APPLE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 29, 2020

2020001567 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/261,112 04/24/2014 Imran A. CHAUDHRI P5702USC2/77770000132202 6842 150004 7590 10/29/2020 DENTONS US LLP - Apple 4655 Executive Dr Suite 700 San Diego, CA 92121 EXAMINER CHANG, KENT WU ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2624 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/29/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): dentons_PAIR@firsttofile.com patent.docket@dentons.com patents.us@dentons.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte IMRAN A. CHAUDHRI, BAS ORDING, and STEVEN JOBS ____________ Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before ERIC B. CHEN, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–12, 14–25, and 27–34, which constitute all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). A telephonic Hearing was held September 10, 2020. We Reverse. 1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Apple Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 4. Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The invention relates to graphical user interfaces on a touch-sensitive display. Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 1, 6–9, 31, 65; Figs. 2A–2C. Claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal (emphases added): 1. A portable electronic device comprising: a touch-sensitive display; one or more processors; memory; and one or more programs, wherein the one or more programs are stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the one or more processors, the one or more programs including instructions for: concurrently displaying a plurality of application icons; while concurrently displaying the plurality of application icons: a touch input on a first application icon from the plurality of application icons located in a first position on the touch- sensitive display; determining whether the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch- sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than a predetermined time period; in response to a determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch- sensitive display remains in contact with the display for less than the predetermined time period, activating an application associated with the first application icon; in response to a determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch- sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than the predetermined time period, modifying a visual appearance of the first application icon automatically upon the determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch-sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than the predetermined time period; after determining that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch- sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 3 than the predetermined time period, detecting movement of the touch input from the first position to a second position on the touch-sensitive display, wherein the detected movement of the touch input causes the first application icon to be moved from the first position to the second position on the touch-sensitive display such that the first application icon ceases to be displayed in the first position; in response to detecting movement of the touch input from the first position to the second position on the touch- sensitive display, modifying a visual appearance of the second position while concurrently displaying the first application icon at the second position; after modifying a visual appearance of the second position while concurrently displaying the first application icon at the second position, detecting a lift off of the touch input at the second position on the touch-sensitive display; and in response to detecting the lift off of the touch input at the second position on the touch-sensitive display, continuing to display the first application icon in the second position on the touch-sensitive display. Appeal Br. 53–54 (Claims App.). THE REJECTIONS Claims 32–34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 5–6. Claims 1, 2, 6, 14, 15, 19, 27, 28, and 32–34 are rejected under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, and Lin. Final Act. 6–21. Claims 3 and 16 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, and Sato. Final Act. 21–22. Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 4 Claims 4, 17, and 29 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson and Lin, and Berman. Final Act. 22–23. Claims 5, 18, and 31 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, and Chiang. Final Act. 23–25. Claims 7 and 20 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Yoshihara, and Fukase. Final Act. 25–27. Claims 8 and 21 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Yoshihara, Fukase, and Raiz. Final Act. 27–28. Claims 9, 10, 22, and 23 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, and Hotelling. Final Act. 28–29. Claims 11, 12, 24, 25, and 30 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, and Yoshihara. Final Act. 29–31. Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 5 REFERENCES Name Reference Date Berman et al. US 5,760,773 June 2, 1998 Hoshino et al. US 2004/0021643 A1 Feb. 5, 2004 Yoshihara US 2004/0056809 A1 Mar. 25, 2004 Fukase et al. US 2005/0060653 A1 Mar. 17, 2005 Sato et al, US 2006/0007182 A1 Jan. 12, 2006 Keely et al. US 2006/0033751 A1 July 16, 2006 Hotelling et al. US 2006/0161871 A1 July 20, 2006 Hutchinson et al. US 2007/0106950 A1 May 10, 2007 Lin et al. US 8,365,084 B1 Jan. 29, 2013 Chiang et al. US 8,601,370 B2 Dec. 3, 2013 Raiz et al. US 2006/0271874 A1 Nov. 2006 ANALYSIS § 112 Written Description Rejections Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding dependent claims 32– 34 “wherein modifying a visual appearance of the first application icon includes continuing to fully display the first application icon” (also referred to as “disputed limitation”) fail to comply with the written description requirement (emphasis added). Appeal Br. 47–51; Reply Br. 10. The Examiner finds there is nothing in Applicant’s disclosure that the first application icon continues to be fully displayed, and the disclosure does not contain any definition as to what the term “fully display entails.