Anjleena Dewan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 16, 2019

12131849 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 16, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/131,849 06/02/2008 Anjleena Dewan 350821-991200 6600
26379 7590 09/16/2019
DLA PIPER LLP (US )
2000 UNIVERSITY AVENUE
EAST PALO ALTO, CA 94303-2248
EXAMINER
HOLLY, JOHN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/16/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PatentDocketingUS-PaloAlto@dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ANJLEENA DEWAN and
JAYESH SAHASI
____________________

Appeal 2017-011553
Application 12/131,849
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ERIC B. CHEN, HUNG H. BUI, and ADAM J. PYONIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–9 and 11–18, which are all the claims
pending in the application. App. Br. 15–16 (Claims App’x). Claims 10, 19,
and 20 have been cancelled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 According to Appellant, On24 Inc. is the real party in interest. App. Br. 1.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed March 13, 2017
(“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed September 11, 2017 (“Reply Br.”);
Examiner’s Answer mailed July 11, 2017 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action
mailed July 11, 2016 (“Final Act.”); and original Specification filed June 2,
2008 (“Spec.”).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellant, the claimed subject matter relates to “a
virtual tradeshow” and “applications offering virtual [trade]show
experiences” such as “virtual exhibit halls, auditoriums, and booths, among
other design elements” programmed to allow “these virtual spaces to be
designed to meet [user experience and promote user efficiency].” Spec. 2:1–
10; Abstract.
Claims 1 and 11 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter, as reproduced below:
1. A system for creating a virtual exhibition,
comprising:
a first store having one or more pieces of virtual exhibition
registration and virtual exhibition usage information about a
user;
a matching unit that matches the one or more pieces of
virtual exhibition registration and virtual exhibition usage
information about the user with a set of targeted content, wherein
the targeted content is one of a document and a presentation;
a content delivery device for delivering the virtual
exhibition having a smart booth area that displays the matched
targeted content to the user within the smart booth area; and
wherein the content delivery device further comprises a
feedback connection which delivers a set of information on the
user’s interaction with the smart booth area to the matching unit.

App. Br. 15 (Claims App’x).

EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS & REFERENCES
(1) Claims 1–9 and 11–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without
significantly more. Final Act. 2–5.
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(2) Claims 1–9 and 11–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Franke (US 7,590,688 B2; issued Sept. 15,
2009), Chung (US 6,657,543 B1; issued Dec. 2, 2003), and Young et al.
(US 7,873,638 B2; issued Jan. 18, 2011). Final Act. 6–11.

DISCUSSION
35 U.S.C. § 101
In rejecting claims 1–9 and 11–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
Examiner determines these claims are directed to “creating a virtual
exhibition” by “collecting . . . virtual exhibition registration and virtual
exhibition usage information about a user” and “matching . . . virtual
exhibition registration and virtual exhibition usage information about a user
with a set of a targeted content to select the targeted content” which is
considered a “fundamental economic practice” and includes limitations that
are analogous or similar to (1) concepts of “comparing new and stored
information and using rules to identify options” as discussed in SmartGene
(Final Act. 4) and (2) concepts of collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis as discussed in
Electric Power Group. Ans. 4–5; see SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced
Biological Labs., SA, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. D.C. 2012), aff’d, 555 F.
App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims directed to “comparing
new and stored information and using rules to identify medical options” are
not patent-eligible); and Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “gathering and
analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results” are
patent-ineligible under § 101).
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The Examiner also determines the claims fail to amount to
“significantly more than the judicial exception” or contain an “inventive
concept” because the additional elements recited (1) do not amount to “an
improvement to another technology or technical field,” (2) do not “improve
the functioning of the computer itself,” (3) are not “necessarily rooted in
technology,” and (4) require “no more than a generic computing device
(server), a client (generic computer) interface, and a network (connected
generic computers) to perform generic functions that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional activities previously known in the industry.” Final
Act. 5.
Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 11 together (App. Br. 9–
10). We select claim 11 as representative. Claims 1–9 and 12–18 fall with
claim 11 (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)).
Legal Framework
To determine whether claims are patent eligible under § 101, we apply
the Supreme Court’s two-step framework articulated in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.
v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). First, we determine whether the
claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept: laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas. Id. at 217. If so, we then proceed to the
second step to consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an
ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements
that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”
Id. In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’
—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original)
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(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
72–73 (2012)).
The Federal Circuit has described the Alice step-one inquiry as
looking at the “focus” of the claims, their “character as a whole,” and the
Alice step-two inquiry as looking more precisely at what the claim elements
add—whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of the
ineligible matter to which the claim is directed. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Internet Patents Corp. v.
Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In an effort to achieve clarity and consistency in how the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (the “Office”) applies the Supreme Court’s two-step
framework, the Office recently published revised guidance interpreting
governing case law and establishing a prosecution framework for all patent-
eligibility analysis under Alice and § 101 effective as of January 7, 2019.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–
57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”).
2019 Revised Guidance
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look under Alice step 1 or
2019 Revised Guidance “Step 2A” to whether the claim recites:
(1) Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., [i] mathematical concepts,
[ii] mental processes, or [iii] certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice or
managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people); and

(2) Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
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Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).3
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55, Revised Step 2A,
Prong One (Abstract Idea) and Prong Two (Integration into A Practical
Application). Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does
not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 or
“Step 2B.” See 2019 Revised Guidance at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:
1) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

2) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
In their briefs, Appellant refers to prior USPTO guidance (e.g., [1] 2014
Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618
(December 16, 2014); [2] July 2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility, 80
Fed. Reg. 45,429 (July 30, 2015) (“the 2015 Update”); [3] May 2016 Subject
Matter Eligibility Update, 81 Fed. Reg. 27,381 (May 6, 2016); [4]
Memorandum on Subject Matter Eligibility Decisions dated Nov. 2, 2016
(App. Br. 4; Reply Br. 3)). Appellant also argues against the Examiner’s
reliance on SmartGene because “[t]he facts at issue relates to [a] system for
creating a virtual exhibition while the facts . . . of SmartGene are directed to

3 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08.2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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guiding the selection of therapeutic treatment regimens” and “thus reliance
on the SmartGene case is not persuasive” (App. Br. 9–10). However, those
prior guidelines and the application of SmartGene have been superseded by
the 2019 Revised Guidance. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52, n. 11 (“These developments in the caselaw can create complications for
the patent-examination process.”). Accordingly, our analysis will not
address the sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection against the cited prior
guidance. Rather, our analysis will comport with the 2019 Revised
Guidance as discussed below.
Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
Step 2A, Prong One
Turning to the first step of the Alice inquiry, Appellant argues the
claims are not directed to an abstract idea because (1) “the ideas to which the
claims are directed are clearly not abstract and not directed to any
fundamental economic practice” and (2) the claim elements (i.e., first store,
matching unit, and content delivery device) “represent more than just an
abstract idea” and “do not represent a scenario where a fundamental and
long prevalent idea that existed before computers is now simply being
implemented on a computer, such as in Bilski and Alice.” Reply Br. 2.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Contrary to Appellant’s
arguments, Appellant’s Specification and claims describe “a virtual
tradeshow” such as “virtual exhibit halls, auditoriums, and booths” which
uses user information to present targeted information from exhibitors,
sponsors, and others “for the use of businesses and their customers with
concrete examples being Virtual Tradeshows, Job Fairs, Product
Demonstration, Partner Pavilion, Conferences, etc.” Spec. 1:5–2:5;
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Abstract. For example, Figure 3 shows an electronic smart booth 120 in the
context of a virtual tradeshow environment 103 for providing targeted
content or content recommendations regarding products or information, as
reproduced below:

Figure 3 shows smart booth 120 for providing targeted content or content
recommendations of products, via a virtual tradeshow, based on user’s
information.

Representative claim 11 recites a method for presenting a virtual
exhibition comprising:
(1) collecting . . . virtual exhibition registration and virtual
exhibition usage information about a user of the virtual
exhibition;
(2) matching . . . virtual exhibition registration and virtual
exhibition usage information about a user with a set of
targeted content to select the targeted content;
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(3) inserting . . . the set of targeted content [or content
recommendations] into a smart booth that is part of the
virtual exhibition;
(4) delivering the virtual exhibition and the smart booth to the
user; and
(5) feeding back . . . the user’s interaction with the smart booth
area . . .
App. Br. 16 (Claims App’x). These limitations, under their broadest
reasonable interpretation, recite nothing more than collecting user’s interests
regarding a virtual exhibition and then providing targeted content or content
recommendations (e.g., presentations, documents or other resources
provided by exhibitors or sponsors for showing at the tradeshow) to the user
(customer or potential customer) based on matching of the user’s interests.
For example, limitations (1)–(3) in claim 11 describe receiving,
maintaining, and matching user’s registration and interests, which are
activities ordinarily performed by companies and related entities such as
businesses and websites (such as online stores) with targeted content for a
tradeshow. See Spec. 4:5–22; Abstract. Limitations (4)–(5) in claim 11
describe presenting targeted content to the user, which are activities
ordinarily performed by businesses and websites (online stores) that offer
targeted content (e.g., presentations, documents or other resources provided
by exhibitors or sponsors for showing at the tradeshow) that are most likely
to bring in potential revenue. Thus, limitations (1)–(6) in claim 1 recite
providing targeted content or content recommendations (e.g., presentations,
documents or other resources provided by exhibitors or sponsors for
showing at a virtual tradeshow) to the user based on matching of the user’s
interests, which is a known business activity and a fundamental economic
practice in our system of commerce.
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Such activities are squarely within the realm of abstract ideas, like
(1) the risk hedging in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); (2) the
intermediated settlement in Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–22; (3) verifying credit
card transactions in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011); (4) guaranteeing transactions in buySAFE, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014); (5) distributing
products over the Internet in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709
(Fed. Cir. 2014); (6) determining a price of a product offered to a purchasing
organization in Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2015); and (7) pricing a product for sale in OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Providing targeted
content or content recommendations (e.g., presentations, documents or other
resources provided by exhibitors or sponsors for showing at a virtual
tradeshow) to the user based on matching of the user’s interests in a virtual
tradeshow is also a building block of a market economy and, like risk
hedging and intermediated settlement, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope
of § 101. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20.
Therefore, we conclude limitations (1)–(6) in claim 1 recite a
fundamental economic practice as one of the certain methods of organizing
human activity identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance and, thus, an
abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance (Revised Step 2A, Prong One), 84
Fed. Reg. at 52 (describing an abstract idea category of “[c]ertain methods
of organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices
. . . commercial or legal interactions (including . . . advertising, marketing or
sales activities or behaviors; business relations)”).
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As further recognized by the Examiner, claim 11 recites collecting,
analyzing, and displaying information (targeted content), similar to other
claims (involving data collection and analysis) identified by the courts as
directed to abstract ideas. Ans. 5; see Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353
(holding that “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results of the collection and analysis” are “a familiar class of claims
‘directed to’ a patent ineligible concept”); Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims were “drawn to the abstract idea of 1) collecting
data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing
that recognized data in a memory”).
Thus, under Step 2A, Prong One, we agree with the Examiner the
claims recite an abstract idea identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance.
Step 2A, Prong Two (Integration into a Practical Application)
Under Revised Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
discern no additional element (or combination of elements) recited in
Appellant’s claims 1 and 11 that may integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements (e.g., “store,”
“matching unit” and “content delivery device” as recited in claim 1 and
“online presentation system” and “matching unit” as recited in claim 11) do
not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are
not applied with any particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3)
do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state; and
(4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use
of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that
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the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h); Ans. 4–5.
Appellant argues, like the claims in McRO Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016), “the present claims
are directed to improving an existing technological process (creating a
virtual exhibition) like the lip synchronization and facial expression control
of animated characters in McRO.” App. Br. 9–10 (emphasis added). In
particular, Appellant argues the claim elements (i.e., first store, matching
unit, and content delivery device) “do not represent a scenario where a
fundamental and long prevalent idea that existed before computers is now
simply being implemented on a computer, such as in Bilski and Alice.”
Reply Br. 2. According to Appellant, “these types of operations represent a
modern technology that is necessarily dependent on computer systems and
an idea that did not exist before the time of computers.” Id. (underlining
omitted).
We disagree. There is no support from Appellant’s Specification for
any feature that would improve any “existing technological process” as
Appellant argues. Even if the Specification has support for such feature,
Appellant’s claim 11 is focused on compiling user’s interests with items in a
virtual tradeshow and then providing targeted content or content
recommendations (e.g., presentations, documents or other resources
provided by exhibitors or sponsors for showing at the tradeshow) to the user
based on matching of the user’s interests, rather than improving any
“existing technological process.”
We also note Appellant’s reliance on McRO is misplaced. For
example, McRO’s ’576 patent (U.S. Patent No. 6,307,576) describes
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computer software for matching audio to a 3D animated mouth movement
to provide lip-synched animation. McRO’s claims contain (i) specific
limitations regarding a set of rules that “define[] a morph weight set stream
as a function of phoneme sequence and times associated with said phoneme
sequence” to enable computers to produce “accurate and realistic lip
synchronization and facial expressions in animated characters” (McRO, 837
F.3d at 1313) and, when viewed as a whole, are directed to (ii) a
“technological improvement over the existing, manual 3–D animation
techniques” that uses “limited rules in a process specifically designed to
achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice.”
Id. at 1316.
In contrast to McRO, Appellant’s Specification and claims do not
describe technological improvements or specific improvements to the way
computers operate. Rather, Appellant’s Specification and claims describe
compiling user’s interests with items in a virtual tradeshow and then
providing targeted content or content recommendations (e.g., presentations,
documents or other resources provided by exhibitors or sponsors for
showing at the tradeshow) to the user based on matching of the user’s
interests.
Using a generic computer (i.e., “matching unit” or “content delivery
device”) as a tool, as shown in Appellant’s Figure 1, to perform an abstract
idea are insufficient to show “integration into a practical application.” See
MPEP § 2106.05(f). Instead, these generic computing devices are simply
the “automation of the fundamental economic concept,” OIP Techs., 788
F.3d at 1362–63, of user’s interests with items in a virtual tradeshow and
then providing targeted content or content recommendations (e.g.,
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presentations, documents or other resources provided by exhibitors or
sponsors for showing at the tradeshow) to the user based on matching of the
user’s interests. “[M]erely requiring generic computer implementation,”
“do[] not move into [§] 101 eligibility territory.” buySAFE, 765 F.3d at
1354.
As correctly recognized by the Examiner, “[n]either the independent
claims nor the dependent claims recite an improvement in another
technology or technical field.” Final Act. 5. Likewise, neither the problem
identified is seen as “a technical field” or “improve the functioning of the
computer.” Id. Instead, the problems contemplated by the Specification are
commercial in nature, i.e., “setting up environments for the use of businesses
and their customers, with concrete examples being Virtual Tradeshows, Job
Fairs, Product Demonstration, Partner Pavilion, Conferences, etc., and uses
in a wider range of areas that can be readily implemented.” Spec. 1:5–10;
Abstract. As such, using a generic computing device to process user’s
interests and provide targeted content does not improve the technical
functioning of the computer or computer networks and, as such, does not
integrate the fundamental economic concept of providing “targeted content
or content recommendations (e.g., presentations, documents or other
resources provided by exhibitors or sponsors for showing at the tradeshow)
to the user based on matching of the user’s interests” into a practical
application.
For business-centric inventions, such as Appellant’s invention
involving providing targeted content to a user, the Federal Circuit’s
precedential decisions in (1) DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773
F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and (2) Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet
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Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) are instructive. For
example, the Federal Circuit held DDR’s claims are patent-eligible under §
101 because DDR’s claims (1) do not merely recite “the performance of
some business practice known from the pre-Internet world” previously
disclosed in Bilski and Alice, but instead (2) provide a technical solution to a
technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a “solution . . . necessarily
rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257.
Likewise, the Federal Circuit also held Amdocs’ claims patent-eligible under
§ 101 because, like DDR, Amdocs’ claims “entail[] an unconventional
technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a
technological problem (massive record flows which previously required
massive databases)” and “improve the performance of the system itself.”
Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302. According to MPEP § 2106.05(a), both
the Federal Circuit’s precedential decisions in DDR and Amdocs are
incorporated into the “integration into a practical application” (Prong Two)
of the 2019 Revised Guidance.
In contrast to DDR and Amdocs, Appellant’s abstract idea of
providing “targeted content or content recommendations (e.g., presentations,
documents or other resources provided by exhibitors or sponsors for
showing at the tradeshow) to the user based on matching of the user’s
interests” does not provide a technical solution to a technical problem, i.e., a
“solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. Nor does Appellant’s invention entail, like Amdocs,
any “unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed
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fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously
required massive databases)” and “improve the performance of the system
itself.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302. Instead, the solution proposed by
Appellant is at best to address commercial problems of maximizing potential
customers by personalizing user experience with targeted content, and not to
improve any technical functioning of any computer or any technological
problem. A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016). “No matter how much of an advance in the finance field the claims
recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no
plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP
Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
For these reasons, we discern no additional elements (or combination
of elements) recited in Appellant’s claim 11 (similarly, claim 1) that
integrate the judicial exceptions into a practical application. See 2019
Revised Guidance, Revised Step 2A, Prong Two.
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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Appellant does not identify any “specific limitation [of claim 11]
beyond the judicial exception that is not ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional’ in the field” as per MPEP § 2106.05(d). Instead, Appellant
presents several arguments, based on DDR and BASCOM Global Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in
support of Appellant’s contention that the claims contain an “inventive
concept.” App. Br. 10–11; Reply Br. 2.
However, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Appellant’s
reliance on BASCOM is also misplaced. For example, BASCOM (U.S.
Patent No. 5,987,606 (“BASCOM ’606 patent”)) describes a particular
arrangement of filtering software at a specific location, remote from the end-
users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user. The
filtering software enables individually customizable filtering at the remote
ISP server by taking advantage of the technical ability of the ISP server to
identify individual accounts and associate a request for Internet content with
a specific individual account. BASCOM ’606 patent, 4:35–38.
The Federal Circuit recognized that BASCOM’S installation of an
Internet content filter at a particular network location is “a technical
improvement over prior art ways of filtering such content” because such an
arrangement advantageously allows the Internet content filter to have “both
the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the
ISP server” and “give[s] users the ability to customize filtering for their
individual network accounts.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350, 1352.
According to the Federal Circuit, BASCOM’S claims “do not preempt the
use of the abstract idea of filtering content on the Internet or on generic
computer components performing conventional activities.” Id. at 1352.
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Instead, BASCOM’S claims “carve out a specific location for the filtering
system (a remote ISP server) and require the filtering system to give users
the ability to customize filtering for their individual network accounts.” Id.
As such, “an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and
non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” Id. at 1350.
In contrast to BASCOM, Appellant’s claims and Specification are
directed to a system and method for providing targeted content or content
recommendations (e.g., presentations, documents or other resources
provided by exhibitors or sponsors for showing at the tradeshow) to the user
based on matching of the user’s interests. Spec. 2:1–10; Abstract. There is
no evidence in the record to support the contention that Appellant’s claimed
system is provided with any non-conventional and non-generic arrangement
of known, conventional components similar to BASCOM.
Lastly, Appellant argues “[the] present claims are limited to a specific
process, do not preempt the general idea of [a fundamental economic
practice].” App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 3. We remain unpersuaded, and note that
lack of preemption is a necessary clue for patent eligibility, but it is not
sufficient for patent eligibility. As the McRO court explicitly recognized,
“the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Furthermore,
“[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible
subject matter” under the Alice/Mayo framework, “preemption concerns are
fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
Because Appellant’s independent claims 1 and 11 are directed to a
patent-ineligible abstract concept and do not recite an “inventive concept” or
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provide a solution to a technical problem under the second prong of the Alice
analysis, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 and 11–18 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1–9 and 11–18
Claims 1 and 11 recite, inter alia:
a matching unit that matches the one or more pieces of
virtual exhibition registration and virtual exhibition usage
information about the user with a set of targeted content, wherein
the targeted content is one of a document and a presentation;
[and]

a content delivery device for delivering the virtual
exhibition having a smart booth area that displays the matched
targeted content to the user within the smart booth area.

In support of the obviousness rejection, the Examiner finds Chung
teaches the claimed “matching unit” and “content delivery device.” Final
Act. 7 (citing Chung 8:19–39; 10:1–16; 12:39–46; 20:50–57; 21:10–31).
Appellant argues the combination of Franke, Chung, and Young do
not teach or suggest these disputed limitations of claims 1 and 11. App. Br.
11–13; Reply Br. 3–4. In particular, Appellant argues Chung does not teach
the claimed “matching unit” because: (1) Chung only teaches “a tracking
method and system for an exhibition in which a tangible record is created for
a visitor of the exhibition after the visit” and (2) Chung’s matching relates to
application specific data and does not “match[] the one or more pieces of
virtual exhibition registration and virtual exhibition usage information about
the user with a set of targeted content” as recited in claims 1 and 11. App.
Br. 12 (citing Chung 8:19–39; 10:1–16; 12:29–46).
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Appellant also argues Chung does not teach the claimed “content
delivery device” because Chung’s LEADS-TRAKKER machine only
displays “exhibitor products and services and the like” but such information
is not “provided to the user based on the virtual exhibition registration and
virtual exhibition usage information about a user” as recited in claims 1 and
11. App. Br. 13 (citing Chung 20:50–57; 21:10–30).
In response, the Examiner takes the position that Chung’s correlation
of relational check numbers corresponds to Appellant’s claimed “matching
unit.” Ans. 19 (citing Chung 12:39–46; 16:49–54).
We disagree with the Examiner. As correctly recognized by
Appellant, Chung’s correlation between “the two check numbers” relates to
whether “there is a high degree of certainty that the application specific data
has not been changed and does not include errors” but does not relate to
“match[ing] the one or more pieces of virtual exhibition registration and
virtual exhibition usage information about the user with a set of targeted
content, wherein the targeted content is one of a document and a
presentation” as recited in claims 1 and 11. Reply Br. 3; see Chung 12:39–
46. Likewise, Chung’s LEADS-TRAKKER machine displays exhibitor
products and services, but does not display a “virtual exhibition having a
smart booth area that displays the matched targeted content to the user
within the smart booth area” as recited in claims 1 and 11. Reply Br. 4
(citing Chung 20:50–57; 21:10–30).
For these reasons, we are persuaded the Examiner erred.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of
claims 1 and 11 and their dependent claims 2–9 and 12–18.
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CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has demonstrated the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–9 and 11–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
However, Appellant has not demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1–9 and 11–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION
As such, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 and 11–18
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9
and 11–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED