Apple Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 29, 2021

2021004872 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/846,511 09/04/2015 Kevin Will CHEN P27230US1/77770000415101 4354
150004 7590 12/29/2021
DENTONS US LLP - Apple
4655 Executive Dr
Suite 700
San Diego, CA 92121
EXAMINER
BRAHMACHARI, MANDRITA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2176
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/29/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
dentons_PAIR@firsttofile.com
patent.docket@dentons.com
patents.us@dentons.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KEVIN WILL CHEN, CHRISTOPHER WILSON,
LAWRENCE Y. YANG, ALAN C. DYE, and JONATHAN P. IVE
Appeal 2021-004872
Application 14/846,511
Technology Center 2100
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 19–57. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 An oral hearing was held for this appeal on December 3, 2021.
2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a) (2012). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple Inc.
Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to methods and systems for accessing a user
interface of a wearable device. Spec. ¶ 3.
Claim 19, reproduced below, illustrates the claimed subject matter:
19. A non-transitory computer-readable storage
medium storing one or more programs, the one or more
programs comprising instructions, which when executed by a
portable multifunction device with a battery and a display,
cause the device to:
detect whether the battery is being charged;
detect whether the device is oriented in a predefined
orientation;
in accordance with a detection that the battery is being
charged and the detection that the device is oriented in the
predefined orientation, activate a predefined mode of operation;
while the predefined mode of operation is activated and
an alarm has been set to go off at a predetermined alarm time:
display a first interface;
detect that a first predetermined timeout time after
displaying the first interface has elapsed, wherein the first
predetermined timeout time is used while the predefined
mode of operation is activated;
in response to detecting that the first
predetermined timeout time after displaying the first
interface has elapsed, cease displaying the first interface
and deactivate the display;
after deactivating the display, determine that a
current time has reached a respective time associated
with the predetermined alarm time; and
in response to determining that the current time has
reached the respective time:
reactivate the display; and
display an option for dismissing the alarm;
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while the predefined mode of operation is not activated:
display a second interface;
detect that a second predetermined timeout time
after displaying the second interface has elapsed, wherein
the second predetermined timeout time is different from
the first predetermined timeout time and the second
predetermined timeout time is used while the predefined
mode of operation is not activated; and
in response to detecting that the second
predetermined timeout time after displaying the second
interface has elapsed, cease displaying the second
interface and deactivate the display.
Appeal Br. 28–29 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Kimura US 6,539,243 B1 Mar. 25, 2003
Howard US 2004/0266491 A1 Dec. 30, 2004
Ostojic US 2007/0055947 A1 Mar. 8, 2007
Bohne US 2009/0051327 A1 Feb. 26, 2009
Pratt US 2009/0312059 A1 Dec. 17, 2009
Marui US 2010/0225495 A1 Sept. 9, 2010
Frossen US 2011/0234152 A1 Sept. 29, 2011
Newman US 2013/0111579 A1 May 2, 2013
Ban US 2014/0037109 A1 Feb. 6, 2014
Faaborg US 8,938,394 B1 Jan. 20, 2015
Yang US 2015/0111558 A1 Apr. 23, 2015
Nanda US 9,239,605 B1 Jan.19, 2016
REJECTIONS
Claims 19, 32, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, and Pratt. Final Act. 3–9.
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Claims 20, 24, 25, 28, 34, 38, 39, 42, 46, 50, 51, and 54 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt,
Yang, and Kimura. Final Act. 9–12.
Claims 21, 35, and 47 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, and Newman. Final Act.
12–13.
Claims 22, 36, and 48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, and Faaborg. Final Act.
13–14.
Claims 23, 37, and 49 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, and Ban. Final Act. 14–15.
Claims 26, 40, and 52 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, and
Newman. Final Act. 16–17.
Claims 27, 41, and 53 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, and
Faaborg. Final Act. 17–18.
Claims 29, 43, and 55 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, and Ostojic.
Final Act. 18–19.
Claims 30, 44, and 56 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, and Howard.
Final Act. 19–20.
Claims 31, 45, and 57 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, Howard, and
Bohne. Final Act. 20–21.
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejection in light of Appellant’s arguments that
the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we concur with the
Examiner concerning unpatentability under § 103. We add the following to
address and emphasize specific findings and arguments.
CLAIM 19
The Rejection
In rejecting claim 19, the Examiner finds Frossen discloses a non-
transitory computer-readable storage medium storing one or more programs
comprising instructions, which cause the device to (1) “detect whether the
battery is being charged,” (2) “detect whether the device is oriented in a
predefined orientation,” (3) “in accordance with the detection that the battery
is being charged and the detection that the device is oriented in the
predefined orientation, activate a predefined mode of operation,” and “while
the predefined mode of operation is activated and an alarm has been set to
go off at a predetermined alarm time: display a first interface.” Final Act. 3–
4 (citing Frossen ¶¶ 2, 17, 34, 44, 56, 58, 59, 65, 88; Figs. 2B, 4–5). The
Examiner further relies on Nanda as disclosing (4) “detect that a first
predetermined timeout time after displaying the first interface has elapsed,
wherein the first predetermined timeout time is used while the predefined
mode of operation is activated,” (5) “in response to detecting that the first
predetermined timeout time . . . has elapsed, cease displaying the first
interface and deactivate the display,” (6) “after deactivating the display,
determine that a current time has reached a respective time . . . , and in
response to determining that the current time has reached the respective
time, reactivate the display.” Final Act. 5–6 (citing Nanda columns 1, 5, 6,
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8, 9; Fig. 2). For the remaining limitations of claim 1, the Examiner finds
Marui discloses “display an option for dismissing the alarm” and Pratt
discloses detecting a second timeout time different from the first timeout
time and “cease displaying the second interface and deactivate the display”
in response to detecting that the second timeout time has elapsed. Final Act.
6–8 (citing Marui ¶¶ 97, 120, Fig. 18; Pratt ¶ 21).
According to the Examiner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have
combined Frossen with Nanda and Marui to enhance convenience because
“the user does not have to turn off [the] display to save power when [the]
device is not in use or turn on the display when user interaction is needed”
and “the user can easily dismiss or snooze an alarm which is a common
practice.” Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner also finds that adding Pratt would
help to eliminate problems with reduced battery life or recharge or
“unnecessary use of power is prevented when the battery is connected or the
charge is low or the device is inactive with an added flexibility where the
user can determine and set different timeout values for different
applications.” Final Act. 8.
Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s proposed combination of the
references does not teach or suggest the recited “first predetermined timeout
time being used while a predefined mode of operation is activated and a
second, different predetermined timeout time being used while the
predefined mode of operation is not activated,” as recited in claim 19.
Appeal Br. 15. With respect to Frossen, Appellant asserts that
Frossen discloses that when a charger is connected to a
device, the device determines a second interaction mode “based
at least in part on the charger attribute information and the
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orientation [of the device].” However, Frossen fails to disclose
that a display of the device is deactivated in response to
detecting that a predetermined timeout time has passed, much
less that the predetermined timeout time is “used while the
predefined mode of operation is activated” or that a second
predetermined timeout time is “used while the predefined mode
of operation is not activated,” as required by claim 19.
Id. (citing Frossen ¶ 59).
Regarding Nanda, Appellant argues that, although Nanda is concerned
with “a computing device transitioning to a lower power state at a scheduled
time,” the reference uses a fixed time period or prior usage statistics to
determine the scheduled time. Appeal Br. 16 (citing Nanda 6:29–30, 49–
52). According to Appellant, Nanda’s disclosed alarm times used for
transitioning to a lower power state are not used “‘while a predefined mode
of operation is activated’ where the predefined mode of operation is
activated ‘in accordance with a detection that the battery is being charged
and the detection that the device is oriented in the predefined
orientation.’” Appeal Br. 16.
Regarding Pratt, Appellant contends that the timeout value is
determined based on the application, which is different from “using a second
predetermined timeout time while a predefined mode of operation is not
activated.” Id. at 16–17 (citing Pratt ¶ 21). According to Appellant, “the
timeout values used in Pratt do not depend on whether or not the device is
being charged and oriented in a predefined orientation” because “[n]one of
the applications in Pratt are activated based on a battery being charged and a
device being oriented in a predefined orientation.” Appeal Br. 17; see also
Reply Br. 4.
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Additionally, Appellant asserts that “Marui discloses displaying
different settings for a snooze operation of an alarm (e.g., settings for how
long the snooze operation should last).” Appeal Br. 17 (citing Marui ¶ 120).