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner finds: Figures 2B–2C of the Applicant's drawings show modifying the visual appearance of every icon, where the icons other than the first application icon are depicted as being fully visible. The first application icon, however, is partially obscured by the finger of the user. Therefore there is no way to Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 6 tell if the first application is continuing to be fully displayed under the fingertip of the user. The first application icon appears to not be obscured by the other icons, but there is nothing in the drawing that shows the first application icon as continuing to [] "fully display". Id. at 5–6. Appellant argues the Specification and Figures describe the disputed limitation. Appeal Br. 49–52 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 32, 62; Figs. 2A–2D). Appellant argues: The specification describes inter alia that 'when the device is in reconfiguration mode, the icon positions are modified from a stationary position to a varying position. (citing Spec. ¶ 32). However, the Examiner incorrectly makes the argument that "there is no way to tell if the first application is continuing to be fully displayed under the fingertip of the user." (citing Final Act. 5). As is undeniably clear in Figures 2B and 2C above, application icons are fully visible when their positions are varied (e.g., see application icons in area 224). The finger that is depicted in the figures is not part of the graphical user interface, but is used to represent a user's finger. Apparently, the Examiner thinks that another unidentified graphical object appears over the application icon as it is being moved------an unidentified graphical object that is not shown in Figures 2B and 2C and one that must necessarily be obscured by the user's finger. However, the Examiner's position is unreasonable. One skilled in the art looking at Figures 2B and 2C would understand that the finger is not part of the user interface and understand that other than the movable application icon, there are no additional graphical objects hidden under the user's finger. This is further reinforced by the fact that as the user's finger location changes from Figure 2B and 2C, nothing is displayed under the tip of the user's finger other than the application icon. Id. at 50–51. Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 7 Regarding lack of a definition for the disputed limitation, Appellant argues there is no legal requirement for a definition and, the disputed term has an ordinary and plain meaning which should be readily understandable to one skilled in the art: “continuing to fully display the first application icon” means displaying an application icon, which is not obscured by another graphical object on the display. Id. at 51. Appellant argues, based on the Specification, one skilled in the art would reasonably conclude for example, varying the position (e.g., modifying a visual appearance) of the first application icon includes “continuing to fully display the first application icon.” Id. In the Answer, the Examiner adds that: As the Applicant has written Claims 32–34, what is being claimed is that " ... modifying a visual appearance of the first application icon includes continuing to fully display the first application icon.". In Paragraph [0062] of the Appellant's disclosure, there is no mention of the selected icon continuing to be fully displayed, only that the selected icon is visually modified. Paragraph [0032] of the Appellant's disclosure also only discloses varying the position of the icons, with no mention of what occurs with respect to the selected icon. The drawings are the only portion of the Applicant's disclosure that can be used to teach continuing to fully displaying the selected icon (i.e. first application icon), but there is no drawing showing displaying of the selected icon (i.e. first application icon) without the user's hand obstructing a portion of the selected icon (i.e. first application icon). As this limitation was incorporated as a way to overcome the reference of Keely et al (US 2006/0033751), specifically the argument that a "right click operation" on an icon within the Microsoft WINDOWS GUI environment causes an option menu to be displayed over a portion of the icon (thereby modifying the appearance of the icon by obscuring a portion of the icon), the Office feels there is insufficient support in the Applicant's disclosure for the above Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 8 language. Therefore the new matter rejection was issued by the Office. Ans. 9. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues one skilled in the art looking at Figures 2B and 2C would understand that the finger is not part of the user interface and would understand that other than the movable application icon, there are no additional graphical objects hidden under the user’s finger. Reply Br. 10. A written “description must ‘clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.’” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “In other words, the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. (citing Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563). “Although [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly the subject matter claimed, . . . the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Put another way, “the applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.” Id. at 1563–64. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. In particular, we agree that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 9 Specification and Figures 2B and 2C show that Appellant had possession of the disputed limitation. The lack of a specific definition does not negate Appellant’s possession of the disputed limitation because the disputed limitation meaning would be understood by one of ordinary skill as its plain meaning. Additionally, we note there is no § 112 indefiniteness rejection based on the disputed limitation. Therefore, we do not sustain the § 112 written description rejection of claims 32–34. The § 103 rejection of Claims 12, 2, 6, 14, 15, 19, 27, 28, and 32–34 over Keely, Hutchinson, Hoshino, and Lin Appellant argues, inter alia, the Examiner errs in finding the combination of Keely and Hutchinson teaches the below claim 1 limitations (also referred to as “disputed limitations”): while concurrently displaying the plurality of application icons: determining whether the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch- sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than a predetermined time period; [(L1)] in response to a determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch-sensitive display remains in contact with the display for less than the predetermined time period, activating an application associated with the first application icon; [(L2)] in response to a determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch-sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than the predetermined time period, modifying a visual 2 Appellant states claim 1 is representative of Group A claims (independent claims 1, 14, and 17, and dependent claims 2, 6, 15, 19, and 28). Appeal Br. 23. Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 10 appearance of the first application icon automatically upon the determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch-sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than the predetermined time period. Appeal Br. 23–37; Reply Br. 3–8 (emphasis added; (L1) and (L2) added). In the Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of Keely and Hutchinson teaches disputed limitation (L1) “in response to a determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch sensitive display remains in contact with the display for less than the predetermined period, activating an application associated with the first application icon.” Final Act. 8 (citing Keely, Fig. 3, ¶ 38). The Examiner finds Keely step 307 teaches, in response to determining that the touch input to the first object remains in contact with the display for less than the predetermined time threshold, determining that the first object is being selected and performing an operation associated with the first object. Id. The Examiner then finds that Hutchinson teaches: in response to a determination that the touch input on the first icon located in the first position on the touch-sensitive display remains in contact with the display for less than the predetermined time period, activating an application associated with the first icon (Figures 35–36 and Paragraph (0259) of Hutchinson et al disclose initiating video display (i.e. activating an application.) within a video window 1180 when an icon 1100 located within a source section 1058 is selected. Paragraph [0255] of Hutchinson et al discloses selecting an icon being displayed in section 1058 by making either a single tap or a double tap on the icon. Therefore Hutchinson et al teaches initiating an application upon receiving a single or double tap input from a user. Figure 3 of Keely et al discloses that a touch input that remains in contact with the display for less than a Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 11 predetermined time period is determined to be a left-mouse click event, which is equivalent to the tap event taught by Hutchinson et al.). Id. at 11–12. Appellant argues Keely does not teach activating an application. Appeal Br. 31 (citing Final Act. 8; Keely Figs. 3, 5A). According to Appellant, Figs. 3 and 5A of Keely teach additional determinations after time threshold 306, none of which teaches activating an application. Id. at 31–32. Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding that Hutchinson teaches activating an application associated with the first application icon when the touch input remains in contact with the display for less than the predetermined time period. Id. at 33–34. According to Appellant, Hutchinson discloses selecting an application via a single tap or double tap, but is completely silent as to time threshold. Id. at 34. Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding “Figure 3 of Keely et al. discloses that a touch input that remains in contact with the display for less than a predetermined time period to be a ‘left-mouse click event, which is equivalent to the tap event taught by Hutchinson.” Id. at 34 (citing Final Act. 11–12). In the Answer, the Examiner explains that Keely describes a Microsoft Windows graphical user interface (GUI) that includes numerous well known features including disambiguating a touch input made by a user into mouse input commands such as “right-click operation,” “left click operation,” and “drag operation.” Ans. 3. Regarding Keely, the Examiner finds: Paragraphs [0003]–[0004] and Figures 3–7 of Keely et al (US2006/0033751) disclose a process for disambiguating a touch input being made by a user into a plurality of different Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 12 mouse input commands such as a "right click operation", a "left click operation", and a drag operation. Paragraph [0003] of Keely et al discloses that the touch input disambiguation process occurs in a Microsoft WINDOWS graphical user interface (GUI) environment, which is known to contain a plurality of application icons. Figures 3, 5A, and 6–7 of Keely et al disclose using the time threshold in step 306 to determine whether the touch input being made by the user is intended to be a "left click operation" or a "right click operation". Figure 5A and Paragraph [0035] of Keely et al disclose that upon determining that the time threshold was not met in step 306, that a tap (i.e. "left click operation") is performed with respect to the selected object (i.e. GUI application icon), where if the tap input is performed on a previously selected object (i.e. double "left click operation"), an action relevant to the selected object (i.e. GUI application icon.) is performed, which is well known in the Microsoft WINDOW GUI environment to include the launching of an application icon. Id. at 3–4. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner’s findings are not based on Keely’s actual disclosure, but rather speculation as to what Keely’s system may include. Reply Br. 8. Appellant argues Keely “fails to disclose any application icons” and does not teach performing the limitations while “displaying the plurality of application icons.” Id. at 6. Appellant argues that the mere mention of “Microsoft WINDOWS” in Keely does not mean the techniques disclosed in Keely are applicable to, or replicable in, the “Microsoft WINDOWS” environment. Id. at 7 (citing Ans. 4–5). We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding disputed limitation (L1). The disclosure of Keely does not teach activating an Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 13 application after the time threshold 306 passes.3 Keely ¶¶ 3, 4, 6, 7, 35; Figs. 3, 5A. Keely describes additional determinations after the time threshold passes, but the Examiner has not shown any of the determinations teaches activating an application. The Examiner’s reliance on a “well known” Microsoft environment to support Keely’s launching of an application icon via a tap as a left click operation followed by a double left click operation is not supported in the record before us. Ans. 3–4. The Examiner’s reliance on Hutchinson and a “well known” Microsoft context do not cure this deficiency. For example, Hutchinson teaches selecting an application icon via single tap or a double tap but discloses no time threshold. Hutchinson ¶ 225. We now refer to disputed limitation (L2): in response to a determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch- sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than the predetermined time period, modifying a visual appearance of the first application icon automatically upon the determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch-sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than the predetermined time period (emphasis added). 3 Additionally, at the Hearing, Appellant argues a related Board Decision in application 14/142,640 dated October 7, 2019 (“Dec.”) with similar art and claims determined Keely does not disclose activating an application. Tr. 5:13–17, 18:12–20:13. In the hearing for the current application (14/261,112), Appellant incorrectly identified application 13/913,173 as a related application currently under Appeal with the Board. Tr. 19:1–3; Appeal Br. 5. Regarding the Board Decision for the correct application 14/142,640, the Board held “the record before us does not adequately show the limitation ‘activating an application associated with the first icon’” is taught by Keely. Dec. 6–7 (citing Keely ¶¶ 5, 30, 35, Figs. 3, 5A). Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 14 In the Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of Keely and Keely’s provisional application US 60/247,844 incorporated by reference (“provisional app.”) teaches disputed limitation (L2). Final Act. 8–9 (citing Keely, Fig. 3, ¶ 38; Fig. 3 of provisional app.). The Examiner finds: Figure 3 of US 60/247,884 discloses that upon determining that the stylus (i.e. touch input) has remained in contact with the object for more than a predetermined period of time (See step 303). generating visual feedback to the user that the hold operation has been recognized (See step 319) before determining if the user intended to perform a right mouse button click or a right mouse button drag event. Therefore Keely et al does disclose modifying a visual appearance of the first object (i.e. icon) automatically upon maintaining contact with the touch-sensitive display for more than a predetermined amount of time. Id. Appellant’s arguments regarding disputed limitation (L2) and Keely include similarities to the (L1) argument discussed supra. Appeal Br. 25 (citing Keely, Fig. 3). Appellant argues Keely does not teach any determination involving a time-based threshold that results in performance of any specific steps and, therefore, does not perform any action analogous to “modifying the visual appearance of the first application icon.” Id. According to Appellant, Keely at Fig. 3 describes a “yes” result in step 306 (“Time Threshold?”) immediately leads to another determination step, step 309 (“2nd Move Threshold?”) and, as a result, Keely only performs additional actions, such as step 603 (“Simulate Right Mouse Button Click”) or step 703 (“Drag Selected Object”) after ascertaining the result of additional determinations. Id. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reliance on the incorporated by reference Keely provisional application as teaching the (L2) limitation is in Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 15 error. Id. at 25–26 (citing Final Act. 8–9; Keely ¶ 38; provisional app. U.S. 60/247,844, Fig. 3). Appellant argues there are no applications visible on the display 202 and the “hold feedback” 205 of the provisional application does not modify an application icon. Id. at 27 (citing Keely provisional app., Fig. 2). Appellant argues the touch input in Keely’s provisional application can be at any location, including one that does not correspond to any graphical object, and Keely and the provisional application do not teach modifying a visual appearance of the first application icon “automatically.” Id. Appellant argues, therefore, Keely’s technique does not teach “modifying a visual appearance of the first application icon automatically upon the determination that upon the determination that the touch input on the first application icon located in the first position on the touch-sensitive display remains in contact with the display for more than the predetermined time period.” Id. at 27–28. In the Answer, the Examiner reiterates the “well known” features of Microsoft Windows and supplements Keely teachings. Ans. 3–4. The Examiner finds: Figure 6-7 and Paragraph [0038] of Keely et al disclose that if the time threshold is met in step 306, determining that a "right click operation" or a drag operation is intended to be performed by the user. It is well known that a "right click operation" performed over an icon in the Microsoft WINDOWS GUI environment causes a pop-up menu to be displayed over the selected icon, as well as a shaded box surrounding the selected icon, which would meet the Appellant's claim language of modifying the visual appearance of the first application icon automatically upon determining that the touch input remains in contact with the display for more than the threshold time period. Additionally, a drag operation would also cause a modification in the visual appearance of the first application Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 16 icon as well, as Paragraph [0040] of Keely et al discloses creating a trail behind the drag operation. Ans. 4. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and argues the Examiner’s reliance on undisclosed Microsoft features to supplement Keely is error. Reply Br. 5–7. For example, Appellant argues “the Examiner’s assertion ‘[i]t is well known that a “right click operation” performed over an icon in the Microsoft WINDOWS GUI environment causes a pop-up menu to be displayed over the selected icon, as well as a shaded box surrounding the selected icon,’ is pure conjecture without any factual support.” Id. at 5 (citing MPEP § 2144.03). According to Appellant, “[t]he Examiner makes assertions as to what happens in a ‘WINDOWS GUI’ environment, but provides zero support for these assertions.” Id. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding disputed limitation (L2) because the Keely teaching identified by the Examiner does not teach “modifying a visual appearance of the first application icon automatically upon the determination that the touch input on the first application icon remains in contact with the display for more than the predetermined time period.” As discussed supra regarding disputed limitation (L1), Keely does not teach a time-based threshold for activating an application. Regarding disputed limitation (L2), Keely does not teach modifying a visual appearance of the application icon and performing this function automatically. Additionally, we note the Examiner does not address Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief that the Keely incorporated by reference provisional application does not cure the insufficient teaching of Keely. On the record before us, the Examiner Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 17 provides insufficient basis to supplement the Keely teachings with the asserted “well known” Microsoft features. For example, the Examiner’s reliance on undisclosed Microsoft features, including: concurrently displaying a plurality of application icons; a right click operation causes a pop-up menu to be displayed over the selected icon and a shaded box surrounding the selected icon. The other cited references of Hutchinson, Hoshino, and Lin in this rejection are not relied upon by the Examiner for disputed limitation (L2). In view of the above, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection of representative claim 1, independent claims 14 and 27 which include the disputed limitations, and dependent claims 2, 6, 15, 19, 28, and 32–34 over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, and Lin. Because our decision with regard to the disputed limitations is dispositive of the rejections, we do not address additional arguments raised by Appellant. The remaining4 § 103 rejections In the obviousness rejections of dependent claims 3–5, 9–12, 16–18, 21–25, 29, and 30 over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin (“claim 1 cited references”), and the additional cited references (Sato, Berman, Chiang, Yoshihara, Fukasa, Berman, Chiang, Hotelling), the Examiner does not present additional findings addressing the insufficient teachings of the claim 1 cited references regarding the disputed limitations of claim 1, discussed supra. Final Act. 22–31. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejections of claims 3–5, 9–12, 16–18, 21–25, 29, and 30. 4 Appellant refers to these claims as “Group B–Group I.” Appeal Br. 13. Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 18 CONCLUSION We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 32–34 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, written description. We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 6, 14, 15, 19, 27, 28, and 32–34 over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, and Lin under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–12, 14–25, and 27–34 over Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Sato, Yoshihara, Fukasa, Berman, Chiang, and Hotelling under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2020-001567 Application 14/261,112 19 DECISION Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed 32–34 112, first para. Written Description 32–34 1, 2, 6, 14, 15, 19, 27, 28, 32–34 103(a) Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin 1, 2, 6, 14, 15, 19, 27, 28, 32–34 3, 16 103(a) Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Sato 3, 16 4, 17, 29 103(a) Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Berman 4, 17, 29 5, 18, 31 103(a) Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Chiang 5, 18, 31 7, 20 103(a) Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Yoshihara, Fukase 7, 20 8, 21 Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Yoshihara, Fukase, Raiz 8, 21 9, 10, 22, 23 103(a) Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Hotelling 9, 10, 22, 23 11, 12, 24, 25, 30 103(a) Keely, Hoshino, Hutchinson, Lin, Yoshihara 11, 12, 24, 25, 30 Overall Outcome 1–12, 14–25, 27–34 REVERSED