Anaconda Wire and Cable Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 25, 1968

173 N.L.R.B. 961 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

ANACONDA WIRE AND CABLE CO. 961
Anaconda Wire and Cable Company and Aluminum
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO. Case
9-CA-4645
November 25, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND ZAGORIA
Cable Company, herein called the Respondent or the Company
The principal issue of the case is whether the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) in the discharge of one employee. The
charge was filed on March 7, 1968, and the complaint issued on
May 8, 1968. Briefs were filed after the close of the hearing by
the General Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On August 28, 1968, Trial Examiner Thomas A.
Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth -in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the
Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision, and a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
Trial Examiner's findings,' conclusions, and recom-
mendations.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Anaconda Wire and
Cable Company, LaGrange, Kentucky, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. RICCI, Trial Examiner . A hearing in the above-
entitled proceeding was held before the duly designated Trial
Examiner on July 17, 1968, at LaGrange, Kentucky, on
complaint of the General Counsel against Anaconda Wire and
1 The Respondent excepts to some of the Trial Examiner's
credibility resolutions It is the Board's established policy, however, not
to overrule a Trial Examiner 's resolutions as to credibility unless, as is
not the case here, the preponderance of all the relevant evidence
convinces us that they are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc.,
91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3).
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Anaconda Wire and Cable Company, a Delaware corpora-
tion, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of electrical wire
and cable products in Kentucky and various other States of the
United States. Its sole plant involved in this proceeding is
located at LaGrange, Kentucky. During the past year, a
representative period, it purchased and caused to be shipped to
LaGrange directly from points outside the State of Kentucky
products valued in excess of $50,000. I find that the
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
exercise jurisdiction herein.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Aluminum Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The Issue
The central issue of this case involves the alleged illegal
discharge of Larry Stanley, a serviceman. He was hired on
December 20, 1967, and released on February 10, 1968. The
plant is about 2 years old and a collective-bargaining agreement
in effect provides for union security and a precise grievance
procedure, the contract also spells out a 60-day probationary
period for new employees. Stanley joined the Union after 30
days
He was working the night shift, from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m.
When he arrived the night of Tuesday, February 6, he
complained to his supervisor, Donald Peterson, because the
latter had performed manual work during the Monday night
shift instead of calling Stanley to do it. Peterson had told
Stanley to stay off duty the night before, and, according to the
union contract as Stanley read it, the supervisor was not to do
this work so long as a regular employee was available. Not
satisfied with Peterson's explanation, Stanley said he would
file a grievance. Peterson, at the hearing, denied hearing the
employee speak of grievances, and this question of credibility,
as well as evidence concerning what processing of a grievance
occurred during the following days, will be discussed below.
Stanley worked the week, and when he arrived late at night for
his Saturday shift, at 11 p.m., was discharged by Peterson with
no advance notice.
The complaint alleges Stanley was released because he
resorted to the grievance procedure in his dispute with the
supervisor. Denying this was the reason, the Respondent
defends on the affirmative ground that he was discussed "due
173 NLRB No. 144
962 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to his inability to perform his work to the satisfaction of his
foreman, Mr. Donald Peterson, as well as his unsatisfactory
work habits." This language is from the Respondent's written
answer to the complaint. Management witnesses also denied
they knew anything about the grievance before the moment of
discharge.
A subsidiary, but essential element of the General Counsel's
case, is company knowledge of the grievance and when it was
processed. Because consideration of this question requires
careful appraisal of the testimony of defense witnesses, and
because the reliability of their testimony generally is more
significantly revealed in the evidence said to support the
affirmative defense, Stanley's work record and management's
reaction to it, must be set out first.
Asserted Cause for Discharge
According to the plant manager, Donald Owens, the
probationary period is for the purpose of teaching a man, and
to decide whether he is worth keeping at all Stanley was an
employee for 50 days, and he actually worked 48 of them, he
did much overtime. He was never out sick. He progressed from
laborer to serviceman and forklift operator. He went from one
supervisor to another, first Stephen Apple, then McAdams, and
finally Peterson. Apple said he supervised the man for 3 weeks,
and Peterson that he had Stanley for a month or 5 weeks. In
any event, Apple's testimony is that under him, "he was a
good employee," and that when he learned of the discharge he
was "surprised" When Stanley first changed jobs he was given
a raise from $1.95 per hour to $2.10. On February 2, after
Stanley had been working for him 3 or 4 weeks, Foreman
Peterson told him "he had thought about putting me in for a
raise and qualify me as a service man." He then and there
reclassified Stanley from labor grade 5 to labor grade 7, and
raised hum from $2.10 per hour to $2.24. As a witness for the
Company Peterson admitted he had "qualified" Stanley for
the higher grade. On cross-examination he conceded he had
done this because Stanley was "able to do a job and did it."
When Stanley reported for work at 11 p.m. the following
Saturday his timecard was not in the rack and when he asked
why, Peterson for the first time informed him of the discharge
decision Asked for a reason, he said, according to Stanley, it
was for spending too much time at the coffee machine, for
once bringing the wrong five barrels of Anlac from the floor
below, for having used the wrong size wire on a duplex head,
and because the second serviceman on the shift had com-
plained of Stanley "bossing him around." Stanley, as a witness,
recalled the Anlac incident, but said he had only carried out
orders, and as to the other serviceman, explained it had been
his assignment to teach the man his duties.
Peterson, the Respondent's first witness, said it was his
decision to discharge the man, and that although he sought
approval of his superiors, they had left the matter entirely up
to him. He started with a rambling discourse on how he had
had to instruct Stanley in the work, and, in general phrases,
casting aspersion upon the man's worth. Asked for exactly
what it was that he found wrong with the employee's
performance, he then listed several incidents. (1) He once sent
Stanley for six drums of Anlac 6 enamel, but he brought Anlac
5 instead. (2) Lloyd Armstrong, the second serviceman on the
shift, had complained that Stanley "keeps on bossing me
around and he doesn't want to do any of the work." (3)
Stanley loitered too much at the coffee machine. (4) One day
he had seen Stanley in conversation with another employee in
the laboratory trying to sell him his house.
There is indication in Peterson's recital that none of these
matters were of serious concern to him when they happened.
When Stanley protested he had not brought the wrong
numbered Anlac, and that this was what the supervisor had in
fact asked for, Peterson told him, according to his own
testimony " . it doesn't make any difference if I said AN 5
or if I said AN 6, you still have two different types of enamel
there .. ." Here Peterson was agreeing with Stanley that he,
Stanley, had done nothing wrong that day When he told
Stanley not to try to sell his house on company time, "he
[Stanley] looked at me and gave me a grin and I said, well let's
get back to work so I guess that he went on back to his job."
As to Armstrong, Peterson agreed with Stanley's explanation
that all the latter was trymg to do was carry out the
supervisor's instructions to teach the man. From Peterson's
testimony. ..... I went to Stanley and I told him, I said, you
know more about the job than Lloyd Armstrong and this I
appreciate, but, if he needs any questions answered, please
come to me, don't leave it for Stanley and I would instruct
him." What "bossing" Armstrong complained of, therefore,
was merely his way of resenting the instructions in lus duties
which Stanley had been told to give him.' As to the coffee
machine, there is no set rule about its use, and Peterson never
told Stanley he used the machine too much.
Peterson could not clearly recall that any of these things
had happened during the four shifts which Stanley worked
after receiving his last raise. At one point he said the "trouble
with Armstrong" came during the last week. Elsewhere he
admitted it was only after Armstrong had complained that he,
Peterson, relieved Stanley of the responsibility to instruct the
second laborer. Did it happen "before or after he was
qualified? A . . before or after I am not sure, I really can't
say " " . some of these things happened before you qualified
him? A Correct"
The workweek ends at 7 a.m. Monday morning, and Stanley
was scheduled to work on a Saturday night. He was therefore
released during the workweek, after being permitted to come
to the plant at night, without advance notice. Peterson was
asked to explain how it came about that he did not advise the
employee when he left in the morning, what caused him to
decide at that particular time. "Well, I reviewed all of his past
work habits, the quality of his past job performances and I
decided that there was no other thing to do other than
terminate him." "Q. Did anything happen on Friday night that
brought this to a head? A. I think just as an overall general
reason"
Stanley testified he was never advised his performance was
inadequate, and Peterson admitted the man was never told he
might be released for any reason. As for criticism of the
i Stanley referred to Armstrong as Louis, but it is clear Louis and
Lloyd are the same man . Armstrong did not appear as a witness.
2 There is a system of written notices given employees in cases of
serious misconduct or incompetence I do not think the fact no such
written notice was ever given Stanley helps prove the complaint here,
for the practice is also to give a copy of such warnings to the union
representatives , and as Stanley was a probationary employee under the
contract , there could logically also be an understanding that the written
notices system would not apply to such persons
ANACONDA WIRE AND CABLE CO. 963
quality of his work, Peterson evaded and in his testimony
merged instructions to a new man with fault finding.2 The
Respondent was hard put to reconcile the record evidence of
Peterson only days previously having "qualified" Stanley for
higher pay, with the principal assertion that he was discharged
for poor workmanship, or, as literally written in the answer,
"inability to perform his work." In an attempt to explain away
the obvious inconsistency between almost simultaneous raise
and discharge, the Company called the plant manager, Owens.
Owens gave the following explanation:
Basically when a man performs a job and he is capable of
performing that job, he is then qualified for that job to
receive that rate of pay. A man can probably do the job but
he might not completely do it, in other words if he has to
move ten barrels as an example, he is qualified to move the
ten but if he is not a good employee he might only move
four and then I would say he is not qualified to move the
ten. It's like running a piece of equipment. He is capable of
running the total equipment. He has that ability and that
knowledge but if he doesn't have the attitude he might not
run at all, with the total job function.
The plant manager was followed by Dorsey Johnson, the
personnel director. He was asked, if he, as a personnel director,
were to make an entry that an employee is qualified, what
would that word mean. He answered: "That he had the ability
to do the job."
If the foregoing testimony, by all three management agents,
amounts to anything of substance, it means there can be a man
who possesses the skill, intelligence and capacity adequately to
perform his duties, but who deliberately chooses not to do so.
I can conceive of such a distinction. I cannot understand how
any employer, whose sole interest necessarily is to have the
work done, can give a raise to the second man with the
knowledge of his willful disobedience. Peterson admitted he
was aware, before February 2, of what he now calls Stanley's
imperfections. When to this is added the fact of summary
dismissal, without notice, in mid-week, at 11 o'clock at night,
a discharge for cause said to be warranted by old-standing
failures which could as well have been effected at the end of
the earlier shift, the conclusion is compelled that Stanley was
not released for "inability to perform his work." I do not
credit the testimony of Peterson, or of the company higher
officials, as to the reason for discharge, and find no merit in
the affirmative defense.
The Grievance.
Unfair Labor Practice Finding
With this, I also credit the testimony of Stanley that on the
night of February 6, when complaining about the foreman
having unjustly performed the serviceman's work, he told
Peterson that he would file a grievance. The merits of Stanley's
gripe are not of great moment here, for Peterson did not even
hint that the spat between the two may have tnggered the
discharge. On Sunday he told Stanley to take the next night
off, he would not need him. It then developed that Armstrong,
the second man, took ill and did not show Monday night.
Stanley thought Armstrong had called in at 8 p.m., and that in
the next 3 hours before the shift began Peterson could have
called him in. Peterson said he expected Armstrong at 11
o'clock, and when that evening he failed to appear, he did call
the telephone numbers Stanley had given him for this very
purpose, but was unable to reach him.
Be that as it may, Stanley spoke to Union Steward
McClellan after his disagreement with the supervisor and
reported his grievance. McClellan piomised to write it up for
Stanley to sign later The grievance statement itself, signed by
both Stanley and McClellan, was received in evidence and
shows the date February 9, which was Friday
There is no direct evidence that the document was delivered
to anyone on behalf of management before Stanley's dis-
charge, or that the Company knew, by 11 p m., Saturday, that
it had been signed. There is much confusion in the oral
testimony as to exactly when the grievance was signed, and the
Respondent makes much of the faulty memories of witnesses
on this point as a defense to the complaint. I am satisfied, on
the basis of the record in its totality, and because I do not
credit the substance of Peterson's story, that he, as well as
other company officials, knew by Saturday at the latest that
there was a grievance being advanced by the Union on behalf
of Stanley.
Stanley stated more than once that the last shift he worked
was Thursday night, 11 p.m., to 7 a.m., Friday morning, and
that he was released that night, without again punching his
timecard, which was missing from the rack when he arrived. He
was equally certain he signed the grievance on the morning of
Friday, February 9, the end of the last shift he worked. He
also said, twice, that he did not work the 11 p.m. shift Monday
night, this is the one when Armstrong was supposed to come
but did not. There are, however, two exhibits which seem to
establish conclusively that he worked four shifts that week-
Tuesday night, Wednesday, Thursday, and Fnday nights. One
is a weekly earnings report showing 32 hours work by Stanley
for the week ending "2-11," which is a Sunday. This a record
slip from the Company's office. The other, an exhibit offered
by the Respondent, is a timecard, punched to show only 1 day
worked, an 8-hour shift Friday, February 9, at 10 44 p.m. to
Saturday at 7:02 a.m. This card conflicts squarely with the
supervisor's testimony that the workweek begins at 7 a.m.
Monday morning. It also, of course, clashes with the weekly
time-worked record for a week ending Sunday. No one on
behalf of the Respondent attempted to explain this complete
inconsistency in its own records. In its brief the Respondent
argues Stanley should not be credited as a witness because he
said he was discharged Friday night and the timecard proves he
worked Saturday night A man who regularly works Saturday
and Sunday night shifts, as Stanley used to do then, could well
be mistaken months later as to the exact date. A no less
questionable element in the case arises from the Respondent's
own records.
Steward McClellan, who wrote and signed the grievance,
was also certain he wrote it up on the 9th. He said he gave it to
Oldham, the assistant steward of the third shift, for Stanley's
signature. Oldham testified he put the document into Stanley's
hands when he came off the night shift at about 7 a.m., but he
was sure it was not "after he was discharged." I can only take
all this to mean the grievance was drawn on the 9th, and that
Stanley signed it before the end of the shift which started on
Friday evening and ended at 7 a.m. Saturday. It was at that
moment, after Stanley had gone home, that Peterson, as he said
"reviewed all of his past job performances" and decided to
terminate him.
McClellan conceded he never delivered the written grievance
to management because by the time it came back to him
Stanley had been discharged. But he also explained why he
delayed from Monday night to Friday in drafting it "Well I
964 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
wrote it out and told Oldham to see Mr. Peterson because I
understood what Mr. Stanley wanted and I wanted him to go
talk to Mr. Peterson about the grievance and give hum his 2
days, you know, and then get Stanley to sign if he didn't like
his answer."3 Under the terms of the grievance procedure of
the contract in effect, the first thing provided for is an oral
appeal to the supervisor involved.
No grievance will be discussed unless the procedure as
outlined hereafter is followed.
Step 1. By the aggrieved employee and his immediate
supervisor, it is being understood that the employee may
have another employee designated as a steward present at
the time the grievance is presented. If a satisfactory answer
is not given within two (2) regular working days after the
complaint has been made, it will be reduced to writing,
specifying the provision of the contract claimed to be
breached, signed by the employee and handled.
Indirect as the foregoing testimony may be, I deem it
persuasive towards a finding that there was, before the
discharge, some talk between union stewards and Peterson
that Stanley was processing a grievance The contract calls for
the steward to speak to the supervisor involved, and allows 2
days for management to state a position before any written
grievance-here dated February 9-is to be signed. The infer-
ence is strengthened by testimony of employees Ronald
Stevens and R. Edward Yocum, who said that a day or two
after the discharge, while a group of employees were gathered
chatting with Supervisor Steve Apple, Stevens asked the
foreman whether Stanley had been discharged because of the
grievance. They said Apple replied "If it wasn't the reason, it
sure hurt him," or, in Yocum's words "if it wasn't the reason
it certainly had a bearing on it " Apple recalled the incident,
that Stevens asked hum "something to that effect," but his
testimony was that all he replied was he "could not say, did
not know." He demed saying the grievance had hurt Stanley. I
credit Stevens and Yocum.
Absence of direct proof of illegal motivation does not of
itself preclude an inference of improper object when the facts
shown on the record in its totality warrant it. Peterson's
evaluation of Stanley's work competence had nothing to do
with the dismissal. But a reason for the unannounced action,
completely at odds with the "qualified" the supervisor had so
recently stamped on him, there had to be. And it had to be
something that happened between February 2 and 10 It was
not the fact Stanley felt abused for losing a night's work, for
Peterson did not even list that incident among the pinpointed
failings he advanced at the moment of discharge. I cannot say
how, or exactly from what person or persons, management
learned of the later processing of the grievance. But I am
convinced by the total testimony that it knew Peterson knew
it was corning, for Stanley told him so on Tuesday night. The
next evening, Wednesday, Peterson passingly remarked to
Stanley at work "some people have their differences . . it all
3 A clearer version by McClellan as to the sequence of events came
on cross -examination
Q. Well, he came back to work on February the 6th , isn't that
correct9
A I am not positive but its the day he came back, that 's the date
he came over to me and told me exactly what happened
Q Now what date appears here in your handwriting'
A. February 9th, 1968
Q Why the delay9 Why did you take so long to write it up9
works out in the end." Shortly after the discharge,
according to uncontradicted testimony by Steven Abney,
Peterson, who was his supervisor also, said to him "we had to
let him [Stanley] go because he cued too much " This was his
euphemism for grievance filing. Further, when Stanley told a
gathering of employees, including the union secretary-
treasurer, immediately following his discharge and before the
start of the shift, what had happened, Supervisor Kinser
quickly approached with the departmental seniority list in his
hands. This list showed that Stanley was still a probationer.
Kinser said, at that point. "... you all can't do nothing for
him, he lacks 10 days being off probation .. " Further
evidence, this, that the uppermost thought in the minds of
management at that moment was the matter of grieving, and
that it seized upon Stanley's probationary status in order to
dismiss him before there could be any grievance submitted. I
therefore conclude, as alleged in the complaint, that the
Respondent discharged Stanley because he chose to resort to
the Union for redress, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act. The contract may preclude Stanley from filing a
grievance, but it does not license an employer to discriminate
against any employee for resorting to union assistance 4
Foreman Peterson was not the only supervisor who gave
vent to the Company's resentment towards the filing of
grievances by employees. About a week after the discharge of
Stanley, employee James Hayes complained of his foreman,
Aldridge, performing manual work contrary to the union
contract Steward Oldham was called and he told Aldridge, in
the presence of Hayes and another employee, "... the steward
was supposed to give him a warning before writing him up, and
that's what I was doing over there. I was giving him a warning
and the next time he strung any wire we would have to write
up a grievance on it" A moment or two later Aldridge
returned to the two men and said. "If you want to. . me I
will .. you and he said anymore you won't get any overtime
I can give it and I can take it away ......
As originally written, the complaint alleged that Hayes was
in fact deprived of overtime work for having said he would file
a grievance The General Counsel later struck this allegation
from the complaint on his own motion. The threat to deny
overtime in the future, however, was not denied by Foreman
Aldridge, who did not testify. I credit Oldham and find that
Aldridge's threat constituted unlawful coercion upon the
employees in their rights to resort to union assistance through
,the grievance procedure, and therefore a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
!V THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set out in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations set forth in
section I, above, have a close, intimate and substantial relation
A Like I said , I was hurt playing basketball and I spranged my
ankle and I was waiting on an answer for Arnold [Oldhaml and I
was supposed to talk to Mr . Peterson and I went ahead and wrote it
up and gave him the grievance and I went and took the grievance in
and found out that the boy was done fired
4 Enduro Metal Products, 160 NLRB 1411 . There is no merit in the
Respondent 's further argument that in urging his grievance Stanley was
not protected under the statute because the activity was not "con-
certed " Cf N L.R .B v Hymie Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (C.A. 5)
ANACONDA WIRE AND CABLE CO. 965
to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act. Because the Respondent
discriminatorily discharged Larry Stanley it must be ordered to
reinstate him, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights
and privileges previously enjoyed, to his former or substantially
equivalent position, and make him whole for any loss of pay
he may have suffered by reason of the discriminatory
discharge. Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in
the manner prescribed by the Board in F W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and shall include interest at 6
percent per annum, as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating
Co., 138 NLRB 716. An act of unlawful discharge also
demands that the Respondent be ordered henceforth to desist
from violating the statute in any other manner.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the
entire record in the case, I make the following-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization as defined in Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Larry Stanley for having resorted to the
grievance procedure under the collective-bargaining agreement
the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the foregoing conduct and by the threat of Foreman
Aldridge to deny employees overtime in order to discourage
the filing of grievances, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I
recommend that the Respondent, Anaconda Wire and Cable
Company, LaGrange, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging employees in retaliation for resorting to the
grievance procedure under the Union's contract.
(b) Threatening employees with loss of overtime work to
discourage the filing of grievances, or in any other manner
interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Larry Stanley immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make him whole for any loss of pay which he may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him, in the
manner set forth in that portion of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy "
(b) Notify Larry Stanley if he is now serving in the Armed
Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement,
upon application, in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve, and upon request, make available to the
Board , or it agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records, and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this order.
(d) Post at its LaGrange, Kentucky, plant, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of said notice,
on forms to be provided by the Regional Director for the
Region 9, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this
Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.'
5 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the 6 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board , the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the Board , this provision shall be modified to read . "Notify the Regional
words ' the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In Director for Region 9, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the
words "a Decision and Order."
966 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner
of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to
effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees for filing griev-
ances under the collective-bargaming agreement with alu-
minum Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization with which we may negotiate
contracts
WE WILL offer Larry Stanley immediate and full rein-
statement to his former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to lus seniority and other rights and
privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay which he
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of overtime
work to discourage the filing of grievances under the union
agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor
organization, to join Aluminum Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or to
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of any labor
organization.
ANACONDA WIRE AND CABLE
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
NOTE: We will notify the above-named employee if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of
his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this Notice or
compliance with its provisions, they may communicate direct-
ly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 2407 Federal
Office Bldg., 550 Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202,
Telephone 684-3663.