American Can Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMay 30, 1975218 N.L.R.B. 102 (N.L.R.B. 1975) Copy Citation 102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD American Can Company and Local One, Amalgamat- ed Lithographers of America , International Typo- graphical Union, AFL-CIO and United Steelwork- ers of America, AFL-CIO, Party to the Contract. American Can Company and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Cases 22-CA- 5619,22-CA-5803, and 22-RC-5853 May 30, 1975 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On October 23, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Milton Janus issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party, Local One, Amalgamated Lithogra- phers of America, International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO, herein the ALA, filed exceptions and supporting briefs; Respondent filed cross-excep- tions and a brief in support of its cross-exceptions and in answer to the exceptions filed by the General Counsel and the ALA; United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, herein the Steelworkers, filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision; and the ALA filed a brief in opposition to Respondent's cross-exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and to the extent indicated hereinafter finds merit in certain of the exceptions of the General Counsel and the ALA. Accordingly, it adopts the Administrative Law Judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendations only to the extent that they are consistent with this Decision. 1. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding, and for the reasons stated by him, that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with the ALA as exclusive bargaining representative of lithographic production employees at the Regency plant and by refusing to bargain with the ALA concerning the effects on Hudson employ- ees of that plant's closing. 2. We disagree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act by entering into a collective-bargaining contract with the Steelworkers which provided that lithographic production employ- ees at the Regency plant be included in the 218 NLRB No. 17 production and maintenance unit represented by that labor organization. For about 30 years prior to 1974, Respondent operated a large metal container manufacturing plant in Jersey City, New Jersey, known as the Hudson plant. Production and maintenance employ- ees at this plant were represented by the Steelwork- ers, and the lithographic production workers by the ALA. In 1972, Respondent announced to the employees that it intended to shut down the Hudson plant in about a year and to open a new, smaller plant about 26 miles away, the Regency plant. It invited employees who wished to be employed at the new plant to file applications. When ALA officials learned from employees of the contemplated shut- down of the Hudson plant and the opening of the new Regency plant, they contacted Respondent and asked if Respondent was considering applying the ALA collective-bargaining contract covering litho- graphic production workers at the Hudson plant to similar workers expected to be employed at the Regency plant. Respondent replied in the negative, stating that Regency was a new plant, that Respon- dent hoped that it would be unorganized, and that if it were organized Respondent preferred that there be a single production and maintenance unit, including lithographic production employees. A few days later the ALA wrote Respondent that a majority of the lithographic production employees at the Hudson plant desired to work at the Regency plant and to continue to be separately represented by the ALA. Each of the parties subsequently reiterated its position about representation rights for lithographic production employees at the Regency plant without convincing the other. On July 7, 1973, canmaking operations began at the Regency plant. On August 23, 1973, the Steel- workers filed a representation petition seeking to represent all production and maintenance employees at the Regency plant, including lithographic production employees. At that time, of the expected full comple- ment of 250 employees, there were only 64 employees at work in 16 of the expected 26 eventual job classifications; there were no lithographic production employees. Neither the Steelworkers nor Respondent informed the Regional Director of the ALA's possible interest in representing lithographic pro- duction employees in a separate unit. Accordingly, on September 10, 1973, the Regional Director approved a stipulation by Respondent and the Steelworkers for the holding of a consent election in a unit of production and maintenance employees at the Regency plant. The phrase "including lithogra- phers" was omitted from the unit description in the stipulated unit at the suggestion of a Board repre- sentative on the assurance of Respondent that no AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 103 lithographic employees were then employed at the new plant. The election was scheduled for September 21. A few days earlier the ALA learned from employees of the prospective election. On September 20, the ALA hand-delivered a letter to the Regional Director objecting to the inclusion of lithographers in the scheduled plantwide unit election. A Board agent telephoned a company representative and asked if he knew of any interest which the ALA had in the election. The representative answered in the negative. The election proceeded as scheduled with only the Steelworkers on the ballot. The Steelworkers won the election by a vote of 84 to 0; no lithographer voted as none was yet employed. On October 1, the Regional Director certified the Steelworkers as bargaining representative of a unit of production and mainte- nance employees at the Regency plant. By the terms of a national collective-bargaining agreement be- tween Respondent and the Steelworkers employees in the newly certified unit were automatically included within its coverage; lithographic production employees were also included. On October 5, Respondent offered five of the Hudson plant lithographers similar jobs at the Regency plant, but on the condition that they join the Steelworkers pursuant to the union-security clause in the Steelworkers contract with Respondent, and with certain less advantageous wages and other conditions of employment. The employees rejected the offer on those terms. The Regency plant hired its first lithographic production employees in December 1973, and lithographic production began there in February 1974. As of the time of the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, there were 24 lithogra- phers employed at the Hudson plant and 7 at the Regency plant; the Hudson plant was expected to be completely shut down in July 1974. The General Counsel contends that, under the principle enunciated in Midwest Piping & Supply Co., Inc., 63 NLRB 1060 (1945), Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act by including lithographic production employees at the Regency plant in the production and maintenance unit represented by the Steelworkers, notwithstanding the pendency of a real question concerning the represen- tation of the lithographic production employees and its awareness that the ALA was claiming to represent such employees. The Administrative Law Judge held that Respon- dent did not by its contract violate Section 8(a)(2) because the ALA did not have even a colorable claim i Playskool, Inc., a Division of Milton Bradley Company, 195 NLRB 560 (1972), enforcement denied 477 F.2d 66 (C.A. 7, 1973); cf American Bread Company, 170 NLRB 85 (1968), cert denied 411 F.2d 147 (C.A. 6, 1969). 2 The Boy's Markets, Inc., 156 NLRB 105, 107 (1965) to represent the Regency lithographic employees inasmuch as Respondent had no obligation to transfer the ALA's bargaining status from the Hudson plant to the Regency plant or to recognize it as bargaining representative of lithographic pro- duction employees at the Regency plant. The Administrative Law Judge has confused the existence of a question concerning representation with its resolution and thereby misapplied the doctrine of Midwest Piping. "[T]he sole requirement necessary to raise a question concerning representa- tion within the meaning of the Midwest Piping doctrine, as modified by the Board, is that the claim of the rival union must not be clearly unsupportable and lacking in substance."' There is no requirement under this doctrine that the rival claim must in fact be valid and that the employer is required to bargain with the rival union. It is enough that the rival claim to representation is not "clearly unsupportable or specious, or otherwise not a colorable claim." 2 An employer faced with conflicting claims of rival unions which give rise to a real question concerning representation may not recognize or enter into a contract with one of these unions until the represen- tation question has been settled under the special procedures of the Act.3 If the employer acts in derogation of this principle it violates Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.4 Here Respondent was faced with a real question concerning which Union, the Steelworkers or the ALA, was entitled to represent lithographic pro- duction employees at the new Regency plant. For many years the ALA had represented the lithograph- ic production employees at the Hudson plant which was expected to be phased out and replaced in part by the Regency plant. Respondent had invited employee applications,- including applications' from lithographic production employees, for transfer to the new plant. It was also planning to transfer and did transfer some of the lithographic equipment from the Hudson plant to the Regency plant. There is no evidence that the work and skills of lithographic production employees at the two plants were expect- ed to be significantly different. And from the time that the ALA learned of the contemplated change in operations it made known to Respondent its claim to represent lithographic production employees at the Regency plant. Although we have found that Respondent was not required as a matter of law to bargain with the ALA for the Regency plant lithographic production employees, this does not mean that the Respondent's claim did not raise a real 3 N.L.RB v Hudson Berlind Corporation, 494 F.2d 1200 (C.A. 2, 1974), enfg 203 NLRB 421 (1973); The Boy's Markets, Inc., supra. 4 Ibid. 1U4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD question of representation. On the contrary, we find that on the basis of the ALA's long history of bargaining for lithographic production employees in a separate unit at the Hudson plant the transfer of part of the operations at the Hudson plant to the Regency plant, including some of the lithographic production work, the transfer of some of the lithographic equipment from the Hudson plant to the Regency plant, and the expected offer of employ- ment at the Regency plant to some of the lithogra- phers employed at the Hudson plant, together with the ALA's repeated claim to represent lithographic production employees at the Regency plant, created a real, substantial question concerning the represen- tation of these employees.5 Instead of submitting to the Board the question of which Union was entitled to represent the Regency plant lithographic pro- duction employees, Respondent sought to resolve the question itself with the cooperation of the Steelwork- ers by utilizing the Board's processes while withhold- ing vital information from the Regional Office personnel. Undoubtedly, if Respondent had reported the ALA's interest and claim, as it was dutybound to do,6 no election would have been held and , no certification would have issued until the unit place- ment of lithographic production employees at the Regency plant had been resolved. Apparently it was to avoid this very possibility that information as to the ALA's claim of representation was withheld. Accordingly, we fmd that, by entering into a collective-bargaining contract with the Steelworkers which included lithographic production employees together with other production and maintenance employees at the Regency plant, while a real question concerning representation of the lithograph- ic production employees existed, Respondent unlaw- fully assisted the Steelworkers in violation of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.7 3. The complaint further alleged that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act, by conditioning the transfer of certain lithographic production employees from the Hudson plant to the Regency plant upon their joining the Steelworkers pursuant to the union-security clause in the collec- tive-bargaining contract between Respondent and the Steelworkers. The Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissing this allegation in view of his fording that Respondent had not given illegal support to the Steelworkers in violation of Section 8(a)(2). As we have found that Respondent did render unlawful support to the Steelworkers with respect to lithographic production employees, the attempt to, enforce the union-security clause of the NLRB. v. Hudson Berlind Corporation, supra. 8 U. S. Chaircraf, Inc., 132 NLRB 922 (1961). contract as to these employees violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Acts We so find. 4. The General Counsel has requested that the certification issued to the Steelworkers in Case 22- RC-5853 be amended to exclude lithographic pro- duction employees at the Regency plant. We fmd merit in this request on two grounds. First, because Respondent violated its duty to inform the Regional Director of the ALA's claim to represent lithographic production employees; and, second, because the amendment is consistent with our remedial Order requiring Respondent to withhold recognition from the Steelworkers unless and until it is certified by the Board. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent violated the Act by recognizing and bargaining with the Steelworkers as the representative of lithographic production em- ployees at the Regency plant, and by applying to such employees the union-security clause in the Steelworkers contract covering production and main- tenance employees, we shall order Respondent to withdraw and withhold recognition from the Steel- workers as the representative of the lithographic production employees at the Regency plant unless and until the Board shall certify it as such representa- tive. We shall also order Respondent to cease giving effect to the collective-bargaining contract covering production and maintenance employees between the Steelworkers and Respondent insofar as it is applica- ble to lithographic production employees at the Regency plant, or to any modification, extension, renewal, or supplement thereof. However, this order shall not be construed to require Respondent to vary any of the substantive terms, conditions, and benefits for employees currently in effect. Having found that Respondent unlawfully assisted the Steelworkers by entering into a collective-bar- gaining contract which included lithographic pro- duction workers at the Regency plant, and that the union-security clause in that contract insofar as it applies to such employees was unlawful, we shall order Respondent to reimburse all past and present lithographic production employees at the Regency plant for all initiation fees, dues, or other moneys paid or checked off pursuant to the unlawful union- security agreement or any extensions, renewals, 7 N.L.RB. v. Hudson Berlind Corporation, supra, Playskool, Inc, supra. 8 Ibid AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 105 modifications , or supplements thereof, or any su- perseding agreement. Additionally, the amounts of reimbursement shall carry interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum.9 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local One, Amalgamated Lithographers of America, International Typographical Union, AFL- CIO, and United Steelworkers of America, AFL- CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By entering into a collective-bargaining con- tract with the Steelworkers which included litho- graphic production employees together with other production and maintenance employees at the Regency plant, while a real question concerning representation of the lithographic production work- ers existed, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. 4. By attempting to enforce as to lithographic production employees the union-security clause in the collective-bargaining contract between Respon- dent and the Steelworkers, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act. 5. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and -thereby has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent, American Can Company, Greenwich, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Giving unlawful assistance or support to United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (b) Recognizing the above-named ]Labor organiza- tion as representative of lithographic production employees at the Regency plant, unless and until it has been certified as such representative by the Board. (c) Giving any force or effect to its collective- bargaining contract with the above-named labor organization insofar as it applies to lithographic production employees at the Regency plant, unless and until the said labor organization has been certified as bargaining representative of such em- ployees by the Board, provided, however, that nothing herein shall require Respondent to vary or abandon any of the substantive terms, conditions, and benefits for employees currently in effect. (d) Encouraging membership in the above-named labor organization by attempting to enforce, as to the lithographic production employees at the Regency plant, the union-security clause in the collective- bargaining contract with the above-named labor organization. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as bargaining representative of lithographic production employees at the Regency plant, unless and until the Board shall certify it as such representative. (b) ' Reimburse all present and former lithographic production employees at the Regency plant for all initiation fees, dues, and other moneys paid by or withheld from them pursuant to the unlawful union- secprity clause, in the manner provided in the Remedy section of this Decision. (c) Post at its Regency plant, Edison Township, New Jersey, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 22, after being duly signed by Respondent's representa- tive, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the certifica- tion issued to United Steelworkers of America, AFL- CIO, in Case 22-RC-5853, be, and it hereby is, amended to exclude lithographic production employ- ees. 9 Hudson Berlind Corporation, supra '° In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a Umted States Court of Appeals, the words m the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 106 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT recognize United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the representative of lithographic production workers at our Regency plant, unless and until it has been certified as such representative by the National Labor Relations Board. WE WILL NOT give any force or effect to the collective-bargaining contract with United Steel- workers of, America, AFL-CIO, insofar as it applies to lithographic production employees at our Regency plant, unless and until that Union has been certified as such representative by the National Labor Relations Board. WE WILL NOT encourage membership in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, by attempt- ing to enforce as to lithographic production employees at our Regency plant the union-securi- ty clause in our collective-bargaining contract with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recogni- tion from United Steelworkers of America, AFL- CIO, as bargaining representative of lithographic production employees at our Regency plant, unless and until the National Labor Relations Board shall certify the Steelworkers as such representative. WE WILL reimburse all present and former lithographic production employees at our Regen- cy plant for all initiation fees, dues, and other moneys paid by or withheld from them pursuant to the unlawful union-security clause applicable to them, with interest at 6 percent per annum. AMERICAN CAN COMPANY DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MILTON JANUS, Administrative Law Judge: The General Counsel issued his complaint iii this proceeding on March 25, 1974, after charges filed on September 28, 1973, in Case 22-CA-5619, and on March 5, 1974, in Case 22-CA-5803, by Local One, Amalgamated Lithographers of America, International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO (ALA). On March 26,' 1974, the Regional Director for Region 22 issued a Notice to Show Cause requesting American Can Company (Company or Respondent) and United Steel- workers of America, AFL-CIO (Steelworkers), the parties in Case 22-RC-5853, to show cause why the certification issued in that case should not be amended specifically to exclude all lithographic production employees and why that matter should not be consolidated with Cases 22-CA- 5619 and 22-CA-5803 for hearing. Thereafter, both the Company and the Steelworkers filed responses opposing amendment of the certification. The Regional Director nevertheless concluded that there were substantial and material issues concerning the amendment of the certifica- tion and issued an order, on April 21, 1974, consolidating Case 22-RC-5853 with the unfair labor practice proceed- ing on which complaint had already been issued. The complaint alleges violations of Section 8(axl), (2),(3), and (5) of the Act. I held a hearing on these consolidated matters on May 29-31, 1974, at Newark, New Jersey, at which all parties were, represented. Briefs have since been received from the General Counsel, Respondent, ALA, and Steelworkers, which I have fully considered. Upon the entire record in the case, including my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office at Greenwich, Connecticut, which is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of metal cans and related products at its various plants in the United States and Canada. Among these are one at Jersey City, New Jersey (known as the Hudson plant), where production was being phased out in 1973 and 1974, and one at Edison Township, New Jersey (known as the Regency plant), which began operations in 1973. In the course of its operations during a recent representa- tive period, Respondent caused to be purchased and delivered to its Regency plant goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 from points outside New Jersey. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The charging party, ALA, and the party to the contract, Steelworkers, are both labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES THE FACTS Briefly, this case revolves around the fact that ALA, which had represented a separate unit of- lithographic production employees at the Hudson plant for 30 years (where Steelworkers had represented a production and maintenance unit) now finds itself frozen out from any representation at the new Regency plant, where Steelwork- ers has been certified for an overall production and AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 107 maintenance unit, including lithographic employees. How this came about is detailed below. Because there is virtually no dispute as to the facts, the parties reserve the weight of their arguments to the formulation of the legal issues and their resolution. The Company's Hudson plant at Jersey City, which has been operating for at least 30 years, comprised eight buildings with over a million square feet of space. Its peak employment in the last few years was about 1,800 employees , represented by five labor organizations : Steel- workers for a production and maintenance unit comprising the vast bulk of the employees; ALA for a lithographic unit of about 44 employees at the beginning of 1973, and 24 at the end of that year; and Teamsters, Operating Engineers, and Office Workers for other small units, none of which is involved in this case. The Company also operates two other plants in New Jersey, at Hillside and Hoboken, both of them fairly close to Jersey City. ALA also represented units at these plants, and the three units were covered by a single contract. On August 8, 1972, the Hudson plant manager, Marifjer- en, informed all employees that the Company intended to shut down nine, of its canmaking plants, including Hudson, within the next year and a half. On December 20, 1972, he informed the Hudson employees that the Company would be opening a new can manufacturing plant in Edison Township (which is about 26 miles from the Hudson plant), that the new plant would employ about 250 people at full production, and that Hudson would be shut down by the end of.August 1973. Marifjeren invited Hudson employees who wished'to be considered for employment at the new plant to apply through the employee relations department at Hudson. Eventually, over 300 Hudson employees applied for employment at the new plant, 216 were offered employment there, but only 95 accepted such offers. Shortly after the December 20 notice was posted, Campione, ALA steward at Hudson, got in touch with Hansen, executive vice president of ALA, to tell him that Hudson was to be shut down. Hansen then called Leser, an industrial relations official of the Company, on January 16, 1973, to find out what was happening and to express his concern about the lithographic employees losing their jobs. Hansen asked Leser whether the Company was consider- ing applying the ALA contract to the Edison plant, but Leser told him that it would be a new plant, that the Company hoped that it be unorganized, but if it were organized, it preferred a "wall to wall" unit, that is, a single production and maintenance unit including lithographic production employees. A few days later, Hansen wrote Marifjeren regarding the December 20 notice about opening a new plant at Edison (with a copy to Leser), in which he said: As an overwhelming majority of the employees whom we represent have signified to us their desire to work at the Edison plant and to continue to be represented by us, we will expect you to continue to recognize Local One as the collective bargaining agent of your lithographic employees. We are taken aback that you did not see fit to advise us of this development and give us the opportunity to discuss it with you. About January 20, ALA Steward, Campione, sent Marifjeren a petition signed by the lithographic employees, advising him that they all desired to work at the Edison plant and continue to be represented by ALA. Marifjeren turned the petition over to the Hudson plant's supervisor for employee relations, Ries. On January 30, Cooper, an employee relations counsel at company headquarters wrote Hansen, in response to Hansen's letter of the January 19, saying that he (Cooper) had concluded that the Company was not obliged to recognize ALA as the representative of any lithographic employees it might employ at its new plant, and that the present contract covering the Hudson lithographic employees did not have to be applied there. Hansen did not reply to Cooper's letter until March 7, 1973, and his response makes the following points : (1) the failure of the Company to bargain with ALA regarding the projected shutdown of Hudson and the move to Edison violated the Company's bargaining obligation, since its members would be drastically affected by the move; (2) nothing more was involved than the transfer of existing lithographic operations and skills already employed at Hudson to another plant; and (3) ALA expected the Company to take to the new plant as many of the Hudson lithographic employees as wished to go, and that it would continue to represent such a unit there. Finally, Hansen said he expected to negotiate a new contract to replace the one expiring May 1, 1973 (covering Hudson, Hillside, and Hoboken). Cooper immediately responded on March - 9 to this effect: (1) The Company has no,duty to bargain with ALA as to closing the Hudson plant or opening the new plant; (2) it had satisfied, for the period of their present agreement, any, duty it might have to bargain over the effects of closing Hudson on the lithographic employees, but would bargain for a new agreement covering Hudson; (3) ALA had not, established any right to represent employees of the new Regency plant at Edison, which was not yet opened; and (4) the Company, would consider for employment at Regency all applicants on a nondiscrimina- tory basis, but would not automatically hire for the new plant every lithographic employee at Hudson who wished to transfer. In mid-April Hansen met with Leser, and they negotiat- ed a new 3-year agreement for lithographic employees at Hudson, Hillside, and Hoboken. The agreement, in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 7, makes no provision for the transfer of Hudson lithographic employ- ees to Hillside, Hoboken, or Regency even though everyone knew that Hudson would be closed down in late 1973 or 1974, and that Regency would be operating then. Hansen admitted that there was no discussion at the bargaining sessions about the Regency plant, and ex- plained that he did not raise a question about it because of the advice of ALA counsel that since no lithographic employees were then employed at Regency the question of their representation was premature. In any event , the ALA position that its Hudson contract should be applied at 108 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Regency had, in Hansen's opinion, been made clear to the Company by their previous correspondence. A month later, at Hansen's request, he met with Leser and Buly, the Company's employee relations director. Among other matters, Hansen raised the Hudson closing and the Regency opening, and asked if the Company had changed its position on employing lithographic employees from Hudson at Regency, and on his union representing them. Buly replied that it was still their position that Regency was a new plant, that they would like it to stay unorganized, but if it were to be organized they preferred a single plantwide unit. Between this meeting in mid-May, and mid-September, there were no contacts or discussions between ALA and company officials regarding any aspect of closing down Hudson and opening Regency. On July 7, 1973, canmaking operations began at Regency. Since this date is a turning point in the recital of events, it seems appropriate to break in here to' describe the differences in operations between Hudson and Regency. Sheeted plate in either its plain, coated, and/or decorated form (a trade term for lithographic punting) is slit into can heights and diameters which are then formed into can cylinders and soldered. A top or bottom is seamed on, and it is then ready for shipment to the customer who fills it and seams on the other end. Until 1972, Hudson produced a wide variety in sizes and shapes of metal containers for coffee, shortening, beer, carbonated beverages, motor oil, and other products. In that year Hudson ceased manufacturing containers for some of these product lines which were shifted to other company plants. Hudson also made aerosol cans, and Regency's production is devoted exclusively to that type of container. Some of the camnaking equipment for, Regency came from company plants, including Hudson, while other equipment was purchased. The lithographic presses and ovens now in use at Regency are all from Hudson, but other presses and equipment used in the lithographic process at Hudson have been shifted to other plants or will be scrapped. Some lithographic work previously done at Hudson has been transferred to Hillside, and additional lithographic employees have been hired there, none of whom came from Hudson. At the time of this hearing, in May 1974, Regency had about 200 employees, while its projected full complement will be about 255, in 26 different job classifications. When Regency was being manned, Hudson's employment was down to about 500, from a peak of 1,800. As has been already noted, only 216 Hudson employees were offered jobs at Regency, on the basis of merit and skill rather than seniority, and only 95 accepted employment there. Some supervisors at Hudson were transferred to Regency, but many others were assigned to other company facilities. However, all the, lithographic supervisors at Regency came from Hudson. Continuing the recital of events after Regency opened in July 1973, the next significant date is August 23, 1973, when Steelworkers filed a representation petition (Case 22- RC-5853) for a unit of "all production and maintenance employees including lithographers" at Regency. Of the 64 employees who then constituted the total complement at Regency, there were no lithographic workers. These 64 occupied 16 job classifications, of the 26 to be eventually filled. On or about September 10, the Regional Director for Region 22 approved a Stipulation for Certification upon Consent Election, signed by the Company and Steelwork- ers, for an election in a unit described as "All hourly rate production and maintenance employees employed by the Employer at its Regency plant .... (with the customary exclusions of office clericals, supervisors, guards, etc.). Lithographic employees were neither specifically included nor excluded. The phrase "including lithographers" con- tained in the petition was onutted from the unit description in the stipulation, at the suggestion of the Board agent on the assurance of the Company that no lithographic employees were then employed at Regency. The Board agent was apparently not informed that ALA was interested in transferring its unit employees at Hudson to Regency. The election was scheduled to be held on Friday, September 21. On September 19, or a few days earlier, ALA steward Campione learned of the pending election from a Hudson employee and had the information confirmed by Ries, a company employee relations official. Campione then called the 'union office and spoke to Olmstead, its director of organizing, urging him to take some action about the election. Olmstead prepared a letter and had it delivered by hand to the Regional Office about 3 p.m. on September 20. It is addressed' to the Acting Regional Director and reads as follows: Just learned of representation election scheduled for September 21st at American Can, Pierson Avenue, Edison New Jersey. We object to any inclusion of lithographic workers in whom we have an interest and who do not properly belong in plant wide unit. /s/ A: Olmstead Director of Organizing- Financial Secretary The letter was immediately turned over to Phyllis Schectman, the Board agent assigned to the representation case. She called Ries at the Hudson plant, and asked him if he knew of any interest that ALA had in the election. Schectman did not testify at the hearing, but Ries says he told her that he knew of no interest of the ALA, but that she could call Company headquarters at Greenwich, where the matter was being handled. Ries admitted that he had seen and had sent on to Greenwich,' the letter of January 19, 1973, from Hansen of ALA to Plant Manager Marifjeren which indicated his Union's desire to continue to represent at the new plant in Edison the employees in its unit at Hudson. Ries also admitted that he had seen the petition which the Hudson lithographic employees had sent to Marifjeren about the same time, expressing their interest in working at the new plant and being represented by ALA. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether Schectman tried to call Cooper, who had signed to Stipulation for Certification on behalf of the-Company, at his office in Greenwich. She did, however, call Olmstead at the Union's office, but he was out. She left a message for him to call her, which he got the next morning, the day of the election. Instead, Olmstead called the Union's attorney, but was AMERICAN CAN COMPANY 109 unable to reach him. So far as the record shows, Olmstead did nothing further to alert the Regional Office that ALA had a present or potential interest in representing anyone at Regency. The election proceeded that day without objection by the Board agent. The 'ballots were opened and counted, and Steelworkers won by a vote of 84 to 0. No lithographic workers voted as there were none yet employed at Regency. Sometime in the next week, Mr. Gill, attorney for ALA, called the Regional Office presumably to protest the holding of the election, although. there is no direct testimony on the point. In any event, on Friday, September 28, a week after the election, ALA filed unfair labor practice charges against the Company and Steelworkers. (The charge against the Steelworkers was later withdrawn.) The charge against the Company alleged (1) a refusal to bargain from December 20, 1972, with ALA' as the bargaining representative of the lithographic production employees at both Hudson and Regency; and (2) unlawful assistance to Steelworkers in becoming the collective- bargaining representative of lithographic employees at Regency to the exclusion of ALA, their rightful representa- tive. The following Monday, October 1, 1973, the Regional Director issued a Certification of Representative, certifying that Steelworkers was the exclusive representative of the production and maintenance unit at Regency. Under a national agreement between the Company and Steelwork- ers, the certified unit was added thereunder, and the union- security clause in that agreement became immediately effective. Those already employed had 30 days in which to Join Steelworkers, while new employees had 30 days after the date of their employement to join. There were then about 90 employees in, the unit, or more than 30 percent of the expected full complement of 255, occupying 16 of the 26 expected job classifications, or more than 50 percent of such classifications. The contract bar rule of General Extrusion Company, Inc., 121 NLRB 1165 (1958), had been satisfied. On October 12, Marifjeren and Ries interviewed five lithographic employees at Hudson (Rizzardi, Grupe, Lemke, Amorese, and Posnanski) and offered them employment at Regency. They were told that they would have to join Steelworkers, pursuant to the union-security provision of the contract covering Regency, that the hourly rates under that contract were less than they were presently receiving under the ALA contract at Hudson, that their prior service with the Company would count toward their pension , but not for seniority at Regency, and that their work week would be 40 hours instead of 32.5 hours as at Hudson. They were given time to consider the offer. A few days later, they all advised a company representative that they would not accept the offer unless their employment would be under ALA jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, one of the factors in their collective decision not to accept employ- ment at Regency under the Steelworkers contract was their covet age under the ALA pension plan by which they were credited for years of service prior to their employment with American Can, with other employers under contract with their union. Regency hired its first lithographic employees in Decem- ber 1973, and lithographic production began there in February 1974. As of the time of the hearing, the end of May 1974, there were 24 lithographic employees still at Hudson and 7 at Regency. The latest estimate as to when Hudson would completely shut down was July 1974. For the next 5 months, presumably while its September 28 charge was being investigated by the Regional Office, ALA made no attempt to contact the Company as to its claims for representation at Regency. Then, on March 4, 1974, Gill, counsel for ALA, advised the Company that it was adhering to its position that the contract currently in effect for lithographic employees at Hudson also covered the same type of employee at Regency, and requesting the Company to recognize it as the bargaining, representative for the four lithographic employees then employed there. The next day, ALA filed its charge in Case 22-CA-5803, alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(3), by conditioning the hire of the five employees who had been offered jobs at Regency on their joining Steelworkers, and a violation of Section 8(a)(5) by wrongfully refusing to recognize it, on or about March 4, 1974, as the bargaining representative for the lithographic employees at Regency.. The same day, March 5, ALA withdrew the 8(a)(5) portion of its first charge, to the effect that the Company had refused to bargain with it from December 20, 1972, for the lithograph- ic employees both at Hudson and at Regency. The Regional Director approved the withdrawal of this portion of the first charge on March 6, 1974. Thereafter, as I have previously noted in the "Statement of the Case" the Regional Director issued a consolidated complaint alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2), , (3), and (5), and later, a Notice to Show Cause why the Certification of Representative in Case 22-RC-5853 should not be amended to exclude all lithographic production employees (at Regency) from the appropriate bargaininay g unit. On M 21, 1974, almost 2 months after issuance of the complaint, and about a week before the start of this hearing, counsel for ALA requested the Company to bargain about the effects of the impending phase-out of lithographic operations at Hudson. A few days later, the Company responded that although no phaseout date had yet been announced, it was imminent, and that it was willing to discuss the matter with' ALA at a mutually convenient time. If such bargaining has in fact occurred, either, before or after the hearing, I have not been made aware of it. The Allegations of the Complaint and the Contentions of the Parties From this welter of facts, frustrated hopes, possible errors, oversights and sharp practices, the General Counsel has constructed a complaint alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5). From the allegations of the complaint and his brief, it appears that the General Counsel's theory of the case is as follows: Respondent, although aware that ALA was demanding recognition for the lithographic production employees at Regency, and while there was a pending question concerning representa- tion over that unit, nevertheless entered into an agreement 110 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with Steelworkers which provided that the lithographic employees be included in the production and maintenance unit, and thereafter applied the union-security and check- off provisions to them; Respondent urged and solicited the lithographic employees at ` Hudson to join Steelworkers, and required them to do so as a condition of being transferred to Regency; the certification in Case 22-RC- 5853 should be amended to exclude the lithographic production'' employees at Regency because the Company knew at the time the Stipulation for Certification was entered into that ALA had raised a valid question concerning representation, and was under a duty to inform the Regional Director of all such claims of which it was aware; and Respondent 'refused to bargain with ALA as the exclusive bargaining representative of the lithographic employees at Regency. The two basic propositions relied on to support the General Counsel's theory of the case are, it seems to me, (1) that ALA's representation of the lithographic unit at Hudson and its claim that 'all lithographic employees hired at Regency would continue to be represented by it, raised a timely question concerning representation which Respon- dent ignored at its peril (and from which the alleged violations of Section 8(a)(2) and (3) flow); and (2) that Respondent was obligated to recognize and bargain with ALA at Regency because the transfer of lithographic operations from Hudson to Regency was a "mere reloca- tion" of such operations. (The 8(a)(5) allegations.) ALA, the Charging Union, concentrates in its brief on the argument, identical with that of the General Counsel, that the lithographic operations at Regency were trans- ferred without substantial change from Hudson, so that ALA remained the representative of the 'lithographic employees at Regency. The conclusions it draws from 'that argument are that' the Company should be ordered to abide by the terms of the Hudson bargaining agreement' for all lithographic employees now at Regency, and that the Company should be ordered to reinstate and make whole the lithographic employees at Hudson who were terminat- ed by virtue of its unlawful' conduct. The Company argues that Regency is a new facility, not a relocation of Hudson,'but whether it is or not, the fact that there has been no accompanying transfer of a large proportion of Hudson employees to Regency means ' that no union which represented employees at Hudson was entitled to carry over bargaining rights to the new plant. The Company stresses that ALA never requested it to bargain over the effects on Hudson employees of that plant's phasing out (including the transfer of such employees to Regency) before issuance of the complaint. In any event, the Company argues that even if the move to Regency was a relocation, neither ALA nor the Hudson employees had an absolute-or automatic right to transfer to the new plant. As for the Notice to Show Cause why the Steelworkers certification should not be amended to exclude a lithographic unit, the Company argues that no amendment should be ordered because ALA waived, any rights it may have had at Regency by its failure to assert its claim, and that the Regional Director was on notice that the lithographic process employees were to be included in the production and maintenance unit at Regency. Finally, the Company contends that the 8(a)(5) allegations of the complaint are barred under Section 10(b), since they relate to matters occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of any pending charge. Steelworkers urges that Regency was not a relocation of the Hudson plant, pointing out, as does the Company in its brief, that the new plant is limited to just one of the many product lines manufactured at Hudson, that the machinery at Regency did not all come from Hudson, and that the total number of employees at Regency is a,small fraction of those previously employed at Hudson. Furthermore, even if Regency were considered, a relocation of Hudson, the Company was still under no obligation, to bargain with ALA for a lithographic unit since ALA never represented a majority of the lithographic employees at Regency, nor was its lack of majority due to unfair labor practices committed by the Company. Steelworkers also urges that the allega- tion of the complaint to the effect that the Company has refused to recognize and bargain with ALA since January 19, 1973 (when the lithographic employees at Hudson first indicated their interest in transferring to, the new plant with their existing ALA representation), 'is not sustainable by the ALA charge of March 5, 1974, which is the only charge currently related to an 8(a)(5) violation. It also argues that its certification for the production and maintenance unit at Regency, issued on October 1, 1973, should' not be amended' to exclude lithographic employees because the Company was under no obligation to recognize ALA for any employees at Regency. It points out that its petition for the Regency production and maintenance unit specifically included lithographic employees, and that if ALA failed to intervene in time it was its own fault or that of the Regional Director, but not the fault of the Company. Steelworkers also points out that the Company recognized it before' Regency had any lithographic employees, and that the election was properly held' since the General Extrusion rule as to percentage of employees and job classifications had been met., It takes the position that the lithographic employees at Regency, all of whom were hired after its certification, are a proper accretion to its production and maintenance unit. Analysis and Conclusions Although the briefs of the General Counsel and the Respondent, the two major proponents here, touch on all the issues raised by the facts in this case, they do so from different perspectives and with varying emphases. The General Counsel starts with the proposition that Respondent failed to satisfy the Board's Midwest Piping doctrine (63 NLRB 1060) by not maintaining strict neutrality between the competing claims of ALA and Steelworkers to represent its lithographic employees at the new Regency plant. Based on its failure to maintain such neutrality, the General Counsel argues that Respondent also violated Section '8(a)(2) by agreeing to extend the coverage of its national agreement with Steelworkers to the Regency plant's lithographic employees. It then follows, according to the General Counsel, that Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(2), as well as (3), by applying the union-security and checkoff provisions of that agreement to the Regency lithographic employees, and by informing AMERICAN CAN COMPANY five lithographic employees at Hudson that they would be transferred to Regency only if they agreed to join Steelworkers. Finally, the General Counsel contends that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize and bargain with ALA for a unit of lithographic employees at Regency. The contention is based on the following points: the lithographic operation at Regency was a mere relocation of the one at Hudson; Respondent was required to negotiate the basis and conditions on which the Hudson lithographic employees would be allowed to transfer to Regency, but failed to do so; and, although ALA did not represent a majority of the lithographic employees at Regency, it would probably have had such a majority but for Respondent's refusal to bargain and its violations of Section 8(a)(2) and (3), since the ALA employees at Hudson had indicated a desire to transfer with continued ALA representation, and would have done so since the two plants were only 26 miles apart. It should be noted that the General Counsel unlike ALA, does not contend that the ALA contract for Hudson is already applicable to the lithographic employees at Regency. The Respondent's arguments are addressed to points which are either unraised by General Counsel or barely considered by him. They are the following: there has been no violation of Section 8(a)(5) because the allegations of the complaint pertaining to that Section are barred by Section 10(b), since the basis of the complaint is an act which occurred on January 19, 1973 (ALA's first demand that all Hudson lithographic employees be transferred to the new plant with their representation intact) more than 14 months before the filing of the only extant charge referring to Section 8(a)(5); the complaint seeks to bestow on ALA a status as the representative of lithographic employees at Regency, which it could acquire only by showing that it had been designated as such by the Regency employees; and that ALA waived its rights to bargain about how a transfer of some unit employees from Hudson to Regency might be effectuated by its insistence that the Company had no other option than to transfer all the lithographic employees from Hudson to Regency. Respondent contends that Regency was a new plant and that it had a right to hire whom- it wanted there, subject only to its admitted obligation to bargain with ALA, if requested to do so, about the terms and conditions on which the Hudson lithographic employees would be offered jobs at Regency, if offered jobs at all. As to the' alleged violations of Section 8(a)(2) and (3), Respondent points out that it entered into a collective- bargaining agreement containing a union-security clause with Steelworkers, only after the Regional Director certified Steelworkers as the representative of a production i There is also another possible alternative- that the existing contract provides, by its terms, that it shall apply to the relocated operation. See Helrose Bindery, Inc, 204 NLRB 499 (1973), and The Rittling Corporation, 203 NLRB 355 (1973).1 find, in the instant case , that neither the expired nor the new contract between Respondent and ALA for the Hudson plant contains such a provision. A related but separate question, whether ALA's bargaining rights for the Hudson unit (irrespective of any contract provision) are transferable to similar work performed at Regency, is discussed hereafter. 2 See Regal Aluminum, Inc, 190 NLRB 468, and McLoughlin Manufac- 111 and maintenance unit at Regency, despite the fact that a charge filed by ALA, alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(2) was then pending in the Regional Office. Respondent does not consider the argument made by the General Counsel that its failure to inform the Regional Office that ALA was claiming representational rights at Regency constituted illegal assistance to the Steelworkers. Section 8(a)(5): Certain bargaining obligations flow from an employer's decision based on economic considerations to relocate all or part of his operations. There is, first, the obligation to inform the representatives of his employees of his decision, and to afford them an opportunity to present their views. If the employer cannot be persuaded to retract his decision to relocate, he is still obligated to bargain, on demand, as to the effects of the relocation on the employees at the old plant, that is, who will be employed at the new plant, under what terms and conditions of employment, and who will be terminated, with what severance rights and benefits.' Here, the Company, with 60 plants throughout the country, decided in 1972 to close down 9 plants; including Hudson, and to realign its operations by moving, purchas- mg, and scrapping equipment, transferring supervisors, and generally modernizing its business. As part of these efforts it built a new plant, Regency, limiting its production there to the manufacture of aerosol cans, one of the many product lines previously manufactured at Hudson. Litho- graphic work on other product lines was transferred elsewhere, but all the lithographic work on aerosol cans formerly done at Hudson was transferred without change to Regency. The employee complement at Regency was drastically reduced from that at Hudson both for can production and for lithographic work. Although the Company did not formally notify ALA (nor Steelworkers either, apparently) of its intention to close Hudson down, it did give all its employees ample notice and kept them informed as to its timetable for phasing out Hudson and opening Regency. As a practical matter, ALA was immediately made aware of the Compa- ny's decision to close Hudson down, but never seriously sought to persuade it to do otherwise. The complaint does not allege that the Company's failure to notify ALA of its intentions as to -Hudson is an independent violation of Section 8(a)(5), nor does the General Counsel argue that, if it is a violation, it should be remedied in any particular manner.2 Under these circumstances, I make no finding as to whether the Company's failure to notify ALA of its decision to close Hudson down was in violation of Section 8(a)(5). It is well-established, from the "plant relocation" cases cited below3 that a union representing employees at a plant whose operations are partially or completely termi- nated and relocated elsewhere is entitled to negotiate the turfing Corporation, 182 NLRB 958, enf d as mod., ,rub nom. International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. N.L.R.B, 463 F.2d 907 (C.A.D C), where the Board awarded backpay to the affected employees because of the employer's failure to notify the bargaining representative of its intention to relocate its operations 3 Fraser & Johnston Company, 189 NLRB 142, enfd in part 469 F.2d 1259 (C.A. 9), The Pierce Governor Company, Inc., 164 NLRB 97, aff d 394 F 2d 757 (C.A.D.C.), Cooper Thermometer Conpany, 160 NLRB 1902, enf d in part 376 F.2d 684 (CA. 2), and Die Supply Corporation, 160 NLRB 1326, enf'd 393 F.2d 462 (CA. 1). 112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD base's and conditions on which the employees affected by the termination may transfer to the new plant and thereby continue to be employed. If, on the basis of such bargaining, the employees at the closed-down plant constitute a majority at the new, then their bargaining representative is unaffected by the move. But if the employer has refused to bargain about the effects of the relocation on its employees, the Board will infer, if the old and new plants are not too distant, and if the new is a continuation of the old in terms of production and equipment, etc., that the employees would have transferred but for the employer's illegal action, so that their union at the old plant continues to be their majority representative at the new. A recent Board case exemplifying these principles is Fraser & Johnston Company, 189 NLRB 142 (1971), and since all the parties recognize its pertinency to the case here, I will summarize its facts and holdings in some detail. The Company (Fraser) was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Westinghouse. Fraser was engaged in its San Francisco plant in the manufacture of heating and cooling equip- ment, while Westinghouse operated a plant at San Lorenzo, 26 miles away, where it manufactured switch- board panels for the electrical industry. The employees at the Fraser plant were represented by three unions in what was substantially a production and maintenance unit, while the Westinghouse employees were represented by another union, IBEW. Fraser employed over 300 hourly rated employees at San Francisco, while Westinghouse had about 85 employees at San Lorenzo. Fraser notified the San Francisco unions in July 1968 that it was considering moving to Westinghouse's San Lorenzo plant because of the inadequacy of its present location. In April 1969, Fraser began to move its inventory and machinery to San Lorenzo, and full production began there in August. The San Francisco plant had been shut down, in July, and all the hourly rated employees were terminated. All requests by the San Francisco unions and the employees there for transfer to San Lorenzo with the retention of existu}g rights were rejected. In the meantime, Fraser had negotiated with IBEW at San 'Lorenzo on changes in the latter's contract,with Westinghouse regard- ing new job classifications for the influx of new employees who had been hired to perform the work done at San Francisco. With the new employees hired at San Lorenzo, IBEW represented more than twice as many employees as it had previously represented, in a variety of new job classifica- tions . In the meantime , Westinghouse had relocated its San Lorenzo operations to another plant 200 miles away. Thus, Fraser was established at San Lorenzo, carrying out the same operations with the same machinery, operating methods and supervisors that it had used at San Francisco, but with another union. Fraser's asserted reason for not considering the request of the San Francisco unions for transfer of their unit employees to San Lorenzo with their bargaining rights and existing contracts, was that it was legally obligated to apply the existing IBEW contract at San Lorenzo to its relocated operation there. It offered the unions only an agreement for severance pay coupled with the final termination of the represented employees and the extinguishment of their contractual and recogmtional rights. The Board rejected the Company's contention that it could not be held,tQ have violated Section 8(a)(5) by not bargaining over transferring the San Francisco employees to San Lorenzo because it was legally committed to recognize IBEW as the representative of all employees at San Lorenzo, holding instead that bargaining over the transfer of the San Francisco employees was obligatory, and that the Company had failed to do so. The essential element in finding that Fraser "refused to bargain" with the San Francisco unions was its refusal to consider their request that their unit employees be transferred to San Lorenzo, based on its alleged commit- ment to IBEW. As the majority opinion in that decision put it (189 NLRB at 143): Respondent was, of course, not free to make this commitment to the IBEW, and its commitment was itself an unfair labor practice. But it is that commit- ment which `led Respondent to refuse even to consider the proposals of the San Francisco unions that San Francisco employees be permitted to follow their jobs to San Lorenzo. Had Respondent bargained in good faith concerning these proposals, that is to say without regard to its commitment to the IBEW, it is highly unlikely that it would have refused to permit those San Francisco employees who wished to transfer to do so, for a majority of the employees of each of the San Francisco units had indicated a desire to transfer to San Lorenzo. These employees were experienced and skilled in the necessary work tasks and they could have worked in San Lorenzo - only 25 miles from San Francisco - without moving their homes. Thus, the vice in Fraser's violation of Section 8(a)(5) was in imposing an illegal condition to consideration of the unions' proposals, not in refusing to grant them. As Chairman Miller said in his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part: (fn. 5, p. 144) The violation found is based on Respondent's refusal to bargain in good faith over the transfer rights of the San Francisco employees after shutdown of that location. We do not hold that Respondent was required to transfer any San Francisco employees, only that Respondent was required, but failed, to bargain over that issue. We are not at liberty to. presume that good- faith bargaining would have produced any agreement to require transfer of San Francisco employees. See H. K Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99. Cooper Thermometer Company, 160 NLRB 1902 (1966), is another plant relocation case where the old and new plants were also about 25 miles apart, a distance considered to make it likely that employees at the shut-down plant would have transferred if given the opportunity. Here, too, as in Fraser & Johnston Company, supra, independent violations of Section 8(aX5) by the company (refusing to furnish information on changes in classifications, rates, and schedules, and dealing individually with employees in derogation of their bargaining representative) negated its AMERICAN CAN COMPANY claim that it had bargained in good faith with the union over conditions of transfer to the new plant. I find there are significant differences between this case and Fraser & Johnston, Cooper Thermometer, and Die Supply, supra In those cases the Board found violations of Section 8(a)(5) in the respondents' refusal to recognize and bargain at the new plants with the unions which represent- ed employees at the old plant, partially on the ground that the new plant was no more than the old plant in a different location. Machinery, manufacturing processes, and super- vision were transferred practically intact from one to the other facility with nothing changed but the site. In Die Supply Corporation, 160 NLRB 1326 at 1341 (1966), the Trial Examiner found that there had been no change in anything except location and the termination of senior employees; in Cooper Thermometer Company, 160 NLRB 1902 at 1912 (1966), the Trial Examiner held that the new plant was not established as an additional facility, but was instead a 'transposition or removal of the employer's business from one location to another; while in Fraser & Johnston Company, 189 NLRB 142 (1971) (fn. 3), the Board found that the employer's operation at San Lorenzo was a continuation of the operations at its former plant at San Francisco, while the court of appeals, in enforcing -the Board's order in part, observed that "In all material respects - company name, products, machinery, opera- tional methods and supervision - the Company's opera- tions in San Lorenzo were a continuation of the operations it had formerly conducted in San 'Francisco." 469 F.2d 1269 (C.A. 9, 1972). In this case, the Regency plant was not a simple removal of Hudson to a new location. Where Hudson had been the site for the manufacture of a wide range of products, Regency is limited to the manufacture of a single product line. It is of course true that the Company's business nationwide is the manufacture of metal containers, and that their size or what they are filled with may be considered to be irrelevant to its basic processes. However, manufacturing processes undoubtedly vary with the size or shape of the product, and the reduction of many product lines to a single line represents a much more substantial change in the Company's business and production than occurred in the other "relocation" cases mentioned above. Furthermore, much of the supervisory staff employed at Hudson was no longer needed at Regency and was transferred elsewhere, while only, part of the machinery at Hudson was ,physically moved to Regency. These are the expected consequences of a substantial diminution in the number of production and maintenance workers needed at Regency. Employment at Hudson was about 500 when the decision was reached to close it down, while the maximum employment at Regency will , be just half that. So substantial a reduction in force is incompatible with a conclusion that Regency was nothing more than a continuation of Hudson, I am aware that the General Counsel and ALA do not deny that Regency is' something more than Hudson at a remove of 25' miles. They argue that even if Regency is not a continuation of Hudson, yet the lithographic department at the new plant is exactly the same as at the old, with employees exercising the same skills on the identical 113 machinery. Even that, however, is only partially true. Here too, employment in the Regency lithographic department will be about half of what it was at Hudson, and although all the lithographic equipment now at Regency came from Hudson, other equipment no longer needed at Regency has been scrapped or sent to still other plants. I find, therefore, that neither the lithographic department at Regency nor the entire plant is a "mere relocation" or continuation of the business and processes formerly conducted at Hudson. An employer who opens an additional plant by transfer- ring machinery from a number of his other plants, including one which is being shut down, is not obligated to hire at the new facility those employees who manned the machinery being transferred. Neither jobs nor representa- tion rights adhere to specific pieces of machinery or manufacturing processes , and flexibility in meeting a changing economic situation requires flexibility in the right to hire and fire. Changes and adjustments of the magnitude present here necessitate a freer hand in adjusting employ- ment to new conditions than if the employer was merely moving an existing facility to a new site. I therefore conclude that the Company was correct in asserting that it had no absolute or automatic obligation to recognize ALA as the bargaining representative of lithographic employees at Regency, merely because it had represented such employees at Hudson. It did, however, have an obligation to bargain with ALA, if requested to do so, about the effects of closing down Hudson on the employees whom it represented there. The first communication between ALA.and the Compa- ny after it learned that a new can manufacturing plant would be opened 26 miles from Hudson was a call from Hansen, executive vice president of ALA, to Leser, an industrial relations official of the Company, on January 16, 193. After expressing concern about lithographic employ- ees, losing their jobs, Hansen asked Leser whether the Company was considering applying the current contract at Hudson to the new plant. Leser told him in effect that none of the contracts at Hudson would be carried over to the new plant. A few days later Hansen wrote the Hudson plant manager', and Leser that ALA expected to be represented at the Edison Township plant. Hansen again wrote to the Company about a month later, March 7, 1973, repeating his claim that ALA should continue to represent a lithographic unit consisting of as many Hudson employees as wanted to transfer to the new plant. He also protested the Company's failure to bargain about the projected shutdown of Hudson, since ALA members were affected by the move. The Company responded a few days later that it had no duty to bargain about closing Hudson or opening the new plant,'that any duty it might have to bargain over the effects of closing Hudson was covered by its existing contract , and that it would bargain for a new agreement to be applied to Hudson. It also' advised Hansen that the Company would consider for employment at Regency all applicants on a nondiscriminatory basis, but would not automatically hire there every lithographic employee who wished to transfer. A month later, Hansen met with Leser and negotiated a new 3-year agreement covering the three New Jersey plants, including Hudson, where it was the bargaining 114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD representative. Hansen did not ask for any special benefits for employees who might be terminated because of Hudson's closing, nor did he request separate negotiations on the effects of such closing on Hudson lithographic employees. A month later, Hansen met with Leser and his superior, Buly, and again Hansen limited himself to discussing whether the Company would consider employ- ing Hudson lithographic employees at Regency, with his union representing them. Buly reiterated the Company's claim that Regency was a new plant and, in effect, that neither employees nor bargaining obligations at Hudson would be brought over to Regency. Hansen did not, as an alternative, 'request' bargaining over any other aspects of the move. There was no attempt by the Company to conceal the fact that production would begin at Regency in July 1973, and that inevitably all -lithographic work at Hudson would be transferred there. Nevertheless, ALA made no attempt to negotiate with the Company about the effects of the closing of Hudson on its members employed there. In late September 1973, when ALA filed its first charge with the Board, it again claimed representation rights at Regency, but not that the Company had refused to bargain with it over the effects of the closing or the conditions on which applications for employment at Regency would be consid- ered. After another 5 months, ALA filed a second charge which again alleged only a wrongful refusal to recognize it as the bargaining representative for lithographic employees at Regency. Thus, from January 1973 to March 1974, ALA consist- ently claimed that its bargaining status at Hudson entitled it to represent all lithographic employees to be hired at Regency. Not until May 21, 1974, 2 months after issuance of the complaint, did ALA request the Company to bargain with it about the effect on its members of the final closing of Hudson. The Company replied immediately that it was willing to discuss the matter. I see no need to engage in an extended discussion about the ALA requests for bargaining: I am satisfied that they were limited to the demand that only ALA-represented employees be hired at Regency, and that ALA continue to represent them there. I have already found that Regency was not a continuation of Hudson, and that ALA had no inherent right to represent whomever the Company hired for its lithographic operations at Regency. I now find that at no time before the issuance of the complaint did ALA request 'bargaining on what it was entitled to - meeting and negotiating with the Company on such matters as severance benefits for employees terminated at Hudson or the factors to be used by the Company in deciding whom to hire at Regency., The Company need not have agreed to whatever demands of this sort ALA might present, but ALA never even put it to the test. I conclude that ALA has waived its rights to bargain about the effects on Hudson employees of that plant's closing .4 Two further, points need to be cleared up before I conclude my discussion of the 8(a)(5) aspects of the case. 1. In Fraser & Johnston and Cooper Thermometer, supra, the Board held that the operations of the relocated plant were sufficiently similar to those of the closed plant so that the representative status of the unions there should be transferred to the relocated plant. Part of the consideration for the Board's findings in those 'cases was that the employers had committed independent violations of Section 8(a)(5), either by insisting on an illegal condition to bargaining (in Fraser & Johnston) or by refusing to furnish pertinent job data (in Cooper Thermometer), and that these violations had frustrated the unions"attempts to bargain about the effects on their members of the plant relocation. If the Board should disagree with me that Regency was not a continuation of Hudson but rather a quite different operation, I hereby observe that the Company did nothing to frustrate the course of bargaining by committing the kinds of violations noted above. In my opinion then, Fraser & Johnston and Cooper Thermometer are distinguishable from this case, even if the Board fords that Regency, or its lithographic department, is only a continuation of its Hudson counterpart. In any event, my finding that ALA waived its right to bargain over "effects" is further support for the conclusion, which I hereby reach, that the allegations of the complaint with respect to Section 8(a)(5) should be dismissed. 2. The Company and Steelworkers argue forcefully that 10(b) bars the refusal-to-bargain allegations because the only charge dealing with that matter is dated March 5, 1974, or 14 months after ALA first asserted its claim that its status at Hudson carried over to Regency. I find no merit in the contention, since ALA continued to put its claim forward well within 6 months of its March 1974 charge.5 Section 8(a)(2) and (3): When Steelworkers filed its petition on August 23, 1973, to represent a production and maintenance unit, including lithographers, at Regency, the plant had been in operation little more than a month. No lithographic workers had yet been employed, nor were there any on September 10, when the Regional Director approved the Stipulation for Certification upon Consent Election, on September 21, when the election was held, or on October 1, when the certification was issued. No lithographic workers were employed at Regency before December. The General Counsel contends that the Company granted illegal support to Steelworkers when it agreed to extend their nationwide contract to the Regency plant, following the certification to Steelworkers on October 1. The basis of the contention is that the ALA claim to be recognized at Regency raised a question concerning representation which the Company ignored, and that it deliberately, concealed the ALA claim from the Regional Director when he approved the Stipulation for Certifica- tion. What is to be regarded as a "real" question concerning representation, or when a rival union's claim is not clearly unsupportable and lacking in substances must, of course, turn on the specific facts of each case. Here, it is true, the Company did not inform the Regional Office that n U.S Lmgerje Corporation, 170 NLRB 750 (1968), and Montgomery Pierce Governor Company, Inc., 164 NLRB 97, 101 (1967), and Cooper Ward & Co., 137 NLRB 418 (1962). Thermometer Company, 160 NLRB 1902, 1915 (1966). 5 Fraser & Johnston Company, 189 NLRB 142, 151, In. 51 (1970); The 6 Playskool, Inc., 195 NLRB 560 (1972). 1 AMERICAN CAN COMPANY ALA was asserting a claim that it should be recognized as the representative for all lithographic employees who would eventually be hired at Regency, but company official, Ries, did tell Board agent Schectman, when she asked him if he knew of any ALA interest at Regency, that she could call company headquarters where Cooper, the company official who had signed the stipulation was located. Schectman apparently was satisfied that ALA had no supportable claim to participate in the election because there were no lithographic workers then employed at Regency. The Company had rejected the ALA claim on the ground that it was entitled to hire at Regency without regard to the bargaining rights of any of the unions at Hudson. It seems to me that this was a legal position which the Company maintained at its peril - if in fact, ALA had even a colorable claim to represent lithographic employees at Regency, based on its status at Hudson, then the Company would have violated Section 8(a)(2) by failing to inform the Regional Office of such claim, once the petition was filed . But since I have previously found that the Company had no obligation to transfer ALA's bargaining status from Hudson to Regency or to recognize it at Regency, it follows that the Company's position was in fact correct. Moreover, it is clear that the Regional Office had been alerted to a possible representation claim by ALA at Regency, when it filed its opposition to holding the election in its letter of September 20, and in its charge of an 8(a)(2) violation, filed after the election but before certification of the Steelworkers. If there were negligence on the part of the Regional Office, although I make no such finding, there is no more reason to penalize the Steelworkers and the Company, who acted pursuant to the certification, than the ALA. I therefore hold that the Company's position that ALA was not entitled to assert any bargaining rights at Regency, before or after the election, was in fact correct, and that the Company has not given Steelworkers illegal support by entering into a contract with it, following the certification, nor violated Section 8(a)(3) by advising the ALA members from Hudson, to whom it offered jobs at Regency, that they would be subject to the union-security provisions of the Steelworkers contract if they accepted its offer. I shall 115 therefore recommend dismissal of the Section 8(a)(2) and (3) allegations of the complaint. On March 26, 1974, the Regional Director issued to the Company and Steelworkers a Notice to Show Cause why the certification to Steelworkers in Case 22-RC-5853 should not be amended specifically to exclude all litho- graphic production employees. The parties objected to amending the certification, but the Regional Director, on April 12, 1974, believing that substantial and material issues had been raised which could best be determined by the taking of record testimony, consolidated that matter with the instant unfair labor practice case. I have considered the question whether the certification should be amended and have decided that it should not be. I have found that the Company has not committed any unfair labor practices, particularly with reference to granting Steelworkers unlawful assistance in seeking and gaining certification . I also note that Regency employed a representative complement of employees, as measured by its satisfying the General Extrusion case standards when Steelworkers was certified for a production and mainte- nance unit. Although lithographic production employees were separately represented at Hudson, and could properly have been so represented at Regency, there is no Board policy against the inclusion of such workers in a pro- duction and maintenance unit. I therefore find that once lithographic employees were hired at Regency they were properly added to the overall production and maintenance unit as an accretion. Pursuant to the Regional Director's Order of April 12, 1974, I hereby transfer Case 22-RC-5853 to the Board for such action as it sees fit to take. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. American Can Company is an employer engaged in commerce and in activities affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local One, Amalgamated Lithographers of America, International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO, and Unit- ed Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organiza- tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has not , engaged in any unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation