Annan, Brandon C. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 24, 2020

2019001713 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/463,799 05/03/2012 Brandon C. Annan IDF 8218 (4300-16900) 2702
28003 7590 06/24/2020
SPRINT
6391 SPRINT PARKWAY
KSOPHT0101-Z2100
OVERLAND PARK, KS 66251-2100
EXAMINER
IMMANUEL, ISIDORA I
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
6450patdocs@sprint.com
SprintMail@dfw.conleyrose.com
steven.j.funk@sprint.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte BRANDON C. ANNAN, ROBERT H. BURCHAM,
WILLIAM F. FOUST, RICKY A. HOHLER, ROBIN DALE KATZER,
DANIEL L. NADEN, and ASHISH K. SINGH
____________

Appeal 2019-001713
Application 13/463,799
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9 and 21–28. Claims 10–20, 29, and
30 are canceled. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Sprint
Communications Company L.P. Appeal Br. 4.
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The present invention relates generally to digital rights management
of vehicle applications. See Spec., Abstract.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A vehicle computer system, comprising:
a network interface that couples the vehicle
computer system to a network;
a processor coupled to the network interface;
a non-transitory memory, coupled to the processor,
storing a plurality of vehicle applications; and
a vehicle application management program stored
in the non-transitory memory, that, when executed, by the
processor:
receives, via the network interface, a single
digital rights management (DRM) payload separately
from the plurality of vehicle applications, the single
DRM payload comprising a plurality of formatted files
that define: DRM for next generation telematics protocol
operations corresponding to a remote access operation,
DRM for native in-vehicle applications, and DRM for
Java in-vehicle applications for a multimedia operation,
wherein the multimedia operation accesses at least one of
movies or music via the vehicle computer system, and
wherein the remote access operation
comprises at least one of locking a door, unlocking a
door, starting an engine, opening a garage door, or any
combination thereof,
in response to reception of the single DRM
payload:
initiates and authorizes at least one
multimedia operation for at least one of the plurality of
vehicle applications in accordance with the single DRM
payload based on at least one of the plurality of files that
define DRM for Java in-vehicle applications, wherein at
least one of movies or music is accessed via the vehicle
computer system based on the authorization provided by
the single DRM payload, and
initiates and authorizes at least one remote
access operation in accordance with the single DRM
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payload based on at least one of the plurality of files that
define DRM for next generation telematics protocol
operations, wherein at least one of locking a door,
unlocking a door, starting an engine, or opening a garage
door is performed based on the authorization provided by
the single DRM payload.
Appellant appeals the following rejections:2
R1. Claims 1–9 and 21–28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or
35 U.S.C. § 112(pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the
written description requirement. Non-Final Act. 4–5.
R2. Claims 1–3, 6–9, 23–26, and 28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spaur (US 2008/0148374 A1, June 19,
2008), Satkunanathan (US 2007/0198428 A1, Aug. 23, 2007), and i-Travel,
SERVICE PLATFORM FOR THE CONNECTED TRAVELLER, SEVENTH FRAMEWORK
PROGRAMME, vol. 1, 28, 43, 71, 87 (2008). Non-Final Act. 8–13.
R4. Claims 4, 5, 21, 22, and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Spaur, Satkunanathan, i-Travel in combination
with various other prior art. See Non-Final Act. 13–15.
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).

ANALYSIS
Rejection under § 112, first paragraph
The Examiner finds that “[t]he specification does not provide for a
multimedia operation accessing ‘at least one of movies or music . . .’ nor

2 The Examiner withdraws the rejection of claims 1–9 and 21–28 under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being
indefinite. See Ans. 4.
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does it provide the algorithm providing an operation, a structure, and
capabilities of accessing the data by a multimedia operation.” Non-Final
Act. 5. We disagree with the Examiner.
To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure must
reasonably convey to skilled artisans that Appellant possessed the claimed
invention as of the filing date. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598
F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Appellant highlights that
“paragraph [0020] [] states ‘[f]or example, in an embodiment, restricted
applications or restricted application features may comprise multimedia
operations and/or remote access operation. For example, accessing
multimedia content may be enabled under some scenarios.’” Appeal Br. 19;
see also Spec. ¶ 20. Additionally, Appellant notes that paragraph [29]
discloses, “[a]s an example, the restricted operations of the plurality of
vehicle applications may comprise multimedia operations (e.g., movies or
music).” Id. at 18–19; see also Spec. ¶ 29. In other words, Appellant’s
Specification clearly discloses accessing multimedia content that includes
movies or music.
As such, we find that Appellant’s disclosure reasonably conveys to
the skilled artisan that at the time the application was filed, Appellant
possessed the claimed limitation, wherein the multimedia operation accesses
at least one of movies or music.
The Examiner further finds that the claimed “vehicle application
management program . . . receives, via the network interface, a single digital
rights management [(DRM) payload] . . . [is] not supported by the
specification.” Non-Final Act. 5. Again, we disagree with the Examiner.
Appellant draws our attention to the Specification, i.e., paragraphs 26,
27, 29, and 48; and Figs. 1 and 6. See Appeal Br. 19–21. For example,
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Appellant’s Specification discloses, “the database 118 provides a digital
rights management (DRM) payload to the vehicle computer system 104 in
response to a DRM sync event . . . [e.g.,] a digital rights purchase carried out
online.” Spec. ¶ 27. The Specification further discloses restricted
operations are permitted by “one or more vehicle applications in accordance
with a single, holistic digital rights payload,” where the “restricted
operations . . . may comprise multimedia operations (e.g., movies or music),
and remote access operations.” Id. ¶ 29 (emphasis added).
As a result, we agree with Appellant that “[u]pon review and
consideration of the Appellant’s disclosure, one skilled in the art would
unquestionably recognize . . . the single DRM payload is transmitted”
(Appeal Br. 21; see also Fig. 1), i.e., the single DRM is disclosed as being
received.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 and
21–28 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph.

Rejections under 103(a)
Appellant contends that “[w]hile Spaur discusses a security controller
separately performing multimedia operations and remote access operations,
the context reveals that these operations are not both performed in response
to a single DRM payload. Instead, these actions are performed separately
with the security controller.” Appeal Br. 15.
Here, Appellant’s argument regarding Spaur not teaching the claimed
“a single digital rights management (DRM) payload” does not persuasively
rebut the combination made by the Examiner. One cannot show non-
obviousness by attacking references individually, where the rejections are
based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d
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1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425–26 (CCPA
1981). For instance, the Examiner relies upon Spaur to teach “a certificate
that does initiate and authorize both a multimedia operation and a remote
access operation” (see Ans. 14; see also Non-Final Act. 9), and relies on
Satkunanathan to teach “a single DRM payload.” Id. Stated differently,
“Spaur is not used to teach a single DRM payload, Satkunanathan is.”
Ans. 14.
Appellant further contends that “the addition of Satkunanathan does
not cure the disclosure defects of Spaur” because “Satkunanathan’s group
license includes a group of related licenses . . . not a multimedia operation
and remote access operation which are unrelated.” Appeal Br. 16.
We disagree. Contrary to Appellant’s contention that Satkunanathan
is limited to using “related licenses,” we note that Satkunanathan discloses
the use of “related licenses” in an exemplary rather than a mandatory
manner: “A license can also comprise a group of licenses (e.g., a group of
related licenses comprising the right to access or use a group of related
software programs or services).” Satkunanathan ¶ 45. In any case,
Satkunanathan uses the term “related” very broadly, and Appellant has not
shown that Satkunanathan interprets multimedia and remote access
operations as being unrelated operations. Furthermore, as highlighted by the
Examiner (see Ans. 16), Appellant’s own Specification suggests a broad
definition for “related digital rights” by noting the following: “The issues of
how, when, and what to install on a vehicle in relation to digital content and
related digital rights is not a trivial question.” Spec. ¶ 5.
Appellant also contends that “Satkunanathan’s group license includes
multiple licenses whereas Appellant[] claim[s] a single DRM payload that
authorizes and initiates both the multimedia operation and the remote access
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operation.” Id. It appears that Appellant is contending the Satkunanathan’s
group of multiple licenses is distinguishable from the claimed “a single
DRM payload.” We disagree.
Appellant’s Specification discloses: “The digital rights provided to a
vehicle may be provided as a single (holistic) digital rights payload
corresponding to one of several packages compatible with the restricted
applications or restricted application features of a vehicle.” Spec. ¶ 21. In
other words, Appellant’s Specification describes the single payload as a
package of licenses that is compatible with the restricted
applications/features selected for a vehicle. As noted by the Examiner (see
Ans. 17), Satkunanathan similarly “classifies the group of licenses as a
package.” See Satkunanathan ¶ 116 (“one or more licenses can be sold in a
dynamic license pack.”).
For at least the reasons above, including the similar descriptions
provided in Appellant’s and Satkunanathan’s disclosures, we find unavailing
Appellant’s contention that Satkunanathan’s group of multiple licenses, i.e.,
a license pack, is distinguishable from the claimed single DRM payload.
Finally, regarding the Examiner’s reliance on i-Travel, Appellant
contends that “the addition of i-Travel does not cure the disclosure defects of
Spaur. . . . [because] [m]erely stating that JMS, a messaging protocol, uses
its own transport format for messages is wholly insufficient to teach a
plurality of formatted files that describe DRM for Java in-vehicle
applications.” Appeal Br. 16–17.
As noted by the Examiner, “i-Travel was not used to teach” the single
DRM payload limitation. Ans. 17. Instead i-Travel was introduced to teach
that it was known to “run a vehicle’s next generation telematics protocol
operations and java applications.” Id. (citing i-Travel pp. 28, 49, 54, 71, 87).
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Appellant’s narrow contention fails to persuasively rebut the Examiner’s
proffered i-Travel teachings, and Appellant’s arguments do not take into
account what the collective teachings of the prior art would have suggested
to one of ordinary skill in the art. Appellant’s arguments, therefore, are
ineffective to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Appellant does not argue separate patentability for the dependent claims.
We, therefore, also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–9 and 21–
28.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–9 and 21–28 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–9 and 21–28 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 is affirmed.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 21–28 112(a) or
112 (pre-AIA)
Written description 1–9, 21–28
1–3, 6–9,
23–26, 28
103 Spaur,
Satkunanathan,
i-Travel
1–3, 6–9,
23–26, 28

4, 5, 21, 22,
27
103 Spaur,
Satkunanathan,
i-Travel, Ayoub,
Sumcad
4, 5, 21,
22, 27

Overall
Outcome
1–9,
21–28

Because at least one rejection encompassing all claims on appeal is
affirmed, the decision of the Examiner is affirmed.
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No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED