Andrew RoscaDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJan 28, 20212020002707 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/848,294 09/08/2015 Andrew Rosca 07164-P0001B 7567 131672 7590 01/28/2021 Whitmyer IP Group LLC 600 Summer Street 3rd Floor Stamford, CT 06901 EXAMINER IMMANUEL, ISIDORA I ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/28/2021 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ANDREW ROSCA ________________ Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JASON J. CHUNG, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1‒14 and 21‒23 which are all the claims pending in this application. Claims 15‒20 are canceled. See Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App’x.). An oral hearing was held on January 13, 2021. A transcript of the oral hearing will be made of record in due course. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Andrew Rosca. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s application relates to securing an online wallet for cryptocurrency and for securing transactions involving such online wallets. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as follows: 1. A method for securing cryptocurrency transactions comprising: receiving, by a first server, a transaction request of a user, the transaction request requesting execution of a transaction with a cryptocurrency stored in an online wallet; generating, through the first server, a request message and embedding at least a part of the transaction request of the user into the request message; placing, through the first server, the request message in a message queue managed by a message broker; transmitting, through the first server, the request message to a second server using the message queue, wherein the second server is accessible only through a private network and is configured to read messages from the message queue; receiving, through the second server, the request message and extracting the transaction request from the request message; executing, through the second server, the transaction of the cryptocurrency based on the transaction request; generating, through the second server, a response message comprising a result of the transaction of the cryptocurrency; placing, through the second server, the response message in a response message queue managed by the message broker; and transmitting, through the second server, the response message to the first server using the message broker. Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 3 The Examiner’s Rejections Claims 1‒14 and 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 8‒11. Claims 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description requirement. See Final Act. 11‒12. Claims 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. See Final Act. 12‒15. Claims 1‒3, 5‒10, 12‒14, and 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Yang (US 2015/0287026 A1; Oct. 8, 2015), Ronca (US 2015/0365283 A1; Dec. 17, 2015), and Kumarjiguda (US 9,098,565 B1; Aug. 4, 2015). See Final Act. 15‒27. Claims 4 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Yang, Ronca, Kumarjiguda, and Godejohn (US 2011/0276475 A1; Nov. 10, 2011). See Final Act. 27‒28. ANALYSIS Subject Matter Eligibility An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U. S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 4 framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 5 attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“Update”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the Update). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Guidance Update at 1. The Manual of Patent Examining Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 6 Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).2 Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.3 MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(d). 2 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. 3 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (1) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (2) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II. Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 7 Revised Guidance Step 1 Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. MPEP § 2106.03. Independent claim 1 recites a “method” and independent claims 8 and 21 recite a “system.” Appellant does not argue the Examiner erred in concluding claims 1, 8, and 21 fall within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter. We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion because claim 1 falls within the process category and claims 8 and 21 fall within the machine or manufacture categories. Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1 Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). MPEP § 2106.04(a). The Examiner determines claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of receiving a financial transaction request, sending the request to be processed, fulfilling the request, and sending a response about the fulfilment. Final Act. 9. The Examiner determines this is a fundamental economic practice. Id. We agree with the Examiner that the steps of the claimed method, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite receiving a financial transaction request, sending the request to be processed, fulfilling the request, and sending a response about the fulfilment. For example, the Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 8 “receiving, by a first server” step characterizes receiving a transaction request relating to a cryptocurrency transaction. This step recites receiving information related to a commercial or legal interaction, which falls within the certain method of organizing human activities category of abstract ideas. The “receiving, through the second server” similarly recites receiving information related to a commercial or legal interaction. The “generating, through the first server” and “generating, through the second server” characterize generating request and response messages relating to the cryptocurrency transaction. These steps recite generating information related to a commercial or legal interaction, which falls within the certain method of organizing human activities category of abstract ideas. The “placing, through the first server,” “placing, through the second server,” “transmitting, through the first server,” and “transmitting, through the second server” each relate to sending and receiving messages related to a cryptocurrency transaction. Thus, each of these steps also recites the exchange of information related to a commercial or legal interaction. For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, in particular commercial or legal interactions that fall within the certain method of organizing human activities category of abstract ideas. We also agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites fundamental economic practices or principles because these same steps recite the exchange of information related to a transaction, which is a fundamental economic practice. Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2 Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 9 exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). The “additional elements” recited in claim 1 include “a first server,” “a message broker,” “a second server,” and “a private network.” None of these additional elements constitutes “additional elements that integrate the exception into a practical application.” Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to securing cryptocurrency transactions. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues this is a technical solution to a computer problem, which is achieved by “separating a server, which hosts a cryptocurrency transaction website, from a server, which hosts the online wallet and performs cryptocurrency transactions.” Id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 10, 33, 34). Appellant argues this is an improvement on conventional computer networks for cryptocurrency transactions. Id. Appellant also argues claim 8 recites structural limitations that require specific functionality, which integrate the purported abstract idea into a practical application. Id. at 9. In particular, Appellant identifies “a first server; a transaction request, cryptocurrency, an online wallet, a request Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 10 message, a message queue, a message broker, a second server, and a private network” as specific structure. Id. at 9. Appellant also argues claim 1 does not preempt substantially all uses of a fundamental principle because there are other ways to practice the stated abstract idea besides those claimed. Id. at 10. Finally, Appellant argues the Examiner failed to analyze the claims as an ordered combination and failed to analyze the dependent claims. Id. at 10. Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. The focus of claim 1 is not on an improvement to computers or another technology, but rather on using generic computer components to perform the recited method of receiving a financial transaction request, sending the request to be processed, fulfilling the request, and sending a response about the fulfilment. Thus, claim 1 focuses on the abstract idea itself, rather than any technical improvement. Appellant’s argument that claim 1 is directed to a technical solution to a computer problem is unpersuasive. Appellant describes the improvement as “separating a server, which hosts a cryptocurrency transaction website, from a server, which hosts the online wallet and performs cryptocurrency transactions.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 10, 33, 34). Other than the generic computer components recited in this purported improvement, this improvement could be describing separating any two actors involved in a transaction. That is, this improvement is essentially the idea of having two actors work on the same transaction—one works on communicating with the user requesting the transaction (the cryptocurrency transaction website) and one works on executing the transaction itself (the online wallet that performs the cryptocurrency transaction). Appellant’s improvement is to take this Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 11 separation of work, and the security benefits of such a separation, and implement it in the context of cryptocurrency transactions. “But ‘limiting the abstract idea to a particular environment—a mobile telephone system—[ ] does not make the claims any less abstract for the step 1 analysis.’” Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Claim 1 includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer and does no more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment, which does not render the claims any less abstract. Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also MPEP § 2106.05(h). Thus, claim 1 “does not improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more efficiently, or solve any technological problem.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Appellant’s argument that the independent claims recite specific structural limitations is also unavailing. “The [S]pecification is silent as to any specific structural or inventive improvements in computer functionality related to this claimed system.” See Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Providing “simply generic descriptions of well-known computer components” does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application where, as here, Appellant “makes no claim that it invented any of those components or their basic functions, nor does it suggest that those components, at that level of generality, were unknown in the art.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 12 Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”). Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Specification confirms that the identified limitations, including “a first server, a transaction request, cryptocurrency, an online wallet, a request message, a message queue, a message broker, a second server, and a private network” are generic computer limitations executed by generic computers. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 25‒ 26, 47‒54. For example, the Specification discloses that “the various devices and modules described herein may be enabled and operated using hardware circuitry (e.g., CMOS based logic circuitry), firmware, software or any combination of hardware, firmware, and software (e.g., embodied in a non- transitory machine-readable medium).” Id. ¶ 47. The Specification further discloses that “[i]t should also be noted that methods disclosed herein can be implemented by one or more computers including, for example, a general- purpose computer, desktop computer, tablet computer, laptop computer, server, game console, cellular phone, smart phone, smart television system, and so forth.” Id. Thus, Appellant’s argument that the claims recite specific structural limitations is not supported by the Specification. Appellant’s argument that claim 1 does not preempt substantially all uses of a fundamental principle is also unavailing. Preemption is the concern that drives the exclusionary principle of judicial exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter. Alice, 573 U.S. at 215–217. However, preemption is not a separate test of patent-eligibility, but is inherently addressed within the Alice framework. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 13 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”). Appellant’s argument that the Examiner fails to consider the limitations of claim 1 as an ordered combination (see Appeal Br. 10) is also unpersuasive of Examiner error. Appellant does not identify any limitations, either individually or as an ordered combination, that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. To the extent Appellant is arguing that the claimed improvements are non-obvious when considered as an ordered combination, we note that the claimed improvements are improvements to the abstract idea itself. Even if the claimed method is novel, a claim directed to a new abstract idea is still directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Commc’n Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 958 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Indeed, “[w]e may assume that the techniques claimed are ‘[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,’ but that is not enough for eligibility.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013)). Thus, as discussed above, a generic computer system is used to implement the claimed steps, and there is no indication that claim 1 improves the functioning of the processor, makes it operate more efficiently, or solves a technological problem with a solution rooted in computer technology. Moreover, our reviewing court has “made clear that mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp. Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 14 v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Like the claims in Credit Acceptance, the focus of claim 1 is on the abstract idea itself, “and the recited generic computer elements ‘are invoked merely as a tool.’” Id. (citing Enfish, 822 F.3d 1327); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). That is, the claimed additional elements are used to achieve the claimed results and are not focused on “a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Finally, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner fails to analyze the dependent claims (see Appeal Br. 10) is unpersuasive of Examiner error. The Examiner determines the dependent claims “do not resolve the deficiency of [the] independent claims” and stand rejected “based on the same rationale.” Final Act. 11. We agree. Appellant has not identified, nor have we found, any limitations recited in the dependent claims that resolve the subject matter eligibility issues discussed above with respect to the independent claims. For example, claim 5 recites “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the message broker and associated queues are managed by the first server.” Claim 6 recites “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein a message broker server configured to handle the message queues shares the private network with the second server.” Claim 7 recites “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the message broker comprises: a request queue comprising the request message; and a response queue comprising the response message.” Each of these dependent claims provides further detail describing the implementation of the claimed abstract idea, but there is no indication that these limitations improve the functioning of the processor, make it operate more efficiently, Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 15 or solve a technological problem with a solution rooted in computer technology. For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance. We, therefore, conclude the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application under the Revised Guidance. Revised Guidance Step 2B Under Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether the claims recite an “inventive concept” that “must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). There must be more than “computer functions [that] are ‘well- understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). Appellant does not separately argue the Examiner errs in performing the Step 2B analysis. See Appeal Br. 7‒10. Instead, Appellant argues the Examiner errs for the reasons discussed above with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2. We disagree for the reasons set forth above. We, therefore, sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of independent claims 8 and 21, which Appellant argues are patent eligible for the same reasons. See Appeal Br. 7‒10. We also sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of dependent claims 2‒7, 9‒14, and 22‒23, for which Appellant provides no separate argument. See id. Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 16 Section 112 Rejections Claims 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and 112(b). See Final Act. 11‒15. Appellant does not argue the Examiner errs in rejecting these claims, instead stating Appellant will work with the Examiner to resolve the issues following this appeal. Appeal Br. 5 n.1. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the rejections of claims 21‒23 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and 112(b). Obviousness Claims 1, 5‒8, 12‒14, 21, and 23 Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Yang, Ronca, and Kumarjiguda. See Appeal Br. 10‒14; Reply Br. 4‒6. In particular, Appellant argues the cited references do not teach or suggest a second server, “wherein the second server is accessible only through a private network and is configured to read messages from the message queue.” See Appeal Br. 11‒14. Appellant argues Yang does not teach this limitation because authentication manager 208 directly interfaces with user devices and third-party services and, therefore, cannot be on a private network. Appeal Br. 11 (citing Yang ¶¶ 24‒26). Appellant argues Ronca teaches enterprise cryptocurrency server 130 is on a network-connected server. Id. at 12 (citing Ronca ¶ 194), Figs. 1, 2 Appellant argues Kumarjiguda is unconcerned with securing cryptographic currency transactions and the Examiner does not rely on this reference for the “second server” limitation. Id. at 12‒13. The Examiner’s interpretation of “private network” differs from Appellant’s interpretation of “private network,” which excludes any interaction between the claimed “second server” and user devices or third- Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 17 party services. See Ans. 7‒8. The Examiner finds Ronca teaches a “private network” under Appellant’s interpretation because Ronca teaches communication about cryptocurrency over an intranet network, local area network (LAN), and virtual private network (VPN). Id. at 8 (citing Ronca ¶¶ 51, 52). The Examiner also finds Kumarjiguda teaches network 120 can be a local area network, which the Examiner finds is a “private network,” as claimed. Id. at 9 (citing Kumarjiguda, 4:4‒25, 50‒60). Appellant responds in the Reply Brief that “Ronca does not teach, and is not cited in the Final Office Action as teaching, this limited system.” Reply Br. 5. The Examiner finds Ronca teaches the claimed “second server” that is “accessible only through a private network.” Ans. 8‒9. Appellant has not provided substantive argument that this finding is erroneous, instead merely arguing that “Ronca does not teach, and is not cited in the Final Office Action as teaching, this limited system.” Reply Br. 5. This conclusory statement is unpersuasive of Examiner error. Moreover, Ronca teaches enterprise cryptocurrency environment 100 includes network 120, which connects various components of the cryptocurrency environment. See Ronca ¶¶ 51‒52. Ronca teaches network 120 may include one or more networks, which may be local to each individual component of the environment. Id. ¶ 51. Ronca teaches these networks may comprise an intranet, a VPN, and a LAN. Id. ¶ 51. The network may also include communication links between the components of the environment or the individual networks. Id. ¶ 52. These communication links may also include an intranet, a VPN, and a LAN. Id. ¶ 52. Thus, Ronca teaches or at least suggests the various components of the cryptocurrency Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 18 environment may be on networks, such as intranets, VPNs, or LANs, that are not accessible to the public. Appellant also argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 because an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine the cited references. See Appeal Br. 11‒13. In particular, Appellant argues Yang teaches against the claimed invention because Yang teaches private keys are stored on servers that interface directly with user devices. Id. at 12 (citing Yang ¶ 34). Appellant argues Ronca teaches keeping active cryptocurrency on a network connected server and, therefore, also teaches against the claimed invention. Id. at 12 (citing Ronca Figs. 1, 2, ¶ 194). Appellant argues Kumarjiguda is unconcerned with securing cryptographic currency transactions and the Examiner has made no showing that an ordinarily skilled artisan would look to Kumarjiguda to reach the present invention where the second server is on a private network. Id. at 12‒13. Appellant’s arguments regarding the Examiner’s rationale to combine the references are unpersuasive because they rely on the same substantive argument as discussed above regarding the “private network” limitation. In particular, Appellant’s arguments that Yang and Rosca teach against the claimed invention are unpersuasive because neither reference criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the claimed solution. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). And Appellant’s argument regarding Rosca is unpersuasive because, as explained above, Rosca teaches private networks may be used to connect the various cryptocurrency Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 19 environment components. Accordingly, Appellant has not persuasively identified error in the Examiner’s proposed rationale to combine the cited references. For these reasons, we sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. We also sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claims 8 and 21, for which Appellant relies on the same arguments. See Appeal Br. 13‒14. We also sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 5‒7, 12‒14, and 23, for which Appellant provides no separate argument. See id. at 14. Dependent Claims 2, 9, 22 Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 2, 9, and 22 because the cited combination does not teach or suggest “an administrative server accessible only by the second server through the private network and only through a second message broker.” Appeal Br. 14‒15. In particular, Appellant argues none of the cited references teaches a private network for the same reasons explained with respect to the independent claims. Id. at 15. We disagree for the same reasons explained with respect to claims 1, 8, and 21. Accordingly, we sustain the obviousness rejections of claim 2, 9, and 22. Dependent Claims 4 and 11 Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 4, 11, and 22/234 because the additionally cited reference, Godejohn, does not teach or suggest “the reversal requests configured to reverse one or more malicious 4 In the Appeal Brief, Appellant refers to claim 22 as containing this limitation. See Appeal Br. 15. In the Reply Brief, Appellant refers to claim 23 as containing this limitation. See Reply Brief 6. The Examiner does not rely on Godejohn for the rejection of claims 22 or 23. See Final Act. 26‒28. Accordingly, we address Appellant’s arguments as they apply to claims 4 and 11. Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 20 transactions of cryptocurrency performed by the second server.” See Appeal Br. 15‒16; Reply Br. 6. In particular, Appellant argues Godejohn teaches credit card chargebacks, but does not teach the claimed “transaction log” or “second server,” and is unconcerned with securing cryptocurrency transactions by isolating a second server on a private network. Appeal Br. 16. Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Godejohn teaches “the request message comprising one or more reversal requests, the reversal requests configured to reverse one or more malicious transactions.” Ans. 10. The Examiner does not find Godejohn teaches cryptocurrency transactions or a second server on a private network. Id. at 11. Instead, the Examiner relies on Godejohn for teaching reversal requests to reverse malicious transactions and relies on the other cited references for the remainder of the claim. Id. at 11. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because it focuses on the teachings of Godejohn without considering the combination of the references as a whole. The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Appellant’s argument does not persuasively identify error in the Examiner’s findings regarding the additionally cited references. Accordingly, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 4 and 11. Appeal 2020-002707 Application 14/848,294 21 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1‒14, 21‒23 101 Eligibility 1‒14, 21‒23 21‒23 112(a) Written Description 21‒23 21‒23 112(b) Indefiniteness 21‒23 1‒3, 5‒10, 12‒14, 21‒ 23 103 Yang, Ronca, Kumarjiguda 1‒3, 5‒10, 12‒14, 21‒23 4, 11 103 Yang, Ronca, Kumarjiguda, Godejohn 4, 11 Overall Outcome 1‒14, 21‒23 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation