APPLE INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 2, 20212021001231 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/342,117 11/02/2016 Stefan Olsson 122202-6929 (P33190USC5) 1434 142248 7590 04/02/2021 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (Apple) 600 Anton Boulevard Suite 1800 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 EXAMINER VAUGHN, RYAN C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2125 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/02/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): OCIPDocketing@morganlewis.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte STEFAN OLSSON, BARRETT M. KREINER, ANDRE JARBOE, KEVIN KLEINFELTER, and JOHN B. SLEMMER Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 Technology Center 2100 Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and JOHNNY A. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judges. MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21, 22, 27–29, 34–36, and 41–53. See Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple Inc., One Apple Park Way, Cupertino, California 95014 of record. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a learning device interaction rules. Claim 21, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 21. A method comprising: establishing, by an aggregator device, communication with a plurality of devices in a device environment; detecting, by the aggregator device, a first event corresponding to a state change at a first device of the plurality of devices; in response to detecting the first event, sending, by the aggregator device, a request for a status of a second device to the second device, wherein the second device is different from the first device; receiving, by the aggregator device, an indication of the status of the second device from the second device; and sending, by the aggregator device, a notification to a third device based on the status of the second device. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Launey US 5,086,385 Feb. 4, 1992 Mun US 5,579,221 Nov. 26, 1996 Houggy US 5,838,226 Nov. 17, 1998 Kawasaki, Toshinobu US 2001/0041982 A1 Nov. 15, 2001 Gonzales, Greg US 2003/0074088 A1 Apr. 17, 2003 Bilger US 6,909,921 B1 June 21, 2005 REJECTIONS Claims 43, 46, and 51–53 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 3 inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention. Non-Final Act. 3. Claims 21, 22, 27–29, 34–36, 41, 44, 46, 48, and 50, 51 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Houggy et al. (US 5838226) ("Houggy"). Non-Final Act. 3. Claim 42 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Houggy in view of Bilger (US 6909921) ("Bilger"). Non- Final Act. 7. Claim 43 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Houggy in view of Gonzales et al. (US 20030074088) ("Gonzales"). Non-Final Act. 8. Claim 45 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Houggy in view of Mun (US 5579221) ("Mun"). Non- Final Act. 9. Claim 47 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Houggy in view of Kawasaki et al. (US 20010041982) ("Kawasaki"). Non-Final Act. 9. Claims 49 and 52 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Houggy in view of Launey et al. (US 5086385) ("Launey"). Non-Final Act. 10. Claim 53 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Houggy in view of Launey and Kawasaki. Non-Final Act. 11. Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 4 Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis 43, 46, 51–53 112, second paragraph Indefiniteness 21, 22, 27–29, 34–36, 41, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51 102(e) Houggy 42 103(a) Houggy, Bilger 43 103(a) Houggy, Gonzales 45 103(a) Houggy, Mun 47 103(a) Houggy, Kawasaki 49, 52 103(a) Houggy, Launey 53 103(a) Houggy, Launey, Kawasaki OPINION Claims 43, 46, and 51–53 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph The Examiner finds that claims 46 and 51 are indefinite because it is unclear whether the phrase “the notification” in each of these claims refers to “a notification” in claim 44 or “a second notification” in claim 50. Final Act. 3. Appellant argues the phrase “the notification” in each of claims 46 and 51 clearly refers to “a notification” in claim 44. Appeal Br. 10. Appellant further argues that reference to “a second notification” of claim 50 in a claim that depends therefrom would state “the second notification” rather than “the notification.” Id. Where, a claim is “amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions, the [Examiner] is justified in requiring the applicant to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211–12 (BPAI 2008) (precedential); see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997) Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 5 (it “is the [A]pplicants’ burden to precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s”). In this case, it is clear that “the notification” as recited in claims 46 and 51 refer back to the recitation of “a notification” of independent claims 28 and 35, respectively. See claims 28, 35, 46, and 51. The intervening “a second notification” of claims 44 and 50 is distinguished from “a notification” and “the notification” by the term “second.” See claims 44 and 50. We note that had the independent claims recited “a first notification” then the terms “the notification” would have rendered the claims vague and indefinite because it would be unclear if the notification referred back to “a first notification” or “a second notification.” However, this is not the case here. Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 43, 46, and 51–53 as vague and indefinite. Anticipation Rejections To the extent consistent with our analysis below, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in (i) the action from which this appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer. A. Claim 35 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated (1). Does Houggy expressly or inherently describe “an aggregator device” and “detecting, by the aggregator device, a first event corresponding to a state change at a first device of the plurality of devices”? a. Houggy Discloses “an aggregator device.” Appellant first argues that the “repeater” of Houggy does not constitute “an aggregator device” as claimed because the repeater relays signals between the first and second transmitters/receivers. Appeal Br. 11 (citing col. 2, ll. 36–40). Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 6 We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We further note that there is no ipsissimis verbis test for determining whether a reference discloses a claim element, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Where no explicit definition for a term is given in the specification, the term should be given its ordinary meaning and broadest reasonable interpretation. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Examiner finds that the Specification, as originally filed on November 2, 2016, discloses that “[t]he aggregator 1402 acts as a conduit of information from one device to another” and “uses a transmitter 1408 and a receiver 1406 capable of communicating with the multiple devices.” Ans. 15 (citing Spec., paras. 91–92). Therefore, the Examiner correctly interprets that any device that is capable of communicating with multiple devices via a transmitter and receiver and collecting signals from the multiple devices, as well as performing the functions claimed in the independent claims, qualifies as an “aggregator device.” Ans. 15. We further agree with the Examiner’s finding that because the term “aggregator device” is not explicitly defined in the Specification, the Examiner reasonably relies on the plain meaning of the word to “aggregate” that means “[t]o gather into one whole or mass; to collect together; assemble; to mass.” Ans. 14–15 (citing Oxford English Dictionary, definition of “aggregate, v.,” available at https://oed.corn/view/Entry/3933?rskey=ZHxT4H&result=2#eid (last accessed September 15, 2020). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Figure 1 of Houggy shows that repeater 40 communicates both with master control device 22 and with Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 7 lighting control device 50 via an RF communication. Ans. 15. That is, repeater 40 aggregates signals from multiple disparate sources. Id. Furthermore, the repeater 40 “establish[es] . . . communication with a plurality of devices in a device environment,” (Houggy Fig. 1 and col. 12, 11. 46–55), “receiv[es] . . . an indication of the status of the second device from the second device,” (Houggy Fig. 17 and col. 24, 1. 64–col. 25, 1. 26), and “send[s] . . . a notification to a third device based on the status of the second device,” (Houggy col. 13, ll. 25–28). Ans. 15. We further note that the Examiner’s citation to column 24, line 64 to column 25, line 26, expressly states the “repeater adds information” to determine the “complete on-off status bit map” of the devices. See Houggy Fig. 17 and col. 24, 1. 64–col. 25, 1. 26 (emphasis added). Thus, Houggy’s repeater “adds” or aggregates information, thereby constituting an “aggregator device.” Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the repeater constitutes an aggregator device as claimed. b. Houggy Discloses “detecting, by the aggregator device, a first event corresponding to a state change at a first device of the plurality of devices.” Appellant argues that in contrast to the “repeater” of Houggy, independent claim 35 recites various operations of an “aggregator device" that are not and cannot be performed by the repeater of Houggy, such as detecting an event, performing operations in response to such a detection, and requesting a status of another device, and are thus also not disclosed, expressly or inherently, in Houggy. Appeal Br. 11. Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 8 More particularly, Appellant argues that Houggy merely describes the simple repeating of a signal with a repeater, and does not describe any detection of an event. Appeal Br. 12. That is, “receiving a signal” is not the same as “detecting . . . a first event corresponding to a state change,” even if a signal that is repeated by a repeater happens to be related to a state change or event at another device, receiving and repeating that signal (without performing any processing or analysis of that signal, none of which is disclosed in Houggy) does not imply detection of the related event or state change by the repeater. Id. Appellant concludes that Houggy does not disclose “detecting, by the aggregator device, a first event corresponding to a state change at a first device of the plurality of devices,” as recited in independent claim 35. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the Specification does not provide a clear definition of the term “detecting.” Ans. 16. Where no explicit definition for a term is given in the specification, the term should be given its ordinary meaning and broadest reasonable interpretation. See E-Pass Techs., Inc., 343 F.3d at 1368. The Examiner correctly turns to the ordinary meaning of the term wherein the Oxford English Dictionary defines, in pertinent part, “detect” as “to discover, find out, [or] ascertain the presence, existence, or fact of [something].” Ans. 16. (citing Oxford English Dictionary, definition 4 of "detect, v.," available at https://oed.corn/view/Entry/51191 ?rskey=2KUeHh&result=2#eid (last accessed September 15, 2020)). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “detect,” in the absence of an explicit definition in the specification, must track this dictionary definition. Id. (citing MPEP § 2111.01). Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 9 The Examiner finds that Houggy discloses the “detecting” limitation because Houggy discloses that a “first signal comprising a command [is transmitted] from [a] first device, [and] the first signal [is repeated] with each repeater in a respective status time slot.” Id. (citing Houggy, abstract). The Examiner further finds that Houggy further discloses that the “first signal comprising a command” corresponds to a button press at the master control device that controls various control devices assigned to the various control buttons. Id. (citing Houggy, col. 12, ll. 20–45). The Examiner finds that the effect of this button press is to "”turn all controlled lamps on or off.” Id. (citing Houggy, col. 17, 11. 55–63 and Fig. 9A). Accordingly, the repeater (i.e., “aggregator device”) detects the button press (i.e., the “first event” which corresponds to the “state change” from a non-depressed button to a depressed button), and thus, ascertains the presence, existence, or fact of the button press, by receiving the signal sent from the master control device (i.e., the “first device”) in response to the button press. Id. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Houggy discloses “detecting, by the aggregator device, a first event corresponding to a state change at a first device of the plurality of devices.” Id. c. Houggy Discloses “in response to detecting the first event, sending, by the aggregator device, a request for a status of a second device to the second device, wherein the second device is different from the first device.” Appellant argues that Houggy does not disclose any request sent from the repeater, let alone sending a request “in response to detecting the first event.” Appeal Br. 13. The Examiner states that Appellant makes no substantive argument in support of this assertion other than to express disapprobation of Examiner’s position that the transmission of the first signal from the repeater to the Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 10 second device in Houggy is a request for the second device’s status because the second device responds to the signal with a status update returned to the repeater. Ans. 18. We start by noting that on this record, we find that Appellant failed to present substantive arguments and supporting evidence persuasive of Examiner error regarding the aforementioned disputed limitation. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(“we hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Houggy’s abstract discloses that the “first signal comprising a command” is transmitted from the master control device (i.e., first device) to the repeater (i.e., the aggregator). See Ans. 18. We agree with the Examiner that the abstract discloses that, in response to the receipt of this signal (i.e., “in response to detecting the first event”), the repeater (i.e., the aggregator) repeats the signal and the signal is received at a second device such as a light dimmer (i.e., a second device), which causes the second device to transmit status information wherein the control device “return[ s] a radio frequency signal . . . via the repeater indicating the true status of the electrical device.” See Houggy, Abstract and col. 1, ll. 30–45 and also see second non-Final Act. 4–5 (citing col. 12, ll. 20–45, col. 17, ll. 55–63, and col. 24, l. 64–col. 25, l. 26). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Houggy discloses “in response to detecting the first event, sending, by the aggregator device, a request for a status of a second device to the second device, wherein the second device is different from the first device.” Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 11 rejection of claim 35 and for the same reasons the rejections of claims 36, 50, 51, 41and 48 not argued separately. B. Claims 21 and 28 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated Appellant repeats some of the same arguments as discussed above for claims 21 and 28. See Appeal Br. 13–15. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 21 and 28 for the same reasons. We also affirm the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 22, 27, 29, 34, and 44 not argued separately. C. Claim 46 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated Appellant argues that dependent claim 46 recites “causing, by the aggregator device, a second state change to the second device to occur after sending the notification.” Appeal Br. 15–16. Appellant argues even the Examiner’s own description of Houggy, the repeaters of Houggy merely pass messages and the repeaters are not disclosed as “causing . . . a second state change to the second device to occur after sending the notification.” Id. (citing Non-Final Act. 6–7 citing Houggy, col. 24, 1. 64 – col. 25, 1. 26, and Fig. 17). We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that the actuation of the button on the master control device sets in motion a process to “turn on certain lamps,” or in other words, to change the status of the second device. Ans. 18 (citing Houggy, col. 24, 1. 64 – col. 25, 1. 26). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that by passing a signal from the master control device to turn on certain lamps, the repeater causes the state change at the lamps, at least insofar as the state change would not occur but for the passing of the message to the affected control devices by the repeater. Ans. 18–19. In other words there is no requirement in the claim for the aggregator to directly cause a state of change, and thus, a Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 12 repeater (i.e., aggregator) that indirectly causes a state change to a second device by relaying or sending the notification meets the claim. Accordingly, we affirm claim 46. D. Claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 1. The Combination of Houggy and Gonzales Teaches or Suggests Interaction Rules Appellant argues that Gonzales does not teach or suggest an “interaction rule” because Gonzales describes how a “home occupant” can launch “scenes,” also called house scenes, involving one or more products and appliances and that the “scenes” of Gonzales are not disclosed to relate to any interaction between the devices. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant argues that the “morning scene” of Gonzales, and “scenes” in general in Gonzales, each include “one (1) or more devices set to a particular state.” Id. (citing Gonzales, para. 4). Gonzales describes how a “home occupant” can “launch ‘scenes,’ also called house scenes, involving one or more products and appliances.” Id. (citing Gonzales, para. 3). Thus, the devices in each “scene” of Gonzales are each set to one particular state for that scene, and the “scenes” of Gonzales are not disclosed to relate to any interaction between the devices. Id. We do not agree with Appellant. The Examiner finds that the Specification does not define the term “interaction rules” in any closed ended way, and the term does not appear to have been an accepted term of art at the time of invention. Ans. 20. The Examiner turns to the Specification for guidance of the meaning of the term, albeit not a definition, and paragraph 8, states that Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 13 [e]mbodiments of the present invention establish interaction rules through observation of user interaction with the devices of the environment . . . . Once the rules are learned, the devices can operate in accordance with the interaction rules . . . automatically [to] change states upon the user initiating an activity at a device within the environment. Id. Thus, at most, the term “interaction rule” means a rule that governs the interaction between states of the devices in a device environment upon the occurrence of a triggering condition. Id. Consistent with Appellant’s Specification, Gonzales teaches a home automation system could, upon the occurrence of a triggering event defined by the user, set, for example, a “morning scene” in which the furnace is set to 70 degrees, the master bathroom lights are set to 50%, the kitchen lights are set to 100%, the coffee machine is on, the TV in the kitchen is on a particular channel, and the front porch light is off. Id. That is, when the furnace (device l) is at 70 degrees and the triggering condition is met, the master bathroom lights (device 2) are set to 50%, the kitchen lights (device 3) are set to 100%, etc. Id. Thus, the “morning scene” governs the interactions among the states of the furnace, kitchen lights, master bathroom lights, etc. upon the occurrence of the triggering condition. Id. As such, it is an “interaction rule” as that term is most broadly reasonably construed in light of the Specification. Id. We note that Appellant’s Specification provides an example stating that “the aggregator may possess the interaction rule that when the VCR is on, the TV should be tuned to channel.” Spec. para. 103. In other words, the triggering condition of the VCR being turned on causing the TV to tune to a particular channel. Consistent with Appellant’s Specification, when the “morning scene” occurs different devices change their settings, wherein the Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 14 furnace is set to 70 degrees, the master bathroom lights are set to 50%, the kitchen lights are set to 100%, the coffee machine is on, the TV in the kitchen is on a particular channel, and the front porch light is off. See Gonzales, para. 4. Thus, when the morning scene is triggered the devices change their statuses similar to Appellant’s Specification including tuning the TV to a particular channel. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims . . . 2. The Modification of Houggy with Gonzales Would Not Change the Principle of Operation of Houggy Appellant argues that the repeaters of Houggy are designed to repeat or pass information, and modifying the repeaters of Houggy to “select an interaction rule governing operations to be performed in the house in response to an event” would change the basic principle under which the repeaters of Houggy are designed to operate. Appeal Br. 17–18. We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Instead, the relevant issue is “what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. “Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Gonzales does not have to be physically combinable with Houggy in order to render the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. Ans. 21. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Gonzales would suggest to an ordinary artisan that Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 15 in a home network such as taught by Houggy, functionality for storing and calling interaction rules among devices in the network would have the advantage of increasing user convenience by allowing multiple devices to be manipulated simultaneously. Id. We agree with the Examiner that whether that functionality can be physically programmed into the repeater of Houggy is immaterial to the analysis. Id. also see In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425 and In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d at 968. Furthermore, we also agree with the Examiner that even assuming arguendo that the validity of the rejection hinges on whether the repeater of Houggy can be physically modified, making the modification would not “change the principle of operation” of the repeater because the aggregator “acts as a conduit of communication from one device to another” and “uses a transmitter 1408 and receiver 1406 capable of communicating with the multiple devices” and similarly Houggy’s description of the repeater states: “[a] communication protocol for a two way transmission system [has] . . . at least one repeater for relaying signals between the first and second devices” and “[t]he repeater 40 includes a[n] . . . RF board 407 coupled to antenna 409.” Ans. 22 (citing Spec. paras. 91–92 and Houggy, col. 16, ll. 49–58). We further agree with the Examiner’s finding that the aggregator is has a “processor” and a “memory,” wherein “the processor . . . communicates with the memory . . . to apply interaction rules that govern the communications.” Ans. 22 (citing Spec. paras. 93 and 48). Similarly, the microcontroller of Gonzales contains “non-volatile memory 36 [that] may be used to store and retain scene settings for the device when power is removed” and “switches [that] may be utilized . . . to trigger a scene that includes other devices.” Id. (citing Gonzales, paras. 43 and 47). Furthermore, Houggy’s repeater also has a microcontroller, (i.e., Figure 24, Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 16 reference character 436), and a button housing providing support for indicators and buttons, (i.e, Figure 5, reference characters 411 and 413). Id. Accordigly, we agree with the Examiner that if the repeater of Houggy were re-engineered to include a memory for storing interaction rules (i.e., the “scenes” of Gonzales) and programmed to include functionality for selecting among them in response to a triggering event would not change the principle of operation of the repeater because the repeater would still be capable of passing signals just as the aggregator of the instant specification does. Id. We agree with the Examiner that such a modification would more properly be described as an enhancement of the repeater and would in no way reduce the capacity of the repeater to perform its essential function, namely to pass messages among the devices in the network. Id. We further agree with the Examiner that Appellant does not suggest, and could not reasonably argue, that merely adding storage and processing functionality to the repeater would render it ineffective as a repeater. Id. At most, Appellant’s argument is that including such functionality would make it more than a mere repeater, which is not the proper test. Id. (citing Cf. MPEP § 2143.0l (VI) (indicating that a suggested combination that “would require a substantial reconstruction and redesign of the elements shown in [the primary reference],” as opposed to merely adding new elements thereto, is impermissible). Id. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 52, and 53. Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 17 CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21, 22, 27–29, 34–36, and 41–53 is AFFIRMED. More specifically, DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 43, 46, 51– 53 112, second paragraph Indefiniteness 43, 46, 51– 53 21, 22, 27– 29, 34–36, 41, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51 102(e) Houggy 21, 22, 27– 29, 34–36, 41, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51 42 103(a) Houggy, Bilger 42 43 103(a) Houggy, Gonzales 43 45 103(a) Houggy, Mun 45 47 103(a) Houggy, Kawasaki 47 49, 52 103(a) Houggy, Launey 49, 52 53 103(a) Houggy, Launey, Kawasaki 53 Overall Outcome 21, 22, 27– 29, 34–36, 41–53 RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Appeal 2021-001231 Application 15/342,117 18 AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation