lin. Final Act. 12. 3 All citations herein to the references are by reference to the first named inventor/author only. 4 The present application is being examined under the pre-AIA first to invent provisions. Final Act. 2. Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 4 ANALYSIS We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential), cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”). We have considered in this decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be forfeit. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019). After considering the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s arguments, we are persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error. Thus, we reverse the Examiner’s rejections. We add the following primarily for emphasis. CLAIMS 1, 9, 10, 13, 14, AND 20: OBVIOUSNESS OVER ZHANG, RAJKUMAR, AND TUNNING. Appellant argues these claims as a group in view of the limitations of Claim 1. Appeal Br. 11 (“Claims 1, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 20 stand or fall together. Claim 1 is the representative claim.”). Therefore, we decide the appeal of the § 103 rejections of these claims on the basis of Claim 1, which we designate as representative, and refer to the rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “the background task importance changes to have a plurality of different values during a grace period that occurs after Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 5 the executing criteria occurs and prior to the requesting of the launch of the background task.” The Examiner finds Tunning, but not the combination of Zhang and Rajkumar, teaches that the importance of a background task changes during a grace period. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds Tunning teaches that a task, having a first priority, may be added to a queue, but prior to its execution, the task may be given a second priority. Id., at 5. The Examiner finds the period between the entry of a task into a queue and its execution is a grace period. Id. Appellant contends Tunning’s re-ordering of tasks in a queue is not the same as assigning a priority to a background task, as claimed. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues to make this finding, the Examiner must interpret the occurrence of Appellant’s claimed execution criteria as the equivalent of Tunning’s adding of an operation request to a queue. Id. Appellant argues the claimed execution criteria: “indicates one or more criteria for launching the background task and the execution criteria based on a component status of the device.” Id. Appellant argues in contrast: “Tunning explicitly discloses two different criteria for launching the operation request: (i) the operation request is at the head of the queue and (ii) resource are ready for the launching of the operation request.” Id. Appellant argues Tunning does not teach a dependence on a component status, as claimed. Id. The Examiner finds the period of time between when a request is added to a queue and when it is executed, is the claimed grace period because Tunning teaches that when a request is in a queue, it can receive a priority-change message that may result in the request being assigned a different location in the queue. Ans. 3-4. The Examiner finds Zhang teaches the background launching criteria. Ans. 4. Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 6 Appellant argues: “the Examiner equates Appellant’s execution criteria as Tunning’s placing a task in a queue,” but “that one of ordinary skill in the art would not recognize that placing a task in a queue is a component status is a component status of a device.” Reply Br. 4. Appellant’s contention clarifies that the dispositive issue between Appellant and the Examiner is the proper definition of the claimed “background task.” As an initial matter, we note that the Federal Circuit has held that the Board may adopt a claim construction of a disputed term that neither party proposes without running afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1946) (“APA”).5 See, e.g., Praxair Distrib., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (rejecting argument that Board violated patent owner’s “procedural rights by adopting a claim construction that neither party proposed”); WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The Board is not bound to adopt either party’s preferred articulated construction of a disputed claim term.”). Parties are well aware that the Board may stray from disputed, proposed constructions. See WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1328 (“Having put it at issue, WesternGeco was well aware that the Board could alter its construction in the final written decision.”). “Claim interpretation is at the heart of patent examination because before a claim is properly interpreted, its scope cannot be compared to the prior art.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Both anticipation under § 102 and obviousness under § 103 are two- step inquiries. The first step in both analyses is a proper construction of the 5 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), requires a federal court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action not in accordance with law or without observance of procedure required by law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 7 claims. . . . The second step in the analyses requires a comparison of the properly construed claim to the prior art.” (internal citations omitted)). Words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, which is the meaning a term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art after reviewing the intrinsic record at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc). Beccause the definition of a claim term is in dispute, we now define the term. “[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Translogic Tech. Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “receiving an execution criteria for a background task for a device, the execution criteria indicates one or more criteria for launching the background task.” The Examiner equates the various tasks placed into a queue by Tunning, to the claimed “background tasks” by finding: it is seen in Tunning that while request are in the queue it can receive priority change messages that include new priorities for the added request operation, these new priorities can result in a change in place to a different location in the queue thus it is viewed as showing that the request operations can have a plurality of different values during this grace period. Ans. 3-4 (citing Tinning, ¶ 18). However, the “request[s that] are in the queue,” as disclosed by the cited portions of Tunning, are incompatible with the claimed background tasks. Appellant defines a “background task” as “a process of a device that runs in the background and without user intervention.” Spec., ¶ 3 (“For example, a background task can be used for logging, system monitoring, device maintenance, software updates, media Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 8 and/or application downloads, or other actions that do not require user intervention.”). In contrast, Tunning discloses: Computer programs often request several operations to be performed in response to a single event. For example, when a user of a photo management application requests to view a page of 100 photos, the photo management application will typically respond by requesting execution of 100 image retrieval operations. Tunning, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). To ensure the best user experience, computer programs can assign priorities to the operations that they request. Tunning, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). For example, assume that after the 100 image retrieval operations have been queued, the user scrolls to the bottom of the 100 image page. The requests for the last 10 images may be at the very end of the queue (since they would have had the lowest priority at the time that the operation requests were submitted by the photo management application to the queue management unit). Tunning, ¶ 7 (emphasis added). if some user interaction with an application indicates a change in a user's priorities (e.g. the user scrolls to the last 10 images of a 100 image page), then the application can change the priorities of the 100 image retrieval operations even though the operations have already been queued by the queue management unit. Tunning, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). Thus, whereas the claimed “background tasks” are those that require no user action, Tunning’s “requests” explicitly require user action and intervention. Thus, we find the prior art fails to teach at least one claimed limitation. In view of the forgoing, we decline to sustain the rejection of Claims 1, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 9 CLAIMS 2-5 AND 15-17: OBVIOUSNESS OVER ZHANG, RAJKUMAR, TUNNING, AND SAMSON. Appellant contends Claims 2-5 and 15-17 are allowable in view of their dependence from one of independent Claims 1 or 14. Appeal Br. 13. The Examiner stands on the findings made in regard to the independent claims. Ans. 4. In view of the forgoing, we decline to sustain the rejection of Claims 2-5 and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. CLAIMS 6, 11, AND 12: OBVIOUSNESS OVER ZHANG, RAJKUMAR, TUNNING, AND ROMAGNINO. Appellant contends Claims 6, 11, and 12 are allowable in view of their dependence from one of independent Claims 1. Appeal Br. 15. The Examiner does not separately argue these dependent claims. See Ans. In view of the forgoing, we decline to sustain the rejection of Claims 6, 11, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. CLAIMS 7, 18, AND 21: OBVIOUSNESS OVER ZHANG, RAJKUMAR, TUNNING, AND PAL. Appellant contends Claims 7, 18, and 21 are allowable in view of their dependence from independent Claim 1. Appeal Br. 16. The Examiner stands on the findings made in regard to the independent claims. Ans. 5. In view of the forgoing, we decline to sustain the rejection of Claims 7, 18, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appeal 2021-001224 Application 14/174,658 10 CLAIMS 8 AND 19: OBVIOUSNESS OVER ZHANG, RAJKUMAR, TUNNING, AND LIN. Appellant contends Claims 8 and 19 are allowable in view of their dependence from independent Claim 1. Appeal Br. 17. The Examiner stands on the findings made in regard to the independent claims. Ans. 5-6. In view of the forgoing, we decline to sustain the rejection of Claims 8 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 9, 10, 13, 14, 20 103 Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning 1, 9, 10, 13, 14, 20 2-5, 15-17 103 Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning, Samson 2-5, 15- 17 6, 11, 12 103 Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning, Romagnino 6, 11, 12 7, 18, 21 103 Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning, and Pal 7, 18, 21 8, 19 103 Zhang, Rajkumar, Tunning, Lin 8, 19 Overall Outcome 1-21 REVERSED