Andrew Rosca

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 28, 2021

2020002707 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/848,294 09/08/2015 Andrew Rosca 07164-P0001B 7567
131672 7590 01/28/2021
Whitmyer IP Group LLC
600 Summer Street
3rd Floor
Stamford, CT 06901
EXAMINER
IMMANUEL, ISIDORA I
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/28/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ANDREW ROSCA
________________

Appeal 2020-002707
Application 14/848,294
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JASON J. CHUNG, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1‒14 and 21‒23 which are all the claims pending in this
application. Claims 15‒20 are canceled. See Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App’x.).
An oral hearing was held on January 13, 2021. A transcript of the oral
hearing will be made of record in due course. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Andrew
Rosca. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s application relates to securing an online wallet for
cryptocurrency and for securing transactions involving such online wallets.
Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as
follows:
1. A method for securing cryptocurrency transactions
comprising:
receiving, by a first server, a transaction request of a user,
the transaction request requesting execution of a transaction
with a cryptocurrency stored in an online wallet;
generating, through the first server, a request message
and embedding at least a part of the transaction request of the
user into the request message;
placing, through the first server, the request message in a
message queue managed by a message broker;
transmitting, through the first server, the request message
to a second server using the message queue, wherein the second
server is accessible only through a private network and is
configured to read messages from the message queue;
receiving, through the second server, the request message
and extracting the transaction request from the request message;
executing, through the second server, the transaction of
the cryptocurrency based on the transaction request;
generating, through the second server, a response
message comprising a result of the transaction of the
cryptocurrency;
placing, through the second server, the response message
in a response message queue managed by the message broker;
and
transmitting, through the second server, the response
message to the first server using the message broker.
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The Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1‒14 and 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 8‒11.
Claims 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to
comply with the written description requirement. See Final Act. 11‒12.
Claims 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being
indefinite. See Final Act. 12‒15.
Claims 1‒3, 5‒10, 12‒14, and 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Yang (US 2015/0287026 A1; Oct. 8, 2015),
Ronca (US 2015/0365283 A1; Dec. 17, 2015), and Kumarjiguda (US
9,098,565 B1; Aug. 4, 2015). See Final Act. 15‒27.
Claims 4 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Yang, Ronca, Kumarjiguda, and Godejohn (US 2011/0276475 A1;
Nov. 10, 2011). See Final Act. 27‒28.
ANALYSIS
Subject Matter Eligibility
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U. S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that
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framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
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attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id.
at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving
of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“Update”); see also
October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct.
18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the Update). “All
USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected
to follow the guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also
October 2019 Guidance Update at 1. The Manual of Patent Examining
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Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent
updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).2
Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.3
MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field; or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106.05(d).

2 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019
(Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated.
3 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by:
(1) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception, and (2) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole
integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II.
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Revised Guidance Step 1
Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject
matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter
identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. MPEP § 2106.03. Independent claim 1 recites a
“method” and independent claims 8 and 21 recite a “system.” Appellant
does not argue the Examiner erred in concluding claims 1, 8, and 21 fall
within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter. We agree
with the Examiner’s conclusion because claim 1 falls within the process
category and claims 8 and 21 fall within the machine or manufacture
categories.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine
whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). MPEP § 2106.04(a).
The Examiner determines claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of
receiving a financial transaction request, sending the request to be processed,
fulfilling the request, and sending a response about the fulfilment. Final
Act. 9. The Examiner determines this is a fundamental economic practice.
Id.
We agree with the Examiner that the steps of the claimed method,
under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite receiving a financial
transaction request, sending the request to be processed, fulfilling the
request, and sending a response about the fulfilment. For example, the
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“receiving, by a first server” step characterizes receiving a transaction
request relating to a cryptocurrency transaction. This step recites receiving
information related to a commercial or legal interaction, which falls within
the certain method of organizing human activities category of abstract ideas.
The “receiving, through the second server” similarly recites receiving
information related to a commercial or legal interaction.
The “generating, through the first server” and “generating, through the
second server” characterize generating request and response messages
relating to the cryptocurrency transaction. These steps recite generating
information related to a commercial or legal interaction, which falls within
the certain method of organizing human activities category of abstract ideas.
The “placing, through the first server,” “placing, through the second server,”
“transmitting, through the first server,” and “transmitting, through the
second server” each relate to sending and receiving messages related to a
cryptocurrency transaction. Thus, each of these steps also recites the
exchange of information related to a commercial or legal interaction.
For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea, in particular commercial or legal interactions that fall within
the certain method of organizing human activities category of abstract ideas.
We also agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites fundamental economic
practices or principles because these same steps recite the exchange of
information related to a transaction, which is a fundamental economic
practice.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we next determine
whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
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exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional claim
elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or any
other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the
judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), effect
a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in
some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)).
The “additional elements” recited in claim 1 include “a first server,”
“a message broker,” “a second server,” and “a private network.” None of
these additional elements constitutes “additional elements that integrate the
exception into a practical application.”
Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to securing cryptocurrency
transactions. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues this is a technical solution to a
computer problem, which is achieved by “separating a server, which hosts a
cryptocurrency transaction website, from a server, which hosts the online
wallet and performs cryptocurrency transactions.” Id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 10, 33,
34). Appellant argues this is an improvement on conventional computer
networks for cryptocurrency transactions. Id.
Appellant also argues claim 8 recites structural limitations that require
specific functionality, which integrate the purported abstract idea into a
practical application. Id. at 9. In particular, Appellant identifies “a first
server; a transaction request, cryptocurrency, an online wallet, a request
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message, a message queue, a message broker, a second server, and a private
network” as specific structure. Id. at 9.
Appellant also argues claim 1 does not preempt substantially all uses
of a fundamental principle because there are other ways to practice the stated
abstract idea besides those claimed. Id. at 10. Finally, Appellant argues the
Examiner failed to analyze the claims as an ordered combination and failed
to analyze the dependent claims. Id. at 10.
Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. The focus of
claim 1 is not on an improvement to computers or another technology, but
rather on using generic computer components to perform the recited method
of receiving a financial transaction request, sending the request to be
processed, fulfilling the request, and sending a response about the fulfilment.
Thus, claim 1 focuses on the abstract idea itself, rather than any technical
improvement.
Appellant’s argument that claim 1 is directed to a technical solution to
a computer problem is unpersuasive. Appellant describes the improvement
as “separating a server, which hosts a cryptocurrency transaction website,
from a server, which hosts the online wallet and performs cryptocurrency
transactions.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 10, 33, 34). Other than the
generic computer components recited in this purported improvement, this
improvement could be describing separating any two actors involved in a
transaction. That is, this improvement is essentially the idea of having two
actors work on the same transaction—one works on communicating with the
user requesting the transaction (the cryptocurrency transaction website) and
one works on executing the transaction itself (the online wallet that performs
the cryptocurrency transaction). Appellant’s improvement is to take this
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separation of work, and the security benefits of such a separation, and
implement it in the context of cryptocurrency transactions. “But ‘limiting the
abstract idea to a particular environment—a mobile telephone system—[ ]
does not make the claims any less abstract for the step 1 analysis.’” Ericsson
Inc. v. TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (quoting In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). Claim 1 includes instructions to implement an abstract
idea on a computer and does no more than generally link the use of a judicial
exception to a particular technological environment, which does not render
the claims any less abstract. Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838
F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also MPEP § 2106.05(h). Thus, claim 1
“does not improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more
efficiently, or solve any technological problem.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v.
IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Appellant’s argument that the independent claims recite specific
structural limitations is also unavailing. “The [S]pecification is silent as to
any specific structural or inventive improvements in computer functionality
related to this claimed system.” See Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish
Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Providing “simply
generic descriptions of well-known computer components” does not
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application where, as here,
Appellant “makes no claim that it invented any of those components or their
basic functions, nor does it suggest that those components, at that level of
generality, were unknown in the art.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v.
Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed.
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Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation
details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware,
or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to
retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Specification confirms that the
identified limitations, including “a first server, a transaction request,
cryptocurrency, an online wallet, a request message, a message queue, a
message broker, a second server, and a private network” are generic
computer limitations executed by generic computers. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 25‒
26, 47‒54. For example, the Specification discloses that “the various devices
and modules described herein may be enabled and operated using hardware
circuitry (e.g., CMOS based logic circuitry), firmware, software or any
combination of hardware, firmware, and software (e.g., embodied in a non-
transitory machine-readable medium).” Id. ¶ 47. The Specification further
discloses that “[i]t should also be noted that methods disclosed herein can be
implemented by one or more computers including, for example, a general-
purpose computer, desktop computer, tablet computer, laptop computer,
server, game console, cellular phone, smart phone, smart television system,
and so forth.” Id. Thus, Appellant’s argument that the claims recite specific
structural limitations is not supported by the Specification.
Appellant’s argument that claim 1 does not preempt substantially all
uses of a fundamental principle is also unavailing. Preemption is the concern
that drives the exclusionary principle of judicial exceptions to patent-eligible
subject matter. Alice, 573 U.S. at 215–217. However, preemption is not a
separate test of patent-eligibility, but is inherently addressed within the Alice
framework. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
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1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While preemption may signal patent ineligible
subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility.”).
Appellant’s argument that the Examiner fails to consider the
limitations of claim 1 as an ordered combination (see Appeal Br. 10) is also
unpersuasive of Examiner error. Appellant does not identify any limitations,
either individually or as an ordered combination, that integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application. To the extent Appellant is arguing that the
claimed improvements are non-obvious when considered as an ordered
combination, we note that the claimed improvements are improvements to
the abstract idea itself. Even if the claimed method is novel, a claim directed
to a new abstract idea is still directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Commc’n
Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 958 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (Fed.
Cir. 2020). Indeed, “[w]e may assume that the techniques claimed are
‘[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,’ but that is not enough for
eligibility.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013)).
Thus, as discussed above, a generic computer system is used to
implement the claimed steps, and there is no indication that claim 1
improves the functioning of the processor, makes it operate more efficiently,
or solves a technological problem with a solution rooted in computer
technology.
Moreover, our reviewing court has “made clear that mere automation
of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a
patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp.
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v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Like the claims in
Credit Acceptance, the focus of claim 1 is on the abstract idea itself, “and
the recited generic computer elements ‘are invoked merely as a tool.’” Id.
(citing Enfish, 822 F.3d 1327); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am.,
Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). That is, the
claimed additional elements are used to achieve the claimed results and are
not focused on “a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Finally, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner fails to analyze the
dependent claims (see Appeal Br. 10) is unpersuasive of Examiner error.
The Examiner determines the dependent claims “do not resolve the
deficiency of [the] independent claims” and stand rejected “based on the
same rationale.” Final Act. 11. We agree. Appellant has not identified, nor
have we found, any limitations recited in the dependent claims that resolve
the subject matter eligibility issues discussed above with respect to the
independent claims. For example, claim 5 recites “[t]he method of claim 1,
wherein the message broker and associated queues are managed by the first
server.” Claim 6 recites “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein a message broker
server configured to handle the message queues shares the private network
with the second server.” Claim 7 recites “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein
the message broker comprises: a request queue comprising the request
message; and a response queue comprising the response message.” Each of
these dependent claims provides further detail describing the implementation
of the claimed abstract idea, but there is no indication that these limitations
improve the functioning of the processor, make it operate more efficiently,
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or solve a technological problem with a solution rooted in computer
technology.
For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error
with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance. We, therefore,
conclude the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application
under the Revised Guidance.
Revised Guidance Step 2B
Under Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether
the claims recite an “inventive concept” that “must be significantly more
than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to
implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” BASCOM Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2016). There must be more than “computer functions [that] are ‘well-
understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the
industry.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
Appellant does not separately argue the Examiner errs in performing
the Step 2B analysis. See Appeal Br. 7‒10. Instead, Appellant argues the
Examiner errs for the reasons discussed above with respect to Step 2A,
Prong 2. We disagree for the reasons set forth above.
We, therefore, sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of
claim 1. We also sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of
independent claims 8 and 21, which Appellant argues are patent eligible for
the same reasons. See Appeal Br. 7‒10. We also sustain the patent-ineligible
subject matter rejection of dependent claims 2‒7, 9‒14, and 22‒23, for
which Appellant provides no separate argument. See id.
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Section 112 Rejections
Claims 21‒23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and 112(b).
See Final Act. 11‒15. Appellant does not argue the Examiner errs in
rejecting these claims, instead stating Appellant will work with the Examiner
to resolve the issues following this appeal. Appeal Br. 5 n.1. Accordingly,
we summarily affirm the rejections of claims 21‒23 under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 112(a) and 112(b).
Obviousness
Claims 1, 5‒8, 12‒14, 21, and 23
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Yang, Ronca, and Kumarjiguda.
See Appeal Br. 10‒14; Reply Br. 4‒6. In particular, Appellant argues the
cited references do not teach or suggest a second server, “wherein the second
server is accessible only through a private network and is configured to read
messages from the message queue.” See Appeal Br. 11‒14. Appellant argues
Yang does not teach this limitation because authentication manager 208
directly interfaces with user devices and third-party services and, therefore,
cannot be on a private network. Appeal Br. 11 (citing Yang ¶¶ 24‒26).
Appellant argues Ronca teaches enterprise cryptocurrency server 130 is on a
network-connected server. Id. at 12 (citing Ronca ¶ 194), Figs. 1, 2
Appellant argues Kumarjiguda is unconcerned with securing cryptographic
currency transactions and the Examiner does not rely on this reference for
the “second server” limitation. Id. at 12‒13.
The Examiner’s interpretation of “private network” differs from
Appellant’s interpretation of “private network,” which excludes any
interaction between the claimed “second server” and user devices or third-
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party services. See Ans. 7‒8. The Examiner finds Ronca teaches a “private
network” under Appellant’s interpretation because Ronca teaches
communication about cryptocurrency over an intranet network, local area
network (LAN), and virtual private network (VPN). Id. at 8 (citing Ronca
¶¶ 51, 52). The Examiner also finds Kumarjiguda teaches network 120 can
be a local area network, which the Examiner finds is a “private network,” as
claimed. Id. at 9 (citing Kumarjiguda, 4:4‒25, 50‒60). Appellant responds in
the Reply Brief that “Ronca does not teach, and is not cited in the Final
Office Action as teaching, this limited system.” Reply Br. 5.
The Examiner finds Ronca teaches the claimed “second server” that is
“accessible only through a private network.” Ans. 8‒9. Appellant has not
provided substantive argument that this finding is erroneous, instead merely
arguing that “Ronca does not teach, and is not cited in the Final Office
Action as teaching, this limited system.” Reply Br. 5. This conclusory
statement is unpersuasive of Examiner error.
Moreover, Ronca teaches enterprise cryptocurrency environment 100
includes network 120, which connects various components of the
cryptocurrency environment. See Ronca ¶¶ 51‒52. Ronca teaches network
120 may include one or more networks, which may be local to each
individual component of the environment. Id. ¶ 51. Ronca teaches these
networks may comprise an intranet, a VPN, and a LAN. Id. ¶ 51. The
network may also include communication links between the components of
the environment or the individual networks. Id. ¶ 52. These communication
links may also include an intranet, a VPN, and a LAN. Id. ¶ 52. Thus, Ronca
teaches or at least suggests the various components of the cryptocurrency
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environment may be on networks, such as intranets, VPNs, or LANs, that
are not accessible to the public.
Appellant also argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 because
an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine the
cited references. See Appeal Br. 11‒13. In particular, Appellant argues Yang
teaches against the claimed invention because Yang teaches private keys are
stored on servers that interface directly with user devices. Id. at 12 (citing
Yang ¶ 34). Appellant argues Ronca teaches keeping active cryptocurrency
on a network connected server and, therefore, also teaches against the
claimed invention. Id. at 12 (citing Ronca Figs. 1, 2, ¶ 194). Appellant
argues Kumarjiguda is unconcerned with securing cryptographic currency
transactions and the Examiner has made no showing that an ordinarily
skilled artisan would look to Kumarjiguda to reach the present invention
where the second server is on a private network. Id. at 12‒13.
Appellant’s arguments regarding the Examiner’s rationale to combine
the references are unpersuasive because they rely on the same substantive
argument as discussed above regarding the “private network” limitation. In
particular, Appellant’s arguments that Yang and Rosca teach against the
claimed invention are unpersuasive because neither reference criticizes,
discredits, or otherwise discourages the claimed solution. See In re Fulton,
391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of
more than one alternative does not constitute teaching away from any of
these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or
otherwise discourage the solution claimed.”). And Appellant’s argument
regarding Rosca is unpersuasive because, as explained above, Rosca teaches
private networks may be used to connect the various cryptocurrency
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environment components. Accordingly, Appellant has not persuasively
identified error in the Examiner’s proposed rationale to combine the cited
references.
For these reasons, we sustain the obviousness rejection of independent
claim 1. We also sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claims 8
and 21, for which Appellant relies on the same arguments. See Appeal
Br. 13‒14. We also sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 5‒7, 12‒14,
and 23, for which Appellant provides no separate argument. See id. at 14.
Dependent Claims 2, 9, 22
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 2, 9, and 22
because the cited combination does not teach or suggest “an administrative
server accessible only by the second server through the private network and
only through a second message broker.” Appeal Br. 14‒15. In particular,
Appellant argues none of the cited references teaches a private network for
the same reasons explained with respect to the independent claims. Id. at 15.
We disagree for the same reasons explained with respect to claims 1, 8, and
21. Accordingly, we sustain the obviousness rejections of claim 2, 9, and 22.
Dependent Claims 4 and 11
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 4, 11, and
22/234 because the additionally cited reference, Godejohn, does not teach or
suggest “the reversal requests configured to reverse one or more malicious

4 In the Appeal Brief, Appellant refers to claim 22 as containing this
limitation. See Appeal Br. 15. In the Reply Brief, Appellant refers to claim
23 as containing this limitation. See Reply Brief 6. The Examiner does not
rely on Godejohn for the rejection of claims 22 or 23. See Final Act. 26‒28.
Accordingly, we address Appellant’s arguments as they apply to claims 4
and 11.
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transactions of cryptocurrency performed by the second server.” See Appeal
Br. 15‒16; Reply Br. 6. In particular, Appellant argues Godejohn teaches
credit card chargebacks, but does not teach the claimed “transaction log” or
“second server,” and is unconcerned with securing cryptocurrency
transactions by isolating a second server on a private network. Appeal
Br. 16.
Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner
finds, and we agree, Godejohn teaches “the request message comprising one
or more reversal requests, the reversal requests configured to reverse one or
more malicious transactions.” Ans. 10. The Examiner does not find
Godejohn teaches cryptocurrency transactions or a second server on a
private network. Id. at 11. Instead, the Examiner relies on Godejohn for
teaching reversal requests to reverse malicious transactions and relies on the
other cited references for the remainder of the claim. Id. at 11. Appellant’s
argument is unpersuasive because it focuses on the teachings of Godejohn
without considering the combination of the references as a whole. The
relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been
obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined
teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
Appellant’s argument does not persuasively identify error in the Examiner’s
findings regarding the additionally cited references. Accordingly, we sustain
the obviousness rejection of claims 4 and 11.

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21

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1‒14, 21‒23 101 Eligibility 1‒14, 21‒23
21‒23 112(a) Written
Description
21‒23
21‒23 112(b) Indefiniteness 21‒23
1‒3, 5‒10,
12‒14, 21‒
23
103 Yang, Ronca,
Kumarjiguda
1‒3, 5‒10,
12‒14, 21‒23

4, 11 103 Yang, Ronca,
Kumarjiguda,
Godejohn
4, 11
Overall
Outcome
1‒14, 21‒23

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED