American Girl Place New York

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Aug 10, 2007

02-CA-037791 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 10, 2007)

JD(NY)-37-07
New York, NY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE
AMERICAN GIRL PLACE, INC.
d/b/a AMERICAN GIRL PLACE NEW YORK
and Case No. 2-CA-37791
ACTORS’ EQUITY ASSOCIATION
Olga C. Torres, Esq., New York, NY,
for the General Counsel.
Michael F. McGahan, Tracyee Klein and Donald S. Krueger, Esqs.
(Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C.), New York, NY,
for the Respondent.
Samantha Dulaney and Nicole Perez, Esqs.
(Spivak, Lipton, Watanabe, Spivak, Moss &
Orfan, LLC), New York, NY, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Based on a charge and an amended
charge filed by Actors’ Equity Association (Union) on July 25 and September 21, 2006,
respectively, a complaint was issued on November 30, 2006 against American Girl Place, Inc.,
d/b/a American Girl Place New York (Respondent or Employer).
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges essentially that on about June 18,
2006, the Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act (a) told its employees that they
did not receive wage increases because they supported the Union (b) threatened its employees
with more onerous working conditions if they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative and (c) made statements equating support for the Union to disloyalty to the
Respondent. The complaint also alleges that on about a date between May 1, 2006 and June
18, 2006, the Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3), denied a wage increase for its
employees and, as an alternative thereto, the Respondent suspended its process of considering
a wage increase for its employees because they assisted the Union and engaged in concerted
activities.
The Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of the complaint and on May
21-23, 2007, a hearing was held before me in New York, NY. On the entire record, including my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by all
parties, I make the following:
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent, a Wisconsin corporation having a facility located at 609 Fifth Avenue,
New York, NY, has been engaged in the business of the retail sale of girls’ goods and apparel.
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Annually, the Respondent derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchases and
receives at its New York facility goods and materials valued in excess of $5,000 directly from
suppliers located outside New York State. Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Facts
1. Background
The Respondent operates a retail store in Manhattan in which it sells products relating to
girls ages 9 to 12, and operates a theater in which live productions are presented by adult and
child actors. The actors include “primary” actors who are the main performers and “cover” actors
commonly known as understudies.
A show entitled American Girls Review employing eight adult actors (including four
primary actors and four cover actors) was performed for most of 2006 until September 4, 2006.1
It was replaced by a production called Circle of Friends which began on about September 22,
2006 and was still playing at the time of the hearing.
Each of the actors has an Employment Agreement with the Respondent which provides
that the primary actor must perform in a minimum of seven shows per week in weeks with eight
to eleven shows scheduled, and 75% of all shows scheduled in all other weeks. The cover
actors perform the remaining 25% of shows, and other shows the primaries do not perform due
to absence from work for vacation, sick or personal reasons. The Agreement also provides for:
(a) The actor’s per show pay. During the time at issue here, the
starting rate for the actors was $44.00 per show. Primary actors
Matthew Sanders and Stephanie Tennill earned $44.00 per show.
Calandra Hackney earned $46.00, and Roseanne Ciparick earned
$48.00.
(b) An hourly rate paid for rehearsals which is the same amount
paid for sick pay, personal time off, and vacation pay. The hourly
rate was based on the show rate for the individual actor and
varied from $13.79 to $17.60 per hour.
(c) A $200 per week stipend payment for 26 specified “slow”
weeks between September and May when no performances are
held, totaling $5200 per year.
(d) Other benefits including eleven paid holidays, 401(k) if
eligibility requirements were met, vacation, sick leave, life
insurance and accidental death and disability, short term and long
term disability, tuition reimbursement, stock investment plan,
health, dental and vision benefits, employee discount, and transit
benefit program.

1 All dates herein are in 2006 unless otherwise stated.
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At least since 2004 the actors received a pay raise of $2.00 per show per year. For
example, the contract between the Employer and actor Roseanne Ciparick for the period March,
2004 to March, 2005 provided for a per show rate of $44.00. The contract for the period March,
2005 to March, 2006 provided for a per show rate of $46.00. The contract beginning March,
2006 (the show and Ciparick’s employment ended in September, 2006) provided for a per show
rate of $48.00. As Ciparick testified, contractually she could expect no further per show raise
during the term of those contracts other than what was provided for in those agreements.
2. The Union Contacts the Respondent and the Actors Request an
Increase in Show Pay and Additional Weekly Stipends in June, 2006
In early February, 2006, Flora Stamatiades, the Union’s National Director of Organizing,
sent a letter to the Employer’s Wisconsin headquarters addressed to its president Ellen
Brothers. The letter stated that inasmuch as the Respondent presented live theatrical
performances at locations in New York, Chicago and expected to do so in Los Angeles, it
should enter into a national collective-bargaining agreement with the Union covering the actors
performing in such productions. Stamatiades offered to meet with Brothers. On February 13,
Stamatiades sent another copy of the letter to Brothers.
On February 24, Menzi Behrnd-Klodt, in-house counsel to the Respondent wrote
Stamatiades saying that the Employer was not interested in signing an agreement with the
Union. In March, the Union met for the first time with the employees of the Respondent.
The four primary actors usually had monthly meetings with their immediate supervisor
Heather de Michele, the Respondent’s artistic director. In late March, 2006, they met with her
and discussed the upcoming summer schedule and stipends.
As set forth above, a $200 per week stipend was given for weeks in which there were no
shows. No stipends were given in the months of June through August. At the March meeting,
the actors told de Michele that usually June is a slow month for the production, and they
requested a $200.00 stipend for three weeks in June. They also asked for a raise in the per
show rate.2 De Michele told the actors that she would communicate their requests to “corporate”
and let them know the result. According to Ciparick, de Michele said that a pay raise would be
“difficult.”
Within a few days, de Michele addressed the actors’ requests with her supervisor Scott
Davidson, the director of the three theaters. Several phone conversations and e-mails between
them sought “ways that we might be able to remedy the concerns.”
At that time, the starting per show rate was $44 and the actors’ per show rates ranged
from $44 to $48. De Michele’s e-mail of April 29 to Davidson outlined the cost if the actors
received per show wages of $50 or $54. The e-mail ended with the following recommendation:
raise the per show rate to $50 and pay a $200 per week stipend for the entire year – 52 weeks
at $200 per week, or $10,400. At that time, the actors received a $200 stipend for only 26

2 Whether Ciparick alone approached de Michele requesting an additional stipend for three
weeks in June as testified by de Michele, or all four actors raised that matter and the issue of
pay raises in a meeting with de Michele as they testified, need not be resolved. It is clear from
de Michele’s testimony that all four actors raised concerns regarding their pay rate and an
additional stipend for June and that she addressed these “concerns” with her superiors.
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weeks, or $5,200. It was contemplated that the stipend would be limited to the primary actors
and not the covers, but de Michele and Davidson did not discuss whether any pay raise would
be so limited. She asked for Davidson’s thoughts on the matter. Davidson wrote back the same
day asking her to put her memo into a spreadsheet for a meeting with Christine Warman, the
director of human resources for retail stores.
On May 2, de Michele sent an e-mail to Davidson and Warman outlining “pay options
and figures” which they discussed by phone later that day. The outline listed the total amount of
money payable to the actors assuming 470 average adult primary actor performances, a stipend
of $5,200 per year, and pay per show at $44 (their current starting rate), and at “proposed”
increases of $50 and $54 per show. During their conversation, Warman approved an additional
weekly stipend of $200 for three weeks in June for the four primary actors because that period
of time was slow, and because Warman believed that granting it was “fair, reasonable” and
constituted a small expenditure. De Michele immediately informed Matthew Kiely, the theater
manager, that the additional three-week stipend for June was approved.3
The actors testified that when de Michele informed them that they would be receiving
their requested $200 stipend for the first three weeks in June, she said that she was still
speaking to “corporate” about a pay raise and that no decision had been made as to that matter.
According to employee Sanders, de Michele said that the requested pay raise was “under
consideration.”
On May 3, Stamatiades sent another letter to Respondent’s president Brothers,
informing her that a majority of the adult actors at the Manhattan location designated the Union
as their collective-bargaining representative. She requested an opportunity to meet with her and
demonstrate such support.
On May 4, de Michele sent an e-mail to Davidson and Warman outlining the rehearsal
rates and show rates for the child and adult actors in the theaters located in New York, Chicago
and Los Angeles. She took an existing document which showed the current rates for those cities
and inserted rates of $50, $52 and $54 to the current New York rates which were $44, $46, and
$48. She included cities other than New York in order to present an “overview” of the various
rates nationally. De Michele testified that when she sent this e-mail there had been no approval
to make changes in the actors’ pay rates, and that she had no authority to approve wage raises
for actors. She noted that nothing in the document states whether the raises apply to primary or
cover actors.
On May 7, de Michele sent an e-mail with an attached chart to Davidson and Warman.
The chart listed the current and “proposed” changes in per show rate and stipends for the
primary and cover actors for the period June 1, 2006 to September 4, 2006, when the American
Girls Review production ended, and for the period September 22, 2006 to December 31, 2006
during the run of the Circle of Friends show.
In the “proposed change” category for the then current American Girls Review, the
starting per show rate was listed as $50, up from $44, and each of the primary actors was listed

3 In this respect I cannot credit the actors’ testimony that they were informed in late April that
the additional stipend was approved. De Michele’s testimony concerning the timing of the
approval and supporting e-mails support a finding that they were informed of the additional
stipend in early May. It is unlikely that de Michele would have told them of the additional stipend
in advance of its approval.
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as receiving a $6.00 per show increase. Thus, Ciparick’s proposed per show rate was listed as
$54, raised from $48, Hackney was $52, increased from $46, and the rates for Sanders and
Tennill were $50, up from $44. The additional stipend increase of $200 per week for three
weeks in June was also listed. Similar $6.00 raises were provided for the named cover actors.
Identical $6.00 per show raises for the “primary” and “cover” actors were also set forth
for the Circle of Friends show, scheduled to open on September 22. However, the names of
those actors were not set forth in the chart. No additional stipend was proposed. With respect to
both shows, although not set forth on the chart, the rehearsal rates for all the actors would have
increased with the increases in the per show rate.
De Michele’s e-mail described the chart as Davidson’s and Warman’s requested
“breakdown of current and proposed adult actor expenses. The two lines at the bottom … show
that even with the changes enacted, we will come in $3,000 ahead at the end of the year! Good
news! I have a meeting (previously scheduled) with the adult actors Thursday [May 11] and
would love to share any information then, if possible.”
Dawn Levenick, the Respondent’s employee relations manager, testified that in early to
mid-May, she was told by supervisor Sandy Anderson that the Union sent a letter dated May 3
stating that it sought to represent the adult actors in the Respondent’s New York store. Levenick
denied being aware of the February correspondence between the Union and Respondent’s
counsel Behrnd-Klodt until after the May 3 letter was received.
Levenick stated that at about the time she learned of the Union’s May letter, she was
told by director of human resources Warman that the Respondent had an “idea” to change the
per show rate paid the actors. Levenick advised Warman not to act on that idea until legal
counsel was obtained. Levenick gave such advice because she knew that changing the terms
and conditions of employees’ employment while “under an active organizing campaign” violates
the law.
Levenick retained legal counsel and pursuant to counsel’s advice and recommendations
decided to “just postpone any more discussions or decisions about any changes in the show
rate until the matter of representation was resolved.” She made this decision because the
Respondent did not want to give the “appearance to our actors that we were trying to persuade
them to not join Equity because they were going to get a benefit or a pay increase.”
Not having received a response to her May 3 letter, Stamatiades wrote again to
president Brothers on May 17 and May 31 requesting a meeting. On June 13, Levenick wrote to
Stamatiades addressing the May 3 letter. The letter advised that the Respondent did not believe
that the Union represented a majority of employees in an appropriate unit and suggested that
the Union file a petition for an election with the Board.
Separately, Levenick directed de Michele and Pat Keating, the Respondent’s director of
human resources, to meet with the actors and tell them that the Respondent would “postpone
any further consideration of any pay increase or change in the show rate until the matter of
representation was resolved.” Levenick testified that no further action was taken with respect to
the “proposal” for a per show wage increase – “it’s just been sitting out there doing nothing.”
3. The Union’s T-Shirt Campaign and the June 18 Meeting
On June 14, Stamatiades met with primary actors Ciparick, Hackney, Sanders and
Tennill and told them that a “T-shirt campaign” would be the next step in seeking recognition. T-
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shirts were distributed to them which prominently displayed the Union’s name and logo and the
words “Support Equity Theatre UNITE.” They were instructed to, and did enter and leave the
theater in a group wearing the shirts, and also wore the shirts during vocal warm-ups in the
theater. The Respondent’s officials acknowledged observing them wearing the shirts.
The actors were advised that a meeting would be held on June 18 which would be
attended by de Michele and Keating. Stamatiades was notified by the employees that a meeting
with Keating, who they never met, was unprecedented. She advised them to take notes at the
meeting.
Employees Ciparick, Hackney, Sanders and Tennill wore their Union shirts at the June
18 meeting with de Michele and Keating. Hackney testified that at the meeting, de Michele told
them that the Union sent the Respondent a letter on May 3, and that the Employer replied that it
was not interested in signing a Union contract at that time, but instead suggested that the Union
seek an election with the Board. Hackney and Sanders stated that de Michele told them that the
Employer prided itself on maintaining a safe, non-union work environment.
Hackney, essentially corroborated by Ciparick and Sanders, testified that de Michele
said that “if Equity were to come in everything would change. There would be a lack of flexibility.
There would be a lot of rigidness toward things such as covers having to be at every show.
There would be a lack of flexibility with having other jobs. And there would also be a lack of
flexibility with such issues such as vocal rest.” Ciparick quoted de Michele as saying “if we were
to be an Equity theater, we would not be able to be as flexible with certain issues such as vocal
rest – it would be a more rigid working environment.” Ciparick testified that de Michele used
examples of the Respondent’s flexibility such as being able to grant vocal rest, and that the
covers did not have to be present all the time. However, Hackney denied that de Michele used
examples of how the Employer had been flexible in the past in accommodating the employees’
other jobs and their need for vocal rest. She quoted de Michele as saying that “if Equity came in
there would be lack of flexibility and rigidness” in that covers would have to be there at every
show, a lack of flexibility with other jobs, and with vocal rest. Hackney denied that de Michele
said that the Union’s rules would “get in the way” and cause a lack of flexibility, but admitted that
de Michele mentioned that such changes would occur “if American Girl had an Equity contract.”
Ciparick stated that perhaps de Michele said that the workplace would be a “more rigid
working environment” if a middleman was involved. However, Hackney did not recall de Michele
discussing the Union organizing the employees in the context that it would be a “middleman”
coming between management and the employees.
Hackney further stated that de Michele gestured toward their Union shirts and said that
“now that we see where your loyalties lie, we are no longer going to be able to give you that
raise that we had discussed earlier.” Hackney’s written note, which she acknowledged was
more accurate than her recollection, was identical to Sanders’ testimony regarding de Michele’s
comment after gesturing to their Union shirts - “we’re not going to be able to offer you the pay
raise we discussed earlier,” thus omitting the phrase to which she testified: “we are no longer
going to be able to give you that raise that we had discussed earlier.” Hackney also stated that
de Michele said that although the wage raise was discussed and “agreed upon,” the matter was
out of her hands and everything has been put on hold. Hackney and Sanders denied that de
Michele said that consideration of the raise was deferred pending the resolution of the
representation matter.4 Sanders testified that de Michele said that the Employer would be

4 Hackney also answered a two-part leading question from the Respondent’s counsel which
Continued
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“unable to offer us the pay raise that they had discussed… earlier.” Ciparick testified that de
Michele told them “we’ve been informed by our counsel that we can no longer offer you (or can’t
give you) the show pay increase because it would appear on our part like bribery.” Ciparick
added that de Michele said that the Employer was “ready to sign off on the budget increase,
which would include the show pay increase for the adult actors, and that they were one
signature away” at which point the Employer received the letter from the Union and she then
contacted counsel who told her that to avoid the payment appearing to be bribery, the show pay
increase should not be given.
Employee Sanders then interjected, as follows: “Let me get this straight. Because we are
interested in joining the Union, you’re not going to be offering us this raise that you were
considering?” As de Michele began to answer, Sanders quoted Keating as interrupting, as
follows. “Guys, you have to realize that if we were to make changes in your contract at this
point, it would appear to be bribery or manipulation on our part.” Sanders stated that de Michele
said that the raise “was something that had been agreed upon… it was one signature short of
being finalized” or “approved.” He denied that de Michele said that the raise was “put on hold.”
De Michele was quoted as telling the actors that the Employer was advised by counsel that the
raise “would not be implemented because they were concerned it would look like they were
bribing the actors.”
De Michele told the actors that all the contractual payments due them would be paid.
She then asked the actors to raise any concerns they had. Hackney offered that they did not
make a “livable” wage because of the high cost of living in New York. Keating asked them what
they believed an appropriate pay rate would be for an actor appearing in the Respondent’s
theater, or a theater for young audiences. Hackney replied that such an actor would earn up to
$800 per week. On this point, Sanders’ testimony differed from Hackney’s. He quoted de
Michele as saying that the salary would probably be the same. Sanders agreed, but noted that
the actors would not be required to do 20 or more shows per week.
The actors mentioned that they did not receive the stipend due them two weeks before,
and that Tennill did not receive her regular pay the past week. Keating said that she would look
into it. The payments which were due were made thereafter.
Hackney testified that although she and the other three actors knew that their
employment with the Respondent would be ending in early September, 2006 when their show
ended, she was concerned with de Michele’s comments that there would be less flexibility with
second jobs and vocal rest if the Union was successful in representing them. Thus, the issues of
“vocal rest” and flexibility with a second job were important to her for the remainder of her tenure
there. She explained that because the actors use their voices extensively in their jobs they must
take time off from work, sometimes weeks at a time, to rest their voices. In addition, they
needed to have second jobs to support themselves. At hearing, the actors conceded that
thereafter there were no changes in their contract, work environment, or flexibility for vocal rest
or a second job.
De Michele’s account of what she told the employees at the meeting is recounted here
based on a compilation of her (a) written notes taken before the meeting in which she rehearsed
what she would say. She stated that those notes were not “verbatim” of what she actually said
but followed the “general idea” of what she expected to say (GC Ex. 8) (b) the notes she wrote
_________________________
implied that de Michele told the actors that consideration of the raise was deferred, but I credit
Hackney’s specific denial that de Michele made that statement.
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as to what occurred at the meeting written the same day or the day following the meeting (GC
Ex. 9) and (c) typewritten notes of the handwritten notes of what occurred at the meeting (GC
Ex. 10). The Respondent’s arguments that these documents were privileged from disclosure
pursuant to the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine will be discussed below.
De Michele told the four actors that the Union informed the Respondent that it sought to
represent them. She said that the Employer told the Union that it did not believe that it needed a
union coming between it and the actors inasmuch as it offers a safe, fair working environment,
and further believed that the Union’s involvement would make the work place more “rigid.” De
Michele told the employees that the Employer advised the Union that if it wanted to pursue the
matter it could ask the Board to hold an election. De Michele then said that she was aware that
they had spoken about changing their per show pay rate, and as she was “completing the
process this all came up.” She noted that although it was clear by their wearing the Union shirts
where their loyalties are, the Respondent could not make any unscheduled changes in their
contract because it could look like it is trying to sway them or buy their vote.
De Michele told them that she brought their concerns about pay to the Respondent’s
human resources department and that they were “in the process of being reviewed but that
since it was apparent (gesture to total group in [Union] shirts) where their loyalties were we
could not follow through with any changes to their contract as that would look as though we
were trying to buy their vote. Until this was settled we could not make any contractual changes,
but we would still, of course, be true to anything in their current contract – annual increases,
show count bonuses, etc.” De Michele noted that since the pay raises were “almost finalized”,
but had not been “finalized” at the time the Respondent received the Union’s letters, the pay
raises were “on hold” or “delayed” until resolution of the Union’s representation matter. She
added, however, that the Respondent would honor its contracts with the actors. Sanders said
“so you won’t pay us what we deserve because the [Union] is involved?” De Michele answered
that the pay raise was “almost finalized when all this came up.”
Following the meeting, Hackney met with Sanders and Tennill and they discussed
together what was said. Hackney compiled their recollections into an e-mail which she sent to
Stamatiades the following day. Essentially the e-mail is the same as her testimony, but the e-
mail sated that regarding the pay raise, de Michele said that “even though it had been
previously discussed and ‘agreed upon’ it was not finalized due to one signature that was
missing but because the letter was sent from Equity everything has been ‘put on hold.’”
No pay increase was received by the actors pursuant to their request. The employees
engaged in a strike on August 3 and 4. On August 10, the Union filed a petition to represent the
actors, and on November 17 an election was held.
Analysis and Discussion
I. The Respondent’s Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege Assertion
Certain documents were subpoenaed from the Respondent by counsel for the General
Counsel. The Respondent asserted that they were privileged due to the attorney-client and
attorney work product doctrines, and I examined them in camera. I ruled that certain documents
were privileged and others were not. I will discuss those documents that I found not privileged
which I directed to be disclosed to the General Counsel over the Respondent’s objections:
1. A three-page handwritten document prepared by de Michele in which she put into her
own words the advice given to her by the Respondent’s counsel on June 7 as to what to say at
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the June 18 meeting (GC Ex. 8). By writing the document she rehearsed her thoughts in
preparation for the meeting. She testified that her comments at the meeting conformed
generally with these notes. In material part, the notes state that the Respondent did not believe
that it needed a union coming between it and the actors, and it believed that the Union’s
involvement would make the work place more rigid. The notes further stated that it was clear, by
the employees’ wearing the Union shirts, where their loyalties are, and that no unscheduled
changes in their contract could be made since it may appear that the Employer was trying to
sway or buy their vote.
2. Two handwritten pages of a six-page document prepared by de Michele consisting of
her notes of what was said at the June 18 meeting written shortly after the meeting (GC Ex. 9).
The Respondent represented that de Michele took these notes at the direction of counsel. In
material part, the notes state that there was a “potential” change in wages but since the change
was not finalized when the Union wrote to the Respondent, the matter of a pay raise was on
hold or delayed until a resolution of the matter since it may look as if the Employer was trying to
buy the employees’ votes.
3. A three page typewritten e-mail prepared by de Michele consisting of a summary of
the notes she took at the June 18 meeting (GC Ex. 10). She sent the document to Kim Gohata,
the Respondent’s in-house counsel, and to other Respondent officials. Counsel represents that
this document was created at the direction of counsel after the charge was filed on July 25. In
material part, the notes state that de Michele told the actors that since it was apparent through
their wearing the Union shirts where their loyalties were, the Employer could not follow through
with any changes to their contract as it would look like it was trying to buy their vote. Until “this”
was settled the Employer could not make any contractual changes.
All the above documents relate to advice the Respondent’s attorney gave to de Michele
concerning her meeting with employees on June 18. GC Exhibit 8 relates to counsel’s advice as
to what she should say and reflects her “rehearsal” notes. GC Exhibit 9 is her handwritten notes
taken at the meeting at the direction of counsel, and GC Exhibit 10 is her typewritten notes of
that meeting.
Central Telephone Co. of Texas, 343 NLRB 987, 988 (2004) is particularly helpful in
deciding this issue. In that case, the employer’s attorney Prophete directed its official, Hindman,
to conduct an interview and take notes at the interview with employees who were suspected of
improperly remaining at work later than their usual hours upon the union’s direction. Hindman
took notes during the interview and prepared a written summary thereof. She reported the
results of the interview to Prophete. The union requested Hindman’s investigation notes for its
use in an arbitration proceeding. The employer’s refusal to provide them was alleged as an
unfair labor practice. The Board found no violation in the employer’s refusal to provide the notes
since they were privileged pursuant to the attorney work product doctrine and were prepared in
anticipation of litigation.
The Respondent argues that all three documents constitute attorney work product since
the notes were written at the direction of counsel in anticipation of litigation, and also contends
that GC Ex. 9 should not have been disclosed because of the attorney-client privilege.
Some question may be raised as to whether General Counsel Exhibit 8 was made in
anticipation of litigation, as argued by the Respondent, or was prepared in the ordinary course
of business. The work product privilege “protects from disclosure written material prepared by a
party or his representative in anticipation of litigation or for trial. The strong public policy
underlying the work product doctrine is to aid the adversarial process by providing a certain
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degree of privacy to a lawyer in preparing for litigation.” Central Telephone, above.
Although the June 18 meeting may have been one of the regularly scheduled meetings
between de Michele and the actors, the meeting itself was unusual, as recognized by the
employees, since Keating, a senior official of the Respondent was present. By June 18, no
litigation had begun and there was no testimony that the Respondent contemplated that
litigation would be brought against it. However, it is not necessary that a lawsuit actually have
been brought. It is enough for the party to have had a “subjective belief that litigation was a real
possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable.” Central Telephone, above,
citing In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3rd 881 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998). It is certainly clear that experienced
labor counsel could reasonably anticipate litigation upon de Michele’s announcement to the
employees that the raise they had requested and which they were told was being considered
could not be given or was now on hold because of the presence of the Union.
Accordingly, GC Exhibit 8, de Michele’s notes of her conversation with counsel
concerning what to say to the employees appears to contain her mental impressions and
interpretations of counsel’s advice as she put his advice into her own words, and was probably
privileged as attorney work product and/or attorney client privilege.
Some question could be raised as to whether GC Exhibits 9 and 10 were privileged in
that they simply contain de Michele’s notes, essentially taken in a clerical capacity, of her
meeting with the employees consisting of what she said to the actors and what they said to her.
However, she was directed by counsel to take those notes, she sent them to counsel for review,
and they too appear to be taken in anticipation of litigation. Central Telephone, above.
I find that the three documents are arguably subject to the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine. Accordingly, I have not relied on them in making my findings
regarding the alleged violations herein. Accordingly, although the three documents perhaps
were privileged from disclosure, I do not believe that the Respondent has been prejudiced by
their disclosure to the General Counsel and their receipt in evidence. I have not relied on them
in making my findings herein.
II. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
The complaint alleges that the Respondent (a) told its employees that they did not
receive wage increases because they supported the Union (b) threatened its employees with
more onerous working conditions if they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative and (c) made statements equating support for the Union to disloyalty to the
Respondent.
All three allegations arise out of the June 18 conversation, set forth above, as to which I
credit the employee witnesses. Their testimony about the meeting was consistent and
essentially the same. As noted, de Michele did not deny their testimony and Keating did not
testify. The test to determine whether a supervisor’s statement violated Section 8(a)(1) is
“whether under all the circumstances the remark reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or
interfere with the employee’s rights guaranteed under the Act.” Exterior Systems, Inc., 338
NLRB 677, 678 (2002).
A. Informing Employees That They Did not Receive Wage
Increases Because of Their Support for the Union
The complaint alleges that on June 18 the Respondent told its employees that they did
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not receive wage increases because they supported the Union.
As set forth above, de Michele gestured at the Union shirts worn by the four employees
and said “now that we see where your loyalties lie” the Employer would not give them the raise
that had been discussed. Whether she said that the raise would not be provided or that it had
been put on hold or that consideration of the raise was being postponed is irrelevant for a
determination of this issue.
The important point is that de Michele identified the actors’ wearing of the shirts as the
reason that consideration of the raise was no longer being pursued. It was unnecessary for de
Michele to have made the connection between the shirts and the wage raise. It was irrelevant
where their loyalties lied. According to the Respondent, consideration of the raise was being
postponed because the Union appeared on the scene. By personalizing the matter, saying in
effect that since you have identified yourselves with the Union our decision has been put on
hold, the Respondent made an unnecessary but nevertheless coercive remark blaming the
employees’ union activity in wearing the shirts as the reason for the postponement of the
decision on the raise. It is true that in the course of the conversation de Michele also said that
consideration of the raise was postponed because the Respondent did not want it to appear that
it was bribing employees, but in referring to the shirts she identified the employees’ loyalty to the
Union as being the reason for the delay in reaching a decision as to the raise.
Contrary to the Respondent’s argument, de Michele did more than simply remark about
the employees’ obvious loyalty to the Union. She made a connection between their loyalty to the
Union and the fact that consideration of the wage increase would be postponed.
“The Board has long held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) if it advises
employees that it will withhold wage increases or accrued benefits because of union activities.”
Invista, 346 NLRB No. 107, slip op. at 2 (2006) where the Board found that an employer’s threat
that there would be no more pay raises as long as the Union was trying to get in was an
unlawful threat which placed the blame on the Union for the employees’ not receiving a pay
raise. See Earthgrains Baking Cos., 339 NLRB 24, 28 (2003); Grass Valley Grocery Outlet, 322
NLRB 1449, 1451 (2000).
In Sacramento Recycling & Transfer Station, 345 NLRB No. 39, slip op. at 1-2 (2005), an
employer told its employees that it had considered granting a raise but could not do so because
it would be considered a bribe to defeat the Union. The Board found that the statement violated
Section 8(a)(1) because the employer attributed the withholding of the raise to the petition,
unlawfully placing the onus for the denial of that benefit on the union.
Under these circumstances, it is clear and I find that de Michele’s remarks reasonably
tended to restrain, coerce, or interfere with the employees’ rights guaranteed under the Act to
have their wage raise considered or granted regardless of whether they support the Union.
I accordingly find and conclude that the Respondent unlawfully informed its employees
that they would not receive a pay raise or that such a pay increase would be postponed
because of their support for the Union.
B. The Threat of More Onerous Working Conditions
The complaint alleges that the Respondent threatened its employees with more onerous
working conditions if they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
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As set forth above, de Michele told the employees that if the Union organized the
employees “everything would change” - there would be a lack of flexibility regarding granting
time for vocal rest and employees’ holding second jobs, benefits which they enjoyed at that time
and a “more rigid working environment.” Such statements violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Topside Construction Co., 329 NLRB 886, 891 (1999); Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 320 NLRB 484,
484 (1995). Even though the employees were open Union supporters, de Michele’s comments
were clearly coercive. Seton Co., 332 NLRB 979, 981 (1999).
The Respondent correctly notes that Section 8(c) of the Act permits an employer to
express any views or opinion to employees if such expression “contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.” De Michele’s comments went much farther than simply expressing
the Employer’s view of how Union representation would affect the relationship between the
employees and the Respondent. As set forth above, her remarks constituted a threat that if the
Union represented the employees they would be subject to an adverse change in their working
conditions.
The Respondent points to the testimony of Hackney who said that de Michele remarked
that the changes would take place pursuant to the terms of a Union contract. However, de
Michele did not support her statement by showing a Union contract to the employees, and no
contract was offered in evidence here to refute de Michele’s implication that under a Union
contract the actors’ working conditions would be less flexible or more rigid or that they would
lose the benefits of vocal rest and second job opportunities they then enjoyed. Schaumburg
Hyundai, Inc., 318 NLRB 449, 450 (1995).
“Although an employer can legitimately make a prediction … regarding the precise
effects of unionization, the prediction must be carefully made on the basis of objective fact to
convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probably consequences beyond its control.”
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). De Michele’s statement that the Union’s
contract would result in the employees being adversely impacted was not sufficient to constitute
objective evidence of such an event. As the Respondent argues, an employer may advise
employees, in a manner which is moderate in tone, of the possible consequences of
unionization. Tri-Cast, Inc., 274 NLRB 377, 378 (1985). However, de Michele’s comments went
far beyond that deemed permissible. Her remarks were direct threats that if the Union
succeeded in organizing the actors there would be less flexibility and more rigidity concerning
matters which were vitally important to them – vocal rest and working second jobs.
I accordingly find and conclude that, as alleged, that the Respondent unlawfully
threatened its employees with more onerous working conditions if they selected the Union as
their collective-bargaining representative.
C. The Alleged Statements Equating Support for the Union
to Disloyalty to the Respondent.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent made statements equating support for the
Union to disloyalty to the Respondent. This relates to de Michele’s gesture to the Union shirts
worn by the actors and her remark that “now that we see where your loyalties lie” the Employer
would not give them a raise.
Apart from the allegation that this comment violated the Act because it served to inform
the employees that their Union activity played a role in their not receiving a raise, this is an
alleged as an independent violation. The General Counsel argues that de Michele’s comment
equated support for the Union with disloyalty to the Respondent, implying that if they were loyal
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to the Union they were not loyal to the Employer, citing Medicare Associates, Inc., 330 NLRB
935, 941-942 (2000) where the Board found that an employer unlawfully equated loyalty to the
employer with opposition to the union by telling an employee that she must takes sides in a
union campaign and was needed on the employer’s side. “Statements equating union activity
with disloyalty to the employer constitute coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1).” HarperCollins
San Francisco v. NLRB, 79 F.3rd 1324, 1330 (2nd Cir. 1996).
I do not agree with the General Counsel’s theory. The Board cases require a “direct
reference equating protected activity with disloyalty to the employer.” Sea Breeze Health Care
Center, 331 NLRB 1131, 1132 (2000). There must be some evidence that the employee was
accused of disloyalty to the employer. Ferguson-Williams, Inc., 322 NLRB 695, 699 (1996),
where the employer was “greatly offended by [an employee’s] disloyalty”; House Calls, Inc., 304
NLRB 311, 313 (1991), where the employees were “ingrates who were hitting him when he was
down”;
In contrast, de Michele did not expressly or impliedly accuse the employees of such
disloyalty. Rather, she remarked only that the employees’ loyalties lie with the Union. Her
observation that the actors were open and obvious loyal Union supporters because they wore
Union shirts was not unlawful. No violation was found where an employer told an employee that
he had hurt his feelings and was disappointed in him because he was distributing union
material. Oklahoma Installation Co., 309 NLRB 776 (1992).
I accordingly will recommend that this allegation be dismissed.
III. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
The complaint alleges that the Respondent denied a wage increase for its employees
and, as an alternative thereto, the Respondent suspended its process of considering a wage
increase for its employees because they assisted the Union and engaged in concerted
activities.
It is the Board’s long-standing principle that:
[A]n employer faced with a union organizing drive is required to
proceed with an expected wage or benefit adjustment as if the
union were not on the scene. However, “[a]n employer may
postpone such a wage or benefit adjustment so long as it ‘[makes]
clear]’ to employees that the adjustment would occur whether or
not they select a union and that the “sole purpose” of the
adjustment is to avoid the appearance of influencing the election’s
outcome.” Sam’s Club, 349 NLRB No. 94, slip op. at 6-7 (2007);
Atlantic Forest Products, 282 NLRB 855, 858-859 (1987); Uarco,
Inc., 169 NLRB 1153, 1154 (1968).
In announcing the postponement, the employer may not attribute its failure to implement
the “expected wage or benefit adjustment to the presence of the union or by disparaging or
undermining the union by creating the impression it impeded the granting of the adjustment.”
Earthgrains Baking Cos., 339 NLRB 24, 28 (2003); See Grouse Mountain Lodge, 333 NLREB
1322, 1324 (2001); Atlantic Forest, above; Uarco, above.
A. The Alleged Denial of a Wage Increase
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The first question which must be answered is whether the wage raise was approved at
the time of the June 18 meeting. The General Counsel argues that it was approved and the
Respondent claims that it was not.
The General Counsel’s credited evidence consists essentially of what the employees
were told at the June 18 meeting. The most that the General Counsel may rely on was de
Michele’s remark that the pay raise was “agreed upon,” and that the Employer was ready to sign
off on the raise but was one signature away, and the increase therefore was “not finalized or
approved.”
The General Counsel cites SNE Enterprises, 347 NLRB No. 43, (2006) for the
proposition that the Respondent approved the raise. In that case the Board found that the
respondent decided, pursuant to its established policy of conducting wage reviews, to grant a
wage increase. Here, in contrast, the Respondent had no established policy of granting mid-
contract pay raises, and there was no credible evidence that it had, in fact, approved the raise
or decided to grant it. Rather, the evidence supports a finding that the raise was still under
consideration at the time of the June 18 meeting.
The Respondent’s evidence establishes that the raise was under active consideration as
of June 18. On May 7, de Michele prepared a chart for the Respondent’s officials with
“proposed” changes in the show rate which set forth a pay raise of $6.00 per show. At about
that time, manager Levenick learned that that the Respondent had an “idea” to raise the actors’
show rate and that the Union sought to represent them. She advised that further discussions or
decisions concerning changes in the show rate be postponed. Accordingly, there is no evidence
that a pay raise had been approved. Nor is there any evidence that the actors were told that
they would be receiving pay raises, or that a definite sum and date of implementation had been
given to them.
I note that when the Respondent decided to grant a $200 weekly stipend increase for
June, that decision was announced immediately to the actors. Assuming that the Respondent
would have followed the same procedure, it appears that if a decision had been made to grant a
per show raise, an announcement concerning the raise would have been made to the actors at
once. That they were not notified of a pay raise by June 18 is some evidence that no decision
had been made to grant the raise.
Clearly, de Michele proposed an increased wage rate and on June 18 the raise
appeared to be well on its way to complete approval, but lacked one signature. If that last
signatory decided not to approve the wage raise it would not have been granted. The wage
raise was either approved or not approved. Here, there was no credible evidence that it had
been approved. It could not have been approved but for one signature. If approval lacked one
signature it may not be found that it was approved. Since the Respondent did not approve a pay
increase it could not have denied such a raise. Thus, no increase was “determined, promised,
scheduled or announced.” American Mirror Co., 269 NLRB 1091, 1094 (1984).
Accordingly, I cannot find that the Respondent had decided to grant the employees a per
show wage increase, and I will recommend that the allegation that the Respondent denied a
wage raise be dismissed.
B. The Alleged Suspension of the Process
of Considering a Wage Increase
The above principles may be applied to the General Counsel’s alternative theory that
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even if the wage raise was lawfully not granted, the Respondent’s suspension of the process of
considering a wage increase was unlawful. Thus, the Respondent was actively considering
granting a raise to the actors but postponed its deliberation because of the Union’s claim to
represent its employees.
According to the above principles, the Respondent was required to act as if the Union
was not on the scene by continuing its process of considering a wage raise. Russell Stover
Candies, Inc., 221 NLRB 441 (1975). It did not do so, and instead suspended its deliberations
on the increase. It could have lawfully deferred its study of the raise if it “made clear” (a) to its
employees that its continued deliberation on the issue would occur whether or not they select a
union and (b) that the “sole purpose” of the postponement was to avoid the appearance of
influencing the election’s outcome, and if it avoided putting the onus on the Union for the
postponement. Atlantic Forest; Earthgrains, above.
The Respondent did not meet its obligations in this regard. Under the first standard, the
Employer was obligated to inform the actors that it would continue to consider the raise
regardless of the Union’s claim to represent them and regardless of how they voted in the
election. The Respondent was required to assure them that it would continue its deliberations
whether or not they selected the Union. At no time, not on June 18 or thereafter, did the
Respondent tell its employees that it would continue its process of considering the raise whether
or not they selected the Union or regardless of the outcome of the campaign. In fact, according
to Levenick’s testimony at the June, 2007 hearing, consideration of the pay raise was still
deferred.
In addition, the Respondent did not, at any time, make clear to its employees that the
“sole purpose” of the postponement was to avoid the appearance of influencing the outcome of
the Union’s campaign to represent the employees. Although the Respondent did tell the actors
that it did not want to make any changes in their pay because it would appear to be bribery, de
Michele also referred to their Union shirts as the reason why a pay raise would not be given.
Thus, she said that “now that we see where your loyalties lie, we are no longer going to be able
to give you that raise….” Accordingly, de Michele did not say that the sole purpose of the
postponement was to avoid the appearance of influencing of any representation matter. Rather,
she expressly referred to their Union affiliation as being the reason for the postponement of its
consideration of the raise. In doing so, the Respondent attributed its postponement to the
presence of the Union and to the employees’ support for it. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 339 NLRB
24, 28 (2003).
In SNE Enterprises, above, at slip op. at 1-2 (2006), the Board found that the employer
violated Section 8(a)(3) by departing from its policy of conducting wage reviews because of the
union’s organizing activity. In that case, the Board found a violation because the employer
claimed that “as a result of the union filing the petition for election we didn’t even consider
granting a general wage increase” and it did not conduct a wage review toward that end. Similar
to the instant case, that employer made no decision as to whether to grant a wage raise, but did
not undertake a wage review which may have led to pay raises. Such conduct was found
unlawful because it was based on the employees’ union activities.
Here, although the Respondent had no policy of considering a pay raise during the term
of the employees’ contracts, nevertheless, it did undertake to consider an increase in the show
rate mid-term. Whether or not the Respondent had a policy of considering a pay increase during
the term of its contract with the actors, it was prohibited from basing employment decisions on
the employees’ union activities. SNE, above.
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Under either analysis, Atlantic Forest or SNE, the Respondent’s action in suspending the
process of considering a wage raise was unlawful.
Under an analysis based on Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), the General Counsel
must prove that animus toward Union or protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor
in the adverse employment action. The elements commonly required to support such a showing
are union or other protected activity by the employee, Respondent knowledge of that activity,
and union animus on the part of the Respondent. See Willamette Industries, 341 NLRB 560,
562, 2004). If the General Counsel makes the required initial showing, the burden then shifts
to the Respondent to prove, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same action
even in the absence of the employee's protected activity. See Manno Electric, 321 NLRB 278,
280 fn. 12 (1996). To establish this affirmative defense, the respondent must persuade by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have taken place even in the
absence of the protected activity." W.F. Bolin Co., 311 NLRB 1118, 1119 (1993).
Here, the evidence establishes that the employees engaged in activity in behalf of the
Union by wearing Union shirts. In addition, the Union sent a letter to the Respondent on May 3
claiming to represent them. The Respondent was aware of these activities, and suspended its
consideration of a wage raise because of the presence of the Union. In this respect, a finding of
union animus is supported by de Michele’s remark that because of their loyalties toward the
Union they would not be receiving a pay raise. A finding of union animus is also supported by
the violations of Section 8(a)(1) above, specifically that the Respondent told its employees that
they did not receive wage increases because they supported the Union, and threatened its
employees with more onerous working conditions if they selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative.
Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has made a prima facie showing that the
Respondent’s failure to continue considering a wage raise was motivated by their union activity.
The Respondent has not met its burden of showing that it would have taken the same action
even in the absence of the employees’ union activity. It cannot do so because it argues that it
postponed its consideration of the raise precisely because of the employees’ union activity.
The Respondent’s reliance on Village Thrift Store, 272 NLRB 572 (1983) and Hovey
Electric, 302 NLRB 482 (1991), is misplaced. The Board, while recognizing that the employer
faced with the appearance of a union has a “Hobson’s choice” of granting or withholding
benefits and being subject to a charge if it chose either course, in both cases noted that the
employer is permitted to postpone benefits where it makes clear that the purpose in doing so is
to avoid the appearance of interference. Here, the Respondent went beyond that simple
statement of neutrality and attributed the postponement of its decision on the raise to the
employees’ support for the Union and the Union’s campaign. Grouse Mountain Lodge, above.
I therefore find and conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
postponing its consideration of a wage increase for its employees.
Conclusions of Law
1. By telling its employees that they did not receive wage increases because they
supported the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By threatening its employees with more onerous working conditions if they selected
the Union as their collective-bargaining representative, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
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3. By suspending its process of considering a wage increase for its employees because
they assisted the Union and engaged in concerted activities, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Inasmuch as I have found that the Respondent unlawfully suspended its process of
considering a wage increase for its employees, I shall recommend that it shall continue its
process of considering the wage increase, and if it decides that it would have granted a wage
increase, to make whole all employees who would have received such an increase but for the
Respondent’s unlawful failure to continue its process of considering the wage raise. SNE
Enterprises, 347 NLRB No. 43, slip op. at 1-2 (2006). The exact amount of the wage increases,
if any, due employees shall be determined in compliance proceedings, and shall be computed
as prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2nd 502 (6th Cir.
1971), with interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). At
the compliance stage, the Respondent shall be given the opportunity to establish that it would
not have granted a wage increase. SNE, above.
The employees covered by the Order herein shall be primary and cover actors.
Inasmuch as de Michele’s May 7 e-mail set forth “proposed change[s]” for both categories of
actors, a remedial order should include primary and cover actors.
In addition, the period of time within which pay increases should be paid, if wage
increases are decided upon, shall be the period from June 1, 2006 to September 4, 2006 for
those actors appearing in the American Girls Review, and for the period September 22, 2006 to
December 31, 2006 for those actors appearing in the Circle of Friends show. Those dates are
consistent with de Michele’s May 7 e-mail which set forth the proposed changes for such
periods of time.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, American Girl Place, Inc., d/b/a American Girl Place New York, New
York, NY, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling its employees that they did not receive wage increases because they
supported Actors’ Equity Association (Union).

5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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(b) Threatening its employees with more onerous working conditions if they selected the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative.
(c) Suspending its process of considering a wage increase for its employees because
they assisted the Union and engaged in concerted activities.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Continue its process of considering a wage increase for its employees that would
have been performed in June, 2006 which was not performed because of the Union’s claim to
represent its employees.
(b) Make whole all employees who were not granted a wage increase from June, 2006
to December 31, 2006, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this Decision.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in New York, NY, copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”6 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
June 18, 2006.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C., August 10, 2007.
____________________
Steven Davis
Administrative Law Judge

6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD(NY)-37-07
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT tell you that you did not receive wage increases because you supported Actors’ Equity Association
(Union).
WE WILL NOT threaten you with more onerous working conditions if you select the Union as your collective-
bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT suspend our process of considering a wage increase for you because you assisted the Union and
engaged in concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL continue our process of considering a wage increase for you that we would have performed in June, 2006
which was not performed because of the Union’s claim to represent you.
WE WILL make whole all of you who were not granted a wage increase from June 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006 to
the extent that we are required to do so.
American Girl Place, Inc., d/b/a American Girl Place New York
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts
secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website:
www.nlrb.gov.
26 Federal Plaza, Federal Building, Room 3614
New York, New York 10278-0104
Hours: 8:45 a.m. to 5:15 p.m.
212-264-0300.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 212-264-0346.