APPLE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 16, 2020

14169024 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/169,024 01/30/2014 Michael H. Geffon 535011 (P19402US1) 9154
77970 7590 06/16/2020
Polsinelli -- Apple Inc.
c/o Polsinelli PC
Three Embarcadero Center
Suite 2400
San Francisco, CA 94111
EXAMINER
HOLLY, JOHN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Apple@Polsinelli.com
patentdocketing@polsinelli.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MICHAEL H. GEFFON and AMANDA ROBINSON
____________________

Appeal 2020-0002131
Application 14/169,024
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40. Claims 6, 7, 12–23, and 34–38 have
been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to: (1) the Final Office Action mailed
Sept. 17, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed April 15, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed Aug. 8, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and (4) the Reply Brief filed Oct. 7, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers to the
inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a patent as
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We affirm the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appellant’s Disclosed and Claimed Invention
Appellant’s invention relates generally to the delegation of purchasing
authority (see Spec. ¶¶ 1–3), and more specifically to tokenizing such a
process in order to increase security and prevent fraud (see Title; Spec. ¶¶ 1,
4). With this in mind, Appellant’s claimed invention concerns “[a]
computer-implemented method” (claim 1), and “[a] system for
conducting a transaction by a delegate account having received an
accountable and modifiable delegation of authority from a user account”
(claim 24).
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 under appeal is exemplary. Claim 1, with
bracketed lettering, formatting, and emphases added to key portions of the
claim at issue, reads as follows:
1. A computer-implemented method for conducting a
transaction by a delegate account having received an
accountable and modifiable delegation of authority from a user
account, the method comprising:
[A] storing, in a memory storage location of a server
computing device, an authorization for the transaction to be
completed by the delegate account at a first device, the delegate
account designated by the user account, the authorization
associated with the user account and at least one requirement;
[B] encoding, using the server computing device, a token
comprising a digital code that, when decoded, points to the
authorization in the memory storage location for the transaction
to be completed by the delegate account designated by the user
account;

provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as Apple, Inc. (Appeal Br. 3).
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[C] enabling access to the token, using the server
computing device, at a second device corresponding to the
delegate account designated by the user account;
[D] receiving, from the first device, a request to complete
a specific transaction according to the authorization when the
first device transmits a decoded token received from the second
device;
[E] verifying, using the server computing device, that the
decoded token matches the token that points to the
authorization for the transaction to be completed by the
delegate designated by the user account stored in the memory
storage location and that the specific transaction corresponds
with the at least one requirement described in the authorization;
and
[F] transmitting, using the server computing device, a
notification to the second device that the specific transaction is
authorized to be completed between the delegate and the first
device.
Appeal Br. 21, Claims Appendix (emphases, formatting, and bracketed
lettering added). Remaining independent claim 24 recites commensurate
limitations pertaining to “[a] system for conducting a transaction by a
delegate account” (claim 24) for performing the method of claim 1.
Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 1–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (an abstract
idea), without significantly more. Final Act. 2–8; Ans. 4–13.
(2) Claims 1–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Outwater (US 2007/017080 A1;
published July 26, 2007), Priebatsch et al. (US 2014/0279556 A1; published
Sept. 18, 2014), and Narayanaswami et al. (US 2004/0225613 A1; published
Nov. 11, 2004). Final Act. 9–17. This rejection has been withdrawn by the
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Examiner (Ans. 3; see also Reply Br. 1), and is, therefore, not before us on
appeal. Accordingly, we will not address this rejection further.
Appellant’s Contentions
With regard to the patent eligibility rejection, Appellant primarily
makes arguments regarding claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 6–13; Reply Br. 1–7),
rely on those arguments for the eligibility of claims 2–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39,
and 40 (see Appeal Br. 13), and generally contends the claims are not
directed to an abstract idea (e.g., math concepts, methods of organizing
human activity, mental processes), but to improvements in delegation of a
purchase authority that solve the problem of authorizing flexible purchasing
authority to a delegate (see Appeal Br. 7–10), thus providing security
benefits beyond traditional delegation schemes, such as making the
delegation modifiable and revocable (see Reply Br. 4).
Therefore, based on Appellant’s patent eligibility arguments, and
because claims 1 and 24 contain commensurate limitations, we select claim
1 as representative of claims 1–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 for patent-ineligibility.
Principal Issue on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 5–
16) and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–7), the following principal issue is
presented on appeal:
Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting representative
claim 1, as well as claims 2–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 grouped therewith,
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
(i.e., a judicial exception such as an abstract idea), without significantly
more?
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ANALYSIS
Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
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(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
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566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, 2018) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).4
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, updating and clarifying the Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–
55.
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (“Step 2B”).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical
products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether “their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).

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Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, representative claim 1 recites “[a]
computer-implemented method for conducting a transaction by a delegate
account having received an accountable and modifiable delegation of
authority from a user account” (claim 1, preamble) including a series of
steps for storing and encoding an authorization (claim 1, limitations A, B)
and verifying information for a transaction and authorization (claim 1,
limitations D, E), and providing notification of authorization of the
transaction (claim 1, limitation F). Therefore, claim 1, as a method claim
reciting a process having a series of steps, recites at least one of the
enumerated categories (e.g., process) of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. In this light, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that (i) “the
claim(s) are nominally directed to payment processing using sharable tokens
to complete transactions and is thereby directed to a statutory category of
invention” (Final Act. 3), and more specifically (ii) claim 1 is “directed to
the statutory category of a process” (Ans. 5).
As a result, as to claim 1, as well as claims 2–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and
40 grouped therewith, we continue our analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1 of
the Guidance to determine whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception (a
law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas above).

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Step 2A, Prong 1
Although claim 1 recites a “computer-implemented method for
conducting a transaction” (see claim 1, preamble) including storing and
authorization and transaction data (claim 1, limitations A and B), encoding
and decoding a token concerning that data under certain conditions and
enabling access to the token (claim 1, limitations B and C) and then
verifying the data (i.e., authentication) corresponding to the delegation
(claim 1, limitation E) upon receiving a request to complete the transaction
(claim 1, limitation D), and issuing a notification of authorization of
transactions (claim 1, limitation F), the focus of claim 1 is on performing the
steps of authorizing and delegating a financial transaction, which is a
fundamental economic practice performed using mental processes (see
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). The mental process includes
steps B–E set forth in the body of claim 1, that make up a method of
organizing human activity, such as verifying or authenticating a delegated
transaction is authorized, which constitute a business relation between
people or commercial transaction. As such, the claimed invention recites
both certain methods of organizing human activities and a mental process,
which are abstract ideas. See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A]nalyzing information by
steps people [can] go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, without more [are] mental processes within the abstract-idea
category.”); Clarilogic Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., 681 F. App’x 950,
954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (gathering, analyzing, and outputting financial
data/assessment is an abstract idea that is patent ineligible); Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that
using an advertisement as an exchange or currency is an abstract idea).
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At a high level, representative claim 1 recites computer-implemented
method for delegating authority for a financial transaction, and
authenticating the transaction with the use of encoding/decoding operations
involving tokens. The Examiner determines, and we agree, that claim 1
recites certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes
(see Final Act. 3–5; Ans. 5–6). Our reviewing court has also concluded that
abstract ideas include the concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain
data within the collected data set, and storing the data in memory. Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding
“claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of data are
directed to an abstract idea”). Moreover, our reviewing court has concluded
that acts of parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas.
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In addition,
the collection of information and analysis of information (e.g., recognizing
certain data within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Similarly,
“collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” is an abstract idea.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2017); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[M]erely presenting the results of abstract processes
of collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of
such collection and analysis”) (quotations omitted).
Delegation of Authority for Transactions:
Delegating authority to allow another person to conduct a financial
transaction is a well-known business practice that is not patent eligible. See
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Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364,
1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Taken together, the Asserted Claims are directed
to the formation of financial transactions in a particular field . . . and data
collection related to such transactions,” which is “an abstract idea under
Alice step one.”); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (summarizing
precedent in which “claims directed to the performance of certain financial
transactions” involve abstract ideas and holding that claims drawn to the
abstract concept of financial transaction-related “data collection, recognition,
and storage is undisputedly well-known.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding computer-
implemented system for “verifying the validity of a credit card transaction
over the Internet” to be patent-ineligible subject matter); see also Smartflash
LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 Fed. App’x. 977, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Claims
directed to “conditioning and controlling access to data based on payment,”
i.e., performing financial transactions is an abstract idea—specifically, a
“fundamental economic practice.”). Claim 1 at issue is not substantially
different.
Further, delegating authority to perform a financial transaction is a
longstanding, fundamental economic practice and using computer
components to perform this practice does not make the practice patent
eligible, similar to the patent-ineligible ideas in Alice, Cybersource, and
Content Extraction. “[T]he essentially result-focused, functional character of
claim language has been a frequent feature of claims held ineligible under §
101, especially in the area of using generic computer and network
technology to carry out economic transactions” involving, for example,
exchanging monetary credits for rewards points. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
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Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Loyalty
Conversion Sys. Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc., 66 F.Supp.3d 829, 837–
38, 840, 843, 845 (E.D. Tex. 2014)).
Encoding/Decoding Data:
Our reviewing court recently held in RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (precedential), that claims directed
to encoding and decoding data were not patent-eligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, the encoding/decoding of tokens does not serve to
further limit claim 1 from reciting an abstract idea found to be patent-
ineligible.
Authentication (i.e., verification):
Authentication, per se, is an abstract idea. See EasyWeb
Innovations, LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 2016 WL 1253674 (E.D.N.Y. 2016),
aff'd, No. 2016-2335 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“receiving, authenticating, and
publishing data” is an abstract idea.). Claims that include authentication
steps have been found patent-ineligible. See e.g., Intellectual Ventures 1
LLC v. J. Crew Group, Inc., 703 F. App’x 991 (Mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Front Row Technologies LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 697 F. App’x
701 (Mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2017); GoDaddy.com LLC v. RPost Communications
Limited, 685 F. App’x 992 (Mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2017); Clarilogic, Inc. v.
FormFree Holdings Corporation, 681 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Morsa
v. Facebook, Inc., 622 F. App’x. 915 (Mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2015); and Prism
Technologies LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x. 1014 (Fed. Cir.
2017). Claim 1 at issue is no different.
Our reviewing court has frequently held authentication, including the
concept of controlling access to resources via software to be an abstract idea.
See Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d
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1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claim involving “denying access to a transit
system if the bankcard is invalid” was directed to an abstract idea); Prism
Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (abstract idea of “providing restricted access to resources”);
Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 F. App’x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (abstract
idea of “conditioning and controlling access to data”). Claim 1 at issue here
is no different.
Our reviewing court has also held verifying financial documents to
reduce transactional fraud is a fundamental business practice that, without
more, is not eligible for patent protection, and that claimed methods that
implement basic computer equipment to achieve verification are similar to
methods held directed to abstract ideas. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v.
Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1054–56 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Fairwarning IP,
LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Assoc., 776
F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Controlling access to resources is exactly the sort of process that “can
be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper,”
which we have repeatedly found unpatentable. See CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The idea of
authentication long predates the instant application and is pervasive in
human activity, whether in libraries (loaning materials only to card-holding
members), office buildings (allowing certain employees entrance to only
certain floors), or banks (offering or denying loans to applicants based on
suitability and intended use). In each of these circumstances, as in claim 1 at
issue, a request is made for access to a resource, that request is received and
evaluated, and then the request is either granted or not.
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Our reviewing court has repeatedly found the concept of controlling
access to resources via software to be an abstract idea. See Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (claim involving “denying access to a transit system if the
bankcard is invalid” was directed to an abstract idea); Prism Techs. LLC v.
T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App’x 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (abstract
idea of “providing restricted access to resources”); Smartflash LLC v. Apple
Inc., 680 F. App’x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (abstract idea of “conditioning and
controlling access to data”). Claim 1 at issue here are no different.
Finally, our reviewing court has held that combining several abstract
ideas (e.g., like a mental process and a fundamental economic activity as
here) does not render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC
v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one
abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-
abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent-ineligible claims were directed to a
combination of abstract ideas).
In view of the foregoing, we conclude claim 1 recites delegation of
purchasing authority, which is a mental process and a certain method of
organizing human activity, such as a commercial interaction and/or business
relation between people. Because we conclude claim 3 recites an abstract
idea and/or combination of abstract ideas, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of
the Guidance to determine whether claim 1 is “directed to” the judicial
exception, by determining whether additional elements of the claim integrate
the abstract idea into a practical application. Such additional elements may
reflect an improvement to a technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55.
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Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not directed to the judicial exception.
As determined by the Examiner (see Ans. 6), the claimed method uses
generic computer components as tools to implement the recited abstract
ideas. We therefore agree with the Examiner that when these additional
elements are considered along with the limitations that recite an abstract
idea, the claimed method does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into a
practical application. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly
generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional
featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (second
and third alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)); Capital
One Bank, 792 F.3d at 1370 (“Steps that do nothing more than spell out
what it means to ‘apply it on a computer’ cannot confer patent-eligibility.”).
Appellant contends the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
(e.g., math concepts, methods of organizing human activity, mental
processes), but to improvements in delegation of a purchase authority that
solve the problem of authorizing flexible purchasing authority to a delegate
(see Appeal Br. 7–10), thus providing security benefits beyond traditional
delegation schemes, such as making the delegation modifiable and revocable
(see Reply Br. 4).
We disagree with Appellant (see Appeal Br. 7–12; Reply Br. 2–5) that
the focus of claim 1 is on a technical improvement (or practical application
of the abstract idea). “[M]erely selecting information, by content or source,
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for collection [and] analysis . . . does nothing significant to differentiate a
process from ordinary mental processes.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355.
Receiving and analyzing (or identifying data), by itself, does not transform
an otherwise-abstract process or system of information collection and
analysis. See id. Like the claims at issue in Electric Power, we find
Appellant’s claim 1 does not invoke “any assertedly inventive
programming” or an “arguably inventive set of components or methods.” Id.
The mere recitation of identifying and verifying information for a
delegated transaction in claim 1 does not embody an improvement in
computer capabilities as in Enfish. See 822 F.3d at 1336 (“[T]he plain focus
of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on
economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary
capacity.”). Rather, the focus of claim 1 is on determining proper
authorization for a delegated transaction. This is an improvement to help the
user, vendor, and/or transaction processor/provider, but not the computer
itself (or in the case of claim 1, the memory and server, first/second devices,
and/or communications network set forth in the claim). Claim 1 does not
recite a method that improves the speed or efficiency of the communications
network or computer systems/devices, or otherwise improves any of these
elements.
To the extent that the claimed method performs fraud prevention for
delegated financial transactions faster or more accurately than other
computerized methods that would not provide an improvement to the
computer itself. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add
significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the claimed
method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious
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mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”)
(emphasis added); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While the claimed system and method certainly
purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed
increase comes from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer, rather
than the patented method itself”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a
computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter”).
The claimed invention (see claim 1) stores and receives/retrieves data
(e.g., limitation A, D); analyzes data (e.g., encoding, decoding, verifying in
limitations B, D, E); and then issues a notification of authorization of a
transaction (e.g., limitation F). Thus, the steps of (i) limitations A and D are
merely conventional data gathering and analysis (see MPEP § 2106.05(g);
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354); and (ii) limitation F is insignificant extra-
solution activity that does not meaningfully limit the claim (see MPEP §
2106.05(g)). As such, based on the record before us, we determine that the
claimed invention is not integrated into a practical application.
Merely adding a programmed computer to perform generic computer
functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general purpose computer to
apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not qualify as a particular
machine. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716–17; In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
v. AV Automotive, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation
of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp.
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IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
decisions). In the instant case, using a computer to more accurately ensure
authentication of delegated transaction authority is nothing more than the
abstract idea itself.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1
(and claims 2–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 grouped therewith) invokes
generic computer components (computer systems, memory, processor,
communications network) merely as tools in which the computer
instructions apply the judicial exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not
integrated into a practical application. Because Appellant has not persuaded
us the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites an abstract idea under
Step 2A is in error, and claim 1 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract
idea of a method of organizing human activity and/or mental process) that is
not integrated into a practical application, in accordance with the Guidance,
we conclude claim 1 and claims 2–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 grouped
therewith, are directed to an abstract idea under Step 2A, and the eligibility
analysis with regard to claims 1–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 proceeds to Step
2B.
Step 2B — Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 1 and claims 2–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40
grouped therewith are directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a
practical application, we now evaluate whether the additional elements,
whether examined alone or as an ordered combination, add a specific
limitation that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in the
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field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the abstract idea. See generally Guidance.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “a memory storage
location of a server computing device” and a “first device” (claim 1,
limitation A) and “a second device” (claim 1, limitation C). Considering
claim 1 as a whole, none of the additional elements applies or uses the
abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Although Appellant contends the steps of claim 1 are not
conventional, and the Examiner has not met the required burden of showing
the steps of claim 1 to be conventional (see Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 5–
6), we agree with the Examiner (Final Act. 5–8; Ans. 6–9) that precedent
from our reviewing court, and at least paragraphs 73, 77, and 82 of the
Specification, support the Examiner’s finding in this regard. In addition, the
Examiner determines, and we agree, that the only elements beyond the
abstract idea are generic computer components or combinations of generic
components used to perform generic computer functions (see Ans. 9) — a
determination that is supported by Appellant’s Figures 7A and 7B and the
accompanying descriptions found in the Specification (see Spec. ¶¶ 22, 23,
70–81). Appellant’s Specification only shows (see Figs. 7A, 7B) and
describes (see e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 22, 23, 70–82) well-understood, routine,
conventional computer components used for delegation of purchasing
authority between users on a network (e.g., a memory and server, and first
and second user devices, impliedly operating in/on a network) that are in a
general purpose computing environment in a manner that indicates the
components and the functions they perform were well-known in the art.
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See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a patent need not teach, and preferably
omits, what is well known in the art”); see also USPTO, Memorandum on
Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility,
Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3
(Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF (explaining that a
specification that describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates
that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the
specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional
elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can show that the elements are well
understood, routine, and conventional); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie
Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile
interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a
generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the
performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific
resources.”).
Specifically, Appellant’s Specification states that “Figure 7A
illustrates a conventional system bus computing system architecture 700
wherein the components of the system are in electrical communication with
each other using a bus 705” (Spec. ¶ 71) (emphasis added
As a result, we are not persuaded that the delegation of purchasing
authority operations recited in claim 1 are anything beyond generic
computer functions as opposed to an improvement to a fundamental
economic practice and/or method of organizing human activity. Considering
the elements of claim 1 individually and as an ordered combination, claim 1
does no more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract
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idea on a generic computer, processor, and/or user interface. Dealertrack,
Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a
‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without
more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible.”)
Additionally, as noted in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II), the courts have
previously recognized that using computer processors and memories to
collect data and keep records, perform repetitive calculations, and/or
receive/send data are well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions
when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of
generality) or as insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II)(i)–(iv)). See also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366 (acts of
parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas); SAP Am.,
Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[M]erely
presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and
analysis”); Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1340 (“collecting, displaying,
and manipulating data” is an abstract idea); Smart Sys., 873 F.3d at 1372
(concluding “claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of
data are directed to an abstract idea.”).
As a result, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred with
respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
Step 2B.
Summary
As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not sufficiently shown
the Examiner erred in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as claims 2–5,
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8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 grouped therewith, as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter without significantly more, and we sustain the
rejection of claims 1–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

CONCLUSIONS
As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as claims 2–5, 8–11, 24–33,
39, and 40 grouped therewith, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter without significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 1–
5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
For all of the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to
reject claims 1–5, 8–11, 24–33, 39, and 40, and we hold as follows:

Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 8–
11, 24–
33, 39,
40
101 Eligibility 1–5, 8–11, 24–
33, 39, 40

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. §§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b) (2013).

AFFIRMED