APPLE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 9, 2021

2020004876 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/178,361 06/09/2016 Sarma V. VANGALA 30134/20202(P27948US1) 6406 114746 7590 11/09/2021 Apple Inc. -- FKM 150 Broadway Suite 702 New York, NY 10038 EXAMINER SOE, KYAW Z ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2412 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/09/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): fhall@fkmiplaw.com mmarcin@fkmiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SARMA V. VANGALA, VENKATESWARA RAO MANEPALLI, and SRINIVAS PASUPULETI Appeal 2020-004876 Application 15/178,361 Technology Center 2400 Before NORMAN H. BEAMER, JOYCE CRAIG, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL Administrative Patent Judges. CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, and 32. Claims 2, 6, 7, 22, 26, 27, 29, and 33 are objected to. See Non-Final Act. 1. Claims 3, 8–20, 23, and 30 have been cancelled. See Appeal Br. 12–14 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2019). Appellant identifies Apple Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-004876 Application 15/178,361 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER According to Appellant, the claims relate to apparatus, systems and methods for enhanced dormancy triggers and dynamic dormancy timer selection in wireless communication systems. Spec. Title, ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, illustrates the claimed subject matter: 1. A method, comprising: determining, by an application processor of a user equipment (“UE”), a first buffer status of an application buffer; communicating, by the application processor, to a baseband processor of the UE the first buffer status of the application buffer; determining, by the baseband processor, a second buffer status of a baseband buffer; and determining, by the baseband processor, an activation of a dormancy trigger based on the first buffer status of the application buffer and the second buffer status of the baseband buffer. Appeal Br. 12 (Claims App.). REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is: Name Reference Date Meylan et al.(“Meylan”) US 2013/0279385 A1 Oct. 24, 2013 Jun et al. (“Jun”) US 2014/0153408 A1 June 5, 2014 Juang et al. (“Juang”) US 2014/0181471 A1 June 26, 2014 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 4, 21, 24, 28, and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Juang and Jun. Non-Final Act. 4–5. Appeal 2020-004876 Application 15/178,361 3 Claims 5, 25, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combination of Juang, Jun, and Meylan. Non-Final Act. 5–6. ANALYSIS Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the obviousness rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 21, 24, 25, 28, and 31, argued as a group, based on representative claim 1. See Appeal Br. 3. The Examiner concluded that the term “dormancy,” as recited in claim 1, is “a relatively broad limitation” that may be interpreted as a “sleep/idle/inactive” state. Ans. 4. The Examiner also interpreted the limitation “determining, by the baseband processor, an activation of a dormancy . . . based on . . . baseband buffer” as related to a mechanism for user equipment (“UE”) to enter into idle mode in order to reduce power consumption. Id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 6, 20–22). The Examiner found that Juang teaches user equipment that triggers or activates idle mode based on the status of buffers. Id. In particular, the Examiner found Juang teaches features for adapting data collection practices of one processor based on a power state of another processor. Ans. 4 (citing Juang ¶¶ 7, 55, 62, 63, 82, and Fig. 6). Appellant argues that the Examiner erred because Juang does not teach “a mechanism that is in any way analogous to the recited ‘dormancy trigger.’” Appeal Br. 4; Reply Br. 3. Appellant refers to paragraphs 6 and 20–23 of the Specification as purportedly providing support for the assertion that the “dormancy trigger,” as recited in claim 1, is limited to fast dormancy technology and that claim 1 requires that the network put a connection in an idle state in which the physical connection is removed while the IP address Appeal 2020-004876 Application 15/178,361 4 is maintained. Appeal Br. 4; Reply Br. 3. Appellant also argues that in Juang “there is not a single instance of either the term dormancy or fast dormancy.” Appeal Br. 4; Reply Br. 3. Appellant further argues “there is also no disclosure in Juang of an operating state that includes a network connection that has characteristics that are in any way analogous to the characteristics of the network connection referenced above that is caused by triggering FD.” Id. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions because Appellant argues limitations not present in claim 1. The plain language of the disputed limitation merely recites “determining, by the baseband processor, an activation of a dormancy trigger based on the first buffer status of the application buffer and the second buffer status of the baseband buffer.” Nothing in the claim language requires the use of fast dormancy technology or specifies the results of determining an activation of a dormancy trigger. With regard to the terminology used in the prior art, the Examiner does not contend, nor is the Examiner required to demonstrate, that the identical text of rejected claim 1 appears in the cited references. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Moreover, while we interpret claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims, as Appellant urges us to do. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Additionally, the importation of a narrow disclosed embodiment into broader independent claim 1 is improper. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a Appeal 2020-004876 Application 15/178,361 5 claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.”). Here, paragraphs 20–23 of Appellant’s Specification describe exemplary embodiments of the claimed invention, which are narrower than the embodiment in claim 1. Moreover, paragraph 6 of the Specification, relied on by the Examiner, describes the network putting a connection in “idle state” and paragraph 7 describes that connected state DRX cyclically wakes up and shuts down the receiver circuits in order to save energy, and allows the UE to periodically “sleep.” Spec. ¶¶ 6, 7. These descriptions are consistent with the Examiner’s interpretation of “dormancy” as a “sleep/idle/inactive” state. For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner’s interpretations of “dormancy” and the disputed “determining” limitation are overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the Specification. Nor has Appellant persuaded us that the Examiner erred in finding that the combined teachings of Juang and Jun teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 4, 5, 21, 24, 25, 28, and 31, which fall therewith. With regard to dependent claims 5, 25, and 32, rejected for obviousness over Juang, Jun, and Meylan, Appellant argues that Meylan fails to cure the deficiencies in Juang and Jun. For the reasons discussed above regarding claim 1, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 5, 25, and 32. Appeal 2020-004876 Application 15/178,361 6 CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, and 32. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 4, 21, 24, 28, 31 103 Juang, Jun 1, 4, 21, 24, 28, 31 5, 25, 32 103 Juang, Jun, Meylan 5, 25, 32 Overall Outcome 1, 4, 5, 21, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED