APPLE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2021

2021001231 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/342,117 11/02/2016 Stefan Olsson 122202-6929
(P33190USC5)
1434
142248 7590 04/02/2021
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (Apple)
600 Anton Boulevard
Suite 1800
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
EXAMINER
VAUGHN, RYAN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2125
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
OCIPDocketing@morganlewis.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEFAN OLSSON, BARRETT M. KREINER,
ANDRE JARBOE, KEVIN KLEINFELTER, and
JOHN B. SLEMMER
Appeal 2021-001231
Application 15/342,117
Technology Center 2100
Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and
JOHNNY A. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judges.
MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21, 22, 27–29, 34–36, and 41–53. See
Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple Inc., One
Apple Park Way, Cupertino, California 95014 of record. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a learning device interaction rules. Claim
21, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
21. A method comprising:
establishing, by an aggregator device, communication
with a plurality of devices in a device environment;
detecting, by the aggregator device, a first event
corresponding to a state change at a first device of the plurality
of devices;
in response to detecting the first event, sending, by the
aggregator device, a request for a status of a second device to the
second device, wherein the second device is different from the
first device;
receiving, by the aggregator device, an indication of the
status of the second device from the second device; and
sending, by the aggregator device, a notification to a third
device based on the status of the second device.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Launey US 5,086,385 Feb. 4, 1992
Mun US 5,579,221 Nov. 26, 1996
Houggy US 5,838,226 Nov. 17, 1998
Kawasaki, Toshinobu US 2001/0041982 A1 Nov. 15, 2001
Gonzales, Greg US 2003/0074088 A1 Apr. 17, 2003
Bilger US 6,909,921 B1 June 21, 2005

REJECTIONS
Claims 43, 46, and 51–53 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35
U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the
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3
inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the
invention. Non-Final Act. 3.
Claims 21, 22, 27–29, 34–36, 41, 44, 46, 48, and 50, 51 are rejected
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Houggy et al. (US
5838226) ("Houggy"). Non-Final Act. 3.
Claim 42 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Houggy in view of Bilger (US 6909921) ("Bilger"). Non-
Final Act. 7.
Claim 43 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Houggy in view of Gonzales et al. (US 20030074088)
("Gonzales"). Non-Final Act. 8.
Claim 45 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Houggy in view of Mun (US 5579221) ("Mun"). Non-
Final Act. 9.
Claim 47 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Houggy in view of Kawasaki et al. (US 20010041982)
("Kawasaki"). Non-Final Act. 9.
Claims 49 and 52 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Houggy in view of Launey et al. (US 5086385)
("Launey"). Non-Final Act. 10.
Claim 53 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Houggy in view of Launey and Kawasaki. Non-Final Act.
11.

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4
Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
43, 46, 51–53 112, second paragraph Indefiniteness
21, 22, 27–29, 34–36,
41, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51
102(e) Houggy
42 103(a) Houggy, Bilger
43 103(a) Houggy, Gonzales
45 103(a) Houggy, Mun
47 103(a) Houggy, Kawasaki
49, 52 103(a) Houggy, Launey
53 103(a) Houggy, Launey,
Kawasaki

OPINION
Claims 43, 46, and 51–53 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35
U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph
The Examiner finds that claims 46 and 51 are indefinite because it is
unclear whether the phrase “the notification” in each of these claims refers
to “a notification” in claim 44 or “a second notification” in claim 50. Final
Act. 3.
Appellant argues the phrase “the notification” in each of claims 46
and 51 clearly refers to “a notification” in claim 44. Appeal Br. 10.
Appellant further argues that reference to “a second notification” of claim 50
in a claim that depends therefrom would state “the second notification”
rather than “the notification.” Id.
Where, a claim is “amenable to two or more plausible claim
constructions, the [Examiner] is justified in requiring the applicant to more
precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by holding
the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as
indefinite.” Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211–12 (BPAI 2008)
(precedential); see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
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(it “is the [A]pplicants’ burden to precisely define the invention, not the
PTO’s”). In this case, it is clear that “the notification” as recited in claims
46 and 51 refer back to the recitation of “a notification” of independent
claims 28 and 35, respectively. See claims 28, 35, 46, and 51. The
intervening “a second notification” of claims 44 and 50 is distinguished from
“a notification” and “the notification” by the term “second.” See claims 44
and 50.
We note that had the independent claims recited “a first notification”
then the terms “the notification” would have rendered the claims vague and
indefinite because it would be unclear if the notification referred back to “a
first notification” or “a second notification.” However, this is not the case
here.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 43, 46,
and 51–53 as vague and indefinite.
Anticipation Rejections
To the extent consistent with our analysis below, we adopt the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions in (i) the action from which this appeal
is taken and (ii) the Answer.
A. Claim 35 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated
(1). Does Houggy expressly or inherently describe “an aggregator
device” and “detecting, by the aggregator device, a first event
corresponding to a state change at a first device of the plurality of devices”?
a. Houggy Discloses “an aggregator device.”
Appellant first argues that the “repeater” of Houggy does not
constitute “an aggregator device” as claimed because the repeater relays
signals between the first and second transmitters/receivers. Appeal Br. 11
(citing col. 2, ll. 36–40).
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We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We give claims their
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re
Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We
further note that there is no ipsissimis verbis test for determining whether a
reference discloses a claim element, i.e., identity of terminology is not
required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Where no explicit
definition for a term is given in the specification, the term should be given
its ordinary meaning and broadest reasonable interpretation. E-Pass Techs.,
Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The Examiner finds that the Specification, as originally filed on
November 2, 2016, discloses that “[t]he aggregator 1402 acts as a conduit of
information from one device to another” and “uses a transmitter 1408 and a
receiver 1406 capable of communicating with the multiple devices.” Ans.
15 (citing Spec., paras. 91–92). Therefore, the Examiner correctly interprets
that any device that is capable of communicating with multiple devices via a
transmitter and receiver and collecting signals from the multiple devices, as
well as performing the functions claimed in the independent claims, qualifies
as an “aggregator device.” Ans. 15. We further agree with the Examiner’s
finding that because the term “aggregator device” is not explicitly defined in
the Specification, the Examiner reasonably relies on the plain meaning of the
word to “aggregate” that means “[t]o gather into one whole or mass; to
collect together; assemble; to mass.” Ans. 14–15 (citing Oxford English
Dictionary, definition of “aggregate, v.,” available at
https://oed.corn/view/Entry/3933?rskey=ZHxT4H&result=2#eid (last
accessed September 15, 2020).
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Figure 1 of Houggy shows
that repeater 40 communicates both with master control device 22 and with
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lighting control device 50 via an RF communication. Ans. 15. That is,
repeater 40 aggregates signals from multiple disparate sources. Id.
Furthermore, the repeater 40 “establish[es] . . . communication with a
plurality of devices in a device environment,” (Houggy Fig. 1 and col. 12,
11. 46–55), “receiv[es] . . . an indication of the status of the second device
from the second device,” (Houggy Fig. 17 and col. 24, 1. 64–col. 25, 1. 26),
and “send[s] . . . a notification to a third device based on the status of the
second device,” (Houggy col. 13, ll. 25–28). Ans. 15.
We further note that the Examiner’s citation to column 24, line 64 to
column 25, line 26, expressly states the “repeater adds information” to
determine the “complete on-off status bit map” of the devices. See Houggy
Fig. 17 and col. 24, 1. 64–col. 25, 1. 26 (emphasis added). Thus, Houggy’s
repeater “adds” or aggregates information, thereby constituting an
“aggregator device.”
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the repeater constitutes
an aggregator device as claimed.
b. Houggy Discloses “detecting, by the aggregator device, a first
event corresponding to a state change at a first device of the
plurality of devices.”
Appellant argues that in contrast to the “repeater” of Houggy,
independent claim 35 recites various operations of an “aggregator device"
that are not and cannot be performed by the repeater of Houggy, such as
detecting an event, performing operations in response to such a detection,
and requesting a status of another device, and are thus also not disclosed,
expressly or inherently, in Houggy. Appeal Br. 11.
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More particularly, Appellant argues that Houggy merely describes the
simple repeating of a signal with a repeater, and does not describe any
detection of an event. Appeal Br. 12. That is, “receiving a signal” is not the
same as “detecting . . . a first event corresponding to a state change,” even if
a signal that is repeated by a repeater happens to be related to a state change
or event at another device, receiving and repeating that signal (without
performing any processing or analysis of that signal, none of which is
disclosed in Houggy) does not imply detection of the related event or state
change by the repeater. Id. Appellant concludes that Houggy does not
disclose “detecting, by the aggregator device, a first event corresponding to a
state change at a first device of the plurality of devices,” as recited in
independent claim 35.
We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds, and
we agree, that the Specification does not provide a clear definition of the
term “detecting.” Ans. 16. Where no explicit definition for a term is given
in the specification, the term should be given its ordinary meaning and
broadest reasonable interpretation. See E-Pass Techs., Inc., 343 F.3d at
1368. The Examiner correctly turns to the ordinary meaning of the term
wherein the Oxford English Dictionary defines, in pertinent part, “detect” as
“to discover, find out, [or] ascertain the presence, existence, or fact of
[something].” Ans. 16. (citing Oxford English Dictionary, definition 4 of
"detect, v.," available at https://oed.corn/view/Entry/51191
?rskey=2KUeHh&result=2#eid (last accessed September 15, 2020)). The
Examiner finds, and we agree, that the broadest reasonable interpretation of
the term “detect,” in the absence of an explicit definition in the specification,
must track this dictionary definition. Id. (citing MPEP § 2111.01).
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The Examiner finds that Houggy discloses the “detecting” limitation
because Houggy discloses that a “first signal comprising a command [is
transmitted] from [a] first device, [and] the first signal [is repeated] with
each repeater in a respective status time slot.” Id. (citing Houggy, abstract).
The Examiner further finds that Houggy further discloses that the “first
signal comprising a command” corresponds to a button press at the master
control device that controls various control devices assigned to the various
control buttons. Id. (citing Houggy, col. 12, ll. 20–45). The Examiner finds
that the effect of this button press is to "”turn all controlled lamps on or off.”
Id. (citing Houggy, col. 17, 11. 55–63 and Fig. 9A). Accordingly, the
repeater (i.e., “aggregator device”) detects the button press (i.e., the “first
event” which corresponds to the “state change” from a non-depressed button
to a depressed button), and thus, ascertains the presence, existence, or fact of
the button press, by receiving the signal sent from the master control device
(i.e., the “first device”) in response to the button press. Id.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Houggy discloses “detecting,
by the aggregator device, a first event corresponding to a state change at a
first device of the plurality of devices.” Id.
c. Houggy Discloses “in response to detecting the first event,
sending, by the aggregator device, a request for a status of a
second device to the second device, wherein the second device
is different from the first device.”
Appellant argues that Houggy does not disclose any request sent from
the repeater, let alone sending a request “in response to detecting the first
event.” Appeal Br. 13.
The Examiner states that Appellant makes no substantive argument in
support of this assertion other than to express disapprobation of Examiner’s
position that the transmission of the first signal from the repeater to the
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second device in Houggy is a request for the second device’s status because
the second device responds to the signal with a status update returned to the
repeater. Ans. 18.
We start by noting that on this record, we find that Appellant failed to
present substantive arguments and supporting evidence persuasive of
Examiner error regarding the aforementioned disputed limitation. See In re
Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(“we hold that the Board
reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in
an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked
assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”).
Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Houggy’s
abstract discloses that the “first signal comprising a command” is
transmitted from the master control device (i.e., first device) to the repeater
(i.e., the aggregator). See Ans. 18. We agree with the Examiner that the
abstract discloses that, in response to the receipt of this signal (i.e., “in
response to detecting the first event”), the repeater (i.e., the aggregator)
repeats the signal and the signal is received at a second device such as a light
dimmer (i.e., a second device), which causes the second device to transmit
status information wherein the control device “return[ s] a radio frequency
signal . . . via the repeater indicating the true status of the electrical device.”
See Houggy, Abstract and col. 1, ll. 30–45 and also see second non-Final
Act. 4–5 (citing col. 12, ll. 20–45, col. 17, ll. 55–63, and col. 24, l. 64–col.
25, l. 26).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Houggy discloses “in response
to detecting the first event, sending, by the aggregator device, a request for a
status of a second device to the second device, wherein the second device is
different from the first device.” Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s
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rejection of claim 35 and for the same reasons the rejections of claims 36,
50, 51, 41and 48 not argued separately.
B. Claims 21 and 28 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated
Appellant repeats some of the same arguments as discussed above for
claims 21 and 28. See Appeal Br. 13–15. Accordingly, we affirm the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 21 and 28 for the same reasons.
We also affirm the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 22, 27,
29, 34, and 44 not argued separately.
C. Claim 46 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated
Appellant argues that dependent claim 46 recites “causing, by the
aggregator device, a second state change to the second device to occur after
sending the notification.” Appeal Br. 15–16. Appellant argues even the
Examiner’s own description of Houggy, the repeaters of Houggy
merely pass messages and the repeaters are not disclosed as “causing . . . a
second state change to the second device to occur after sending the
notification.” Id. (citing Non-Final Act. 6–7 citing Houggy, col. 24, 1. 64 –
col. 25, 1. 26, and Fig. 17).
We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. We agree with the
Examiner’s finding that the actuation of the button on the master control
device sets in motion a process to “turn on certain lamps,” or in other words,
to change the status of the second device. Ans. 18 (citing Houggy, col. 24,
1. 64 – col. 25, 1. 26). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that by passing a
signal from the master control device to turn on certain lamps, the repeater
causes the state change at the lamps, at least insofar as the state change
would not occur but for the passing of the message to the affected control
devices by the repeater. Ans. 18–19. In other words there is no requirement
in the claim for the aggregator to directly cause a state of change, and thus, a
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repeater (i.e., aggregator) that indirectly causes a state change to a second
device by relaying or sending the notification meets the claim.
Accordingly, we affirm claim 46.
D. Claims rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
1. The Combination of Houggy and Gonzales Teaches or Suggests
Interaction Rules
Appellant argues that Gonzales does not teach or suggest an
“interaction rule” because Gonzales describes how a “home occupant” can
launch “scenes,” also called house scenes, involving one or more products
and appliances and that the “scenes” of Gonzales are not disclosed to relate
to any interaction between the devices. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant argues
that the “morning scene” of Gonzales, and “scenes” in general in Gonzales,
each include “one (1) or more devices set to a particular state.” Id. (citing
Gonzales, para. 4). Gonzales describes how a “home occupant” can “launch
‘scenes,’ also called house scenes, involving one or more products
and appliances.” Id. (citing Gonzales, para. 3). Thus, the devices in each
“scene” of Gonzales are each set to one particular state for that scene, and
the “scenes” of Gonzales are not disclosed to relate to any interaction
between the devices. Id.
We do not agree with Appellant. The Examiner finds that the
Specification does not define the term “interaction rules” in any closed
ended way, and the term does not appear to have been an accepted term of
art at the time of invention. Ans. 20. The Examiner turns to the
Specification for guidance of the meaning of the term, albeit not a definition,
and paragraph 8, states that

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[e]mbodiments of the present invention establish interaction
rules through observation of user interaction with the devices of
the environment . . . . Once the rules are learned, the devices
can operate in accordance with the interaction rules . . .
automatically [to] change states upon the user initiating an
activity at a device within the environment.
Id. Thus, at most, the term “interaction rule” means a rule that governs the
interaction between states of the devices in a device environment upon the
occurrence of a triggering condition. Id.
Consistent with Appellant’s Specification, Gonzales teaches a home
automation system could, upon the occurrence of a triggering event defined
by the user, set, for example, a “morning scene” in which the furnace is set
to 70 degrees, the master bathroom lights are set to 50%, the kitchen lights
are set to 100%, the coffee machine is on, the TV in the kitchen is on a
particular channel, and the front porch light is off. Id. That is, when the
furnace (device l) is at 70 degrees and the triggering condition is met, the
master bathroom lights (device 2) are set to 50%, the kitchen lights (device
3) are set to 100%, etc. Id. Thus, the “morning scene” governs the
interactions among the states of the furnace, kitchen lights, master bathroom
lights, etc. upon the occurrence of the triggering condition. Id. As such, it is
an “interaction rule” as that term is most broadly reasonably construed in
light of the Specification. Id.
We note that Appellant’s Specification provides an example stating
that “the aggregator may possess the interaction rule that when the VCR is
on, the TV should be tuned to channel.” Spec. para. 103. In other words,
the triggering condition of the VCR being turned on causing the TV to tune
to a particular channel. Consistent with Appellant’s Specification, when the
“morning scene” occurs different devices change their settings, wherein the
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furnace is set to 70 degrees, the master bathroom lights are set to 50%, the
kitchen lights are set to 100%, the coffee machine is on, the TV in the
kitchen is on a particular channel, and the front porch light is off. See
Gonzales, para. 4. Thus, when the morning scene is triggered the devices
change their statuses similar to Appellant’s Specification including tuning
the TV to a particular channel.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims . . .
2. The Modification of Houggy with Gonzales Would Not Change the
Principle of Operation of Houggy
Appellant argues that the repeaters of Houggy are designed to repeat
or pass information, and modifying the repeaters of Houggy to “select an
interaction rule governing operations to be performed in the house in
response to an event” would change the basic principle under which the
repeaters of Houggy are designed to operate. Appeal Br. 17–18.
We do not agree with Appellant’s argument. “The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Instead, the relevant issue is “what
the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.” Id. “Combining the teachings of references does
not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt,
482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973).
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Gonzales does not have to
be physically combinable with Houggy in order to render the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. Ans. 21. We agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Gonzales would suggest to an ordinary artisan that
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in a home network such as taught by Houggy, functionality for storing and
calling interaction rules among devices in the network would have the
advantage of increasing user convenience by allowing multiple devices to be
manipulated simultaneously. Id. We agree with the Examiner that whether
that functionality can be physically programmed into the repeater of Houggy
is immaterial to the analysis. Id. also see In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425 and
In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d at 968.
Furthermore, we also agree with the Examiner that even assuming
arguendo that the validity of the rejection hinges on whether the repeater
of Houggy can be physically modified, making the modification would not
“change the principle of operation” of the repeater because the aggregator
“acts as a conduit of communication from one device to another” and “uses a
transmitter 1408 and receiver 1406 capable of communicating with the
multiple devices” and similarly Houggy’s description of the repeater states:
“[a] communication protocol for a two way transmission system [has] . . . at
least one repeater for relaying signals between the first and second devices”
and “[t]he repeater 40 includes a[n] . . . RF board 407 coupled to antenna
409.” Ans. 22 (citing Spec. paras. 91–92 and Houggy, col. 16, ll. 49–58).
We further agree with the Examiner’s finding that the aggregator is
has a “processor” and a “memory,” wherein “the processor . . .
communicates with the memory . . . to apply interaction rules that govern
the communications.” Ans. 22 (citing Spec. paras. 93 and 48). Similarly,
the microcontroller of Gonzales contains “non-volatile memory 36 [that]
may be used to store and retain scene settings for the device when power is
removed” and “switches [that] may be utilized . . . to trigger a scene that
includes other devices.” Id. (citing Gonzales, paras. 43 and 47).
Furthermore, Houggy’s repeater also has a microcontroller, (i.e., Figure 24,
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reference character 436), and a button housing providing support for
indicators and buttons, (i.e, Figure 5, reference characters 411
and 413). Id.
Accordigly, we agree with the Examiner that if the repeater of
Houggy were re-engineered to include a memory for storing interaction rules
(i.e., the “scenes” of Gonzales) and programmed to include functionality for
selecting among them in response to a triggering event would not change the
principle of operation of the repeater because the repeater would still be
capable of passing signals just as the aggregator of the instant specification
does. Id. We agree with the Examiner that such a modification would more
properly be described as an enhancement of the repeater and would in no
way reduce the capacity of the repeater to perform its essential function,
namely to pass messages among the devices in the network. Id. We further
agree with the Examiner that Appellant does not suggest, and could not
reasonably argue, that merely adding storage and processing functionality to
the repeater would render it ineffective as a repeater. Id. At most,
Appellant’s argument is that including such functionality would make it
more than a mere repeater, which is not the proper test. Id. (citing Cf.
MPEP § 2143.0l (VI) (indicating that a suggested combination that “would
require a substantial reconstruction and redesign of the elements shown in
[the primary reference],” as opposed to merely adding new elements thereto,
is impermissible). Id.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 42, 43, 45,
47, 49, 52, and 53.

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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED.

The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21, 22, 27–29, 34–36, and
41–53 is AFFIRMED.

More specifically,
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
43, 46, 51–
53
112, second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 43, 46, 51–
53
21, 22, 27–
29, 34–36,
41, 44, 46,
48, 50, 51
102(e) Houggy 21, 22, 27–
29, 34–36,
41, 44, 46,
48, 50, 51

42 103(a) Houggy, Bilger 42
43 103(a) Houggy, Gonzales 43
45 103(a) Houggy, Mun 45
47 103(a) Houggy, Kawasaki 47
49, 52 103(a) Houggy, Launey 49, 52
53 103(a) Houggy, Launey,
Kawasaki
53
Overall
Outcome
21, 22, 27–
29, 34–36,
41–53

RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
Appeal 2021-001231
Application 15/342,117
18
AFFIRMED