American Foundry

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 12, 1942

43 N.L.R.B. 1277 (N.L.R.B. 1942)

In the Matter of DOBIINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA, DOING BUSI-
NESS AS AMERICAN FOUNDRY, A PARTNERSHIP and INTERNATIONAL
UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, C.. I. O. and
INTERNATIONAL MOLDERS, AND FOUNDRY WORKERS LOCAL UNION No.
374, A. F. L., PARTY TO THE CONTRACT.
Case No. C-01,32.-Decided September 12, 194.
Jurisdiction : castings and plumbing fittings fo undry.
Unfair Labor Practices.
Interference, Restiacnt. and Coercion: nuking profane and scurrilous, statements
criticizing and condemning union and its officials ; questioning employees con-
cerning their union affiliation ; threatening reprisals if employees joined the
union;- advising employees not to join the union and that employer would lock
plant rather than recognize the, union ; unlawfully rendering assistance to
affiliated labor organization by soliciting membership in its behalf, threatening'
employees with discharge if they did not join, and executing an agreement
providing for a closed shop.
Discrimination. discharge of employees for union activities; allegation of dis-
crimination with respect to refusal to reinstate strikers dismissed.
Collective Bargaining: majority established by membership applications-re-
fusal to bargain collectively by: refusal to accept union's letters and to meet
with union-strike caused and prolonged by refusal to bargain.
Remedial Orders : abrogation of illegal contract with affiliated organization;
order to bargain collectively with charging union upon request ; reinstate-
ment with back pay of discharged employees, except one, and back pay for
voluntarily reinstated employee; preferential list for strikers denied full'
reinstatement.
Unit Appropriate for Collective Bargaining : production and maintenance em-
ployees excluding office and clerical employees and supervisory employees with
the right to hire and discharge.
Messrs. Charles M. Ryan and Maurice J. Nicoson, for the Board.-
Latham cfi Watkins, by Mr. Richard W. Lund, of Los Angeles, Calif.,
for the respondent.
Gallagher e Wirin, by Mr. Victor Kaplan, and Messrs.. John Bacel-
lar and Charles Bioletti, of Los Angeles, Calif., for the Union.
Messrs. Reginald Prime,,Albert A. Bird, Robert Black, and William
A. Lazzerini,'for Local No. 374.
Mr. Eugene R. Thorrens, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a second amended charge duly filed on' October 16,1941" by
International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, affili-
43 N. L. R. B., No. 204.
1 The original charge was filed on May 14, 1941; the amended charge on May 19, 1941.
1277
1278 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, herein called the
Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board,
by .the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region (Los Angeles,
California), issued its complaint dated October 16, 1941, against
Dominic Meaglia and Samuel Meaglia, doing business as American
Foundry, a partnership, Montebello, California, herein called the re-
spondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was en-,
gaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the mean-
ing of Section 8 (1), (3),, and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act.
Copies of the complaint and notice of hearing, thereon were duly
served upon the respondent, the Union, and International Molders
and Foundry Workers, Local Union No. 374, A. F. L., herein called
Local No. 374.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged in
substance (1) that during the period from on or about April 28, 1941,
to the date of the complaint, the respondent discouraged its employees
in their affiliation with and activities on behalf of the Union (a) by
making profane and scurrilous statements to the respondent's em-
ployees, criticizing and condemning the Union _and its officials; (b)
by questioning its employees with'respect to their union affiliations;
(c) by threatening to discharge_employees if they became-members of
the Union and by advising employees who were members of the Union
to leave the respondent's plant; (d) by threatening bodily harm to
employees who,had joined the Union; and (e) by advising employees
that the respondent would not recognize, the Union and would lock
its plant rather than bargain with the Union; (2) that on or about
April 28, 1941, and at all times thereafter, the respondent refused to
bargain collectively with the Union, although it represented a ma-
jority of the respondent's employees in a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining; (3) that on or about stated dates,
the respondent discharged seven named persons,2 and thereafter re-
fused to reinstate them, because they joined and assisted the Union and
engaged in concerted activities with other employees for their mutual-
aid and protection; (4) that on or about May 13, 1941, the respondent
locked out and refused to employ the persons listed in Appendix A,3
and thereafter until on or about June 5, 1941, refused to reinstate
them, because they joined and' assisted the Union and engaged in con-
certed activities for their mutual aid and protection; (5) that, be-
2 Those discharged and the approximate dates of their discharge , as,alleged , are as fol-
lows : Joe Camarillo , May 6 , 1941; Jackie Stewart, May 12 . 1941 ; and Jose Guzman,
Flank Sanceri, Manuel Garcia, John Nagy, and F. Velasquez on May 13, 1941.
'During the hearing the Trial Examiner granted without objection a motion of counsel
for the respondent to strike out the names of Joe Camarillo and Jackie Stewart from
the list of those allegedly locked out. They are therefore not listed in Appendix A.
DOMINIC MEAGL• IA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA ' 1279
cause of the respondent's unfair labor practices set forth above, on
or about June 5, 1941, the respondent's employees,went on strike; (6)
that thereafter the respondent, by its continued failure and refusal
to bargain collectively with the Union, prolonged the strike until on
or about June 29, 1941, when the Union terminated the strike; (7)
that on or about June 29, 1941, and thereafter, the respondent re-
fused to reinstate 11 persons 4 because they joined and assisted 'the
Union and engaged in concerted activities with other employees for
their mutual aid and protection; (8) that beginning on or about June
5, 1941, the respondent began a 'campaign in which it persuaded and
compelled its employees to resign from the Union and to join the
A. F. L. (a) by threatening its employees with discharge and advising
them that they could not work at the respondent's plant unless they
resigned from the Union and joined the A. F. L.; (b) by openly
soliciting membership on behalf of the A. F. L. on company time and
property; (c) by sending officers and agents of the respondent to
the homes of,its employees to induce them to become members of the
A. F. L.; and, (d) by offering employees money with which to pay
A. F. L. initiation dues; and (9) that by the aforesaid acts, the re-
spondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
On October 30, 1941, the respondent filed (1) its answer denying
the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices and asserting that
the Board has no jurisdiction since the respondent's business is not
interstate in character, and (2) a separate "Motion To Strike Or In
The Alternative Demand For Bill of Particulars."
Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at Los Angeles, California;
from November 17 through November 29, 1941, before Peter F. Ward,
the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner.'
The Board, the respondent, and the Union were represented by coun-
sel, and Local No. 374 was represented by its representatives. All
parties participated in the hearing and were accorded full opportu-
nity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to intro-
duce evidence bearing upon the issues.
At the outset of the hearing the respondent renewed its motion for
particulars insofar as it had 'not theretofore been granted and the
Trial Examiner denied the motion as renewed. During the hearing
the Trial Examiner granted, over the respondent's objection, a motion
by counsel for the Board to amend the complaint, and the Board issued
* Lotus Garcia , Agapito Marquez , Tony Fonseca ,, Ray Perez, Frank Robles , Raymond
Castro, Manuel Godoy, Roy Juarez, Frank Ramirez, Raymond Juarez, and Frank Laurenz
With the exception of Roy Juarez , whom we hereinafter find to be the same ' person as
Raymond Juarez , they are listed in Appendix B During the hearing the Trial Examiner
granted without objection a motion of counsel for the respondent to strike out the name
of Roy Juarez from the list of those allegedly refused reinstatement on or about June 29,
1941.
5 On November 6, 1941 , the Trial Examiner had entered an order granting in part and
denying in part the respondent ' s motion for particulars ; and,, thereafter , the Board had
1280 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL 'LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and filed a second amendment to the complaint, dated November 26;
1941, which alleged-in substance (1) that on or about June 20, 1941,
the respondent entered into an exclusive collective bargaining agree-
ment with Local No. 374 at a time when the Union was the exclusive
bargaining representative of the respondent's employees in a unit
appropriate for the,purposes of collective bargaining and at a time
when Local No. 374 was not such representative; and (2) that by
entering into the agreement with Local No. 374, the respondent there-
by interfered with, restrained, and coerced- its employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thus rendering
the agreement invalid, illegal, void, and of no effect. Thereafter,
on November 29, 1941, the respondent filed its- answer to the second
amendment to the complaint in which it admitted the execution of the
agreement with Local No. 374, but denied the allegations,with respect
to the unfair labor practices. After the close of the Board's case in
chief, the respondent made several motions to dismiss portions of the
complaint which alleged discrimination with respect to 12 employees.
Except as stated below,6 the Trial Examiner either denied the motions
or reserved ruling thereon at the hearing and, denied them in his
Intermediate Report.
At the close of the hearing the Trial Examiner granted without
objection a motion by counsel for the Board to conform the complaint
to the proof with respect to formal matters. During the course of the
hearing, the Trial Examiner made rulings on other motions and on
objections to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed all
rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial errors
were committed. The Trial Examiner's rulings are hereby affirmed.
After the close of the hearing, counsel for the Board and for the re-
spondent, and a representative of Local No. 374, respectively, submitted
briefs to the.Trial Examiner.
Thereafter, the Trial Examiner issued his, Intermediate Report,
dated March 10, 1942, copies of which were duly served upon all the
issued and filed an amendment to the complaint , dated November 10, 1941 , setting forth
the names of persons who allegedly participated on behalf of the respondent inrthe unfair
labor practices and that the respondent 's campaign to induce employees to resign from
the Union and to loin the A. F L extended from on or about June 5, 1941 , to the date
of the complaint . At the hearing a stipulation was entered into between counsel for the
-Board and counsel for the respondent that the respondent's answer , theretofore filed,
should stand as the respondent ' s answer to the complaint and amendment thereto
6 As indicated above, the Trial Examiner granted the respondent 's motion to dismiss
those 'portions of the complaint which alleged ( 1) that on or about May 13, 1941, the
respondent discriminated against Jackie Stewart and Joe Camarillo by locking them
out , and ( 2) that on or about June 29, 1941, the respondent discriminated against Rov
Juarez , listed in footnote 4, supra, by refusing to reinstate him. There was no evidence
in the record with respect to any person known by that name . Apparently Raymond
Juarez , who is also listed in footnote 4, supra , - and Roy Juarez ale one and the.same
person .' As,hereinafter appears, the respondent had dischaiged Joe Camarillo on May 6,
and Jackie Stewart, on May 12, 1941 Their discharges are hereinafter treated.
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1281
r
parties, finding that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of
Section 8 ( 1), (3), and ( 5) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Act.. He
also found that the respondent had not discriminated against Jackie
Stewart, Roy Juarez, and the persons listed in Appendix B. The
Trial Examiner recommended that the respondent cease and desist
from its unfair labor practices and, in order to effectuate the policies
of the Act , take certain affirmative action including abrogation of the
agreement with Local No. 374 , reinstatement of certain discharged
employees with back pay, and placement of certain other employees
upon a preferential list for employment when available . He also
recommended that the complaint be dismissed as to the cases of Jackie
Stewart, Roy Juarez, and the persons listed in Appendix'B. There-
after, the respondent on April 16, 1942, and the Union , on April 20,
1942, filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and submitted briefs
in support of the exceptions.?
The Board has considered the exceptions to the Intermediate Re-
port and the briefs submitted by the parties 8 and, save as the excep-
tions are consistent with the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order set forth below , finds them to be without merit.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
American Foundry, a partnership composed of Dominic Meaglia
and Samuel Meaglia, is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and dis-
tribution principally of grey iron castings, semi-steel and alloy cast-
ings, and 'plumbing fittings at its foundry located in Montebello,
California. The raw materials used by the respondent in,the operation
of its foundry consist of sand, pig iron, coke, scrap iron, briquets,
silicon, and manganese. During the fiscal year ending March 31, 19411
the respondent- purchased all its raw materials, amounting to over
$71,000 by value and over 4,000, tons by weight, from dealers inside
the State of California. Of this amount, between one-fourth and
one-third, or approximately $20,000 by value and 840 tons by weight,
was shipped directly to the respondent's foundry from sources out-
side the State of California,, and the respondent purchased all its
bricuets, silicon, and manganese, amounting to about $3,500 by value
tend 32 tons.by weight, from vendors who secured such-raw materials
'Oral argument scheduled before the Board in Washington, D, C., was'*canceled with
the assent of all the parties
8 including a supplemsn$il brief , filed by the respondent on April 27 , 1942 , and a letter
in the nature of a brief, dated Tune 25, 1942, submitted by Harry A Stevenson, president,
International Dlolders' and Foundry Workers Union of North America
481039-42-'vol. 43-81
1282 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
outside the State of California. During the same period, the re-
spondent's production of finished castings and plumbing fittings totaled
approximately $255,000. Of this amount, the respondent shipped
about one-half of 1' percent by value directly outside the State of Call-
forriia and about 30 percent by value to vendees inside California who
transshipped their purchases outside the State of California.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, affili-
ated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor organ-
ization admitting to membership employees of the respondent.
International Molders & Foundry Workers, Local Union No. 374,
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, is a, labor organiza-
tion admitting to membership employees of the respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain
1. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges that all production and maintenance workers
of the respondent, exclusive of office and clerical employees and those
employees engaged in a supervisory capacity with the right to hire
and discharge, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining. Although the respondent denied the allega-
tion in its answer, it does not claim that any other unit is appropriate,
and no evidence was introduced at the hearing with respect to the
issue of appropriate unit. The unit as alleged is a normal bargaining
unit in the industry.9 We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that all
production and maintenance employees of the respondent, excluding
office and clerical employees and supervisory employees with the right
to hire and discharge, at all times material herein constituted and
now constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other conditions of employment. We further find, as did the
Trial Examiner, that said unit insures to the employees ,of the re-
spondent the full benefit of their right to self-organization and col-
lective bargaining and otherwise effectuates the policies of the Act.
Cf., for example , Matter of The Ohio Foundry , Plant No. 1 and United Automobile
llrori,ers of America (AFL), 35 N' L. R. B. 302; Matter of Auburn Foundry, Inc. and
Lodge 1998 of Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of North America,
etc, 14 N L. R. B. 1219 ; Matter of Ohio Foundry Co and International Molders' Union
of North America, Local No. 218, at at., 3 N L. R B. 701.
DOMINIC' MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1283
2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit
As of May 1, 1941, the respondent had 74 production and mainte-
nance workers on its pay roll.10 Of these, approximately 44 signed
applications for membership in the Union on or before April 30, 194111
In addition, Frank Sanceri, an employee of the respondent who sub
sequently became president of the Union, testified without contra-
diction, and we credit, as did the Trial Examiner, his testimony that
he joined the Union on March 19,1941 .12
We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that on April 30, 1941, and
at all times thereafter, the Union was the duly designated bargaining
representative of a majority of the employees in the aforesaid appro-
priate unit, and that pursuant to'Section 9 (a) of the Act, the Union
was at all such times and is now the exclusive representative of all
employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of.collective bargain-
ing with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment., '
3. The refusal to bargain
The, Union began organizing the respondent's employees in March
or April 1941. By-letter, dated April 28, 1941, the Union advised the
respondent that a majority of its employees had joined the'Union and
requested that the respondent meet with John Bacellar, an interna-
tional representative of the Union, and a committee of five named
employees on May 1 "for the purpose of collective bargaining for such
of your employees as are members of the Union." The respondent
received the letter on April 30, but failed to reply to it.
On,May 5, 1941, many employees appeared for work wearing union
buttons. The next day, the respondent discharged Joe Camarillo, a
union committeeman, as we find in Section III, B, 1, below, because
of his union activities. As hereinafter more fully set forth in Section
III, C, below, virtually all the respondent's employees ceased work on
May 13, 1941, as the result of a labor dispute. That day, Lewis
Michener, an international representative and the Regional Director
of the Union in that area, telephoned Dominic Meaglia, a partner- of
the firm and general manager of the respondent's foundry.13 Accord-
10 Excluding Foremen Pete Meaglia , Arthur Graham , and James A . Taylor
"An application for membership in a labor organization and, a fortiori, membership
therein , contrary to a contention of the respondent , may be considered as a designation
of the labor organization as the representative of the applicant or member , as the case
may be, for the purposes of collective bargaining See for example , National Labor Rela-
tions Board v Bradford Dyeing Ass 'n; 310 U S 318 ; National Labor Relations Board v.
Chicago Apparatus Co., 116 F ( 2d) 733 (C. C A. 7) ; National Labor Relations Board v.
Somerset Shoe Co , Ill F . ( 2d) 681 (C C A 1)
12 This date appears in the Intermeediate Report as March 27, 1941
13 At the time of the events involved in this case, Samuel Meaglia, the other partner,
was confined to a hospital and took no part in the labor relations of the respondent.
Subsequent references herein , unless otherwise indicated , are to Dominic.
1284 - DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing to Michener's testimony, he advised Meaglia that the Union rep-
resented a majority of the employees and requested an appointment
for a conference with Meaglia for the purpose of settling the con-
troversy and discussing other problems of the employees. Michener
further testified that Meaglia replied that'he was not -interested in
"the welfare of the men," that "no communist soh-of-a-bitch -was
going to tell [him] how to run [his] shop," and that he was "going
to close up [his] shop and go to Mexico. . . . the-C. I. O. could go
to hell." At the hearing Meaglia denied using the language attributed
to him by Michener and testified that he had told Michener that there
was "no trouble" at the foundry and that the employees could return
to work if they so desired. In resolving this conflict in testimony, it
is significant that no appointment was arranged and that Meaglia de-
parted 'for Mexico on May 17.14 Moreover, another employee, F.
Laurenz, gave credible testimony, which Meaglia denied, that about
May 6, 1941, Meaglia stated that "if the men made any trouble, .. .
[he] would close the shop and go back to Mexico." We find, as did
the Trial Examiner, that Meaglia made the statements to Michener
and Laurenz set forth above and that Meaglia refused to meet
Michener. ,
Thereafter, by registered mail the Union sent to the respondent
further communications, dated May 15 and May 19, 1941; respectively,
which stated that the Union represented a majority of the respondent's
employees and requested that the respondent bargain collectively with
the Union. The respondent refused to accept the mail, and returned
the communications, which bore the name and return address of the
Union on the envelope in which they were dispatched, unopened.
Under date of May 22, 1941, the Union sent a similar communication
to the respondent advising it that time employees would report at the
foundry prepared to work on May 26, provided that the respondent
meet with the Union to negotiate terms of settlement and existing
grievances. The respondent treated this communication as it did those,
of May 15 and May 19.
On May 26, 1941, the employees appeared at the plant gates and
presented a written statement, signed by approximately 50 employees, '
to the effect that they were prepared to resume work immediately if
the respondent would simultaneously enter into negotiations for set-
tlement of their grievances. The respondent did not accept the offer.
Instead, of replying to the Union, as hereinafter appears, the re-
spondent sent individual letters to the employees, each dated June 3,
1941, in which an appeal was made to the patriotism of the employees,
urging them not to interfere with production for "National Defense,"
and soliciting their return to work on June 5. Under date of June 4,
j
u As hereinafter indicated , he returned to the foundry on or about May 31, 1941.
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1285
1941, the Union again wrote to the respondent. In the communica-
tion, sent by registered mail, the Union stated, among other things,
that its attention had been drawn to one of the letters, dated June 3,
soliciting the return of individual workmen, called the respondent's
attention to the fact that it had ignored the letters of the Union, and
again requested that a meeting for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing be arranged. Again the respondent refused to accept the mail
and returned the communication of June 4, which like those previ-
ously sent, visibly bore the name and return address of the Union on
the envelope, unopened. At the hearing Meaglia admitted that he
had refused to accept the Union's letters because, in his own words, "I
am not interested in what the C, I. O. does . . . If the C. I. O. wanted
to see me, they could cone down to the office to see me." As herein-
after more fully appears, the respondent and Local No. 374, entered
into an agreement, dated June 20, 1941, providing for a "union shop";
thereafter, the Union abandoned the strike, and the employees re-
turned to work on or about June 29, 1941.
Under the circumstances we ,find no merit in the respondent's con-
tentions (1) that the Union's letter of April 28 did not provide suffi-
cient time for a reply to the request for a meeting on May 1; (2) that
the respondent was privileged to do nothing but await a personal visit
by union representatives; (3) that the respondent was not required
to bargain during the period in which Meaglia was in Mexico; and
(4) that there was no showing of compliance with the Union's 'con-
stitution which requires approval of a local union to authorize the
International or its representatives to enter into a contract. On the
basis of the facts hereinabove reviewed, it is clear that the'respondent
refused to meet with the Union and thereby refused to bargain col-
lectively in flagrant disregard of the provisions of the Act 15
Accordingly, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that on May 13,
1941,16 and at all times thereafter, the respondent refused to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in an appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages,
"The respondent also contended that it was under no obligation to bargain with
Michener since he had a reputation as a communist and was responsible for the wildcat
strike at the plant of the North American Aviation Company which was quelled by the
use of Federal troops . In passing it may be noted that Michener denied the charges at
the hearing We find it unnecessary , however , for the purposes of our decision to
determine whether they have a basis in fact. In any event, the Act requires an employer
to bargain collectively with the freely chosen representative of his employees, however
unfit such iepresentative or its agents may be thought to be See Matter of Ford Motor
Company and Internationa' Union, United Automobile TIorl,crs of America, C. I' 0 , 30
N L R B . 9S5 at 9S7 Ci Matter of Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp . and United
Electrical, Radio & Machine 11 of hers of America, Local No. 4111 (C. I. 0 ), 41 N L R. B 973.
"This date appeais in the Intermediate Report as April 36, 1941 We have altered
the date since the first request of the Union for collective bargaining rights, subsequent
to achieving majority status, occurred on May 13, 1941, and prior thereto the Union
had sought to bargain for members only On and after May 13, 1941, the Union did not
limit its request to baig,uniug on behalf of its members.
1286 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and that
by such refusal interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.,
B. The individual discharges
1. Camarillo
As hereinabove set forth, the Union, by letter dated April 28, 1941,
requested the respondent to meet for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining with a union committee of five listed employees, including
Joe Camarillo, and the respondent did not reply to the letter .1T Pur-
suant to a vote of the membership of the Union, on May 5 many em-
ployees reported for work at the foundry wearing union buttons
prominently displayed on their persons. Camarillo, who was first em-
ployed by 'the respondent during April 1941, was sick that day and
took leave without notifying the respondent in advance. The next
day Camarillo was' discharged allegedly for insubordination occurring
after the respondent had decided to, lay him off because Camarillo
had taken leave on May 5 without notice and because of a shortage'
of work. The respondent has not since Camarillo's discharge offered
him reinstatement.
According to Board witnesses, when Camarillo appeared for work
on May 6, his foreman, James A. Taylor, notified Camarillo of a lay-
off; Frank Sanceri, president of'the Union, protested when the matter,
was called to his attention ; and Meaglia, after referring to Sanceri
in obscene terms,'with threatening gestures, told him "I am going to
fire [Camarillo] and no God-damned C. I. 0. or anybody else is going
to stop me" and told Camarillo "to get the hell out of the plant."
According to the respondent's witnesses, Camarillo refused to abide
by Taylor's notice of lay-off and returned to work when Sanceri
claimed that he was "running things," and Meaglia discharged Cama=
rillo for such insubordination after having decided initially, at the
instance of Taylor, to lay Camarillo off because of his failure to re-
port for work and because of lack of work for him. In resolving this
conflict in testimony, it is significant that, so far as appears, no other
employee had ever been laid off or discharged by the respondent in
similar cases of absence of work on account of illness, and there'had
been no decline in Camarillo's work load during the short period of
his employment with the respondent. Indeed, at the hearing, Meaglia
admitted that the respondent invokes no disciplinary action against
employees who fail to appear for work under similar circumstances
i
Q
17 It should be noted that , unlike the case with respect to subsequent letters, mentioned
above in Section III, A, 3, the respondent accepted the Union's letter of April 28 and,
consequently, it had knowledge , as Meaglia admitted at the hearing , that Camarillo was
a union committeeman prior to his discharge.
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1287
by reason of overindulgence in drink; and, an examiiiation' of the
respondent's pay rolls for the weeks immediately preceding and. fol-
lowing May 6 indicates no change in the number of workers employed,
thus negativing the respondent's claim that it had decided to lay off'
Camarillo because. of lack of work., Moreover, employee Manuel,
Garcia, a union committeeman, gave testimony, which Meaglia denied,
that, on the day of Camarillo's discharge, Meaglia stated : "... you
or Jesus Christ are not going. to run this, shop for me. No damn
C.' I. 0. is going to run this shop for me. You think you and Frank
[Sanceri] are going to run it, you are full of prunes, and if you don't
like the way it is run, you can just get the hell out of here. I want
you to leave the boys alone . . ." Meaglia admitted at the hearing,
however, that he talked to Garcia on May 6 and asked him "... why
don't you mind your own business ... if you don't like this job, why
don't you quit?" after Garcia had been observed by` Mea'glia in con-
versation with other employees in the shop. Under the circumstances,
we credit, as did the Trial Examiner, the testimony of Garcia and
other Board witnesses hereinabove related. We find that Camarillo
did not flout the authority of his superiors, and that he was not dis-
charged because of insubordination or laid off because-of absence from
work or shortage of work. Rather we believe that 'the respondent
seized upon Camarillo's absence from work under the circumstances
described as a 'pretext 'to lay off a' relatively new employee who had
become a union leader and that the respondent now seeks to make his
lay-off permanent, as it sought to do op May 6, by labeling his union
activities a form' of insubordination.
Accordingly, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the respondent
discriminated in regard to'the hire and tenure of 'employment of Joe
Camarillo, who was discharged-by the respondent on May 6, 1941, and
has not since been reinstated, because of his union' activities, thereby
discouraging membership in the Union and interfering with, restrain-
ing, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act. '
2. Stewart
In his Intermediate Report the Trial Examiner recommended that
the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleged discrimination with
respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Jackie Stewart since
the Trial Examiner found that the respondent discharged Stewart,
a relatively new employee, on May 12,1941, because he did not meet the
respondent's requirements with respect to-productivity,_and not, as the
complaint alleges, because of his union activities. The Union filed
no exception thereto. We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion
and find, as he did, that the respondent by discharging Stewart did
1288 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'
not discriminate in regard to his hire or tenure of employment within
the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act. Under the circumstances
we shall dismiss that allegation of the complaint in accordance with
the Trial Examiner's recommendation without setting, forth in detail
the circumstances surrounding Stewart's discharge.
3. Velasquez
The complaint alleges,. and the respondent's answer denies, that
the respondent discharged Francisco Velasquez on or about May 13,
1941, and thereafter refused to reinstate him, because of his union
activities. The respondent asserts that it relieved Velasquez of his
duties as night watchman during a work stoppage; hereinafter more
fully discussed in Section 'III, C, infra, because it felt that he could
not perform them. -
Velasquez joined the Union 'on May 14, the day after the work stop-,
page began. That morning, iii response to a summons, Velasquez,
wearing a uiiion button, reported to Meaglia. According to Velas-
quez's testimony, he was interrogated by Meaglia with respect to the
union button and his union membership, and Meaglia stated, after
Velasquez admitted his union affiliation, "All right, give me the keys.
Youi belong to the Union. You go ahead and belong with the other
fellows over there. I don't want ... the Union in my place ..."
Meaglia testified that he summoned Velasquez because of a report that
the Union had forced Velasquez to join against his will and that'he
was suffering from fear; and .that Meaglia, asked Velasquez to'sur-
render the keys to the plant premises when he admitted that he' was
still "afraid"*of the Union. While in his testimony Velasquez ad-
mitted telling Meaglia that he (Velasquez) feared injury if he re-
fused to affiliate with the Union, on the other hand, when Meaglia
demanded the keys, he did not indicate that the existence of such fear
had any bearing upon Velasquez's ability to do his work; rather,
Meaglia referred, significantly, we think, to Velasquez's union mem-
bership. In any event, Meaglia admitted telling Velasquez: "'If you
are afraid, and the C. I. 0. tell' ,you to go out there '18 go ahead." 19
Moreover, at a hearing before, the California Employment Commis-
sion in August 1941, Meaglia gave the following testimony with re-
spect to Velasquez's discharge
Q. You laid him off because, he belonged to the C. I. 0.?-
A. Yes.
Q. That is why you fired him?
A. Yes, because he could not take care of that job, they wouldn't
let him.
'- Referring to the Union 's picket line hereinafter mentioned
1O Velasquez denied that a union representative "shook his coat" as Meaglia testified
Velasquez had reported on May 14.
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1289
And at the instant hearing Meaglia testified as follows :
You fired him because he belonged to the C. I. 6.?
A. I asked him to give me the keys.
Q. And you said you fired him because he belonged to the
C. I. 0.?
A. Well, the C. I. O. had him-,in their wing, and he couldn't.
work there., -
Under the circumstances, we credit, as did the Trial Examiner, the
testimony of Velasquez.
So far as appears, Velasquez served as watchman during the night
of May 13 and early morning of May 14, while the work stoppage
was in progress, without mishap. We are not convinced that the trend
of events had affected Velasquez's ability to perform his duties or that
the respondent relieved Velasquez, who had a service-record with the
respondent of approximately 4 years, of his job because it believed that
he was unable to do his work, properly during the work 'stoppage.
Rather we are of the opinion that the respondent desired to compel
Velasquez to choose between retaining his union membership and
allying himself with management. We find therefore, as did the
Trial Examiner, that the respondent discharged Velasquez on May
14, 1941, and thereafter until June 5, 1941,20 refused to reinstate him,
because he had joined the Union and had indicated-that he chose to
retain his union affiliation.
Accordingly v-e find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the respond-
ent discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment
of Francisco Velasquez, who was discharged by the respondent on
May 14, 1941, and thereafter refused reinstatement until June 5, 1941,
because of his union activities, thereby discouraging membership in
the Union and interfering with; restraining, and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of`the Act.
C. The discharges of Nagy, Sanceri, Garcia,, and Guzman, and the
lockout
The complaint alleges, and the respondent's answer denies, that
on or about May. 13, 1941, the respondent locked out the persons
listed in Apf)endix A and discharged Frank Sanceri, John Nagy,
Manuel Garcia, and Jose Guzman because of their union activities 21
The respondent claims that it discharged Nagy because he interfered
with other employees by talking to them and thereby neglected his
own work and that the other employees ceased work on May 13, 1941,
as participants in a strike.
'-° Velasquez rejected the respondent's invitation to report for work on June 5, 1941.
However, on July 4, 1941, after the Union had abandoned the strike, as hereinafter more
fully appears, Velasgnez returned to work
21 As indicated above, Sanceri's name does not appear in Appendix A ; with respect to
Nagy, Garcia , and Guzman , all listed in Appendix A, the complaint contains separate
allegations with regard to their discharge and their lockout.
1290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As already noted in Section III, A and B above, during the ap-
proximately 2-week period immediately prior to May 13, 1941, the
respondent, ignoring the Union's requests for collective bargaining
negotiations, failed to meet with the union committee, and discharged
Camarillo, one of their number, unlawfully, and Stewart, a union of-
ficer, for cause. In addition, among other things, as ,we hereinafter
'find in Section III, E, infra, shortly after May 4, when the Union
decided that its members should wear -union buttons in the plant,
management representatives ridiculed employees who reported for
work with union buttons displayed on their persons and made obscene
remarks about the buttons. To each of several union adherents dur-
ing the ensiling week of May 5 to 12, Meaglia in substance stated, as
we hereinafter find in Section III, E, infra, that "if you don't like the
way the shop is run, why don't you quit. No God damn C. I. O. is
going to run this shop."
On the night of May 12, the union membership decided to send
a delegation, consisting of, Frank Sanceri, president of the Union,
John Nagy, the Union's vice-president, and Manuel Garcia, Frank
Robles, and Camarillo, members of the Union's bargaining commit-
tee, to consult with the respondent next morning concerning bargain-
ing rights and the discharges of Camarillo and Stewart; the union
membership also decided to strike in the event that the respondent
refused to recognize the Union and to follow a policy of non-discrimi-
nation with respect to union members.
About 9 o'clock on the morning of May 13, according to the testi-
mony of Manuel Garcia, he was approached, while working just out-
side the plant, by Meaglia who sought an explanation for Garcia's
presence at work,22 demanded an insight into plans of the Union, cursed
the Union, and invited Garcia to quit his employment if he were dis-
satisfied with working conditions. At the hearing Garcia gave the
following testimony :
Q. Just tell us about May 13th.
A. [Meaglia] came up to me ...
* *
A. (Continuing) .,and he said, "what did you come to work
for?"
A. (Continuing) , .. I says, "Well, because the rest of -the
boys,came to work." Then he says, "What the hell is this special
bulletin 23 you fellows are putting out?" I says, "You will hear
32 Apparently Meagha had a mistaken notion as to the course of action voted by the
union membership the night before.
21 Below Garcia relates his understanding as to what Meaglia referred to as the "special
bulletin P ,
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA' 1291
about it" . . . Then I walked off slowly, . . . and I heard him
say, No God damned C. I. 0. is going to boss this shop . . if
you don't like this place, the way it is run, you can just get the
hell out of here." _
Q. That was Dominic talking?
A.- That's right, Dominic Meaglia.
Q. Do you know what was being referred to as a special
bulletin?
A. Well, the special.bulletin 24 was, that we was supposed, all
the committeemen was supposed to go to the office at 10:00
o'clock that morning and see about Joe Camarillo's firing ...25
Shortly thereafter, about 9 o'clock that morning, according to the
testimony of, John Nagy,26 he was approached while at work by
Meaglia who stated :
. . . go on out . . . I don't like you .... get out and, stay out
go down' and take the rest of the sons-of-bitches with you
. . , there is no C. I. 0. going to run my shop ;
and Nagy thereupon walked out of the foundry; and, as he was
leaving, he saw Meaglia at a distance gesturing to other employees
"to get out." At the hearing Meaglia claimed that he had two con-
versations with Nagy on the morning of May 13, one in the pattern
shop, and the, other in the foundry at Nagy's regular work place.
,Meaglia testified with respect to the conversation on the first occa-
sion as follows :
Q. Did you and he speak at that time 27 to each other?
A. He said, "Good morning," to me.
Q. What did you say?
A. I said, "Good morning, hell. You don't mean it.".
Q. Anything further?
A. Yes. He,said, "Why?"
A. (Continuing) ... "Why," I said, "if you stay on your floor
and mind your own business , it will be abetter morning."
'24 The Union had disti lbuted to its members a written notice stating , among other
things, that the Union would call a stike unless the respondent negotiated with the Union.
21 Garcia returned to woi k after his conversation with Meaglia but shortly thereafter
he ceased work , as hereinafter appeais , when the employees walked out of the plant en
masse. Meaglia claimed th.rt lie could not "recall" a conveisation with Garcia on May 13. -
21 As a result of an incident between Meaglia and Frank Sanceri, president of the Union,
mentioned above in Section I' I, B, 1, Sanceri apologized to Meaglia for having joined the
Union, offered to withdraw from membership, and delegated his, duties as president of
the Union to Nagy, its vice pi esident Meaglia learned of Nagy's assumption of Sanceri's
duties prior to May'13
2" At the time Na'gv had gone to the pattern shop to obtain materials for cleaning'pur-
poses There is no claim that lie had no business in the pattern shop
1292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS' BOARD -
A. (Continuing)' He says, "You can't make me."
A. (Continuing) I say, "The hell I can't. If you don't stay on
your floor, out you go."
Q. Anything further?
A. No. I went back to the office.
Meaglia further testified that the second'conversation, related below,
took place in the foundry when he found- Nagy speaking to Ramon
Castro, an employee, and other unnamed employees listening
Q. Did you go up to speak to Mr. Nagy at the time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you say to Mr. Nagy?
A. I say, "John, if you don't like your job, why don't you quit?"
"I don't have to quit."
Q. Is that what Mr. Nagy said, "I don't have to quit?" '
A. Yes, sir. I' says, "Why don't you stay on your floor and
mind your own business." He says, "I don't have to." "Well,
then I will fire you."
Q. That is what you said, "Well, then I will fire you ?"
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he say?
A.' He just let out one yell and threw his shovel down.
Q. Did he say whether or not you could fire him?
A. No, I don't think he did say that.
Q. What kind of a yell did he let out?
A. He threw the shovel down and said, "Youp" and made a
motion like this (witness indicated the motion by waving his
right arm from the right to the left) .28
Q. Now, I will ask you whether or not on or about May 12, 1941,
you had occasion to have a conversation with Dominic Meaglia
,regarding the Union?
A. . . . I went out to the pattern shop May the 12th, on Monday
morning, wearing my button on my cap.
A. (Continuing) . . . I entered the pattern shop to get some
pattern cleaner to clean my pattern. Mr. Dominic Meaglia, he
was at the pattern shop when I was coming out- from there, and
I told Mr. Meaglia, I says, "Good morning, Dominic." And he
says, "Don't morning me. Morning my ... (indecent reference
to portion of the, anatomy) I will knock you on yours." There
was nothing more said May the 12th.
28Nagy also testified that he had' two conversations with nleagl is but places the first
as having occurred on May 12 and gave the following version of it :
DOMINIC - MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1293
There is also a sharp conflict in the testimony as to 'what occurred
immediately ' following the announcement, of Nagy's discharge.
Immediately after Meaglia took leave of Nagy, according to the tes-
timony of several Board witnesses, Meaglia ranged through the
foundry and directed the employees to leave the plant by waving his
arm and by telling them all "sons-of-bitches wearing blue (C. I. 0.)
buttons should get the hell out of the plant." They further testified
that the employees immediately walked out of the plant in obedience to
Meaglia's order.29 Meaglia denied that he ordered the employees to
leave -the plant. He asserted at the hearing that the employees
ceased work and left the plant in response to a command by Nagy that
the employees strike.30
While ranging through the foundry, Meaglia had conversations with
Sanceri and Guzman which gave rise to the separate allegations in the
complaint that the respondent discriminated with respect to their hire
and tenure of employment by discharging them. The testimony with
respect to these conversations, however, is also conflicting. Guzman
testified that he, was told by Meaglia : "You, too, get the hell out of
here . . . Get outside, get out of the gate." According to Meaglia,
he was asked by Guzman as to what course of action he should take,
and that Meaglia stated that Guzman could remain, at work or leave
the plant as he,chose. Sanceri testified that he was approached about
9: 30 that morning at his work place by Meaglia, who stated : "IYou
are] fired . . . get out." Meaglia asserted at the hearing, however,
that Sanceri protested Nagy's discharge and threatened to call a
strike.
In resolving the conflicting testimony set forth above, several facts
appear significant. In addition to failing to meet with the union
committee as requested, and discharging one of the committeemen, the
respondent had shown hostility to the Union by antiunion statements
of management representatives. Also, on May 12, after'the respond-
ent had decided to discharge Stewart, according to Meaglia's undenied
testimony which we credit, Foreman Graham reported to Meaglia that
Graham had been informed by Nagy of the Union's intention to strike
in the event the respondent continued to "lay off" its members; and,
as already noted, Meaglia had threatened to shut down the plant if
the Union caused "trouble." Although the union membership had
voted to go out on strike, that course of action was conditioned, in part
at least, upon the failure of the union committee to persuade the
" some employees testified that they left the plant because they saw other employees
leave
ao Meaglia testified that Nagy issued the strike call by simply w avirig his arm isa manner
which indicated that he wished the employees to follow him. On the other hand, Castro
testified that he did not hear Nagy "yell out" or "say a word when the thing happened,"
but that he saw Meaglia signal the employees to leave the -plant and that he [Castro] left
the plant in compliance with Meaglia's order.
1294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
respondent to engage in collective bargaining, and the committee had
not called upon the management at the time of the incidents herein-
above related. Moreover, in his testimony Meaglia admitted that
'Nagy gave no verbal strike order; and, Ramon Castro, the only wit-
' ness named by Meaglia as having been present at the time of Nagy's
discharge, failed to support Meaglia's version of his conversation with
Nagy and of the events which then occurred. Finally, the accuracy of
Meaglia's testimony is impugned by the fact that the respondent
delivered pay checks to Sanceri and Garcia, as well as to Nagy, about
15 minutes after the work stoppage began, thus, lending credence to
the testimony of Sanceri and Garcia. Undex the circumstances, we
credit, as did the, Trial Examiner, the testimony of Nagy, Sanceri,
Garcia, Guzman, and other Board witnesses referred to above, and
find that the discussions and events involving Meaglia occurred sub-
stantially as testified to by them.31 We are of the opinion that Nagy,
a piece-worker, did not neglect his work or interfere with the work.of
his fellow employees.' Rather we believe that the respondent sought to
take advantage of Nagy's presence in the pattern shop and the fact that
he was engaged in conversation with a fellow employee to eliminate
from the plant the Union's vice president who had assumed the duties
of president. Accordingly, we find that the respondent discharged
Nagy because of his union activites. We are also of the opinion'that
the Union did not call a strike upon learning of Nagy's discharge but
that the respondent discharged Sanceri, Garcia, and Guzman and
locked out the persons listed in Appendix A, except Nagy, Garcia, and
Guzman, because it was incensed as a result of the union activities of
its employees. Accordingly, we find that, the respondent discharged
Sanceri, Garcia, and Guzman and locked out the persons listed in
Appendix A, except Nagy, Garcia, and Guzman, because of their union
activities.
We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the respondent discrimi-'
nated in regard. to the hire and tenure of employment of Frank San-
ceri and the persons listed in Appendix A, by discharging Sanceri,
John Nagy, Manuel Garcia, and Jose Guzman and by locking out the
persons listed in Appendix A, excepting Nagy, Garcia, and Guzman;
thereby discouraging membership in the Union and interfering with,
restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
D: The strike
As a result of the lockout, the respondent's employees promptly
congregated at the plant gate. Shortly thereafter, union represent-
"While union officers, called to other, employees to cease work, as witnesses for the'
respondent testified, the officers' conduct was in accordance with Meaglia's older that all
union adherents leave the plant.
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1295
atives,,who had been summoned to the scene, established a picket' line
which was maintained until on or about June 29, 1941.
There is a conflict in the testimony as to whether the respondent
terminated the lockout shortly after the, establishment. of the, picket
line According to the respondent's witnesses, Ray Del Pino, a sales-
man employed by the respondent who also acted as assistant to
1VMeaglia, pursuant to Meaglia's direction, requested employees on the
picket line, about 11: 30 a. m. on May 13, to return to work, but
without success. Del Pino testified that the employees referred the
request, to union representatives and that the union representatives
refused to permit the employees to 'return to work unless the re-
spondent agreed to negotiate with the Union. As already noted, the
respondent refused to bargain with the Union. 'Witnesses for the
Board, including union representatives, testified that Del Pino boasted
that the respondent would break the work stoppage, as it had other
work stoppages in its history, and that the employees would never
recover their jobs. In resolving the conflicting testimony, it is sig-
nificant that several employees who were named by Del Pino as
having been among those in the picket line at the time referred to
above, did not deny that Del Pino issued an invitation to return to
work. Moreover, Charles Bioletti, an international representative,'
admitted in his testimony, that he told Del Pino on May 13 that
the Union "will have the men return to work just as soon as Meaglia
decided to bargain"; and communications of the Union addressed to
the respondent on May 19 and 22, referred to above, on their face,
conditioned the employees' willingness to return to work upon the
respondent's assent to collective bargaining negotiations, thus lending
support to Del Pino's version. Under the circumstances, we credit
Del Pino's testimony and find, as did the Trial Examiner , that the
respondent terminated the lockout, which begaii about 9 a. m. on May
13, 1941, and offered to reinstate Sanceri and the persons listed in
Appendix A at about 11:30 a. m. on the same day,32 and that the
Union commenced a strike at about 11: 30 a. m. on May 13, 1941, as
a result of the respondent 's refusal to bargain with the Union. As
we have found above in Section III, A, the respondent thereafter
continued to refuse to bargain with the Union, and as we hereinafter
find in Section III, E, infra, engaged in other unfair labor practices.
Accordingly, we find, as did the Trial Examiner , that the strike
which began on May 13, 1941, was caused and prolonged by the re-
spondent's unfair labor practices.
33 The Union contends , inter alga, that the respondent failed to terminate the lockout on
flay 13 in that'it did not invite each and every locked-out employee to return to work.
We find no merit in the contention The respondent extended the nnditation , as appears
above , through the Union which represented all employees in the appropriate unit, as
%%ell as to individual employees.
1296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
E. Interference, restraint. and coercion; execution of the contract
between the respondent and Local No. 374
Shortly after May 4,1941, when the Union decided that its members
should wear union, buttons in the plant,, according to partially un-
deniied testimony of Board witnesses, management representatives
including Dominic Meaglia and his brother, Pete, a foreman in the
plant, ridiculed employees 'who appeared in the plant wearing union'
buttons and made obscene remarks-about the buttons.33 1Board wit-
nesses also gave testimony, which Dominic 1\2eaglia denied, that to each
of several union adherents Meaglia stated in substance during the
week of May 5 to May 12 : "If you don't like the way the shop is run,
why don't you quit. No Cod damn C. I. 0. is going to run this shop."
We credit, as did the Trial Examiner, the testimony of Board wit
nesses related above, and find that Dominic Meaglia and Pete Meaglia
made the statements attributed to them. We have also found above
in Section III, A, 3, that on May 6, 1941, Meaglia warned F. Laurenz
that the plant would be shut down if the employees caused "trouble"
and that on May 13, 1941, Meaglia made profane and scurrilous state-
ments to Michener about himself and the Union and threatened to
close down the plant and go to Mexico when Michener sought to ar-
range a meeting for the purposes of collective bargaining with the
respondent. By the conduct hereinabove described, the respondent
interfered with, restrained, and,coerced its employees in .the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. .
In addition, the respondent engaged in other conduct unlawful
under Section 8 (1)' of the" Act. Under date of June 3, 1941, the re-
spondent sent letters to individual employees soliciting their return
to work on June 5. The Union refused to permit its members to return
to work unless the respondent agreed to engaged in collective bargain-
ing negotiations. Since the respondent refused to bargain collectively,
the Union continued,to strike., Between June 6 and June 20, 1941,
according to the uncontradicted testimony of William Lazzerini, an
organizer for the International Molders and Foundry Workers of
North America, Meaglia sought to secure a supply of workmen from
that organization and, for that purpose, induced it to organize the
strikers in Local No. 374. Thereafter, the respondent and Local No.
374 entered into a written agreement, dated June 20, 1941, in which
the respondent recognized Local No. 374 and undertook to "sign a
union shop agreement and [to] negotiate union wages, rates and
working conditions." At the time of the execution of the agreement
Local No., 374 did not represent a majority,of the respondent's em-
ployees in the appropriate unit and the respondent did not require
as Pete Meaglia did not testify and no reason is disclosed in the record for his failure to
appear as a: witness.
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1297
production of proof as to a claim by Local No. 374 that it had been
designated as representative by a majority of the respondent's em--
ployees. During the 2-week interval between June 5 and June 20, "and
thereafter, according to partially undenied testimony of Board wit-
nesses which we credit, as did the Trial Examiner, the "respondent's
foremen, including Pete Meaglia and Arthur Graham, canvassed em-
ployees at their homes and, by promising to defray payment of initia-
tion dues in Local No. 374, and by promising to provide a police escort
to gain entry into the plant, induced them to apply for member-
ship in Local No. 374 and to return to work. On or about June 23,
1941, approximately 14 members of the Union who had been thus
induced by management representatives to join Local No. 374, met at
an appointed place near the plant, pursuant to arrangements made by_
Pete Meaglia, and instead of reporting on the picket line as had been
their custom since May 13,, went through the picket line and into the
plant and resumed work. ^ On or about June 29, 1941, the Union abah-
cloned the strike and directed the remaining strikers to report for work.
Thereafter, according to partially undenied testimony of Board wit-
nesses , foremen, including Pete Meaglia and Arthur Graham, advised
employees that they were required to join Local No. 374 within 2
weeks as a condition of continued employment. Foreman Graham
testified, however, that he told employees that the respondent and
Local No. 374 were in the process of negotiating a contract and that
if they concluded a closed-shop agreement the employees would have
to join Local No. 374. We credit, as did the Trial Examiner, the testi-
mony of Board witnesses related above and find that the respondent
informed its employees that membership in Local No. 374 was a con-
dition precedent to continued employment.. The respondent contends,
however, that its employees were not- in fact coerced by such conduct
since several employees testified at the hearing that they had not
become members of Local No. 374. We find no merit in the contention.'
At the time of the hearing, approximately 57 employees, constituting
the bulk of the respondent's pay roll, had signed applications for mem-
bership in Local No. 374. In the light of the circumstances under
which many of the applications were signed, as set forth above, coupled
with the, respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union, and discrimi-
nation against its members, as hereinabove found, their execution is
attributable to -the unfair labor practices of the respondent. By the
conduct hereinabove described, the respondent further interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in, Section 7 of the Act.
The execution of the contract with Local No. 374, dated June 20,
1941, itself constituted an unfair labor practice. The respondent not
only was aware of the Union's claim concerning representation of the
employees, but also refused to bargain with the Union, and took
481039-42-vol. 43-82
1298 DECISIONS ' OF NATIONAL LABOR-RELATIONS BOARD
affirmative steps to bring Local No. 374 into the plant. Local No. 374
had not been. designated as exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees and the respondent did not require any proof as to its
alleged majority' status. By entering into the contract, which in
effect granted exclusive recognition to Local No. 374 and required
membership -in that organization as a condition of employment, the
respondent gave potent assistance to Local No. 374.34 By soliciting
membership in behalf of Local No. 374 and by entering into the con-
tract thus recognizing Local No. 374 as the exclusive representative
of its employees and requiring them to become members of Local No.
374, the respondent interfered with,, restrained, and coerced its em-
ployees in their choice of representatives and thereby assisted Local
No. 374. The contract is therefore invalid and must be set aside3'
By sending letters to individual employees, each dated June 3, 1941,
urging them to abandon the concerted activities in which they were
engaged while they were represented by a labor organization entitled
to exclusive recognition, the respondent violated its obligation to deal
with' the Union and thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its 'employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.-"'
F. The alleged refusal to reinstate strikers
The complaint alleges, and the respondent's answer denies that the
respondent unlawfully refused to reinstate 11 named strikers 37 on
or about. June 29, 1941, the date of the termination of the strike. In
his Intermediate Report the Trial Examiner found, however, that the
respondent reinstated 3 38 of the 10 strikers at the end of the strike.
The Trial Examiner also found in his Intermediate Report that the
respondent did not reinstate the remaining 7 named strikers because
of a curtailment of work resulting from the withdrawal of patterns
by customers during the strike.39 He recommended that the com-
plaint be dismissed insofar as it alleged that the respondent discrimi-
nated with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of the 10
named strikers by refusing to reinstate them. The Union filed no
exception thereto. We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusions'
34 See for example, National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Gi eyhound Lines,
Inc, et at ., 303 U. S 261.
36 Cf international Association of Machinists v. National Labor Relations Board, 311
L' S 72, aff'g 110 F. (2d) 29 (App D C ), enf'g 8 N. L. R. B 621 ; National Labor Rela-
tions Board v Electric Vacuum Cleaner Company, 311 U. S 685 decided March 30, 1942,
rev'g 120 F (2d) 611 (C C A 6), setting aside 1S N. L R. B 591.
36 See, for example, Platter of The Burke 'Machine Tool Company and International
Association of Machinists (A F of L ), 36 N. L. It B 1329. -
37 They are listed in tootnote 4, supra The list includes Roy Juarez whom we found
above to, be the same person as Raymond Juai ez, thus reducing the number to 10 persons.
38 They are Marquez, GodoS', and Ramon Castro
3e The respondent had not hued any new employees as replacements for strikers at the
time that it refused them reinstatement.
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1299
and find. as he did, that the respondent did not discriminate with re-
spect to the hire and tenure of employment of the 10 named strikers
by refusing to reinstate them, within the meaning of Sectipn 8 (3) of
the Act. Under the circumstances we shall dismiss that allegation of,
the complaint in accordance with the Trial Examiner's recommenda-
tion without setting forth in detail the circumstances surrouuding
such alleged discrimination.
The complaint also alleges, and the respondent's answer denies, that
the respondent discriminated with respect to hire and tenure of em-
ploynient by refusing to reinstate Nagy, Sanceri, Manuel Garcia, and
Guzman.
In his, Intermediate Report the Trial Examiner found, however, that
the respondent did not discriminate with respect.to the hire and tenure
of employment of Nagy, Guzman,40 and Sanceri by refusing-to rein-
state them after the end of the strike. The Union filed no exception
thereto. We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusions and find,
as he did, that the respondent did not discriminate in regard to their
hire and tenure of employment by refusing to reinstate them after
the termination of the strike.
The Union excepted, however, to the Trial Examiner's finding that
the respondent did not discriminate against Manuel Garcia by refusing
to reinstate -him after, the strike on the ground that the respondent
retained on its pay roll an employee in the same occupational classi-
fication but having less seniority than Garcia. The employee referred
to, Alfred Medrona, a member of the Union, was among those em-
ployees who abandoned the strike, and `returned to work on or about
June 23, 1941. Garcia did not report for work until June 30, 1941,
when work was unavailable because of customer withdrawal of patterns
during the strike, and the respondent then asserted that reason in
denying him reinstatement at that time. The Union contends, how-
ever, that, in retaining Medrona in preference to Garcia, the respondent
discriminated against Garcia since he had greater seniority than Med-
rona. We find no merit in the contention. While the respondent fol-
lowed a policy of seniority in rehiring employees, it considered seniority
as a guiding factor only in those cases in which competing-,employees
were equal in ability; and the record discloses no evidence with respect
to the comparative ability of Medrona or Garcia, Accordingly we
find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the respondent did not discrimi-
nate with respect ,to the hire and tenure of employment of Manuel
Garcia by refusing to reinstate him after the termination of the strike.
We shall dismiss the complaint insofar as it alleges such discrimination.
10 As hereinafter appears, Guzman, along with Marquez, Godoy, and Ramon Castro, was
discharged as an alien on July 25, 1941.
I
1300 DECISIONS OF 'NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF TILE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section III
above, occurring, in connection with the operations of the respondent
described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among tha several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening,and-obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
We have found that the respondent refused to bargain, collectively
with the Union as the representative of the majority of the employees
in an appropriate unit. The respondent and Local No. 374 maintain,
however, that the Union has lost its majority. At the hearing Local
No. 374 introduced applications for membership in Local No. 374
signed -by approximately 58 employees. However, such defections or
withdrawals from membership in the Union resulted from, and are at-
tributable to, the unfair labor practices of the respondent', hereinabove
set forth, in refusing to bargain with the Union, in discriminating in
regard to the hire and tenure of employment of members of the Union,
in assisting Local No. 374 by recruiting membership in its behalf and
by entering into an agreement recognizing Local No. 374 as exclusive
representative of its employees and requiring membership in that labor
organization2 and in otherwise interfering with, restraining, and co-
ercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act. The unfair labor practices just enumerated cannot operate
to change the bargaining 'representative previously chosen by the un-
trammeled will of the majority of the respondent's employees '1 We
shall, therefore, order that the respondent, upon request, bargain col-
lectively with the Union. -
We have found that the contract between the respondent and Local
No. 374, dated June 20, 1941, is invalid because Local No. 374 did not
n National Labor Relations, Board v. P. Lorillard Company, 314 U S 512; National
Labor Relations Board v Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U S 918; International Association
of Machinists v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U. S. 72; Bussman. Mfg Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 111 F. (2d) 783, 788 (C. C A. 8)^; Continental Oil Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 113 F. (2d) 473, 481 (C. C A. 10), remanded on another
issue , 61 S Ct. 861 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park Mfg Co, 110 F.
(2d) 632 , 640 (C . C A. 1) ; Valley Mould & Iron Corp . v. National Labor Relations Board,
116 F ( 2d) 760 (C C A. 7) ; Oughron, et al. v National Labor Relations Board, 118 F.
( 2d) 494 (C. C. A 3) ; National Labor Relations Board v. New Era Die Co., Inc, 118 F.
(2d) 500 (C. C. A 3) ; Solvay Process Co. v. National Labor , Relations Board, 117 F. (2d)
83 (C C. A. 5) ; cert. den. 61 S. Ct. 1121.
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1301
represent a majority of the employees, in the appropriate unit at the
time of the execution of the closed-shop agreement and because the
contract was made with a labor organization which had been as-
sisted by unfair labor practices.. In order to insure to the employees
the full and free exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act without interference, restraint, or coercion by the respondent, we
shall order that the respondent withdraw,and withhold recognition
from Local No. 374 as the representative of any of its employees for the
purposes of collective bargaining until such time as Local No. 374
may be certified as their representative by the Board 42 We shall fur-
ther order the respondent to cease and desist from giving effect to its
contract, dated June 20, 1941, with Local No. 374, as well as to any
'extension, renewal,modification, or supplement thereof, and any super-
seding contract which may now be'in force. Nothing herein, however,-
shall be deemed to require the respondent to vary those wage, hour,
seniority, and other such substantive features of its relations with the
employees themselves, if any, which the respondent established in per-
formance of the contract, dated June 20, 1941, as ,extended, renewed,
modified, supplemented, or superseded. ,
We have also found that the respondent discharged Joe Camarillo
on May 6, 1941, and Francisco Velasquez on May 14, 1941, because
of their union activities. The respondent offered to,,reinstate Velas-
quez on June 5, 1941, and Velasquez returned to work thereafter.
Since the respondent has recalled Velasquez and he was at work at the
time of the hearing, we shall not order his reinstatement. We shall
order that the respondent offer to Joe Camarillo immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position with-
out prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges and
make Camarillo'and Velasquez whole for any loss of pay they may
have suffered, by reason of the discrimination against them by pay-
ment to each of them of a sum of money equal to that which each nor-
mally would have earned as wages from the date of his discharge to the
date of offer of reinstatement , less 'his net earnings 43
- 'We have also found that the respondent discharged Frank Sanceri,
John Nagy, Manuel Garcia, and Jose Guzman and locked out the per-
sons listed in Appendix A, excepting Nagy, Garcia, and Guzman, on
42 See, for example , Matter of Fiss Corporation and Pocketbook Ii'or7xrs Union of New
York, Local No. 1, et at , 43 N L R B 125, and cases cited in footnote 44 therein.
4'Bv,"net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses, such as for transportation, room,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the respondent, which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful
discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere See Matter
of Crossett Lumber Company and United Brotherhood of "Ca7penters and Joiners of
America; Lumber and Saaoinill Workers Union, Local 2590, 8 N., L. R B 440 Monies
received for work performed upon Federal, State , county, municipal, or other work-relief
projects shall be considered as earnings. See Republic Steel Corporation v. N. L R. B.,
311U.S 7.
I
1302 DECISIONS OF` NATIONAL LABOR, RELATIONS' BOARD
May 13, 1941, because of their union activities. The respondent offered
to reinstate them 21/, hours later. Accordingly we shall order that
the respondent snake whole Frank Sanceri and the persons listed in'
Appendix A for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of
the discrimination against .them by payment to each of them -of a sum
of money equal to that which each normally would have earned as
wages from the time of his discharge or lockout, as the case may be, to
the time of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings.
We hitive also found that the respondent's unfair labor' practices
caused and prolonged the. strike which began on May 13, 1941. It
appears, however, that since May 13, 1941, a number of the strikers
have returned to the respondent's employ. In order to restore the
status quo as it existed prior to the time the respondent engaged in
the unfair labor practices, we shall order the respondent (1) to" offer
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges,
to those employees Who went on strike on May 13, 1941, or thereafter,
and who have 'applied for and have not been offered full reinstate-
ment,44 and (2) upon application to offer reinstatement to their former
or, substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their sen-
iority or other rights and privileges, to those employees who went on
strike on said date, or thereafter, and who have not previously applied
for reinstatement; -dismissing if necessary, except as, noted below 4E,
any persons hired by the respondent on or after May 13, 1941, the date
of. the commencement of the strike, and not in the employ of the
44 Our order contemplates that all employees shall receive full restoration of all rights
and privileges, including the ri^ht to self-oigamzation, to which they would have been
entitled absent, the respondent's unfair labor practices. , Since the respondent illegally
required,, after the termination of the strike, as a condition to further employment mem-
bership in Local 374, even those employees who recovered their jobs did not secure full
reinstatement - Our-order of reinstatement therefore applies to Frank Sanceri, who was
recalled to work after the termination of 'the strike but who was subsequently laid off
because of an absence of work, and to John Nagy, who was offered reinstatement by the
respondent but declined it because the respondent refused to increase his pay, since in
both cases the respondent conditioned their reinstatement upon membership in Local No.
374. Cf. National, Labor Relations Board v. National Motor Beaitng Co, 105 F. (2d),652
(C C A 9), enf'g as mod , 5 N L R' B. 409; National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle
Lumber Co, 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C A 9), cert. den 304 U. S 575, 99'F. (2d) 533, cert.
den 306 U S 646, enf'g 2 N. L. R. B 248. Our order, of course, should not be construed
to require the respondent to comply with Nagy's request for a wage increase
95 After the termination of the strike, the respondent recalled to work, among others,
Agapito Marquez, Ramon Castro, Manuel Godoy, and Jose Guzman and, on July 25, 1941,
d'scharged them as aliens, in accordance with the requirements of the United' States Navy
Department for which the respondent performed work under defense contracts. In view
of the respondent's unfau labor piactices, there is grave danger that the respondent will
not employ them even if they meet all qualifications with respect to citizenship necessary
for employment kith the respondent We therefore include them in our order of rein-
statement and require the respondent to place them on the preferential list- hereinafter
mentioned provided that they furnish proof of having complied with the necessary govern-
mental requirements applicable to aliens seeking 'employment in plants such as that of
the respondent, but we shall not require the respondent to dismiss any employee to make
employment available for such, persons to be reinstated Cf National Labor Relations
Board V. C Nelson Mfq. Co , 120 F (2d) 444 (C. C A S), cut g 15 N L It B. 1051.
4
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA 1303
respondent on said date. If there is then not sufficient work,available
for all the employees, all available positions shall be distributed among
them without discrimination against any employee because of his union
affiliation or activities, following the system of seniority or other
non-discriminatory practice heretofore applied in the conduct of the
respondent's business. Those employees, if any, remaining after such
distribution,.for whom no employment is immediately available, shall
be placed upon a preferential list and thereafter offered employment
in their former or substantially equivalent positions as such employ-
ment becomes available and before other persons are hired for such
work, in the order determined among them by said system of seniority
or other non-discriminatory practice. We shall also order the re-
spondent to make whole those employees who went on strike on May
13, 1941, or thereafter, and who have applied , for and have not' been
offered reinstatement, for any loss of pay they may have suffered by
reason of the respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them, as pro-
vided above, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to
that which he Would normally have earned as wages during the period
from five (5) days after the date on which he applied for reinstate-
ment to the date of the respondent's offer of reinstatement or place-
ment on a preferential list, less his net earnings, if any, during said
period. We shall also order the respondent to make whole those em,
ployees who went on strike on May 13, 1941, or thereafter, and who
have not previously applied for reinstatement, for any loss of pay
they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's refusal, if any,
to reinstate them as provided above, by payment to each of them of
a sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned
as wages during'the period from five (5) days after the date on which
he applies for reinstatement to 'the date of the respondent's offer,of
reinstatement 'or placement upon a preferential list,- less his net
earnings, if any, during such period.
Upon the-basis of, the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Union,, United Automobile Workers of America,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Inter-
national Molders and Foundry Workers, Local No 374, affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor, are labor organizations, within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All the production and maintenance employees of the respondent,
exclusive of office and clerictd employees and those employees engaged
in a supervisory capacity with the right to hire aiid discharge, consti-
0
1304 DECISIONS Or NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, within
the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. International Union,' United Automobile Workers of America,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, was on ,May
13, 1941, and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining, within thelmeaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
-4. By refusing to bargain collectively with International Union,
United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations, as the exclusive representative of its em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, the respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8
(5) of the Act. . .
5. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment
of Joe Camarillo, Francisco Velasquez, Frank Sanceri, and the persons
listed in Appendix A and thereby discouraging membership in Inter-
national Union, United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the mean-
ing of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
6. By, interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
.the exercise,of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the re-
spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. .
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of- Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
8. By discharging Jackie Stewart on May 12, 1941, and thereafter
refusing to reinstate him, the respondent has not, engaged in unfair
labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
9. By refusing to reinstate John Nagy,- Frank Sanceri, Manuel
Garcia, Jose Guzman, and the employees listed in Appendix B after
the termination of the strike, the respondent has not engaged in unfair
labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act;
the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent,
Dominic Meaglia and Samuel Meagha, doing business as American
Foundry, a partnership, and its officers, agents, successors, and, assigns,
shall :
0
DOMINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL MEAGLIA , 1305
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union,
United Automobile Workers'of America, affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations, as the exclusive representative of the
respondent's production and maintenance employees, exclusive of office
and clerical employees and those employees engaged in a supervisory
capacity with the right to hire and discharge;
(b) Recognizing International Molders & Foundry Workers, Local
Union No. 374, affiliated with the American Federation' of Labor, as
the representative of any of its employees for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining, unless and until that labor organization shall have'
been certified by the Board as the representative of 'the employees;
.(c) Giving effect to its contract, dated June 20, 1941, with Interna-
tional Molders & Foundry Workers, Local Union No. 374, affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor, or to any extension, renewal,
modification or supplement thereof, or to any superseding contract
with that labor organization which may now be in force, unless and
until that organization shall have been certified by the Board as the
representative of the employees;
(d) Discouraging membership in International Union, United Au-
tomobile Workers of 'America, affiliated with the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations, or any other labor organization of its employees,
by discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or
any term or,condition of their employment;
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or, coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities, for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Union,
United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations, as the exclusive representative of all the
respondent's production and maintenance employees, exclusive of office
and clerical employees and those engaged in a supervisory capacity with
the right to hire and discharge, with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other conditions of employment;
(b) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from International
Molders & Foundry Workers, Local Union No. 374, affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor, as the representative of any of
its employees for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to
rates of pay,,wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of em-
1306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployment, unless and until that organization shall have been certified
by the Board as the representative of the employees; ,
(c) Offer to Joe Camarillo immediate and full reinstatement to
his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to
his seniority and other rights and privileges;
(d) Make- whole Joe Camarillo for any loss of pay he may have
suffered by reason of the respondent's discrimination against him, by
payment to him of a sum equal to that which he normally would have
earned as wages during the period from May 6, 1941, the date of his
discharge, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earn-
ings during such period;
(e) Make whole Francisco Velasquez for any,loss of pay he may
have suffered by reason of the respondent's discrimination against
him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which lie
normally would have earned from May 14, 1941, the date of his
discharge, to June 5, 1941, the date of the offer of reinstatement, less
his net earnings during such period ;
(f) Make whole the persons listed in Appendix A and Frank San-.
Geri for the, loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the re-'
spondent's discrimination against them by discharging or locking them
out, as the case may be, on May 13, -1941, by payment to each of them
of a sum of- money as provided above in the section entitled "The
remedy" ;
(g) Offer to those employees who went on strike on May 13, 1941, or
thereafter, and who have applied for and have not been offered rein-
statement, except Agapito Marquez, Manuel Godoy, Ramon Castro,
and Jose Guzman, immediate and full reinstatement to their former
or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights or privileges, in the manner set forth in the
section entitled "The remedy" above, and place those employees for
whom employment is not immediately available, upon a preferential
list in the manner set forth in said section, and, thereafter, in said
manner, offer them employment as it becomes available ;
(h) Upon application offer to those employees who went on strike
on Mtiy_ 13, 1941, or thereafter, and who have not previously applied
for reinstatement, immediate and full reinstatement to their former
or substantially equivalent positions, 'without prejudice to their
seniority and other rights and privileges, in the manner provided in
the section -entitled "The remedy" above, and place those employees
for whom employment is not immediately available upon a preferential
list in the manner set forth in said section, and thereafter, in said
manner, offer them employment as it becomes available;
, (i) Upon production of proof of their having complied with the
necessary governmental requirements applicable to aliens seeking
employment in plants such as that of the respondent, place Agapito
D6- IINIC MEAGLIA AND SAMUEL _MEAGLIA 1307
Marquez, Manuel Godoy; Ramon Castro, and Jose Guzman upon a
preferential list in the manner set forth' in the section entitled "The
remedy,'' and thereafter, in said manner, offer them employment as it
becomes available ;
(j) Make whole the employees specified in paragraph'2'(g) above,
for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respond-
ent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them, upon' payment to each of them
of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned
as wages during the period from five (5) days after the date on which
he applied for reinstatement to the date of the respondent's offer of
reinstatement or placement upon a preferential list, less his net
earnings, if any, during said period;
(k)' Mane whole the employees specified in paragraph 2 (h) above,
for any loss of pay they may have suffered-by reason of the respond-
ent's refusal, if 'any,,to reinstate them, by payment to each.of them of a
sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned as
wages during the period from five (5) days after the date on which he
applies for reinstatement to the date of the respondent's offer of rein-
statement or placement upon a preferential list, less his net earnings,
if any, during said period;
(1) Post immediately in conspicuous places in its plant at Monte-
bello, California, and maintain for a period of at least- sixty (60)
consecutive days from the date of posting, notices, to its employees
stating: (1) that the respondent will not engage in the conduct from
which it'is ordered to cease and desist in paragraph 1 (a) to (e),
inclusive, of this Order; (2)-that the respondent will take the affirma-
tive action set forth in paragraph 2 (a) to (k), inclusive, of this Order;
and (3) that the respondent's employees are free to become or remain
members of International Union, United Automobile Workers of
America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and
that the respondent will not discriminate against any employee
because of membership in or activity on behalf of that organization;
(m)' Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region in
writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps
the respondent has taken to comply herewith. '
ANN D IT IS FURTHER, ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar
as it alleges that the' respondent discriminated ,iii regard to hire' and
tenure 'of employment within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act
by discharging and refusing to reinstate Jackie Stewart.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint , be dismissed insofar
as it alleges that the respondent discriminated in regard to hire and
tenure of employment within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act
by refusing to reinstate Frank Sanceri, John Nagy, Manuel Garcia.
Jose Guzman, Roy Juarez, and the persons listed in Appendix B
after the termination of the strike.
1308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MR. GERARD D. REILLY took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
APPENDIX A
Pete Acosta
Joe Acuna
Mike Anguiano
Horace Arias
John Avila
Donald-Baker
Lester L. Biehl
Sam Bucarelli
Maxcimilino Bustos
Louis R. Campos
Salvador Casillas
Isidore Castro
Manuel Castro
Ramon Castro
Felipe S: Chacon
Manuel Chacon
Isidro De Arcos
Ramon Escaniilla
Tony Fonseca
Albert V. Froncoso
Lewis Froncoso
Louis P. Garcia
Manuel C. Garcia
Richard Jesse Garcia'
Manuel Godoy
Alfred Gonzales
Gilbert A. Gonzales
Jess Graham
Jose Guzman
Manuel Guzman
Raymond Juarez
F. Laurenz
Don Lewin
Teleforo Lopez
Jose Macias
Francisco Madrid
Andres Mandeez
Agapito Marquez
Alejandro Matron,
Alfred Medrano
Jesse Medrano
Ralph Medrano,
Carlos Moncada
John Nagy
Amado Pargas
Gus C. Perez
Ray Perez
Carmelo Priolo
Frank M.'Ramirez
Francisco Rivera
George Rivers'
Frank Robles
Richard A. Robles
Anasticio A. Rodriguez
Tony Ross
Irvin R. Sambrano
Salvador Santillon
Henry Silva
Joe R. Silva
Alfred V. Uribe
Santiago A. Uribe
Carlos Valehzuela
Lupe Valenzuela
Pete Vercelli
Fred Ybarra
Camilo Zippi
APPENDIX B
Ramon Castro
Tony Fonseca
Louis Garcia
Manuel Godoy
Raymond Juarez
Frank Laurenz
A gapito Marquez
Raymond C. Perez
Frank Ramires
Frank Robles