Amazon Technologies, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 15, 2020

14168779 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 15, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/168,779 01/30/2014 Jonathan SCHLER SZMK P0114 2279
126647 7590 06/15/2020
Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP Am
999 Peachtree Street, NW
Suite 2300
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
SITTNER, MICHAEL J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/15/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
amazonpatents@eversheds-sutherland.com
patentdocket@eversheds-sutherland.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JONATHAN SCHLER and ITAY OVITS
Appeal 2019-006399
Application 14/168,779
Technology Center 3600
Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JAMES R. HUGHES, and BETH Z. SHAW,
Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–25. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as SIZMEK
TECHNOLOGIES LTD. Appeal Br. 3. There is also an ASSIGNMENT
FOR SECURITY - PATENTS held by CERBERUS BUSINESS FINANCE,
LLC, AS COLLATERAL AGENT which was assigned by SIZMEK
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., POINT ROLL, INC., and ROCKET FUEL INC.
Id.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a system and method for advertising
verification based on user demographics. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for performing demographic verification of an
online advertising campaign, comprising:
serving advertisements of the online advertising campaign
to users in response to users visiting webpages;
generating a demographic profile for each user in a group
of the users wherein the demographic profile for each respective
one of the users in the group is developed based on webpages
known to have been visited by the respective users in the group;
analyzing demographic profiles of viewers of the
advertisements of the online advertising campaign to determine
at least a campaign reach of the online advertising campaign,
wherein the viewers of the advertisements of the online
advertising campaign are a subset of the users in the group of
users;
comparing the determined demographic campaign reach
to at least one target audience attribute defined in a media plan
of the online advertising campaign; and
verifying at least a demographic campaign reach based on
the comparison.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Rao US 8,973,023 B1 Mar. 3, 2015
Ketchum US 8,117,067 B2 Feb. 14, 2012
Hickman US 8,386,398 B1 Feb. 26, 2013
Sambrani US 8,612,435 B2 Dec. 17, 2013

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Final Act. 2–8.
Claims 1–9, 12–22, and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Rao, Ketchum, and Hickman. Final Act. 8.
Claims 10, 11, 23, and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Rao, Ketchum, Hickman, and Sambrani. Final Act. 16.

OPINION
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also
indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
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If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see
also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
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human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

Abstract Idea
For the following reasons, we conclude the claims recite a
fundamental economic practice, which is one of certain methods of
organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and thus, an
abstract idea. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 53 (listing

3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental economic
principles or practices” as one of the “enumerated groupings of abstract
ideas”).
Appellant addresses the claims as a group, and we treat claim 1 as
representative. The claim is directed to an abstract idea because it is directed
to a fundamental economic practice, which is one of certain methods of
organizing human activity, as discussed below. The steps of claim 1, include,
with italics:
serving advertisements of the online advertising campaign
to users in response to users visiting webpages;
generating a demographic profile for each user in a group
of the users wherein the demographic profile for each respective
one of the users in the group is developed based on webpages
known to have been visited by the respective users in the group;
analyzing demographic profiles of viewers of the
advertisements of the online advertising campaign to determine
at least a campaign reach of the online advertising campaign,
wherein the viewers of the advertisements of the online
advertising campaign are a subset of the users in the group of
users;
comparing the determined demographic campaign reach
to at least one target audience attribute defined in a media plan
of the online advertising campaign; and
verifying at least a demographic campaign reach based on
the comparison.
Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to verifying a campaign
reach of an advertising campaign.
Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract
idea are patent ineligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which
extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas
include (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human
activity, and (3) mental processes. Among those certain methods of
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organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are fundamental
economic practices, such as the concept of intermediated settlement in Alice,
and the concept of hedging in Bilski. Like those concepts, claim 1 also
recites a fundamental economic practice. Specifically, the italicized steps fall
under the umbrella of economic practices, because the steps, including at
least “serving advertisements” “generating a demographic profile” and
“analyzing demographic profiles,” would ordinarily take place in analyzing
advertising, which occurs in our system of commerce. See Spec. ¶ 2
(“[E]mbodiments of the invention determine a value for an advertisement
based on a volume of impressions for that advertisement and corresponding
revenue.”).
In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d
1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015), an advertisement taking into account the time
of day and tailoring the information presented to the user based on that
information was considered another “fundamental . . . practice long
prevalent in our system.” In Credit Acceptance Corporation v. Westlake
Services, 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017), patent claims directed to a system
and method for providing financing to allow a customer to purchase a
product selected from an inventory of products maintained by a dealer were
considered patent ineligible as directed to the abstract idea of processing an
application for financing a purchase, an economic practice long prevalent in
commerce. Like the claims at issue in Intellectual Ventures I and Credit
Acceptance, the verifying a campaign reach of an advertising campaign is “a
fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commerce.” Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d at 1054. Thus, we conclude claim
1 recites a fundamental economic practice, which is one of certain methods
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of organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and thus an
abstract idea.
In accordance with the Revised Guidance, and looking to MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h), we determine that claim 1 does not integrate
a judicial exception, in this case the abstract idea of a fundamental economic
practice, into a practical application. As the Examiner points out, no physical
hardware or technical component is recited as necessary to perform the
“analyzing,” “comparing,” and “verifying” steps of claim 1. Ans. 4.
In addition, the users visiting “webpages” mentioned in claim 1 is
insignificant extra-solution activity, because it is merely ancillary to the
focus of the claimed invention, namely, verifying a campaign reach of an
advertising campaign, given the webpages and advertisements have a high
level of generality and context in the claimed invention. Where, as here, the
recited webpages are merely ancillary to verifying the campaign reach of the
claimed invention, given its high level of generality and context in the
claimed invention, the recited webpages are insignificant post-solution
activity and, therefore, do not integrate the exception into a practical
application for this additional reason. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
This is invention is not analogous to that which the court held eligible
in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 16).
There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules that
rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a
sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315.
Notably, the recited process for automatically animated characters using
particular information and techniques—an improvement over manual three-
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dimensional animation techniques—was not directed to an abstract idea. Id.
at 1316.
But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the
physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed
invention here merely verifies a campaign reach of an advertising campaign.
This invention is not only directed to a fundamental economic practice, but
also does not improve a display mechanism as was the case in McRO. See
SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(distinguishing McRO).
Accordingly, the claim as a whole does not integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application because the claim limitations do not impose any
meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Stated differently, the
claims do not (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology,
(2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for generic computer
components), (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a
different state, and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim, as a whole, is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Inventive Concept
Because we determine that claim 1 is “directed to” an abstract idea,
we next consider whether claim 1 recites an “inventive concept.” The
Examiner determined that claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept
because the additional elements in the claim do not amount to “significantly
more” than an abstract idea. See Ans. 7.
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We agree with the Examiner’s determination in this regard. Ans. 7.
Using generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not
provide the necessary inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he
mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, the elements of claim
1 do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea itself.
Preemption is a driving concern when determining patent eligibility.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17. Patent law cannot inhibit further discovery by
improperly tying up the future use of the building blocks of human
ingenuity. See id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 85–86). Although preemption is
characterized as a driving concern for patent eligibility, preemption itself is
not the test for patent eligibility. “Where a patent’s claims are deemed only
to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as
they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015). “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” Id.
To the extent Appellant contends that the recited limitations, including
those detailed above in connection with Alice step one, add significantly
more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under
Alice/Mayo step two (see Appeal Br. 14), these limitations are not additional
elements beyond the abstract idea, but rather are directed to the abstract idea
as noted previously. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (instructing
that additional recited elements should be evaluated in Alice/Mayo step two
to determine whether they (1) add specific limitations that are not well-
understood, routine, and conventional in the field, or (2) simply append
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well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to
the industry (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d)). These elements form part of the
recited abstract ideas and thus are not “additional elements” that “‘transform
the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78); see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55 n.24 (“USPTO guidance uses the term ‘additional elements’ to
refer to claim features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim
beyond the identified judicial exception.” (Emphasis added)).
To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention is rooted
in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical solution (see
Appeal Br. 11), we disagree. Even assuming, without deciding, that the
claimed invention can verify a campaign reach of an advertising campaign
faster than before, any speed increase comes from the capabilities of the
generic computer components—not the recited process itself. See
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012,
1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“Though the claims purport to
accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have
held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary
capabilities of a general-purpose computer ‘do[ ] not materially alter the
patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.’”). Like the claims in
FairWarning, the focus of claim 1 is not on an improvement in computer
processors as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use
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generic computing components as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of the pending
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

Section 103 Rejections
Appellant argues that Rao fails to teach “generating a demographic
profile for each user in a group of the users wherein the demographic profile
for each respective one of the users in the group is developed based on
webpages known to have been visited by the respective users in the group,”
as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 17, 18. In particular, Appellant argues the
cited portion of Rao only appears to show parameters and does not explain
how the information in the parameters is used. Appeal Br. 18.
As the Examiner explains, however, and we agree, Rao teaches
generating a demographic profile for each user in a group of users because
Rao teaches maintaining an online panel database to store panel member
information such as demographics and preferences of users exposed to
online media. Ans. 9 (citing Rao, 3:59–4:15). Rao describes that the “online
media” includes “web pages.” Id. Moreover, Rao describes that “online
measurement entity 116 uses Internet usage activity data collected by the PC
meters in the Internet access devices 106 [ of audience members] to log
impressions against different online media to which the on line audience
members 110c were exposed.” Id. Appellant does not respond to these
findings, and consequently, we are not persuaded of error.
Although Appellant argues that Rao’s demographic information is
obtained prior to any ads being presented, this argument is not supported by
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the record. Moreover, claim 1 does not preclude collecting demographic
information prior to ads being presented.
Appellant also argues that Rao fails to teach or suggest “analyzing
demographic profiles of viewers of the advertisements of the online
advertising campaign to determine at least a campaign reach of the online
advertising campaign,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 19. Appellant
argues Rao teaches “to measure tracked ad impressions for known users in
order to determine reach.” Id. Rao, Appellant argues, “determines the reach
based on tracking ad impression for known users, and then tying the
determined reach to audience demographic information to measure
demographic coverage achieved by an ad campaign.” Id. This is the
“opposite” of what Appellant’s claim “requires, which is actually
determin[ing] the campaign reach based on analysis of the demographic
profiles of viewers.” Id.
As the Examiner explains, however, the claims do not preclude Rao’s
teachings of using audience member demographics. Ans. 10. The Examiner
explains that one must know the demographics of the users reached to
express the quantity of reach in regard to a particular demographic group. Id.
Rao teaches “reach” as “a measure indicative of unique audience.” Id. (citing
Rao 2:56–58). Rao also teaches a method to calculate reach, based on a
particular universe, or demographic, of a subset of audience members, such
as those in the United States population. Id. at 11 (citing Rao (32:55–34:24).
Appellant also argues that the cited references fail to teach or suggest
“comparing the determined demographic campaign reach to at least one
target audience attribute defined in a media plan of the online advertising
campaign,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 19, 20. Yet, as the Examiner
finds, Ketchum teaches using a “target audience” that can include certain
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demographics. Ans. 12 (citing Ketchum, 3:60–4:25). Hickman teaches
measuring and monitoring the progress of a campaign goal and determining
if a goal has been achieved. Id. (citing Hickman, 11:P10–12:57). We agree
with the Examiner that these portions of Ketchum and Hickman therefore
teach “comparing the determined demographic campaign reach to at least
one target audience attribute defined in a media plan of the online
advertising campaign,” as recited in claim 1.
Additionally, Appellant argues the Examiner erred by using
impermissible hindsight to combine the references. Appeal Br. 21–23.
Any judgment on obviousness is . . . necessarily a reconstruction
based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account
only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at
the time the claimed invention was made and does not include
knowledge gleaned only from applicant's disclosure, such a
reconstruction is proper.
In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). See also Radix
Corp. v. Samuels, 13 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (D.D.C. 1989) (”[A]ny
obviousness inquiry necessarily involves some hindsight.”). Here, the
Examiner’s reasons for combining teachings from Rao, Ketchum, and
Hickman, are based on the teachings of Rao, Ketchum, and Hickman. These
reasons do not include knowledge gleaned only from Appellant’s disclosure.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that one having ordinary skill in the art
would not have been motivated to combine the references.
Appellant also argues the Examiner provides insufficient rationale to
combine the references. Appeal Br. 23. Upon reviewing the record before us,
we find that the Examiner’s suggestion for the proposed modification in the
prior art suffices as an articulated reason with some rational underpinning to
establish a prima facie case of obviousness. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
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Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). In summary, we find that an ordinarily
skilled artisan at the time of the claimed invention would have combined
Rao’s teaching of determining a demographic campaign with the advertising
techniques of Hickman and Ketchum, because it allows advertisers to
stipulate campaign goals corresponding to Rao’s calculated demographic
campaign reach and verify such goals, based on Hickman. Ans. 13.
Moreover, such a combination is an obvious predictable variation of
known elements. “The combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a
predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. As the
Examiner explains, Rao teaches that advertisers are interested in knowing
consumer exposure (i.e. reach) to better market their products and calculates
reach based on demographics. Ans. 13. Ketchum explicitly teaches that
reach can be a targeted goal. Hickman teaches measuring and monitoring
progress of campaign goals, and determining if a qualitative campaign goal
has been achieved. Id. The ordinarily-skilled artisan, being “a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” would be able to fit the teachings of
Rao, Hickman, and Ketchum together like pieces of a puzzle to predictably
result in the claimed demographic verification of an online advertising
campaign. For these reasons, and because Appellant has not demonstrated
that the Examiner’s proffered combination would have been “uniquely
challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art,” we agree with the
Examiner that the proposed modification would have been within the
purview of the ordinarily skilled artisan. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-
Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at
418).
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Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under §103.

Dependent Claims 3 and 16
Appellant also argues the cited references fail to teach “wherein the
campaign data includes at least URLs previously visited by the user,” as
recited in dependent claims 3 and 16. Appeal Br. 24. In particular, Appellant
argues Rao teaches that the demographic information for the users “must be”
obtained “prior to any ads being presented,” so its demographic profile for
the user is not based on URLs. See id. We are not persuaded by this attorney
argument because this argument is not supported by the record. Rather, Rao
teaches that “online measurement entity 116 uses Internet usage activity data
collected by the PC meters in the Internet access devices 106 [ of audience
members] to log impressions against different online media to which the on
line audience members 110c were exposed.” Rao, 3:59–4:15.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 3 and 16
under §103.
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of the
remaining pending claims under §103. Despite nominally arguing these
claims separately, Appellant reiterates similar arguments made in connection
with claim 1, and alleges that the additional cited prior art fails to cure those
purported deficiencies. Appeal Br. 23–25. We are not persuaded by these
arguments for the reasons previously discussed.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–25 101

1–25
1–9, 12–22,
25
103 Rao, Ketchum, and
Hickman
1–9, 12–
22, 25

10, 11, 23,
24
103 Rao, Ketchum,
Hickman, and
Sambrani
10, 11, 23,
24

Overall
Outcome:
1–25

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED