Anaconda Ericcson, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 12, 1982

261 N.L.R.B. 831 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

ANACONDA ERICSSON INC
Anaconda Ericcson Inc. and Chauffeurs, Teamsters
and Helpers Local Union No. 391, International
Brotherhood of Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America. Cases 11-
CA-8790, 11-CA-8818, and 11 -CA-9240
May 12, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On December 9, 1980, Administrative Law
Judge William A. Gershuny issued the attached
Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Gener-
al Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the Respondent filed a brief in support of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision and in oppo-
sition to the General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, 3 as
modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modi-
i The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings
made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established
policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with re-
spect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant
evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry
Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing his findings.
2 In the absence of exceptions, Member Fanning adopts the conclusion
of the Administrative Law Judge that William Black's Weingarten rights
were not violated when his request to have a union representative present
was denied after he was summoned to the office of Employee Relations
Manager Matkins and discharged See Member Fanning's dissent in Baton
Rouge Water Works, 246 NLRB 995 (1979). N.LR.B. v. J Weingarten,
Inc. 420 U.S 251 (1975).
s Moore, a Pinkerton undercover agent posing as an employee, was
brought into the Respondent's plant to investigate the cause of large
shortages of copper discovered during a plant audit. Concededly, Moore
testified that he smoked marijuana with employees Black, LaPrad, and
Walker while working, in clear violation of the Respondent's rules of
conduct. However, contrary to the General Counsel's assertion, there is
no evidence that Pinkerton supplied this contraband or that Moore en-
gaged in entrapment while furnishing to the Respondent in his regular
reports this information which, in part, brought about their discharge.
We hereby correct the following inadvertent errors in the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Decision: substitute "1979" for "1980" in the first para-
graph under the section entitled "The Discharges of Black, LaPrad,
Broadnax and Walker," and substitute the name "William Berrier" for
"Berry" wherever reference is made to the Respondent's plant manager
261 NLRB No. 121
fled below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Anaconda Ericsson Inc., Eden, North Carolina, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Add the following as paragraph l(b):
"(b) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges vio-
lations not expressly found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAl LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT lay off bargaining unit em-
ployees without notice to or consultation with
the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
Section 7 of the Act.
ANACONDA ERICCSON INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WIL LIAM A. GERSHUNY, Administrative Law Judge:
A hearing was held on September 29-October 1, 1980, in
Reidsville and Eden, North Carolina, on amended con-
solidated complaint issued September 17, 1980, alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, by Respondent, Ana-
conda Ericsson Inc.' Respondent's answer denies any
violation of the Act.
At issue principally is whether Respondent unlawfully
suspended one employee and unlawfully discharged four
others during the period of contract negotiations and
whether, during those negotiations, Respondent laid off
bargaining unit employees without notice or consultation
and unilaterally withheld a regularly scheduled general
I By stipulation of the parties, the caption was amended at the hearing
to correct the name of Respondent.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
wage increase. During the hearing, an agreement as to
the course of further bargaining was approved, thereby
disposing of paragraph 20(a) of the complaint.
Upon the entire record, including the General Coun-
sel's untimely brief and my observation of witness de-
meanor, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Respondent engaged in the production of plastic
communications cables at its Eden, North Carolina, fa-
cility, with annual interstate shipments in excess of
$50,000, is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOI.VItD
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
11. THE UNFAIR I AIIOR PRACTICES
A. Background
On May 25, 1979, following a May 17 election which
resulted in an 84-17 vote, the Union was certified as ex-
clusive bargaining agent for 112 production and mainte-
nance employees at Respondent's Eden, North Carolina,
facility. As a result of a number of layoffs in 1980 for
economic reasons, the bargaining unit presently consists
of 55 employees.
B. The 3-Day Suspension of Caudle
On June 11, during contract negotiations, employee
Caudle was given a 3-day disciplinary suspension for
"leaving his position" at the end of his shift on June 5,
1980, before being replaced. It is undisputed that Caudle
was an employee-member of the negotiating committee
and that a negotiating session was scheduled to com-
mence 30 minutes after conclusion of the shift.
Also undisputed are the essential facts surrounding the
June 5 incident. During the course of the shift, Caudle
and 23 other employees were specially assigned to assist
in an experimental operation involving the stranding of a
cable, Each of the employees was assigned to a reel of
cable and instructed to apply manual tension to the cable
as it was being stranded, so as to prevent the cable from
hitting the floor and being damaged.
Several times before the end of the shift at 3 p.m.,
Caudle informed Supervisor Berrier, who was the only
supervisor present at the experimental operation, that he
had a negotiating meeting and had to leave at 3 p.m.
Berrier, concerned about overtime, arranged for replace-
ments from the second shift and advised the employees
they could leave when they were replaced. Shortly
before 3 p.m., the replacements began to arrive and
many first-shift employees were relieved. Despite the
fact that the experimental operation would be completed
in 5 to 10 minutes and that more replacements then were
arriving, Caudle immediately left his position at the
sound of the 3 p.m. buzzer, punching out at 3:03 p.m.
His reel was promptly taken up by Supervisor Berrier
before the cable struck the ground. Had Berrier not
stepped in, it would have been necessary to shut down
the machine before completion of the experiment. No
other employee left before being relieved and at least
one other bargaining committee member, McCullouch,
remained to complete the job, checking out at 3:09 p.m.
and thereafter attending the bargaining session. The pat-
tern of bargaining for the past year was that, despite a
scheduled 3:30 p.m. starting time, Respondent's repre-
sentatives did not arrive and thus bargaining did not
commence until 3:45 to 4 p.m.
Company representatives responsible for making the
decision as to discipline testified that Caudle's disregard
of responsibility required discipline that his known activi-
ties were not a factor in their decision. I credit their tes-
timony and find, based on the entire record, that the dis-
cipline was reasonably related to the offense and that this
disciplinary action against Caudle would have been taken
regardless of his union activities. Wright Line, a Division
of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). There is not
the slightest suggestion on this record that Respondent
sought to frustrate employee attendance at negotiating
sessions or discourage union activity by imposing unrea-
sonable working hours. Moreover, there is no evidence
to indicate that Caudle would have been prevented from
making the meeting even had he remained on the job for
the several additional minutes required for its comple-
tion. Indeed, another member of the negotiating team did
just that and presumably arrived at the meeting on time.
No violation is established.
C. Ihe Discharges of Black, LaPrad, Broadnax, and
Walker
On December 12, 1980, employees Black, LaPrad,
Broadnax, and Walker were summarily terminated by
Respondent following receipt of undercover investiga-
tive reports revealing serious violations of company
rules. Each was known by Respondent to be a union ad-
herent and each denied engaging in any wrongdoing.
None was on the negotiating committee.
The uncontroverted evidence, which I credit, is that,
in August 1979, Respondent, through its corporate vice
president of employee relations and its plant manager for
employee relations, contracted with Pinkerton's to pro-
vide an undercover agent to investigate the cause of
large shortages of copper discovered during an audit of
the Eden, North Carolina, plant. The contract, consistent
with Pinkerton's policy, provided that no information
concerning union activity was to be supplied. Periodic
reports, submitted by the agent to Pinkerton's district
office to be typed, were to be transmitted to Respondent
corporate headquarters in Connecticut for further distri-
bution as warranted to company representatives at the
Eden plant. This procedure was decided upon because
no one at the plant was, at that time, beyond suspicion.
The investigation, however, in accordance with Pinker-
ton's policy, was not limited to copper thefts, but was to
provide information generally on security, safety, and su-
pervision.
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ANACONDA ERICSSON INC.
In September 1979, agent Moore, a young male high
school graduate with 2-1/2 years' experience as a Pinker-
ton's agent, was assigned by Respondent to the third
shift as an hourly employee. During the period of Sep-
tember 30 through November 30, he submitted 16 re-
ports which reflected, inter alia, that, on a number of oc-
casions, employees Black, LaPrad, and Walker were ac-
tually observed smoking marihuana in the plant during
working hours;2 that Black and Walker were actually
observed leaving the plant with company tools; and that
Broadnax, on a regular basis, was actually observed op-
erating a forklift in a reckless and unsafe manner, causing
property damage in the plant. No thefts of copper were
observed by the agent at any time on the third shift,3
and no information relating to union activity at the plant
was supplied.
The agent's reports, forwarded to Plant Manager
Berry from corporate headquarters, were reviewed by
the plant manager for employee relations, Matkins. Berry
and Matkins, along with the corporate manager for labor
relations, Priggins, met with the agent in early December
to insure themselves of the accuracy of the reports and
the extent to which the agent actually observed the re-
ported activities. Thereafter, Matkins, Berry, and Plant
Superintendent Boyd decided to terminate the four em-
ployees, based on the eyewitness account of the agent. In
accordance with general corporate policy, final approval
was sought and obtained from Corporate Manager of
Labor Relations Priggins.
On the morning of December 12, the four employees
were separately called to meet with Matkins and Boyd
and were informed that they were discharged. Previous-
ly prepared termination papers and checks were deliv-
ered to each at that time. For appearances sake and so as
not to jeopardize his safety, agent Moore also was called
in at the same time and "discharged."
Essentially, the General Counsel's prima facie case
under Wright Line, supra, has a number of elements: One,
the four employees were known union adherents. As
noted, these employees did not participate in contract ne-
gotiations.
Moreover, there had been widespread wearing of
union "daisies" and buttons at the plant. Two, Black tes-
tified that at the December 12 termination meeting Mat-
kins told him his "biggest problem" was that he was a
union supporter and that he was discharged because of
union activity. Matkins and Boyd denied that such a
statement was made and, it should be noted, none of the
other three employees testified that any similar statement
was made in their meeting, despite the fact that they,
too, were known union adherents. I am unable to credit
the testimony of Black as it is highly improbable and un-
supported by any other evidence in the record. Three,
Respondent was found to have violated Section 8(a)(l)
during the organizational campaign by engaging in four
2 The agent testified that he participated in the use of drugs at the
plant, but did not supply the drugs.
I The agent reported that he suspected copper thefts occurred during
the first shift, but Respondent was unable to reassign the agent because
his 3-month investigation was nearing an end and there was no way
under existing personnel procedures and transfer an employee with no se-
niority to the preferred first shift.
separate incidents of interrogation at the first-line super-
visory, level. Anaconda Co.-Wire and Cable Div., 241
NLRB 1091 (1979). Again it should be noted that the
Administrative Law Judge in that case found no other
evidence of union hostility; that each of the three em-
ployees involved was a known union adherent; that the
incidents were isolated and occurred in a large bargain-
ing unit; and that no unlawful discharges or disciplinary
actions were alleged. And lastly, each of the four em-
ployees denied engaging in the misconduct.
Assuming, without deciding, that these slender threads
of evidence satisfy the General Counsel's initial burden
of proof, I nevertheless find and conclude (1) that the
sole motivation for the December 12 discharges was Re-
spondent's belief, reasonably based on the reports of
agent Moore, that each of the employees engaged in seri-
ous misconduct at the plant and (2) that Respondent
would have taken the same disciplinary action even in
the absence of protected activity.
I find that Pinkerton's activity was a bona fide investi-
gation initiated by Respondent for legitimate business
reasons unrelated to union activity at the plant. There is
absolutely nothing in this lengthy record to suggest an
unlawful motive on the part of Respondent. While all
contracts with Pinkerton's were through corporate and
plant employee relations officials, there is no evidence
that such activity was beyond their authority. Indeed, it
would not be unreasonable for an investigation into em-
ployee misconduct to be the responsibility of employee
relations officials who would thereafter be responsible
for handling not only the disciplinary action but also the
arbitration, Labor Board, and EEOC proceedings which
not infrequently follow. Moreover, had Respondent
wished to employ undercover agents in connection with
union activities, it is more likely to have done so during
the organizational campaign. Yet no such allegations
were made. Nor was there need to determine union sen-
timents of these four employees, since they admittedly
were known union adherents. Finally, there is a possible
suggestion, based on evidence lacking in credibility, that
the investigation was somehow related to a decertifica-
tion campaign at the plant. In that connection, employee
Martin testified that, on May 30, 1980, nonbargaining
unit employee Hensly asked him to assist in obtaining
signatures on a petition to "get rid" of the Union; that
Hensly gave him a blank petition; that Martin signed the
petition and approached other employees; that two such
employees told him they would sign the petition if
Martin could get the Company to issue property passes
to allow them to remove scrap wood from the plant; that
Martin spoke with Hensly who assured Martin that he
would talk to Matkins about the passes; that, shortly
after, Hensly returned and informed Martin that Matkins
would fix it so the two employees would get the passes;
and that thereafter Martin obtained the signatures of the
two employees.
Martin's testimony is not credited as it was unconvinc-
ing and unsupported. First, it was uncontroverted that
the two employees never sought to remove scrap wood
from the plant. Second, Matkins, who was forthright and
whose testimony I credit, denies any activity, direct or
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
indirect, in connection with rumored decertification ac-
tivity. Third, Hensly was not called to testify by counsel
for the General Counsel. Fourth, although much was
made of Hensly's occasional assignment as acting super-
visor (without the traditional authority of a supervisor),
the uncontroverted evidence is that on the day in ques-
tion he was merely another fellow employee at the plant
for whose activities Respondent is not liable. And, final-
ly, the uncontroverted evidence is that the investigation
was directed neither at the activities of any particular
employee or group of employees nor at the union activi-
ties of the bargaining unit members as a whole.
I also find Respondent's reliance on the reports of un-
dercover agent Moore in discharging the four employees
to be reasonable. Pinkerton's is nationally recognized or-
ganization providing security and investigative services.
Moreover, Respondent undertook to satisfy itself as to
the reliability and accuracy of the agent's reports before
taking summary disciplinary action. Matkins and Priggins
met with Moore and questioned him, testing to their sat-
isfaction the veracity of the agent and the nature of the
proof they would have available to them. Respondent
was entitled to rely on the agent's word 4 and was under
no legal obligation to concuct a further investigation or
to first confront the employees with the charges.
And, finally, I find there to be no disparate treatment
of employees identified in the investigative reports. In
each case where the agent witnessed misconduct, the re-
sponsible employee summarily was discharged. In those
instances where the agent observed only an intent to
engage in wrongful conduct but no misconduct, Re-
spondent took no disciplinary action. In short, there was
no disparate treatment by Respondent.
Accordingly, paragraphs 11 and 14 of the amended
complaint are dismissed. 5
D. The Request for Union Representation
Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the amended complaint allege
that Respondent, on two occasions, proceeded unlawful-
ly to interview employees after denying their requests
for representation.
The first, on December 12, 1979, related to the dis-
charge of Black. The undisputed evidence is that the sole
purpose of the meeting was to effectuate a discharge de-
cision previously made. The termination papers already
were prepared and a check for wages due had been
drawn. Black admitted being informed of the decision
before making his request. Under the circumstances,
Black was not entitled to representation. Great Western
Coca Cola Bottling Company, 251 NLRB 860 (1980).
The second, on June 9, 1980, related to the suspension
of Caudle. Under the circumstances, Caudle was not en-
titled to a representative on June 9 for the reason that no
4 Although unnecessary to the case, I find Moore to be a thoroughly
credible witness, whose testimony was quite convincing.
s As a result of credibility findings made in this part of the Decision.
par. 8(a) of the amended complaint relating to the alleged threat to dis-
charge Black because of his union activities and pars. 8(d) and (e) of the
amended complaint relating to solicitation of signatures for the decertifi-
cation petition also are dismissed. In this latter connection, I similarly de-
cline to credit Martin's testimony concerning a conversation on June 23
and 25, 1980, with Matkins on the same subject matter. As noted above,
Matkins credibly denied any such statement.
meeting occurred. N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251 (1975). The credible evidence, presented by
Matkins and Boyd, and largely admitted by Caudle, re-
flects that Matkins informed Caudle on June 9 that he
was not prepared to discuss the June 5 incident and that,
therefore, Caudle did not need a representative. When
the meeting finally was conducted on June 13, Caudle
was accompanied by a representative of his choosing
without objection by Respondent.
Accordingly, no violation is established and para-
graphs 9 and 10 of the amended complaint are dismissed.
E. The Failure To Bargain as to June 13 Layoffs
Paragraph 20(d) of the amended complaint alleges, and
Respondent candidly concedes, a failure to notify or con-
sult with the Union concerning the layoff of approxi-
mately 25 bargaining unit employees on June 13, 1980.
Respondent, which did consult with the Union as to sub-
sequent layoffs, neglected to do so as to the June 13 lay-
offs solely due to an oversight. It is undisputed that the
layoffs were for economic reasons and that, at a negotiat-
ing session prior to June 13, Respondent had explained
its established layoff procedures to the union representa-
tives.
Respondent's neglect constitutes an unintentional vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
F. The Unilateral Withholding of the General Increase
Paragraph 20(c) of the amended complaint alleges that
Respondent refused to bargain in good faith by unilater-
ally withholding a general wage increase from the bar-
gaining unit employees on December 1, 1979. Here
again, there is no dispute as to the facts. In each of the 5
years prior to 1979, general wage increases were granted
by Respondent. The record is silent, however, as to the
amounts of those increases or whether they were uni-
form and counsel for the General Counsel does not sug-
gest what relief might be appropriate, where, as here, the
amount of the increase apparently is discretionary. At
the November 8, 1979, negotiating sessions, Union Busi-
ness Agent Keiger requested that the annual increase be
given and stated that, if it were not considered adequate,
the Union would then negotiate for an additional in-
crease. Priggins, Respondent's chief negotiator, replied
no increase would be given unless negotiated, that the
Union had not yet presented its wage demands, and that
Respondent would not negotiate on the basis of a retro-
active increase. Keiger then presented an 85-cent across-
the-board wage demand. Priggins countered with a 5-
cent offer. A brief discussion followed concerning the
future of the current incentive wage plan. However, at
no time thereafter, either in the Union's voluminous cor-
respondence with Respondent or at the several negotiat-
ing sessions which followed, was the issue of wage in-
creases again raised.
The General Counsel's brief does not address the
merits of this issue and cites no authority for its conclu-
sory statement that Section 8(a)(1) and (5) are violated.
I find, to the contrary, that no violation is established.
Despite evidence of annual wage increases to nonbar-
gaining unit employees, the existence of a certified bar-
834
ANACONDA ERICSSON INC.
gaining representative compels the employer thereafter
to bargain over all terms and conditions. It is essential
that, during bargaining, the status quo be maintained.
Indeed, under the circumstances here, for Respondent to
have granted the wage increases would itself have con-
stituted a violation of the Act. The subject of wages was
on the bargaining table 3 weeks before the December I
scheduled increase. The Union did not unconditionally
agree to the increase. Rather, it conditioned its approval
on the right to bargain, retroactively if necessary, for ad-
ditional wages over and above Respondent's increase.
Thus, there has occurred no unilateral withholding of
the scheduled December I wage increase.
Paragraph 20(c) of the amended complaint is dis-
missed.
G. Threats That Selection of Union Was Futile
Paragraph 8(b) of the amended complaint alleges two
separate instances of threats to an individual employee
that selection of a union was futile.
The first, according to the testimony of W. Black,
who was discharged for cause in December 1979, oc-
curred in mid-October when his uncle J. Black, a super-
visor, approached him and two other employees with
newspaper clippings relating to union elections. Accord-
ing to W. Black, J. Black stated that the Union would be
of no help to the employees and that to support it was a
"waste of time." The two other employees were not
called to corroborate W. Black's testimony. J. Black ad-
mitted that he kept such clippings on his desk in the
work area and that he had two discussions with his
nephew about the advantages and disadvantages of a
union at the plant. However, such conversations, he tes-
tified, were initiated by the nephew who came to him on
a personal basis and were strictly between uncle and
nephew. As indicated earlier, I am unable to credit the
testimony of W. Black. Noteworthy here is the fact that
counsel for the General Counsel failed to call the two
employees who were present during the conversation. I
accept, as the credible one, the version given by J.
Black. Noncoercive and nonthreatening discussions, such
as those which occurred here between nephew and
uncle-supervisor, are not impermissible.
No violation is established.
The second incident, testified to by employee Bolick,
occurred on August 13, 1980, when he jokingly asked
Supervisor Berrier to get a raise for the employees. Ac-
cording to Bolick, Berrier replied, in a manner which did
not reflect he was kidding, "Before you get a raise, the
minimum [wage] will catch up with you." In his affidavit
to the Board, Bolick admitted stating that no supervisor
had ever said that the employees would get no raise until
the Union was decertified. Berrier, whose testimony in
this respect and as to the Caudle suspension was forth-
right and convincing, did not recall any such incident
and denied ever making such a statement. Given the pat-
tern of Respondent's virtually violation-free conduct
both during the organizational campaign and the period
following certification, I credit the version of Berrier as
the more probable and find that no violation of Section
8(a)(1) occurred based on Berrier's conduct.
H. The Threat of Layoff
According to the testimony of J. Smith, a second-shift
employee, Supervisor Mills of the third shift said that
Smith had better take off his union T-shirt; that the
Company had "laid off' (i.e., discharged) some employ-
ees and would get some more; and that the Union had
filed charges before and lost them. The incident alleged-
ly occurred in a restroom on December 20, 1979, a week
after the discharge of the four employees for cause.
Mills, a highly credible witness, did not recall any such
instance and denied making any such statement. He
pointed out, and the testimony throughout the hearing
substantiated the fact, that union T-shirts and emblems
frequently were worn by the employees. Again, consid-
ering the absence of union animus on the part of Re-
spondent during the campaign and thereafter, the fact
that the discharges were for cause, and the fact that vir-
tually 9 of every 10 employees in the bargaining unit had
supported the Union only several months previously, I
find Mills' version to be the more credible and conclude
that there was no violation of Section 8(a)(1) based on
Mills' conduct.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, Respondent shall be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
ORDER i"
The Respondent, Anaconda Ericsson Inc., Eden,
North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
1. Cease and desist from laying off bargaining unit em-
ployees without notice to or consultation with the
Union.
2. Post at its Eden, North Carolina, location copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 11, after being duly signed by Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
I' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
12 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
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