According to Appellant, Marui does not remedy the above-discussed
deficiencies and particularly, “that the display on which the settings are
displayed is deactivated in response to detecting that a predetermined
timeout time has passed.” Id. at 17–18. Appellant further points to Figure
8(a) of Marui, and argues that the “settings for a snooze operation of an
alarm” in Figure 8(a) of Marui “does not necessarily imply that an option for
dismissing the alarm is displayed.” Id. at 20–21 (citing Marui ¶¶ 79, 120).
With respect to the proposed combination, Appellant argues that
“modifying Frossen with the teachings of Nanda would not result in a device
using a first timeout time based on whether a battery of the device is being
charged and the device is in a predefined orientation.” Id. at 18. Appellant
further argues that adding Nanda’s lower power state is dependent on
“whether a time has been scheduled according to the RTC alarm or battery
alarm” or other reference teachings argued above would not result in the
recited features and would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art. Id. at 18–20.
Discussion
With respect to the disclosure of “the predefined mode of operation”
in Frossen, we agree with the Examiner that the nightstand mode when the
device is charging or displaying an application mode provides the recited
“predefined mode of operation,” which may be activated based on the
position of the device. See Ans. 4 (citing Frossen ¶¶ 17, 56). As found by
the Examiner, Frossen discloses different interaction modes based on the
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charger attribute information and the device orientation. Ans. 4 (citing
Frossen ¶ 59). Frossen explains the interaction modes determine how the
user action changes depending on the interaction mode. See Frossen ¶¶ 37–
39, 59–60; Figs. 2A–2C, 5. That is, Frossen’s charging status and device
orientation that correspond to different interaction modes for determining the
timing of activating the display, meet the recited active or inactive
predefined modes of operation, when interpreted broadly but reasonably.
Similarly, we agree with the Examiner’s findings regarding Nanda’s
disclosure of turning off the display to save power after a certain time has
elapsed. See Ans. 4–6 (citing Nanda 5:12–15, 47–55). As further explained
by the Examiner, Nanda discloses that the device “may be configured to
implement the power management techniques described herein in order to
reduce an amount of power consumed by the computing device 100 over
time, such as during periods of user inactivity.” Nanda 5:12–16. Nanda
further discloses that power consumption may be reduced “during a period
of user inactivity” wherein “the first active power state may be a display-
active power state, where a display of the computing device is powered on
and active and the second active power state may be a display-inactive
power state, where the display is powered off.” Nanda 5:47–55.
We also agree with the Examiner’s characterization of the timeout
time in “detecting that the first predetermined timeout time after displaying
the first interface has elapsed, cease displaying the first interface and
deactivate the display” as being “based on a time after a certain interface has
been displayed,” but not dependent on the mode of operation. Ans. 5.
Based on Nanda’s disclosure of deactivating the display to save power after
detecting inactivity time after an interface is displayed, see Nanda 1:19–27,
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we also agree with the Examiner’s reasoning for the proposed combination.
We specifically agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that “it would be
obvious to transition from a display of the clock interface in a nightstand
mode taught in Frossen to a display-inactive mode where the display is
ceased after detecting a time of inactivity to save power taught in Nanda”
because “Frossen teaches that a clock application interface may be displayed
while the predetermined nightstand mode is active.” Ans. 5. Thus, “it
would be obvious that a change to a display-inactive mode to save power
after the clock interface is displayed occurs ‘while’ the device is in the
predetermined mode.” Id. We also find that the Examiner reasonably
interprets the word “while” as merely requiring to turn off the display to
save power when a device is inactive, as taught by Nanda, which is used to
modify Frossen when the device is being charged. See id. at 5–6. As
explained by the Examiner, “[t]his function is also widely implemented in
all mobile devices and is well known in the art.” Id. at 6.
Regarding the recited detecting that a second timeout time has elapsed
wherein “the second predetermined timeout time is used while the
predefined mode of operation is not activated,” we also agree with the
Examiner’s findings with respect to Pratt. See Ans. 6–7. As explained by
the Examiner, paragraphs 21 and 22 of Pratt disclose “different timeout
times may be used for different applications to cease display and enter into a
dimmed mode,” and the times “may be customized by the factory or the user
to be different for different application.” See Ans. 6 (citing Pratt ¶¶ 21, 22).
Pratt is concerned with dimming the screen of a mobile device when the
elapsed time exceeds a set time duration which is specific to the application.
See Pratt Abstract. We agree with the Examiner that this application-
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specific time duration would teach or suggest the recited first and second
predetermined timeout times to be used in different modes of operation
where the display stays active or is dimmed. See Ans. 7. Contrary to
Appellant’s contentions contrasting the recited mode of operation with
Pratt’s application, Appeal Br. 17, Pratt is concerned with timeout times that
are used for dimming the display and how the time duration before the
display is dimmed depends on the user interaction mode and the duration of
inactivity. That is, for a given operation, such as charging or sending
messages, there are different timeout times corresponding to the mode of
operation and the user interaction.
With respect to the teachings of Marui, we are also unpersuaded by
Appellant’s arguments related to Figure 8(a) of Marui and the option for
dismissing the alarm. See Appeal Br. 17–18, 20–21; Reply Br. 9. As
explained by the Examiner, Marui was relied on as disclosing a selectable
snooze option that allows the user to deactivate or dismiss the alarm for a
particular time based on the selected snooze option. Ans. 9–10 (citing Marui
¶ 97). The Examiner further finds that Marui discloses deactivating or
dismissing the alarm during a time interval that is triggered by the snooze
option. Ans. 10 (citing Marui ¶ 120). We also agree with the Examiner’s
explanation of how setting the alarm by algorithm 442 indicates that an
option to dismiss the alarm is present. See id. More specifically, we agree
with the Examiner that the disclosure in Marui of “[w]hen the alarm is
dismissed, the algorithm 442 sets the state to alarm (or ‘on’) and then
schedules the alarm to trigger at its next scheduled time” does “indicate[s]
the presence of an option to dismiss the alarm until next scheduled time.”
Id. Therefore, Appellant’s reference to Figure 8(a) of Marui (reproduced
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below) relates to how the snooze option is set, but not how the snooze option
deactivates the alarm. See Appeal Br. 21.

Figure 8(a) of Marui showing an alarm menu with selection options.
Although Appellant’s description of the “settings for a snooze operation of
an alarm” in Figure 8(a) of Marui is accurate, the disclosure of how Marui
re-activates or dismisses the alarm at least suggests the recited “display an
option for dismissing the alarm.” See Marui ¶¶ 97, 120. As further asserted
by the Examiner, displaying buttons or icons on a touch-enabled device
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See Ans. 10–11.
Turning next to the combination of the references, we also agree with
the Examiner’s findings. For example, the Examiner properly relies on
Frossen as disclosing “the predefined mode of operation (nightstand mode
with clock display) and a second different mode of operation (mode
displaying an active application),” which means “a different application
interface is displayed while the device is in the predefined nightstand mode
than when the device is not in the predefined nightstand mode.” See Ans. 8;
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see also Appeal Br. 18. As further found by the Examiner, modifying
Frossen with Nanda such that “a change to display-inactive mode after the
clock interface is displayed occurs ‘while’ the device is in the predetermined
mode” would have been obvious because, according to Frossen, “a clock
application interface is displayed while the predetermined nightstand mode
is active.” Ans. 9. The Examiner also properly finds “the word ‘while’
merely indicates that the teaching of Nanda, to turn off the display to save
power when a device is inactive, is being implemented when the device is
being charged.” Id. We particularly agree with the Examiner’s findings
regarding modifying Frossen and Nanda with the teachings of Pratt “that
these timeout times may be customized by the factory or the user to be
different for different application[s],” because it would have been obvious
“to use one timeout time for the clock application which is displayed in the
predefined nightstand mode and a different second timeout time for the
texting or map application displayed when the device is not in the predefined
mode.” Id.
We also note that Appellant’s contentions focus on the references
separately and ignore that the proposed rejection is based on the combination
of different interface displays based on whether the device is in the
nightstand mode as taught in Frossen with the power saving options of
Nanda, where these dimming options occur after a specific time and is either
preset or selectable by a user, as disclosed by Pratt. See Ans. 7–9. Each
reference must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in
combination with the prior art as a whole. In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he test for obviousness is what the combined
teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
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in the art.” (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981))).
Furthermore, the artisan is not compelled to blindly follow the teaching of
one prior art reference over the other without the exercise of independent
judgment. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
Based on the proposed combination, the resulting structure would
allow the system of Frossen to include the user-selectable timeout times that
are associated with the mode of operation or the charging status of the
device. In other words, this is a combination of familiar elements according
to known methods with predicable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.”). Additionally, the Supreme Court made
clear that when considering obviousness, “the analysis need not seek out
precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
Furthermore, the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton,” and this is a case in which the skilled artisan would “be able to
fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR,
550 U.S. at 421. We therefore find the Examiner provided a sufficiently
reasonable motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the
references based on the above discussed improvements to Frossen’s system
as modified by Nanda, Pratt, and Marui.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 19. We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
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of independent claims 32 and 33 which are not separately argued by
Appellant. See Appeal Br. 13–21.
CLAIM 23
The Examiner rejected claim 23 based on a similar combination of the
prior art that was applied to claim 1 and further added Ban as disclosing
“detect a fourth input comprising a terminal motion; and in response to
detecting the fourth input, dismiss the alarm.” See Final Act. 14–15 (citing
Ban ¶¶ 34, 38, 39, 42). The Examiner also finds that the proposed
combination would have been obvious “to implement the teachings of Ban
to provide an option to dismiss [an] alarm when an input of device motion
out of charger is detected,” which is based on the user being awake and
active. Final Act. 15.
Appellant contends “Ban discloses detecting motion of a device, and
in response, inquiring whether an alarm should be released,” but does not
teach “disconnecting a device from a charging connector.” Appeal Br. 22.
According to Appellant, “[d]etecting motion of a device does not imply that
the device has been disconnected from a charging connector,” because
“many devices can be moved without disconnecting the device from a
charging connector (e.g., a mobile phone can be moved while the phone is
connected to a charging cable).” Id. at 23; see also Reply Br. 10.
The Examiner responds by stating that because “disconnecting the
device from charger is an input that indicates the device is being transitioned
to an active state,” one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered
such an input as an active state to dismiss the alarm. Ans. 12. The
Examiner explains that, Ban considers a pre-registered pattern of the
terminal motions which are used as inputs to indicate the device is
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transitioned to an active state and a signal to dismiss the alarm. Id. (citing
Ban ¶ 147).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that Ban’s movement of
the device is equated to the recited disconnecting the device from a charger.
In fact, the Examiner is relying on Ban’s detecting a user input to identify
the device state as being active or not in sleep mode as a trigger to dismiss
the alarm. See Final Act. 14–15; Ans. 12. As explained by the Examiner,
“it would also have been obvious to use other possible input options to
identify that the device is no longer in sleep mode” and because
“disconnecting the device from charger is an input that indicates the device
is being transitioned to an active state,” one of ordinary skill in the art would
have considered other types of inputs as one of the recognized
inputs/motions to indicate the device is no longer in sleep mode and dismiss
the alarm. Ans. 12.
We also note that the rationale to modify or combine the prior art does
not have to be expressly stated in the prior art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d
1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Instead, the combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Further, if a
technique has been used to improve one device and a person of ordinary skill
in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same
way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond
his or her skill. See id. at 417. Moreover, we are not persuaded the
Examiner’s proffered combination and adding the indication of no longer
being in a sleep mode, such as moving or disconnecting from a charger, as
suggested by Ban, would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for
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one of ordinary skill in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher–Price,
Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 23. We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims
37 and 49 which are argued by Appellant as a group with claim 23. See
Appeal Br. 22–23.
REMAINING CLAIMS
Appellant argues the patentability of the remaining claims based on
similar arguments presented for claim 19, and other independent claims that
recite similar features. Appeal Br. 23–26. For the same reasons stated
above in the analysis of claim 19, we are also unpersuaded of Examiner
error in rejecting those claims.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
19, 32, 33 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt
19, 32, 33
20, 24, 25,
28, 34, 38,
39, 42, 46,
50, 51, 54
103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt, Yang,
Kimura
20, 24, 25,
28, 34, 38,
39, 42, 46,
50, 51, 54

21, 35, 47 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt,
Newman
21, 35, 47
22, 36, 48 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt,
Faaborg
22, 36, 48
23, 37, 49 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt, Ban
23, 37, 49
26, 40, 52 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt, Yang,
Kimura Newman
26, 40, 52
27, 41, 53 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt, Yang
Kimura, Faaborg
27, 41, 53
29, 43, 55 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt, Yang,
Kimura, Ostojic
29, 43, 55
30, 44, 56 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt, Yang
Kimura, Howard
30, 44, 56
31, 45, 57 103 Frossen, Nanda,
Marui, Pratt, Yang
Kimura, Howard,
Bohne
31, 45, 57
Overall
Outcome
19–57
Appeal 2021-004872
Application 14/846,511

19
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2013).
AFFIRMED