Apple Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 29, 20212021004872 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/846,511 09/04/2015 Kevin Will CHEN P27230US1/77770000415101 4354 150004 7590 12/29/2021 DENTONS US LLP - Apple 4655 Executive Dr Suite 700 San Diego, CA 92121 EXAMINER BRAHMACHARI, MANDRITA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2176 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/29/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): dentons_PAIR@firsttofile.com patent.docket@dentons.com patents.us@dentons.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KEVIN WILL CHEN, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, LAWRENCE Y. YANG, ALAN C. DYE, and JONATHAN P. IVE Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 Technology Center 2100 Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 19–57. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 An oral hearing was held for this appeal on December 3, 2021. 2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2012). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to methods and systems for accessing a user interface of a wearable device. Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 19, reproduced below, illustrates the claimed subject matter: 19. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing one or more programs, the one or more programs comprising instructions, which when executed by a portable multifunction device with a battery and a display, cause the device to: detect whether the battery is being charged; detect whether the device is oriented in a predefined orientation; in accordance with a detection that the battery is being charged and the detection that the device is oriented in the predefined orientation, activate a predefined mode of operation; while the predefined mode of operation is activated and an alarm has been set to go off at a predetermined alarm time: display a first interface; detect that a first predetermined timeout time after displaying the first interface has elapsed, wherein the first predetermined timeout time is used while the predefined mode of operation is activated; in response to detecting that the first predetermined timeout time after displaying the first interface has elapsed, cease displaying the first interface and deactivate the display; after deactivating the display, determine that a current time has reached a respective time associated with the predetermined alarm time; and in response to determining that the current time has reached the respective time: reactivate the display; and display an option for dismissing the alarm; Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 3 while the predefined mode of operation is not activated: display a second interface; detect that a second predetermined timeout time after displaying the second interface has elapsed, wherein the second predetermined timeout time is different from the first predetermined timeout time and the second predetermined timeout time is used while the predefined mode of operation is not activated; and in response to detecting that the second predetermined timeout time after displaying the second interface has elapsed, cease displaying the second interface and deactivate the display. Appeal Br. 28–29 (Claims App.). REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Kimura US 6,539,243 B1 Mar. 25, 2003 Howard US 2004/0266491 A1 Dec. 30, 2004 Ostojic US 2007/0055947 A1 Mar. 8, 2007 Bohne US 2009/0051327 A1 Feb. 26, 2009 Pratt US 2009/0312059 A1 Dec. 17, 2009 Marui US 2010/0225495 A1 Sept. 9, 2010 Frossen US 2011/0234152 A1 Sept. 29, 2011 Newman US 2013/0111579 A1 May 2, 2013 Ban US 2014/0037109 A1 Feb. 6, 2014 Faaborg US 8,938,394 B1 Jan. 20, 2015 Yang US 2015/0111558 A1 Apr. 23, 2015 Nanda US 9,239,605 B1 Jan.19, 2016 REJECTIONS Claims 19, 32, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, and Pratt. Final Act. 3–9. Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 4 Claims 20, 24, 25, 28, 34, 38, 39, 42, 46, 50, 51, and 54 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, and Kimura. Final Act. 9–12. Claims 21, 35, and 47 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, and Newman. Final Act. 12–13. Claims 22, 36, and 48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, and Faaborg. Final Act. 13–14. Claims 23, 37, and 49 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, and Ban. Final Act. 14–15. Claims 26, 40, and 52 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, and Newman. Final Act. 16–17. Claims 27, 41, and 53 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, and Faaborg. Final Act. 17–18. Claims 29, 43, and 55 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, and Ostojic. Final Act. 18–19. Claims 30, 44, and 56 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, and Howard. Final Act. 19–20. Claims 31, 45, and 57 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, Howard, and Bohne. Final Act. 20–21. Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 5 ANALYSIS We have reviewed the rejection in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we concur with the Examiner concerning unpatentability under § 103. We add the following to address and emphasize specific findings and arguments. CLAIM 19 The Rejection In rejecting claim 19, the Examiner finds Frossen discloses a non- transitory computer-readable storage medium storing one or more programs comprising instructions, which cause the device to (1) “detect whether the battery is being charged,” (2) “detect whether the device is oriented in a predefined orientation,” (3) “in accordance with the detection that the battery is being charged and the detection that the device is oriented in the predefined orientation, activate a predefined mode of operation,” and “while the predefined mode of operation is activated and an alarm has been set to go off at a predetermined alarm time: display a first interface.” Final Act. 3– 4 (citing Frossen ¶¶ 2, 17, 34, 44, 56, 58, 59, 65, 88; Figs. 2B, 4–5). The Examiner further relies on Nanda as disclosing (4) “detect that a first predetermined timeout time after displaying the first interface has elapsed, wherein the first predetermined timeout time is used while the predefined mode of operation is activated,” (5) “in response to detecting that the first predetermined timeout time . . . has elapsed, cease displaying the first interface and deactivate the display,” (6) “after deactivating the display, determine that a current time has reached a respective time . . . , and in response to determining that the current time has reached the respective time, reactivate the display.” Final Act. 5–6 (citing Nanda columns 1, 5, 6, Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 6 8, 9; Fig. 2). For the remaining limitations of claim 1, the Examiner finds Marui discloses “display an option for dismissing the alarm” and Pratt discloses detecting a second timeout time different from the first timeout time and “cease displaying the second interface and deactivate the display” in response to detecting that the second timeout time has elapsed. Final Act. 6–8 (citing Marui ¶¶ 97, 120, Fig. 18; Pratt ¶ 21). According to the Examiner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Frossen with Nanda and Marui to enhance convenience because “the user does not have to turn off [the] display to save power when [the] device is not in use or turn on the display when user interaction is needed” and “the user can easily dismiss or snooze an alarm which is a common practice.” Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner also finds that adding Pratt would help to eliminate problems with reduced battery life or recharge or “unnecessary use of power is prevented when the battery is connected or the charge is low or the device is inactive with an added flexibility where the user can determine and set different timeout values for different applications.” Final Act. 8. Appellant’s Arguments Appellant contends that the Examiner’s proposed combination of the references does not teach or suggest the recited “first predetermined timeout time being used while a predefined mode of operation is activated and a second, different predetermined timeout time being used while the predefined mode of operation is not activated,” as recited in claim 19. Appeal Br. 15. With respect to Frossen, Appellant asserts that Frossen discloses that when a charger is connected to a device, the device determines a second interaction mode “based at least in part on the charger attribute information and the Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 7 orientation [of the device].” However, Frossen fails to disclose that a display of the device is deactivated in response to detecting that a predetermined timeout time has passed, much less that the predetermined timeout time is “used while the predefined mode of operation is activated” or that a second predetermined timeout time is “used while the predefined mode of operation is not activated,” as required by claim 19. Id. (citing Frossen ¶ 59). Regarding Nanda, Appellant argues that, although Nanda is concerned with “a computing device transitioning to a lower power state at a scheduled time,” the reference uses a fixed time period or prior usage statistics to determine the scheduled time. Appeal Br. 16 (citing Nanda 6:29–30, 49– 52). According to Appellant, Nanda’s disclosed alarm times used for transitioning to a lower power state are not used “‘while a predefined mode of operation is activated’ where the predefined mode of operation is activated ‘in accordance with a detection that the battery is being charged and the detection that the device is oriented in the predefined orientation.’” Appeal Br. 16. Regarding Pratt, Appellant contends that the timeout value is determined based on the application, which is different from “using a second predetermined timeout time while a predefined mode of operation is not activated.” Id. at 16–17 (citing Pratt ¶ 21). According to Appellant, “the timeout values used in Pratt do not depend on whether or not the device is being charged and oriented in a predefined orientation” because “[n]one of the applications in Pratt are activated based on a battery being charged and a device being oriented in a predefined orientation.” Appeal Br. 17; see also Reply Br. 4. Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 8 Additionally, Appellant asserts that “Marui discloses displaying different settings for a snooze operation of an alarm (e.g., settings for how long the snooze operation should last).” Appeal Br. 17 (citing Marui ¶ 120). According to Appellant, Marui does not remedy the above-discussed deficiencies and particularly, “that the display on which the settings are displayed is deactivated in response to detecting that a predetermined timeout time has passed.” Id. at 17–18. Appellant further points to Figure 8(a) of Marui, and argues that the “settings for a snooze operation of an alarm” in Figure 8(a) of Marui “does not necessarily imply that an option for dismissing the alarm is displayed.” Id. at 20–21 (citing Marui ¶¶ 79, 120). With respect to the proposed combination, Appellant argues that “modifying Frossen with the teachings of Nanda would not result in a device using a first timeout time based on whether a battery of the device is being charged and the device is in a predefined orientation.” Id. at 18. Appellant further argues that adding Nanda’s lower power state is dependent on “whether a time has been scheduled according to the RTC alarm or battery alarm” or other reference teachings argued above would not result in the recited features and would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 18–20. Discussion With respect to the disclosure of “the predefined mode of operation” in Frossen, we agree with the Examiner that the nightstand mode when the device is charging or displaying an application mode provides the recited “predefined mode of operation,” which may be activated based on the position of the device. See Ans. 4 (citing Frossen ¶¶ 17, 56). As found by the Examiner, Frossen discloses different interaction modes based on the Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 9 charger attribute information and the device orientation. Ans. 4 (citing Frossen ¶ 59). Frossen explains the interaction modes determine how the user action changes depending on the interaction mode. See Frossen ¶¶ 37– 39, 59–60; Figs. 2A–2C, 5. That is, Frossen’s charging status and device orientation that correspond to different interaction modes for determining the timing of activating the display, meet the recited active or inactive predefined modes of operation, when interpreted broadly but reasonably. Similarly, we agree with the Examiner’s findings regarding Nanda’s disclosure of turning off the display to save power after a certain time has elapsed. See Ans. 4–6 (citing Nanda 5:12–15, 47–55). As further explained by the Examiner, Nanda discloses that the device “may be configured to implement the power management techniques described herein in order to reduce an amount of power consumed by the computing device 100 over time, such as during periods of user inactivity.” Nanda 5:12–16. Nanda further discloses that power consumption may be reduced “during a period of user inactivity” wherein “the first active power state may be a display- active power state, where a display of the computing device is powered on and active and the second active power state may be a display-inactive power state, where the display is powered off.” Nanda 5:47–55. We also agree with the Examiner’s characterization of the timeout time in “detecting that the first predetermined timeout time after displaying the first interface has elapsed, cease displaying the first interface and deactivate the display” as being “based on a time after a certain interface has been displayed,” but not dependent on the mode of operation. Ans. 5. Based on Nanda’s disclosure of deactivating the display to save power after detecting inactivity time after an interface is displayed, see Nanda 1:19–27, Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 10 we also agree with the Examiner’s reasoning for the proposed combination. We specifically agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that “it would be obvious to transition from a display of the clock interface in a nightstand mode taught in Frossen to a display-inactive mode where the display is ceased after detecting a time of inactivity to save power taught in Nanda” because “Frossen teaches that a clock application interface may be displayed while the predetermined nightstand mode is active.” Ans. 5. Thus, “it would be obvious that a change to a display-inactive mode to save power after the clock interface is displayed occurs ‘while’ the device is in the predetermined mode.” Id. We also find that the Examiner reasonably interprets the word “while” as merely requiring to turn off the display to save power when a device is inactive, as taught by Nanda, which is used to modify Frossen when the device is being charged. See id. at 5–6. As explained by the Examiner, “[t]his function is also widely implemented in all mobile devices and is well known in the art.” Id. at 6. Regarding the recited detecting that a second timeout time has elapsed wherein “the second predetermined timeout time is used while the predefined mode of operation is not activated,” we also agree with the Examiner’s findings with respect to Pratt. See Ans. 6–7. As explained by the Examiner, paragraphs 21 and 22 of Pratt disclose “different timeout times may be used for different applications to cease display and enter into a dimmed mode,” and the times “may be customized by the factory or the user to be different for different application.” See Ans. 6 (citing Pratt ¶¶ 21, 22). Pratt is concerned with dimming the screen of a mobile device when the elapsed time exceeds a set time duration which is specific to the application. See Pratt Abstract. We agree with the Examiner that this application- Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 11 specific time duration would teach or suggest the recited first and second predetermined timeout times to be used in different modes of operation where the display stays active or is dimmed. See Ans. 7. Contrary to Appellant’s contentions contrasting the recited mode of operation with Pratt’s application, Appeal Br. 17, Pratt is concerned with timeout times that are used for dimming the display and how the time duration before the display is dimmed depends on the user interaction mode and the duration of inactivity. That is, for a given operation, such as charging or sending messages, there are different timeout times corresponding to the mode of operation and the user interaction. With respect to the teachings of Marui, we are also unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments related to Figure 8(a) of Marui and the option for dismissing the alarm. See Appeal Br. 17–18, 20–21; Reply Br. 9. As explained by the Examiner, Marui was relied on as disclosing a selectable snooze option that allows the user to deactivate or dismiss the alarm for a particular time based on the selected snooze option. Ans. 9–10 (citing Marui ¶ 97). The Examiner further finds that Marui discloses deactivating or dismissing the alarm during a time interval that is triggered by the snooze option. Ans. 10 (citing Marui ¶ 120). We also agree with the Examiner’s explanation of how setting the alarm by algorithm 442 indicates that an option to dismiss the alarm is present. See id. More specifically, we agree with the Examiner that the disclosure in Marui of “[w]hen the alarm is dismissed, the algorithm 442 sets the state to alarm (or ‘on’) and then schedules the alarm to trigger at its next scheduled time” does “indicate[s] the presence of an option to dismiss the alarm until next scheduled time.” Id. Therefore, Appellant’s reference to Figure 8(a) of Marui (reproduced Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 12 below) relates to how the snooze option is set, but not how the snooze option deactivates the alarm. See Appeal Br. 21. Figure 8(a) of Marui showing an alarm menu with selection options. Although Appellant’s description of the “settings for a snooze operation of an alarm” in Figure 8(a) of Marui is accurate, the disclosure of how Marui re-activates or dismisses the alarm at least suggests the recited “display an option for dismissing the alarm.” See Marui ¶¶ 97, 120. As further asserted by the Examiner, displaying buttons or icons on a touch-enabled device would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See Ans. 10–11. Turning next to the combination of the references, we also agree with the Examiner’s findings. For example, the Examiner properly relies on Frossen as disclosing “the predefined mode of operation (nightstand mode with clock display) and a second different mode of operation (mode displaying an active application),” which means “a different application interface is displayed while the device is in the predefined nightstand mode than when the device is not in the predefined nightstand mode.” See Ans. 8; Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 13 see also Appeal Br. 18. As further found by the Examiner, modifying Frossen with Nanda such that “a change to display-inactive mode after the clock interface is displayed occurs ‘while’ the device is in the predetermined mode” would have been obvious because, according to Frossen, “a clock application interface is displayed while the predetermined nightstand mode is active.” Ans. 9. The Examiner also properly finds “the word ‘while’ merely indicates that the teaching of Nanda, to turn off the display to save power when a device is inactive, is being implemented when the device is being charged.” Id. We particularly agree with the Examiner’s findings regarding modifying Frossen and Nanda with the teachings of Pratt “that these timeout times may be customized by the factory or the user to be different for different application[s],” because it would have been obvious “to use one timeout time for the clock application which is displayed in the predefined nightstand mode and a different second timeout time for the texting or map application displayed when the device is not in the predefined mode.” Id. We also note that Appellant’s contentions focus on the references separately and ignore that the proposed rejection is based on the combination of different interface displays based on whether the device is in the nightstand mode as taught in Frossen with the power saving options of Nanda, where these dimming options occur after a specific time and is either preset or selectable by a user, as disclosed by Pratt. See Ans. 7–9. Each reference must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole. In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 14 in the art.” (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981))). Furthermore, the artisan is not compelled to blindly follow the teaching of one prior art reference over the other without the exercise of independent judgment. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Based on the proposed combination, the resulting structure would allow the system of Frossen to include the user-selectable timeout times that are associated with the mode of operation or the charging status of the device. In other words, this is a combination of familiar elements according to known methods with predicable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”). Additionally, the Supreme Court made clear that when considering obviousness, “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Furthermore, the skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” and this is a case in which the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. We therefore find the Examiner provided a sufficiently reasonable motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references based on the above discussed improvements to Frossen’s system as modified by Nanda, Pratt, and Marui. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 19. We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 15 of independent claims 32 and 33 which are not separately argued by Appellant. See Appeal Br. 13–21. CLAIM 23 The Examiner rejected claim 23 based on a similar combination of the prior art that was applied to claim 1 and further added Ban as disclosing “detect a fourth input comprising a terminal motion; and in response to detecting the fourth input, dismiss the alarm.” See Final Act. 14–15 (citing Ban ¶¶ 34, 38, 39, 42). The Examiner also finds that the proposed combination would have been obvious “to implement the teachings of Ban to provide an option to dismiss [an] alarm when an input of device motion out of charger is detected,” which is based on the user being awake and active. Final Act. 15. Appellant contends “Ban discloses detecting motion of a device, and in response, inquiring whether an alarm should be released,” but does not teach “disconnecting a device from a charging connector.” Appeal Br. 22. According to Appellant, “[d]etecting motion of a device does not imply that the device has been disconnected from a charging connector,” because “many devices can be moved without disconnecting the device from a charging connector (e.g., a mobile phone can be moved while the phone is connected to a charging cable).” Id. at 23; see also Reply Br. 10. The Examiner responds by stating that because “disconnecting the device from charger is an input that indicates the device is being transitioned to an active state,” one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered such an input as an active state to dismiss the alarm. Ans. 12. The Examiner explains that, Ban considers a pre-registered pattern of the terminal motions which are used as inputs to indicate the device is Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 16 transitioned to an active state and a signal to dismiss the alarm. Id. (citing Ban ¶ 147). We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that Ban’s movement of the device is equated to the recited disconnecting the device from a charger. In fact, the Examiner is relying on Ban’s detecting a user input to identify the device state as being active or not in sleep mode as a trigger to dismiss the alarm. See Final Act. 14–15; Ans. 12. As explained by the Examiner, “it would also have been obvious to use other possible input options to identify that the device is no longer in sleep mode” and because “disconnecting the device from charger is an input that indicates the device is being transitioned to an active state,” one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered other types of inputs as one of the recognized inputs/motions to indicate the device is no longer in sleep mode and dismiss the alarm. Ans. 12. We also note that the rationale to modify or combine the prior art does not have to be expressly stated in the prior art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Instead, the combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Further, if a technique has been used to improve one device and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. See id. at 417. Moreover, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s proffered combination and adding the indication of no longer being in a sleep mode, such as moving or disconnecting from a charger, as suggested by Ban, would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 17 one of ordinary skill in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher–Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 23. We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 37 and 49 which are argued by Appellant as a group with claim 23. See Appeal Br. 22–23. REMAINING CLAIMS Appellant argues the patentability of the remaining claims based on similar arguments presented for claim 19, and other independent claims that recite similar features. Appeal Br. 23–26. For the same reasons stated above in the analysis of claim 19, we are also unpersuaded of Examiner error in rejecting those claims. Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 18 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 19, 32, 33 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt 19, 32, 33 20, 24, 25, 28, 34, 38, 39, 42, 46, 50, 51, 54 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura 20, 24, 25, 28, 34, 38, 39, 42, 46, 50, 51, 54 21, 35, 47 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Newman 21, 35, 47 22, 36, 48 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Faaborg 22, 36, 48 23, 37, 49 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Ban 23, 37, 49 26, 40, 52 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura Newman 26, 40, 52 27, 41, 53 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang Kimura, Faaborg 27, 41, 53 29, 43, 55 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang, Kimura, Ostojic 29, 43, 55 30, 44, 56 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang Kimura, Howard 30, 44, 56 31, 45, 57 103 Frossen, Nanda, Marui, Pratt, Yang Kimura, Howard, Bohne 31, 45, 57 Overall Outcome 19–57 Appeal 2021-004872 Application 14/846,511 19 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2013). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation