Apple Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 3, 2021

2021000386 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/876,715 01/22/2018 Jennifer L. C. FOLSE 106842151101
(P31590USC1)
1018
161038 7590 08/03/2021
Apple c/o Kubota & Basol LLP
445 S. Figueroa Street
Suite 2140
Los Angeles, CA 90071
EXAMINER
GEE, JASON KAI YIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2495
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/03/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@kuba-law.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JENNIFER L. C. FOLSE, JONATHAN LOCHHEAD,
FLORIAN GRUENKE, and WILLIAM M. BACHMAN
Appeal 2021-000386
Application 15/876,715
Technology Center 2400
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, JUSTIN BUSCH, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–13. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple
Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2021-000386
Application 15/876,715

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a device-level authorization for viewing
content. The Specification describes:
In some embodiments, media (e.g., recorded sports games,
recorded movies, live sports games, etc.) is available to an
electronic device via one or more applications installed on the
device. For example, the electronic device optionally has
applications associated with HBO and ESPN downloaded on it,
via which the electronic device accesses media from secondary
content providers such as HBO (e.g., movies) and ESPN (e.g.,
sports), respectively. Such applications optionally require a user
of the electronic device to have an account with a primary
content provider, such as a cable or satellite provider that
provides access to a bundle of content from a plurality of
different secondary content providers for a fixed monthly or
yearly fee, and to authorize the applications with the account
with the primary content provider before allowing the electronic
device to access media from those applications. In some
implementations this authorization generally occurs on a per-
application basis, however when each application is performing
its own authorization the user may have to navigate through a
large number of authorization processes (one for each app) which
may all be organized slightly differently with different
requirements and different steps for authorization. This process
is complex and many users will give up before completing the
authorization for all of the secondary content providers with
media that the user is entitled to access via a subscription with
the primary content provider. The examples of the disclosure are
directed to authorizing an electronic device with a primary
content provider such that various applications on the electronic
device are able to use that authorization to provide the electronic
device with access to media, without requiring separate
authorization of each application with the primary content
provider, to make the process of authorizing access to media
from different secondary content providers more efficient, thus
improving the machine-person interface.
Spec. ¶ 127.
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Application 15/876,715

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Appellant’s claims realize the concepts described above by reciting a
process by which users receive authorization to access content from multiple
sources via a single account, whereby additional applications that can access
content via that same single account are identified and offered for
downloading to the user. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method comprising:
at an electronic device that is in communication with a display
and one or more input devices:
receiving, via the one or more input devices, an input for
initiating a process for authorizing a user to access first content
from multiple sources via a single account; and
in response to receiving the input for initiating the process
for authorizing the user to access first content from multiple
sources via the single account:
authorizing the user to access the first content via
one or more applications installed on the electronic device;
and
prompting the user to download additional
applications that have access to the first content via the
single account, wherein the additional applications are not
downloaded on the electronic device;
receiving, via the one or more input devices, an input for
downloading one or more of the additional applications; and
in response to receiving the input for downloading the one
or more of the additional applications, downloading the one or
more of the additional applications.
Appeal Br. 26 (Claims Appendix).
Appeal 2021-000386
Application 15/876,715

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REFERENCES2
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Rao US 9,247,014 B1 Jan. 26, 2016
Naggar US 2013/0332838 A1 Dec. 12, 2013
Zheng US 2014/0075574 A1 Mar. 13, 2014
Shaw US 2014/0365919 A1 Dec. 11, 2014
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 5–8, 10, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Naggar, Shaw, and Rao. Non-Final Act. 3–9.
Claims 3, 4, and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the Naggar, Shaw, Rao, and Zheng. Non-Final Act. 9–10.
ISSUE
Appellant’s arguments raise the following issue for consideration:
Has the Examiner erred in finding the cited references teach or
suggest “receiving, via the one or more input devices, an input for initiating
a process for authorizing a user to access first content from multiple sources
via a single account,” as recited in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner cites Naggar as teaching the
limitation “receiving . . . an input for initiating a process for authorizing a
user to access first content from multiple sources via a single account.”
Final Act. 3–4. More specifically, the Examiner finds Naggar’s description
of a user logging into an account and utilizing login information to permit

2 Citations to the references are to the first named inventor/author only.
Appeal 2021-000386
Application 15/876,715

5
access to content in a content distribution system teaches this claim
limitation. Final Act. 3 (citing Naggar ¶¶ 31, 77).
Appellant argues “the Examiner maps the ‘single account’ to the user
account of the cross-platform application that enables access to the cross-
platform application. But nowhere does Naggar disclose that this same
account is able to provide other applications with access to the content
available in the cross-platform application.” Appeal Br. 13. We agree.
Naggar describes a “user interface providing access to content from
multiple content providers, each of the multiple content providers having a
separate subscription associated with the user.” Naggar, Abstract. Naggar
provides access to content via a cross-platform application which “may
provide a single interface to select and view content from multiple sources.”
Naggar ¶ 31. Naggar teaches that “the cross-platform application may
permit a user . . . to login to an account . . . and access catalog information
. . . for content from multiple providers.” Id. However, consistent with
Appellant’s argument, Naggar indicates that separate account credentials are
used to access available content from partner content providers. For
example, Naggar states that “cross-platform application 405 may enable user
device 260 to perform functions . . . [including] permitting a user of user
device 260 to login to an account with partner content providers 250 and/or
web content providers.” Naggar ¶ 51. However, Naggar does not teach that
merely logging into to the cross-platform application provides access to
content from content partner providers that require authorization or
authentication. Indeed, Naggar makes clear that separate subscriptions are
used: “User interface 540 may include an interactive client interface that
allows a user to provide input, such as user passwords, preferences, and
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selections from the list of available content.” Naggar ¶ 58. As such, we are
persuaded the Examiner has not sufficiently demonstrated that Naggar
teaches “authorizing a user to access first content from multiple sources via
a single account” as recited in claim 1, which we interpret as requiring
authorizing the user to be granted access to at least two sources with a single
account (i.e., set of login credentials). In other words, the claim requires a
“single sign on” feature to access content from multiple, otherwise
inaccessible sources that each require authentication in order to access the
content therein.
Even to the extent Naggar teaches allowing a user access to content
from multiple sources (e.g., partner providers or web content providers) via
a single application (i.e., the cross-platform application), Naggar does not
teach or suggest the credentials associated with the cross-platform
application as providing the necessary authorization to the user to access
content from those sources. Rather, Naggar merely authorizes the user to
access the cross-platform application.
As noted above, Naggar provides an interface to access content from
multiple sources but, to the extent a source requires a user to be authorized
to access the content, Naggar teaches providing an interface into which the
user must enter such credentials. In other words, the user is not authorized
to access content from multiple sources via a single account (i.e., merely by
logging in to the cross-platform application) because the user still must enter
the credentials associated with the particular source from which the user
wishes to access content in order to access content from that source. The
Examiner does not rely on the remaining references as teaching or
suggesting this claim limitation, and we agree with Appellant that Shaw and
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Rao do not remedy this deficiency in Naggar. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Remaining Claims
Claims 10 and 11 are independent and recite limitations
commensurate in scope to the argued limitation above. For the same
reasons, we also do not sustain the rejection of claims 10 and 11 under
§ 103. The remaining claims are dependent, and stand together with their
respective independent claims.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject the claims.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 5–8,
10, 11
103 Naggar, Shaw, Rao 1, 2, 5–8,
10, 11
3, 4, 9 103 Naggar, Shaw, Rao,
Zheng
3, 4, 9
Overall
Outcome
1–11

REVERSED