Alterman Transport Lines

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1992

308 N.L.R.B. 1282 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

1282
308 NLRB No. 186
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The name of the Charging Party has been changed to reflect the
new official name of the International Union.
2 The General Counsel and the Respondent have excepted to some
of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is
not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully exam-
ined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
Although we agree with the judge’s portrayal of the facts and tes-
timony in this proceeding, we correct the following inadvertent er-
rors which do not affect the result: at sec. III, par. 4, the location
of one of the Respondent’s break bulk terminals should read Atlanta,
Georgia; at par. 5, the Respondent did not assume England’s LTL
business; at par. 7, the Respondent planned to establish Bridgeport
as a break bulk terminal; at par. 9, the Respondent did not have a
Pittsburgh terminal; at par. 17, the meeting at Bennett’s home took
place on November 10, and the petition was filed on October 28,
1990, in Case 4–RC–17494; at par. 32, Fischer’s November 7 con-
versation was with Lee; and at par. 77, Fischer testified that he
spoke with Van Horn on May 15, and August 17 was the intended
date for the hearing in this proceeding, rather than for the election.
3 In adopting the judge’s dismissal of the allegation that in a con-
versation with employee Fischer Respondent’s president, Sidney
Alterman, promised to remedy employee complaints, we note, con-
trary to the judge’s finding, that Alterman did not testify concerning
this aspect of the conversation. We rely instead on the judge’s dis-
crediting of Fischer’s testimony regarding this discussion. We agree
with the judge that employee Tablas’ testimony that he overheard
Alterman state that he was unaware of the drivers’ problems but
‘‘we can get together and work them out’’ does not demonstrate a
clear promise to remedy specific complaints.
We agree with the judge’s conclusions that the Respondent re-
duced the hours of its local drivers in retaliation for the union activi-
ties of its employees and that employees Rease and Tablas were
constructively discharged. Having reviewed the documents entered
into the record by the Respondent, we agree with the judge that
these documents, coupled with the testimony of the Respondent’s
witnesses, fail to satisfy the Respondent’s burden to demonstrate that
this decrease in work hours would have occurred in the absence of
the employees’ union activity. See Migali Industries, 285 NLRB
820, 824 (1987).
Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. and Food Drivers,
Helpers and Warehousemen Employees Local
500 a/w International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL–CIO1 and Richard E. Tablas and
Perry Rease. Cases 4–CA–19364, 4–CA–19696,
and 4–CA–19718
September 30, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On December 13, 1991, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas R. Wilks issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief, cross-excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed
a brief in answer to the cross-exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and con-
clusions3 and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Alterman Transport Lines,
Inc., Burlington, New Jersey, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order.
Barbara A. O’Neill, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Peter D. Walther, Esq., of Jenkentown, Pennsylvania, for the
Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS R. WILKS, Administrative Law Judge. This mat-
ter was tried before me at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on Au-
gust 7, 8, and 9, 1991, pursuant to a consolidated complaint
issued by the Regional Director for Region 4 on May 31,
1991. That complaint was based on charges filed in Case 4–
CA–19364 by Food Drivers, Helpers and Warehousemen
Employees Local 500 a/w International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, AFL–CIO (Union) on November 14, 1990; and in
Cases 4–CA–19696 and 4–CA–19718, respectively, by indi-
viduals Richard Tablas and Perry Rease on April 11 and 18,
1991, against Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. (Respondent).
The consolidated complaint alleged 8(a)(1) violations of the
Act consisting of multiple incidents of coercive interference
with Respondent’s employees rights to obtain membership in,
activity on behalf of and representation by the Union. The
complaint also alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act consisting of the discharge of dock worker and
lead leader Gordon Bennett for pretextual reasons and the re-
duction of work hours assigned to its drivers and dock load-
ers at the Burlington terminal which, in turn, caused the con-
structive discharge of local drivers Richard Tablas and Perry
Rease in order to discourage its employees’ union member-
ship, activities and to frustrate union representative efforts at
the Burlington terminal.
Respondent’s timely filed answer denied the allegations of
unlawful conduct and thereafter took a position that Bennett
(whom it alleges was an unprotected supervisor) had been
discharged for misconduct in the performance of his duties,
and that a drastic decline in the shipments in and out of the
Burlington terminal caused the reduction of available pickup
and delivery duties for the local drivers assigned to that ter-
minal. The General Counsel contends that the work, that was
available for the geographical area covered by the Burlington
terminal after union representation efforts commenced for the
local drivers and dock workers and a representation petition
filed with the Regional Director, was discriminatorily as-
signed to the long distance distance over-the-road drivers, in-
cluding those servicing other Respondent terminals.
At the trial, the parties were given full opportunity to ad-
duce relevant testimony and evidence which encompassed a
1283ALTERMAN TRANSPORT LINES
1 Counsel for General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct tran-
script is granted.
massive exhibit of shipping records. All parties have re-
quested and I have taken administrative notice of the tran-
script of the now deferred representation case, Case 4–RC–
17494 which contains 2 days’ worth of testimony of wit-
nesses common to both proceedings.
All parties were given opportunity to set forth oral state-
ments of position in the record, and they have also filed
post-trial briefs which, after an extension of time was grant-
ed, were received on September 23, 1991.
On the entire record of this case, including my evaluation
of extensive documentary evidence and disputed testimony of
witnesses and their demeanor, and consideration of exhaus-
tive, lengthy but very well written briefs, I make the follow-
ing1
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is, and has been at all times material, a
Florida corporation engaged in the interstate transportation of
refrigerated perishables with, its principal place of business
located in Opa Locka, Florida. The Respondent’s Burlington,
New Jersey terminal (the Burlington terminal) is the facility
involved in this proceeding. During the past year, in the
course and conduct of its operations, the Respondent derived
gross revenues in excess of $50,000 for transporting refrig-
erated perishables from its Burlington terminal directly to
points outside the State of New Jersey.
It is admitted, and I find, that the Respondent is, and has
been at all times material, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
It is admitted, and I find, that the Union is, and has been
at all times material, a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. FACTS
A. Background
Respondent transports food and other temperature-sensitive
items which require the use of temperature-controlled trailers
and storage facilities capable of holding frozen or chilled
items. As a so-called LTL (less than truckload) carrier, Re-
spondent services more than one consignee for each trailer
load.
From its ‘‘central dispatch’’ headquarters in Opa Locka,
Florida, Respondent superintends a nationwide network of
about 18 terminals through which consignments are proc-
essed by long distance over-the-road drivers or ‘‘peddle’’
drivers, who are generally paid by a mileage and weight cal-
culation, and local hourly paid drivers, who rarely remain en
route overnight and who generally service the geographic
area around the terminal of their domicile. A third category
of driver utilized is the owner-operator who owns his own
equipment and who leases it to the Respondent as an inde-
pendent contractor. Respondent also employs dockworkers
and loaders at each terminal. It is undisputed that Respond-
ent’s past practice has been to primarily utilize local drivers
to make pickups and deliveries within the geographical area
of their terminal of domicile and also to utilize over-the-road
drivers who come into that area from other terminals for the
same purpose when business conditions warrant it. According
to Respondent, a practical judgment is made by the local ter-
minal dispatcher as to which driver he should use based on
the economics, method of pay, availability of local driver,
and what over-the-road drivers are known to be coming into
his area and his jurisdiction as revealed by computerized in-
formation issuing from central dispatch. It is the economic
objective of the local dispatcher to send out the fullest pos-
sible loads with the fewest drivers.
Only the drivers at the Hackensack, New Jersey, and Chi-
cago, Illinois terminals are represented by a labor organiza-
tion under collective-bargaining agreements.
Of the 18 terminals, as of late 1990, Respondent main-
tained four ‘‘break bulk’’ terminals at Atlanta, Georgia;
Charlotte, North Carolina; Dallas, Texas; and Winter Haven,
Florida. A break bulk terminal serves as distribution center
whose consignments coming from a variety of terminals con-
verge and are unloaded and reassembled for ultimate delivery
to a local terminal or to another break bulk terminal.
Although Respondent had done business for some years
out of the Hackensack terminal, about 4 years ago it decided
to locate a second terminal in New Jersey. An opportunity
arose in early 1989, when the C.R. England Company de-
cided to abandon LTL operations out of its warehouse in
Burlington. Respondent was aware of the Burlington market
growth potential because it had serviced the areas from the
Hackensack terminal about 80 miles away. Commencing
about April 1989, Respondent assumed England’s LTL busi-
ness and rented space in England’s warehouse from which
England also continued its refrigerated full truckload oper-
ations.
The break bulk terminal from which Respondent serviced
the Burlington terminal was, of course, Charlotte where less
than truckload goods over the entire northeast would be
shipped for reassembly and, to some extent, sent backup
again to Burlington. Respondent discovered the adverse time
factor involved was greater than anticipated. Respondent’s
president, Sidney Alterman, testified that because of that fac-
tor, some clients who demanded shorter, quicker delivery
ceased doing business with Respondent. In the fall of 1990,
Respondent became the owner at a facility in Bridgeport,
New Jersey, where, after a remodeling of the existing build-
ing, it planned to establish a break bulk terminal. All Bur-
lington operations were to be transferred to the longer ex-
panded operation at Bridgeport, where tonnage was to be di-
verted away from the Charlotte terminal. On March 4, 1991,
Respondent commenced its vastly expanded operations as a
break bulk terminal at Bridgeport, 40 miles away from its
former Burlington operations where, from late 1990, it had
rented terminal dock and refrigerator space from England at
sufferance, without a fixed-term lease, until such time as the
unanticipated much delayed renovation had been completed.
Respondent utilized some of England’s dockworkers to aug-
ment its own dock loaders at the Burlington facility.
In the fall of 1990, Respondent had expectations of estab-
lishing Burlington as a major break bulk terminal. Such a fa-
cility by its nature maintains a greater flow of consignments
and thus a higher number of over-the-road drivers domiciled
there. A question to be resolved in this case is whether an
1284 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
increase in hourly drivers would also have been a con-
sequence, and conversely whether a reduction in the use of
local hourly drivers would have occurred by means of an un-
planned, discriminatory intervention such as the transfer of
work local drivers would have otherwise done to over-the-
road drivers because of the local drivers’ union activities.
Alterman testified that he expected Burlington to equal the
size of the Charlotte terminal. The workload of the estab-
lished Charlotte break bulk terminal warrants a complement
of 40 to 50 dockworkers, 30 to 40 long-distance drivers, 15
‘‘intermediate’’ distance drivers, and, according to Sidney
Alterman’s somewhat evasive response, ‘‘six or seven’’ or,
as he testified after quick reflection, ‘‘five or six local driv-
ers.’’ However, according to undisputed testimony, although
it carries 100 percent more tonnage than Bridgeport, the
union-represented Hackensack’s terminal has only three local
drivers.
At the representation petition hearing on November 15 and
16, 1990, Respondent took a position that the unit at the Bur-
lington terminal was to expand so much as to preclude a
question concerning representation. At that hearing, Sidney
Alterman testified that the expectation was for such an ex-
pansion of tonnage that 30-drivers and 20 dockworkers
would be required. Of those 30 new drivers, he at first speci-
fied that 15 would be mileage and weight drivers and that
15 would be ‘‘regular hour drivers’’ (Tr. 138). He testified,
‘‘[W]e already have the weight . . . and present tonnage
. . . the work will continue on. I will just transfer from Bur-
lington to Bridgeport . . . with a number of people I am
presently using.’’ (Tr. 143.) He testified that as of November
1990, Respondent had utilized a large number of non-Bur-
lington domiciled drivers for the Burlington area pickups be-
cause Respondent had experienced a ‘‘shortage of drivers or
[because they] are hard to get.’’ In that case, Sidney
Alterman conceded that qualified drivers are not readily
available and training requires time. He testified when asked
what he intended to do if he could not hire a sufficient num-
ber of drivers at Bridgeport to satisfy the 30 driver objective:
We have various systems of how to move the
freight.
We have been doing it for a number of years and we
will continue to do at in some fashion. [Tr. 159.]
It is Sidney Alterman’s testimony in both the representa-
tion hearing and at this trial that Respondent intended to in-
crease the tonnage at Bridgeport not only by diverting over-
the-road break bulk terminal destined tonnage from Charlotte
and tonnage previously sent to the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
terminal, but that also he expected a growth in the local mar-
ket. The local growth was not only to be gained from the
abandonment of the local LTL market by England but also
by the solicitation of new local customers. Thus the only in-
ference to be raised from that testimony is that Respondent
expected an expansion in the need for local drivers. There-
fore, when Respondent’s counsel was asked in the represen-
tation case hearing for a statement of position, he responded:
Five local drivers [now employed at the Burlington
terminal] do not constitute an appropriate unit—reason
number one, it’s an expanding unit. [Tr. 183.]
Despite the foregoing testimony, Sidney Alterman altered
the expectation of an increase in the hourly driver com-
plement in subsequent testimony at the same representation
case hearing when he later testified that he expected to em-
ploy only ‘‘two or three’’ hourly drivers and 20 to 30 mile-
age and weight drivers at Burlington. Thus, within a short
span of less than 100 pages of testimony, economic expecta-
tions changed the predicted ratio of hourly to other drivers
that would be required by the then state of local business.
When cross-examined by the union counsel, he testified that
with respect to the then complement of five Burlington driv-
ers that ‘‘possibly they will be ‘cut back.’’’ When asked how
he could so testify in the fact of an expected expansion of
tonnage, he answered: ‘‘By using the system that the other
break bulk terminals use.’’
After a series of questions and answers which constituted
a dialogue of whether or not it was more economical to use
hourly drivers in certain circumstances, Alterman testified:
A. That is an operational decision to be made by the
Company and we do that.
Q. Is it foolhardy?
A. We own the Company, and we have a right to
make those decisions to maintain an orderly type of
system and that is what we do. [Tr. 279–280.]
At that representation case hearing, Alterman went on to tes-
tify that the work of hourly drivers had decreased since the
beginning of November, ‘‘because business fell off.’’ (R.
Exh. 283.) He testified that his greater problem in staffing
was the more severe shortage of dockworkers. Thus, in the
representation hearing, Alterman rendered three different ver-
sions of the expected local driver complement at Bridgeport.
First, it would expand to 15 drivers from a point when 5
local drivers already constituted a shortage of drivers needed
for local service. Second, it would reduce to three drivers de-
spite an expected tonnage increase because a different system
of driver utilization would be employed as had existed at
other break bulk terminals. Third, the local driver com-
plement would be reduced because of a loss of business.
At the instant trial, Sidney Alterman testified that at Bur-
lington, Respondent attempted to pay drivers more rigidly ac-
cording to their classification because an initial attempt to
pay local drivers on a mileage basis proved unsuccessful. He
did not explain.
Louis Fischer testified that he was hired as a mileage and
weight driver but, because of the low net earning under this
formula, Respondent agreed to reclassify him as an hourly
paid driver with a resulting higher earnings. Alterman testi-
fied that at Bridgeport, he has followed Respondent’s nation-
wide policy of paying terminal drivers at both methods when
the advantage to Respondent arises. Thus, the somewhat
more rigid practice of compensation by classification at Bur-
lington came to an end at Bridgeport, according to Sidney
Alterman’s own testimony.
The issue before us is whether an admitted reduction in
use of local drivers on the heels of union organizing efforts
was the consequence of their protected activity or whether it
was a necessary consequence of economic conditions.
1285ALTERMAN TRANSPORT LINES
B. Union Activity at Burlington
The Burlington terminal was the site of attempted union
organizing activities and Respondent’s alleged discriminatory
reaction to it. As of October 1, 1990, Respondent maintained
a staff of three lead loaders. Of these, Gordon Bennett was
employed on a full-time basis whereas Mark Daugherty and
Andrew Celmer worked only part-time. Five hourly local
drivers employed were Louis Fischer, Richard Tablas, Perry
Rease, Timothy Craven, and Miguel Ojeda. Their hiring
dates are as follows:
Tablas—11–17–89
Rease—12–4–89
Ojeda—3–5–90
Fischer—3–31–90
Craven—8–24–90
Tablas had resigned on May 17, 1990, and was rehired on
September 5, 1990. Thus only 1–1/2 months prior to Sidney
Alterman’s representation case testimony of ‘‘possible’’
plans to reduce the number of hourly drivers at an expanded
Bridgeport operation, Respondent had sufficient local service
potential to rehire Tablas and to hire a fifth new driver. The
weekly hours worked by each of these drivers for October
1990 and up to November 5, 1990, averaged from 46.5 to
a high of 59 hours. Respondent’s Burlington managerial staff
consisted of Terminal Manager Frank Van Horn; Office
Manager Bill Flyer; Dock Supervisor James Narine; and
Chief Dispatcher Wendell Lee, all undisputed supervisors
within the meaning of the Act.
The prime union activist appears to be Louis Fischer. Ac-
cording to his own undisputed testimony, in mid-September
1990, he had confronted Lee, Narine, and Van Horn with the
local drivers’ complaints as to their fringe benefits status and
a variety of working conditions. Somehow, thereafter, a
meeting was arranged between the five local drivers, Ben-
nett, and two other employees, apparently nondrivers, with
two union representatives at a local restaurant where they all
executed union representation authorization cards. Other em-
ployee union meetings were thereafter held at Bennett’s
home, including one on October 10. However, on October
29, 1990, the Union filed a petition for representation for Re-
spondent’s Burlington drivers and dockworkers in Case 4–
RC–1794. At the November 15 and 16, 1990 hearings, the
Union stated its position in favor of a unit inclusive of hour-
ly paid local drivers, and also an unspecified number of
over-the-road drivers domiciled in the Burlington area.
C. November 5—Van Horn Interrogation
Van Horn testified that he had become aware of ‘‘scuttle-
butt’’ to the effect of union organizing efforts even prior to
telephone notification from a Board agent on or about No-
vember 5. The office manager had reported to him such talk
overheard on the loading dock. Furthermore, Respondent’s
labor counsel, specifically engaged to advise Respondent,
had, according to Van Horn, visited the terminal and in-
structed him even prior to that telephone notification. Van
Horn admitted that counsel had instructed him on how to
noncoercively retrieve information from employees regarding
their union activities without asking ‘‘direct’’ questions. He
admitted that his supervisor in Opa Locka had ordered him
to find out ‘‘what was going on.’’ Van Horn testified that
he had maintained a 15-year acquaintanceship with Fischer
and, because of that and because Fisher had appeared to be
a spokesperson for employee grievances, Respondent’s coun-
sel instructed him to summon Fischer to his office to engage
in a supposedly noncoercive investigation, where hopefully
Fischer would spontaneously volunteer information as to the
extent of employee support and activity for the Union and
Van Horn would merely be a ‘‘listener.’’ Van Horn admit-
tedly then summoned Fischer to his office where he imme-
diately demanded of Fischer, ‘‘what the hell is going on.’’
Van Horn claimed that he made no specific reference to the
‘‘union’’ nor identity of union sympathizers but that Fischer
just garrulously launched into an explanation of those activi-
ties which Van Horn dutifully recorded in a notebook. Van
Horn was at trial led by Respondent’s counsel into a series
of categorical denials as to what Fisher had testified. Van
Horn gave no full contextual narration of what transpired.
Even if he were to be believed, according to his own testi-
mony, a highly coercive context resulted. Clearly it was un-
derstood by virtue of known and suspected union activities
of Fischer that Fischer was being interrogated as to union ac-
tivities. In any event, I credit the more certain, spontaneous,
fluent, responsive, detailed, and contextually framed testi-
mony of Fischer rather than Van Horn’s cryptic, hesitant, un-
convincing denials.
In the office interrogation by Van Horn on November 5,
it is Fischer’s credible testimony that Van Horn immediately
demanded that he reveal ‘‘what the hell is going on,’’ re-
ferred to the Board agent’s telephone call and expressed cha-
grin of not being informed of union activity in the terminal.
At that point, Fischer told him at least one-third of the em-
ployees had decided upon union representation. Van Horn re-
torted, ‘‘My God, there are only five of you; what do you
expect to gain?’’ Fischer reiterated the complaints he had
earlier conveyed to Van Horn but Van Horn pretended
unawareness of them and without success asked Fischer to
identify those employees who had supported the petition,
where they had met and when they had met. Van Horn then
told Fischer that he knows ‘‘for a fact’’ that Sidney Alterman
‘‘will fight you . . . to the end’’ and that Alterman was
‘‘dead set’’ against union representation.
Van Horn’s emotional, high strung reaction to and interro-
gation of union activity is not exculpated by the so-called
past ‘‘friendship’’ between himself and Fischer. That rela-
tionship was clearly presumed upon in a setting of and dis-
play of managerial authority. The recitation by Van Horn of
high level animosity to the Union and the implication that re-
sort to union organizing was futile, objectively tended to
constitute the interview as that of an ominous implied warn-
ing, not a mere casual interchange between friends over din-
ner in a public place. The interrogation of who, when, and
where the employees engaged in union activities served no
legitimate interest, transpired in a coercive atmosphere and,
therefore, I find, constituted unlawful coercive interrogation
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. November 5—Sidney Alterman Threats and Promises
At 1:30 p.m. on November 5, Fischer was introduced to
Sidney Alterman at the Burlington terminal driver’s dispatch
window and a conversation ensued between them. According
to Fischer’s uncontradicted testimony, the conversation took
place in the presence of Van Horn, Wendell Lee, and two
1286 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Florida based over-the-road drivers, Williams and Allen.
Alterman essentially responded to Respondent’s counsel’s
elicitation of categorical denials to certain parts of Fischer’s
account of the information. He admitted that he told Fischer
that he would take ‘‘every legal means’’ to remain nonunion
and ‘‘may have’’ referred to a virtually nonunion national
operation for 40 or 50 years. Lee and Van Horn did not give
their account of the conversation nor did they deny their
presence.
Fischer testified that in the foregoing afternoon confronta-
tion, Sidney Alterman introduced himself to Fischer, told
him he was there because of union organizing problems, that
he had been in nonunionized business for 50 years, and
‘‘more or less’’ that there would not be a union at Burlington
inasmuch as ‘‘oil and water don’t mix.’’ Further, Alterman
expressed unawareness of employee work problems but that
he would send a group of people up to the terminal to solve
them. At that point, Fischer reminded him that he had been
previously promised a jacket but had never received one. It
is undisputed that in the past Alterman had maintained a
practice of distributing such items as jackets and writing pens
to the terminal drivers. Alterman thereupon asked Fischer’s
jacket size and promised to get him a jacket.
Fischer placed neither Tablas nor Craven at the scene of
this conversation. However, both testified as to having wit-
nessed such a conversation particularly with references to the
‘‘oil and water’’ and 50 years of nonunion operation. The
General Counsel argues that Tablas and Craven are referring
to a subsequent confrontation between Fischer and Sidney
Alterman on November 14. If so, they are inconsistent with
Fischer’s November 14 account of an extremely succinct
statement of opposition to the Union by Alterman. As
Alterman himself conceded making remarks about his non-
union history on November 5, and intent to use every legal
means of opposition, I conclude that Craven’s and Tablas’
testimony corroborates the November 5 confrontation and not
November 14. Tablas himself places it on November 5.
With respect to the promise to remedy drivers’ work com-
plaints, they do not corroborate Fischer. According to Tablas,
Alterman said he was unaware of the drivers’ problems but
‘‘we can get together and work them out.’’ Even if credited,
this is nothing more than an employer’s statement that col-
lective bargaining is not necessary because any problems can
be resolved without intervention of a bargaining agent. It
does not constitute a clear promise to remedy specific com-
plaints in the manner requested by employees. Craven, whom
Tablas testified was merely filling out forms, recalled no
promises but instead recalled Alterman as opposing the
Union ‘‘because everybody would want a piece of the pie.’’
Fischer’s own testimony as to the alleged promise was
first prefaced with: ‘‘he more or less said.’’ Upon pointed
repetition by counsel for General Counsel, the response be-
came: ‘‘he said.’’ Fischer was far from certain and forceful
on this point as compared to his other testimony. Because of
the inconsistencies of General Counsel witnesses’ testimony
and uncertainty, I credit Sidney Alterman’s categorical denial
that on November 5, he promised to remedy employee griev-
ances. In view of the uncontradicted testimony of Sidney
Alterman as to Respondent’s past and ongoing practice to
distribute work jackets and other gifts to all employees, I
cannot find that his promise to give Fischer a jacket pre-
viously promised to him constituted an unlawful promise of
a gift. Had Alterman ceased such practice during ongoing
union activity, he would have been in jeopardy of commit-
ting another unfair labor practice. Cf. Grupta Permold Corp.,
289 NLRB 1234 (1988).
Fischer’s, Craven’s, and Tablas’ account of Alterman’s
self-characterization of antiunion animus is not certain and
clear enough for me to find Alterman coerced employees by
telling them implicitly that he would retaliate against their
activities on behalf of union representation or that he would
frustrate the processes to obtain collective bargaining by un-
lawful means. Neither Fischer nor any of the drivers who
testified appeared so naive as not to realize that the mere re-
sort to lawful procedural resistance generates such a delay as
to frequently induce impatience and abandonment of union
representation by employees likely to become impatient or
who have gone on to other employment or who have simply
changed their minds. Suggesting to employees the brutal
facts of life with respect to inherent procedural delays does
not amount to such an abuse of the right of free speech as
to constitute unlawful coercion. Nor do Alterman’s com-
ments suggest that his resort to a lawful resistance and
counter-campaign necessarily precludes their voluntary aban-
donment of union representation as a result of a lawful, non-
coercive election campaign. A statement of certitude in the
success of this lawful resistance can hardly constitute an un-
lawful threat. Election campaigns are not lost by unions sole-
ly because of unlawful conduct by the employers. Respond-
ent has successfully avoided union organizing efforts for the
vast preponderance of its terminals, and it has not been dem-
onstrated that it has done so through unlawful means. Thus,
Alterman’s assertion of certitude, premised on 50 years’ ex-
perience that there will be no union because he will resort
to all legal means to frustrate it, does not constitute an un-
lawful threat. It is, however, revelatory of Respondent’s’ atti-
tude.
E. November 7, 1990—Van Horn Telephone Call
Fischer testified that at 2:30 p.m. on November 7, 1990,
from his home he telephoned Van Horn to discuss certain
personal business matters he had with a prior employer
where Van Horn had been employed in a managerial posi-
tion. In that conversation, Fischer claims that he raised the
subject of the sudden loss of work for hourly drivers. Van
Horn denied that he had any such conversation and categori-
cally denied the essential elements of Fischer’s account. I
credit the more convincing, vivid testimony of Fischer. His
certitude outweighed the weak, hesitant denials of Van Horn.
In that November 7 telephone call, Fischer demanded to
know why the work for local drivers had suddenly and dras-
tically been reduced. To that question, Van Horn answered
with the statement: ‘‘No more Mr. Nice Guy.’’
Fischer expostulated his bewildered disbelief, but Van
Horn pressed on with the statement that as the representation
case proceeds to a hearing, Respondent will ascertain the
identity of prounion employees and ‘‘get to the bottom of
it.’’ Fischer responded that it did not matter who was behind
the Union nor why, and that Van Horn had already known
why they wanted representation. Van Horn retorted: ‘‘Sidney
Alterman is going to fight you . . . drag this out . . . spend
$50,000, $100,000 to fight you people.’’
Van Horn’s answer to an explanation of why there was a
reduction in local driver work assignments, in the full con-
1287ALTERMAN TRANSPORT LINES
text of that conversation and his preceding remarks to Fisch-
er, clearly constitute an implicit admission that work was
being denied local drivers because of their union activity and
a threat that any further union representation efforts would
be futile because of that loss of work and other unspecified,
but implied retaliation. I find that Van Horn’s statements vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
F. Early November—Lee Conversations About Lack
of Work
Local driver Perry Rease testified, without explicit con-
tradiction, that in the early afternoon of November 9, 1990,
he engaged in a conversation with dispatch supervisor Lee in
the terminal driver’s room. In a very fluent and precise testi-
mony accompanied by a demeanor of assuredness, Rease tes-
tified that he inquired of Lee whether his reduction of 2
weekday workdays was permanent and, if so, whether he
could substitute another workday. He also asked Lee why
there had been such a sudden drop of work assigned to local
drivers. Lee responded: ‘‘I want you drivers to know it is not
my doing. It is out of my hands.’’ In and of itself, such a
statement is arguably ambiguous and not clear enough to
constitute a threat. Lee may have been referring to a business
downturn. However, if he had that in mind, a question arises
as to why he was so defensive about this personal respon-
sibility and why he did not come right out with an explicit
economic exculpation.
Bennett testified that at the beginning of November, he
spoke to Lee about the reduction in work. The full context
of the conversation was not given. According to Bennett’s
uncontradicted testimony, he asked Lee why the work hours
were so ‘‘crazy,’’ and Lee stated that he ‘‘didn’t know what
Sidney Alterman was going to do about the union prob-
lems.’’ The ambiguous answer was unresponsive to the ques-
tion unless it is interpreted, as it can only reasonably be in-
terpreted, that work was purposely depressed because of Sid-
ney Alterman’s reaction to the union organizing effort.
On November 7 at 4:30 p.m. in the dispatch area of the
Burlington terminal, Fischer engaged Van Horn in a con-
versation abut the sudden reduction of his hours because of
a purported lack of work. Fischer suggested by implication
that there was a retaliatory purpose to the drop in his work
assignments. Fischer testified that Van Horn answered: ‘‘Oh,
no, things are slow . . . . We’re not doing that. It is just
slow.’’
Fischer also testified, without explicit contradiction, that
he had several conversations with Lee about the reduction in
his driving assignments wherein Lee answered that he was
‘‘not doing this’’ but was rather ‘‘just following orders.’’
Fischer testified that on Monday, November 19, at 11:30
a.m., he commented to Lee that he looked ill and asked what
was wrong. Lee answered: ‘‘I have been sick all week-
end. . . . I don’t like what I am doing here . . . what they
are asking me to do.’’ Fischer asked how long the depressed
work schedule would persist. Lee answered that he did not
know but that ‘‘things have to pop the next 2 to 3 weeks
because we are in the busy season.’’
Lee only testified to generalized denials. Thus, he testified
that there had been no change to the method of his assign-
ments, that there had been a ‘‘big reduction’’ in pickups and
deliveries in the fall of 1990, that there had been no other
reason for the reduction in driving assignments, and that he
never told the drivers that there had been any other reason.
Lee testified that he was told by Tablas of his intended
resignation because of lack of work about 1 week before that
termination. Tablas resigned on February 8, 1991. Lee denied
having told Tablas that it was not his fault. He did not deny
telling others that the reduction in hours was ‘‘not my fault.’’
Rease, not Tablas, testified to a preresignation conversation
with Lee. Rease resigned on March 15, 1991, because of a
reduction in his work assignments and concomitant lower
pay. He testified to a conversation about that decision about
1 month before he quit.
Wherever there is a direct conflict in testimony between
any other witness and Lee, I discredit Lee. His demeanor,
even in direct examination, revealed a hesitancy, uncertainty,
and guardedness that precluded any sense of candid spon-
taneity. His testimony consisted in large part of categorical
denials and answers to leading questions. He gave every ap-
pearance of being the haunted, guilt-ridden person depicted
by the General Counsel’s witnesses’ testimony. Standing
alone, his remarks and denials of personal responsibility are
arguably ambiguous. Their cumulative effect as to this evi-
dence of unlawful motivation must be evaluated on the total-
ity of the record.
I find that in the context of other union animus and unlaw-
ful coercion by Respondent, Lee’s repeated self-exculpations
of personal responsibility were calculated to imply that a de-
pression in work assignments were retaliation for union ac-
tivities, and thus violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
G. November 14—Fischer/Sidney Alterman
Conversations
Fischer testified that the day before the representation
hearing on November 14, 1990, at 4:30 p.m. at the Bur-
lington terminal dispatch window, in the presence of drivers
Craven and Tablas, he engaged in a conversation with Sid-
ney Alterman initiated over the subject of which of the Bur-
lington drivers will move to the Bridgeport terminal. For the
reasons noted above, I conclude that Craven and Tablas ei-
ther did not witness this confrontation or had confused it
with the November 5 encounter. Again, Sidney Alterman
failed to give a narrative account of that conversation. He
merely responded with categorical denials elicited by coun-
sel. He testified that he would not have made certain state-
ments regarding the Union because his counsel advised him
and was present in the terminal on that date. I will take no-
tice that clients do not universally follow the advice of coun-
sel. In any event, I credit the detailed, narrative of the more
convincing Fischer concerning the reference to the Bur-
lington terminal, which Alterman did not adequately con-
tradict.
As Fischer approached the dispatch window at the Bur-
lington terminal at 4:30 p.m., he encountered Sidney
Alterman who reminded him of the promised jacket and ten-
dered one to him which it turned out did not fit. Alterman
raised the subject of the Bridgeport terminal by saying: ‘‘I
understand that four of you are moving [to Bridgeport]?’’
Fischer answered that he understood that all five local drivers
desired to accept a transfer and that Fischer himself will then
be located only 12 miles from his residence. Alterman said
‘‘good,’’ and then promised to supply them with hats and
coats imported from China and to ‘‘dress us good.’’ Almost
1288 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as an afterthought, Fischer added to his narrative that
Alterman said that he ‘‘will not have any union.’’
In view of Alterman’s stated premise of the resort to
‘‘legal means’’ to frustrate union organizing activity, I do not
find this cryptic remark to constitute a threat of unlawful re-
taliation or threat of unlawful resistance to collective bar-
gaining. In view of the ongoing policy and practice of pro-
viding drivers with articles of clothing at Bridgeport, I again
cannot find the promise of maintaining such a policy at Bur-
lington to constitute an unlawful promise of a benefit.
Thus, as of November 14, Sidney Alterman evidenced a
strong aversion to union representation of the Burlington
drivers but had not yet given any indication that any of them
might be terminated on the transfer to Bridgeport. On the
contrary, he suggested that all five local drivers would be
welcome there, and thus he implied that sufficient work for
them would, or could, continue.
H. November 14—Confrontation with John Alterman
At 5 p.m. on November 14 at the Burlington terminal,
Fischer and John Alterman encountered each other and en-
gaged in a conversation in which the General Counsel alleges
the latter solicited employee grievances and made certain un-
lawful promises. John Alterman is the financial vice presi-
dent and general counsel of Respondent. He has also prac-
ticed real estate, corporate business, and some labor law as
an attorney for 17 years. Although in the terminal earlier, he
was not in the immediate presence of the above-described
conversation between his father Sidney and Fischer. John
Alterman testified that Van Horn had reported to him his ear-
lier conversation with Fischer, including Fischer’s repetitions
of employee complaints and also including the November 5
conversation.
Both Fischer and John Alterman each claim that the other
of them actually initiated the conversation and its location in
a private area. Fischer claims it occurred in a small kitchen.
Alterman says it was in a private office. Alterman testified
that Fischer started to recite the same complaints as reported
by Van Horn. Fischer testified that John Alterman started the
conversation by saying that he had been unaware of the ex-
istence of problems amongst the employees and was at a loss
to understand why but Alterman also stated that he could not
make any promises. Without explicitly being asked to relate
those problems, according to Fischer’s own testimony, he
freely repeated all the complaints he had raised to Van Horn.
Respondent’s assessment of Fischer’s volubility as mani-
fested in the instructions to Van Horn proved to be accurate.
His assertive nature and lack of inhibition led him to fully
detail to Alterman the nature of those complaints. John
Alterman became the listening post that Van Horn was sup-
posed to have been. John Alterman, however, made no
threats. He is alleged to have made promises.
Fischer testified that he told Alterman that though he was
supposed to have been provided health insurance coverage
after his hire, he still had not yet received it. According to
Fischer, Alterman said that he would ‘‘look into it.’’ Fischer
testified that he reminded Alterman that employees are not
paid overtime for certain hours worked over 40 weekly
hours. Alterman testified that Fischer accused Respondent of
violating the law with respect to overtime. Although it is dis-
puted how he phrased it, clearly Alterman responded that he
understood that a privilege existed that exempted perishable
food carriers such as Respondent from certain overtime obli-
gations and that Alterman would review the law to be sure
he was not in violation.
Fischer testified, without contradiction, that he then told
Alterman that he had made his complaints to Van Horn to
no avail and that he did ‘‘not know where else to go.’’
Fischer testified, without contradiction, to the following dis-
course:
John Alterman: You could have come to manage-
ment. You could have picked up the telephone. We
have an open door policy.
Fischer: I am unaware of it.
John Alterman: If anyone stops you let me know.
Aside from Fischer’s cryptic comments to Alterman, there
is no other evidence of the existence or lack of existence of
an ‘‘open door policy.’’ The General Counsel alleges that
Respondent unlawfully promulgated a new policy by John
Alterman. However, Fischer’s ‘‘unawareness’’ is not suffi-
ciently probative of whether anything new was promulgated.
Fischer’s testimony did not detail any further reference to
specific complaints he raised to John Alterman. According to
Fischer, he raised the subject of Gordon Bennett by stating
that there had been a vast improvement in dock problems on
Bennett’s hiring, to which Alterman informed him that Ben-
nett had been discharged because of a conflict with a cus-
tomer.
It is John Alterman’s uncontradicted and thus credible tes-
timony that he not merely said that he could make no prom-
ises but that he also said that he could ‘‘only listen.’’
Alterman testified, without contradiction, that with respect to
Fischer’s complaint that employees were deprived of an ade-
quate lunch period, he interrupted Fischer by telling him of
the existence of a universal companywide policy on a man-
datory lunch period and if he was forced to work through
lunch it would be looked into. The existence or nonexistence
of a lunch policy, like that of the open-door policy, was not
litigated at this trial, and no finding can be made that one
did or did not exist. In any event, Fischer responded to the
proffer ‘‘to look into it’’ that he had already made a specific
complaint to Van Horn prior to known union activities.
With respect to Fischer’s complaint regarding hospitaliza-
tion coverage, John Alterman testified that he only com-
mented that medical costs were rising and made no promise
of any kind. Similarly, with respect to a complaint of low
pay, as with other complaints, he made no promise to take
any specific action except, as noted above, to verify his un-
derstanding of the pertinent wage and hour laws.
I find that the evidence fails to establish that in that con-
versation Respondent deviated from any proven prior policy
nor that it instituted any new policies or practices, including
that of listening to employee complaints. Fischer had aggres-
sively and openly acted as a spokesperson for employee
complaints. He had early confronted Van Horn in this capac-
ity. It is irrelevant whether John Alterman or Fischer raised
the subject of ‘‘problems.’’ Clearly, Fischer was not coerced
nor even explicitly invited to recite again to John Alterman
the very same complaints that he had already conveyed to
Van Horn prior to known union activities. I am unable to
find that John Alderman solicited employee grievances. Both
witnesses gave different accounts of just what area John
1289ALTERMAN TRANSPORT LINES
Alterman intended to ‘‘look into.’’ On this point, I credit
Alterman who was more certain and cohesive in his narra-
tion. Fischer, a forceful and assertive witness, tended to be-
come heated, rushed, and emotional during parts of his testi-
mony and did not convey certitude as to Alterman’s specific
replies to specific complaints. But even under Fischer’s ac-
count, I cannot find that within the context of this conversa-
tion, ‘‘look into’’ a complaint constitutes a promise to effec-
tuate a remedy. ‘‘Look into’’ can also mean a review of past
personnel action which results in a detailed explanation to
the employee as to why that action transpired and not nec-
essarily a change of that action.
I. Dock Supervisor Threats and Interrogation
James Narine, the dock supervisor and admitted agent of
Respondent, did not testify, and I accordingly credit the testi-
mony of the General Counsel’s witnesses as to his conduct
except as noted. Dennis Cryan was employed by C. R. Eng-
land on the dock of the Burlington terminal and worked
along with Respondent’s employees. He testified that in early
November, probably on or about November 5, he had en-
gaged in conversations with Bennett in which Bennett solic-
ited his support for the Union and promised him employment
by the Respondent at the Bridgeport terminal if the Union
were to represent employees there. Several days later, Narine
told Cryan to stay away form union activities or he would
be discharged and repeated that warning several times before
Cryan’s termination by England on November 12. Cryan tes-
tified that Narine did not supervise his activities and was his
personal friend and, moreover, the conversations themselves
were friendly. No context was given for any of these con-
versations. Cryan could not recall who or how the subject of
the Union was raised. Given the uncertainty of Cryan and the
lack of any context for the alleged threat, I cannot premise
a finding of coercive interrogation in what Cryan character-
ized as a friendly conversation of his nonsupervisory friend.
The issue of Respondent’s responsibility for Narine’s state-
ments to Cryan, an employee of England, becomes moot.
Moreover, the threat of employee termination is inconsistent
with subsequent conduct attributed to Narine and therefore
improbable.
Fischer testified that on November 30, while he was walk-
ing toward his vehicle in the Burlington terminal yard,
Narine approached him and complained that the other em-
ployees had ceased talking to him. Fischer responded that it
was ‘‘because of the events with the Union going on that no
one talked to each other anymore.’’ Narine then allegedly in-
terrogated Fischer as to the identity of persons who had at-
tended the union meetings and the reasons for their union ac-
tivity. Fischer testified that he then promptly disclosed to
Narine that all five local drivers and dockworkers had signed
union cars at a meeting on October 28. Narine responded
that although Sidney Alterman opposed union representation,
he would not retaliate against employees by discharging
them because of union activities.
I am unable to credit Fischer’s account of this conversa-
tion. I find it highly improbably that Respondent had not al-
ready ascertained from Fischer the full explanation for the
prounion motivation. It is also most likely that Respondent
already was aware of who supported the Union. Fischer testi-
fied that as early as November 5, Van Horn told him that
there were only ‘‘5 of you,’’ i.e., five local drivers. Further-
more, even if the identity of union supporters was unknown
to Respondent as late as November 30, it is unlikely that
Fischer would have freely disclosed it to the dock supervisor
when he had already refused to make an earlier disclosure
to Terminal Manager Van Horn. Given Fischer’s ‘‘street
wise’’ sophistication, he would only have made such a dis-
closure if it had become common knowledge. By November
14, Bennett had already been discharged as an alleged known
union activist.
In view of my problems with Fischer’s credibility as to his
conversation with Narine, I find it unnecessary to determine
whether if he had been questioned, it would have been done
in a coercive manner, given Narine’s insistence that
Alterman would not discharge any employee because of
union activity. Finally, if the General Counsel is correct as
to allegations of dock loader Bennett’s November 14 dis-
charge, it seems unlikely that Narine would have made a dis-
claimer which would neutralize the coercive impact on other
employees of such a discharge.
J. Bennett’s Discharge
Gordon Bennett was employed as the lead loader at the
Burlington terminal. Respondent, as part of an affirmative
defense, alleged that Bennett was a supervisor and thus not
protected by the Act. In cross-examination, Bennett grudg-
ingly admitted that his position was being cultivated for ulti-
mate supervisory status at the Bridgeport terminal. At most,
the Respondent established that Bennett possessed some de-
gree of responsibility for the loading and unloading of Re-
spondent’s vehicles in which Bennett engaged in the same
physical tasks as those England employees whom he directed
in those functions at the Burlington terminal. Bennett’s re-
sponsibility appears to be in the conveying of instructions to
those loaders as to what item is to be placed on or retrieved
from which vehicle and/or where it is to be placed in the
Burlington terminal. There is no evidence as to whether these
directions involve the slightest application of discretion or
independent judgment. From the record, it cannot be dem-
onstrated that Bennett’s responsibility rises above that of a
routine reading of shipping records and conveying of instruc-
tions based on a predetermined flow of the load consign-
ment. Bennett has not been shown to have responsibility for
or the exercise of matters concerning employee status, com-
pensation, hours of work, or discipline. It is uncontradicted
that Narine possessed those responsibilities. The most that
Respondent has achieved has been to establish that Bennett
was a highly valued employee of enhanced status and super-
visory potential, i.e., not a casual dock worker whose serv-
ices an employer would readily abandon.
Bennett’s solicitation of support for the Union among the
dockworkers was disclosed to Respondent by the happen-
stance of the discharge by England of its dock worker Den-
nis Cryan on November 12, shortly after a November 10
union meeting at Bennett’s home. William McNally is the
east coast manager for C. R. England and is responsible for
the management of its operations at the Burlington terminal.
He discharged Cryan, an employee he described as having
the worse disciplinary record of any of his employees. As a
Respondent witness, McNally testified that he discharged
Cryan by telephone notification on Monday, November 12,
based on a complaint made to him on Thursday, November
8, by Bennett that Cryan had been pilfering goods at the ter-
1290 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
minal. Bennett denied having accused Cryan of stealing.
With respect to the episode of Cryan’s discharge, the testi-
mony of Cryan, a General Counsel witness, conforms more
with the testimony of McNally than it does with Bennett. In
fact, Cryan sharply contradicts Bennett on several crucial
points. I credit Cryan as having the least interested, most de-
tached and more convincing demeanor.
McNally discharged Cryan on Bennett’s accusation of mis-
conduct without independently investigating, not because he
relied on Bennett’s recommendation as a supervisor.
McNally readily believed the accusation because of Cryan’s
alleged past misconduct. Thus, Bennett acted in a super-
visory capacity no more than any other employee who might
have reported the alleged thievery. England’s dock super-
visor, in fact, was Al Zigler with whom Bennett had a recent
work dispute irrelevant to this case.
On Cryan’s discharge on November 12, he testified that he
requested a person-to-person confrontation with McNally,
whom he testified had not proffered a reason for his dis-
charge of which he was notified by telephone. On Tuesday,
November 13, Cryan confronted McNally in person with Van
Horn present. There is some divergence between Cryan and
McNally as to what was said. They are not far apart in sig-
nificant substance. According to McNally, when first notified
of discharge, Cryan urged McNally to investigate by talking
to Van Horn. He explained that Bennett attempted to recruit
Cryan as a prospective Respondent employee at Bridgeport.
Cryan does not contradict this testimony.
At the Tuesday, November 13 confrontation, Cryan admit-
ted that he raised the subject of the Union by asking
McNally whether it was union activity or suspected thievery
that prompted his discharge. He testified that he told
McNally that the union-Bridgeport employment solicitation
with himself and other employees occurred in a ‘‘couple of
conversations’’ during work hours when McNally asked him
when they did. He admitted that he, not McNally, had raised
the subject of proffered employment at Bridgeport and that
he told McNally that 10 minutes of time were involved while
they were idle, awaiting freight. He admitted that he told
McNally the recruitment for Bridgeport employment was
made contingent by Bennett on Cryan’s support for an ongo-
ing union organizing effort for Respondent’s employees.
McNally had summoned Van Horn to the November 13
confrontation. Van Horn’s participation was essentially pas-
sive. According to McNally, Cryan had accused Bennett of
trying to get him fired so he would then have to accept the
Bridgeport solicitation.
McNally testified that after the November 12 telephone
call, he summoned Van Horn to the meeting because he felt
that he might have discharged the wrong person. He testified
that Van Horn asked some followup questions of Cryan in
clarification of the recruitment solicitation. McNally also
confronted Bennett but who, in turn, complained that Van
Horn had ‘‘trumped’’ up the whole incident in order to get
Bennett discharged. McNally testified credibly that the in-
volvement of recruitment of his employees breached a stand-
ing agreement between England and Respondent arising from
prior incidents of attempted recruitment in the summer of
1989 and 1990 by Narine. Respondent had reacted to
McNally’s vehement protests by agreeing to cease such ac-
tivity. Although Narine had not been reprimanded, Respond-
ent agreed in the summer of 1990 that any future breach of
the agreement would result in the discharge of the culpable
Respondent agent.
McNally testified that he interviewed Pittman in Van
Horn’s presence to confirm Cryan’s assertions with respect
to the recruitment effort. He admitted that in the process he
interrogated Pittman as to whether there were and of what
duration were discussions on worktime among the England
dockworkers with Bennett regarding the Union in the context
of future recruitment by Respondent at Bridgeport. McNally
testified that Pittman corroborated Cryan but told McNally
that he ‘‘walked away’’ when Bennett started to discuss the
Union. The General Counsel’s witness, Mark Pittman, an
England dock worker, testified that he was summoned to
Van Horn’s office by McNally and Van Horn. He testified
that McNally explained that he had just discharged Cryan,
but was unsure if he did the ‘‘right thing’’ and wanted to
get to the ‘‘bottom of what was going on.’’ According to
Pittman’s initial testimony, ‘‘they,’’ i.e., ‘‘both between’’
McNally and Van Horn, asked him whether Bennett or
Cryan had approached him on the dock during working hours
and asked him to join a union. But on further examination,
he thought it was McNally who raised Bennett’s name. He
was uncertain and he admitted it. He testified that neither
manager asked about recruitment at Bridgeport. McNally did
not ask whether they were actively working at that moment,
which they were not. He responded that Bennett engaged
him in a 30-second conversation one time during work hours
and told him that Bennett had some union informational ma-
terials in his vehicle for Pittman, if he was interested, after
work.
Pittman and McNally conflict as to what extent Pittman
corroborated Cryan. Pittman testified that he was not asked
by McNally about recruitment for employment at Bridgeport.
Van Horn was not examined by counsel for Respondent as
to the Pittman and Cryan interviews.
The General Counsel alleges that Van Horn’s participation
constitutes unlawful coercive interrogation in violation of the
Act. I do not agree. With respect to Cryan, he was a
nonemployee of either Respondent or England at the time
and it was he who instigated the confrontation and it was he
who raised the subject of the Union’s solicitation. With re-
spect to both interrogations, there was no suggestion that the
rehiring or employment or either employee by England at
that terminal was dependent on Respondent’s pleasure. Re-
spondent’s agent played relatively a passive role. It was
McNally who was the questioning agent exclusively of
Cryan and primarily of Pittman. It was McNally who prof-
fered the reasons to Pittman for the interrogations, i.e., the
reevaluation of the justification for Cryan’s discharge. He did
not ask Pittman anything beyond the time, place, and dura-
tion of Bennett’s solicitation. He limited his inquiry as to
only whether there were conversations during work hours
and the duration of the conversations. In this context, I can-
not find that Respondent is culpable for McNally’s
noncoercive interrogations of either Pittman or Cryan, even
assuming the total accuracy of the General Counsel’s wit-
nesses. However, by that presence, Van Horn acquired acute
awareness of union activity, the nature of which he had ear-
lier threatened Fischer and of which he had been instructed
to investigate in a purportedly noncoercive manner. McNally
testified that although he discussed the recruitment problem
1291ALTERMAN TRANSPORT LINES
with Van Horn, that Van Horn expressed more concern about
the union solicitation.
It is McNally’s subsequent complaint to Respondent of
Bennett’s conduct that is Respondent’s proffered reason for
the discharge of Gordon Bennett. The specific complaint that
McNally made to Respondent, however, is profoundly con-
tradicted by or inconsistent with Respondent’s witnesses
McNally and John Alterman.
There is no basis to discredit McNally’s testimony as to
his past problems with Respondent and his concern for the
loss of able dockworkers. As Sidney Alterman had testified
in the representation hearing, although qualified drivers are
not easily obtained, the larger recruitment problem at the ex-
panded Bridgeport operation was anticipated to be a shortage
of competent dockworkers. That shortage was expected to be
so grave that he planned to utilize drivers for some loading
and unloading functions. Thus nonavailability of competent
dockworkers motivated McNally’s complaint to Respondent.
McNally testified, without contradiction that shortly after
the Cryan-Pittman interviews, which he supplemented with
unspecified further England employee interviews, he engaged
in a long distance joint telephone conference call with Sid-
ney Alterman, John Alterman, and Rick Alterman, John’s
brother, in Opa Locka wherein amidst, ‘‘a lot of hollering’’
he made his complaint. However, McNally testified further
that he forcefully reminded the Altermans that Respondent
was a tenant on sufferance, that McNally needed all his
dockworkers, that he could easily supplant Respondent with
a prospective tenant who was awaiting Respondent’s imme-
diate departure, that Bennett’s recruitment of his personnel
was ‘‘totally contrary to our continued agreement,’’ and that
he hotly demanded that Bennett be taken off the dock where
he worked along with England employees, but that Respond-
ent could ‘‘put [Bennett] wherever you want, [but] not in our
facility.’’
Sidney Alterman’s testimony is conspicuous by its failure
to refer to the decision to discharge Bennett, which was char-
acterized by John Alterman as a collective decision made by
himself, his brother Rick, and his father, Sidney Alterman.
Rick Alterman did not testify. Neither did Frank Van Horn
testify about Bennett’s discharge nor the circumstances of it,
although he was called to testify on other matters and had
been intimately involved with the discharge.
John Alterman acknowledged participation in a telephone
conversation with McNally. He testified in direct examina-
tion that McNally telephoned him to complain that Bennett
was disrupting his work force, disrupting the flow of work
and interfering with his operations by recruiting his workers
during the performance of their duties.’’ As noted above,
McNally limited his complaint in the telephone call to the
Altermans’ breach of the nonrecruiting agreement. He made
no reference in his complaint to any disruption in work, as
indeed, from his own testimony, there appears to have been
no significant impact on actual performance of work by any
England employee by Bennett of any precise description.
McNally testified that his immediate concern was the at-
tempted recruitment and that is what he initially complained
about to Van Horn. It is clear that from his direct testimony,
his complaint was the recruitment of his employees. Only in
cross-examination did he refer to earlier general reports from
supervisors that ‘‘Alterman’’ employees were interrupting the
work flow. He could not recall whether Bennett had been
named to him.
John Alterman testified that his response to McNally was
that ‘‘because of the current union organization going on at’’
Burlington, he would have to consult Respondent’s labor at-
torney. John Alterman admitted in direct examination that
McNally further explained that the recruitment of England
employees related to Bennett’s solicitation on behalf of
‘‘Local 500.’’ J. Alterman testified that before any action
was taken, Respondent ‘‘wanted to be absolutely certain as
we could possibly be’’ about Bennett’s ‘‘interference with
England’s employees.’’ In cross-examination, however, J.
Alterman retracted and then claimed that McNally made no
specific reference to ‘‘Local 500’’ in his complaining tele-
phone call. Embellishing on this stark contradiction, he testi-
fied:
As a matter of fact, I do not think even think, to this
day, I have even heard the word Local 500, come out
of his lips.
He may have said it to somebody else, but not to
me.
Despite the equivocation by J. Alterman, Respondent’s agent,
Van Horn, had been intimately involved in and apprised of
the nature of the alleged recruitment by Bennett and its
intertwinement with solicitation for the Union.
J. Alterman went on further in cross-examination to insist
that McNally’s complaint was that Bennett interfered with
the work performance of McNally’s employees. He then tes-
tified ‘‘I was reluctant to consent, to agree, to what I had
done twice before with him [and I told McNally] I will order
my workers to completely cease recruitment activities with
your workers immediately.’’ Thus, it was in early cross-ex-
amination that J. Alterman implied that McNally was com-
plaining about recruitment instead or in addition to disruption
of work. However, he quickly amended this response by tes-
tifying:
We fired Mr. Bennett for interfering with the course
of work on sharing his dock [sic], at the behest of Mr.
McNally, after he did an investigation involving some
of our people, as well as his own people.
J. Alterman insisted in cross-examination that Bennett was
not discharged simply because McNally demanded his re-
moval from the site pursuant to a no-recruiting agreement.
He explained: ‘‘The Altermans do not like to fall down on
their hands and knees, and abide anybody’s insistence.’’ J.
Alterman also testified that McNally requested not explicit
discharge of Bennett but removal from England’s dockers
because of disruption of work, which Respondent verified.
He testified, ‘‘Through our interviews, with our employees,
and he conducted interviews, and we did, ultimately termi-
nate him for that reason.’’ In further cross-examination, J.
Alterman testified in response to the court’s inquiry as to
whether the breach of the nonrecruitment agreement was the
premise for the discharge. John Alterman testified that
McNally indeed was ‘‘concerned that . . . for the third time
his employees were being recruited by one of our employ-
ees’’ and that Respondent was in a vulnerable position as a
tenant by sufferance, and indeed it was not simply a matter
of disruption of work flow. In further elucidation to the
1292 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
court, J. Alterman went on to describe two telephone com-
plaints made to him by McNally, in contradiction to
McNally’s testimony as to a single joint telephone call. Now
J. Alterman testified that in the first telephone call McNally
made no complaint whatsoever of alleged employment re-
cruitment by Bennett of England employees but limited his
complaint to work flow disruptions and made no suggestion
of any relationship to union organizing efforts. J. Alterman
then testified that it was in that first telephone call that he
suggested to McNally that McNally investigate the matter.
The sequence of events described by J. Alterman at this
point in his testimony is starkly inconsistent with McNally
as well as the thrust of Alterman’s foregoing testimony. In
any event, J. Alterman admitted receiving a full report of
Bennett’s activities from Van Horn after which the recruit-
ment issue was first raised. According to Alterman, Van
Horn, at his orders, had investigated Bennett’s activities and,
on his report but primarily on McNally’s ‘‘confirmation,’’
the termination decision was made. He retracted this testi-
mony somewhat by testifying that he could not testify that
he actually read any of Van Horn’s purported notes of inter-
views with employees.
In redirect examination, J. Alterman testified that it was in
the first telephone call with McNally that the latter demanded
Bennett’s removal from the job. Alterman further embel-
lished his testimony by adding that McNally not only asked
for Bennett’s removal from the England dock but also de-
manded his discharge from employment, clearly a contradic-
tion of McNally’s testimony. J. Alterman’s final statement of
Respondent’s motivation for the discharge of Bennett was
for: ‘‘disrupting work on C. R. England’s dock.’’ He placed
McNally’s first telephone call as November 12 or 13, the in-
vestigating interviews as the same or next day, and the dis-
charge decision as having been made on the morning of No-
vember 14. J. Alterman’s final word in testimony is that
Bennett was not discharged because of a complaint of
McNally but rather because Respondent’s investigation veri-
fied that complaint, i.e., disruption of work on the dock by
Bennett. John Alterman’s testimony is thus revealed to be in-
ternally inconsistent and inconsistent, if not contradictory,
with McNally’s testimony. Furthermore, according to John
Alterman, Bennett was discharged for the disruption of work
by England employees. The record contains insufficient evi-
dence of any significant disruption of work. Van Horn failed
to testify, and there is no probative evidence of any other in-
vestigation by Van Horn other than the interviews of Cryan
and Pittman. McNally’s testimony reveals that his complaint
was that of recruitment, not of any significant disruption of
work by Bennett.
The General Counsel has established Respondent’s deep-
seated, historical opposition to union representation of its
employees manifested in forms of unlawful as well as lawful
conduct. Bennett was known to be a union activist. Despite
his position as a potential supervisor and valued status as a
skilled lead loader, of whom there was to be an anticipated
shortage of at a then-expected imminent new terminal, he
was permanently discharged on disclosure of his union ac-
tivities even though McNally, according to his more credible
testimony, did not even request it. The testimony of Re-
spondent’s witnesses proffered for the motivation of the dis-
charge is inconsistent and/or contradictory. The motivation
cited by Respondent’s decision, disruption of work, has not
been demonstrated by probative evidence. Nor was there any
reasonable basis for Respondent to believe it occurred.
I must find that the General Counsel has sustained the bur-
den of proving that Bennett was discharged, in part if not in
whole, because of his union activities and that Respondent
has not sustained the burden of showing that Bennett would
have been discharged even in the absence of those protected
activities. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
K. Reduction of Work and Constructive Discharge
It is not disputed that 1 week after the November 5 filing
of the representation petition the assignment of work hours
to the drivers and warehouse employees suffered a sharp,
precipitous decline. The driving assignments remained at a
depressed level and impacted the earnings of the drivers to
the extent that Rease and Tablas notified Respondent that
they could not afford to remain under its employ unless their
earnings were restored. Tablas and Rease unilaterally were
forced to seek other employment on February 8 and March
16, respectively.
The General Counsel alleges that the reduction in driving
assignments was an act of discriminatory retaliation cal-
culated to coerce the employees to abandon their union sup-
port, or to force the prounion local drivers out of the termi-
nal. The General Counsel adduced evidence as to post-No-
vember 5 instances of local driver inactivity at times when
over-the-road drivers performed local pickups and deliveries
to customers previously serviced by the local drivers.
Concurrent with the ongoing local drivers’ complaints
about their reduction of driving assignments, Respondent
continued manifesting its hostility to the Union. The Board-
conducted election, now deferred to this litigation, was being
processed. On May 5, according to Fischer’s unobjected to
and more credible testimony, he engaged Van Horn in an-
other discussion as to the reduction in driving assignments
and a pay raise he had expected but not received. Van Horn
answered that Respondent would not give him a pay raise in
the face of a pending election petition. (There is no com-
plaint allegation as to the pay raise issue and the cir-
cumstances of its deferral was not litigated.) With respect to
the depressed work hours, Fischer told Van Horn that it was
Ojeda’s opinion that after August 7 (the expected election
date) everything will return to normal, i.e., the lost assign-
ments would be restored. Van Horn responded that it would
not and, further, if Respondent lost the election that it would
‘‘drag it out some more.’’ They then discussed the election
and the Union’s fear that Respondent might try to utilize
temporary employees to pack the ballot box. Fischer said he
would be a union observer, and he intended to challenge any
temporary employee who attempted to vote. Van Horn told
him that by being an observer Fischer placed himself in a
vulnerable position and reminded him that the Union did not
pay his mortgage or put food on his table. Van Horn then
warned him to use his ‘‘discretion’’ as to volunteering to be
the Union’s observer. Thus, Van Horn continued to threaten
retaliation for union activity in the context of the discussion
of reduced worktime and implied that the reduction in as-
signments were punitive. I discredit Van Horn’s generalized
categorical denials. Although not alleged, this conduct is vio-
lative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and constitutes further
1293ALTERMAN TRANSPORT LINES
implication to an employee that the reduced driving assign-
ments are the result of their union activities.
The Respondent herein has reduced the driving hours of
the Burlington local drivers almost immediately on learning
of their union activities. The drastic downturn in work came
at a time when Respondent was claiming that a five local
driver unit was not appropriate because even such a small
unit was ‘‘expanding.’’ The representation hearing record
discloses at least three different scenarios of the employment
level of local drivers to be imminent upon the then soon ex-
pected move to Bridgeport. Sidney Alterman provided a
shifting and inconsistent prognosis of expected local driver
employment levels. The precipitous drop in work assigned to
the five pro-union local drivers and dock loaders was accom-
panied by a display of animosity to union representation in-
clusive of interrogations and explicit and implicit threats. By
the conduct of dispatcher Lee and the conduct of Manager
Van Horn, Respondent gave a calculated impression to the
drivers that the reduction in work was retaliatory. Simulta-
neously, one of the more visible union adherents was dis-
charged for clearly pretextual reasons. Against the foregoing
background, non-Burlington drivers were observed in driving
assignments previously undertaken by the alleged
discriminatees. The evidence thus constituted raises a very
strong prima facie showing that Respondent, for retaliatory
nonbusiness reasons, depressed the work assigned to the
local drivers and dock loaders. As Sidney Alterman had testi-
fied at one point in the representation petition, an increase
of work could be absorbed by Respondent at Bridgeport with
fewer local drivers by adopting means of delivery and driver
compensation not utilized at Burlington. He suggested that
Respondent throughout its system had a variety of means of
moving the higher tonnage with fewer drivers. The burden
of proof shifts to Respondent. Wright Line, supra. Indeed, it
is a heavy burden within the context of the foregoing evi-
dence to prove that the hours of the work drivers would nec-
essarily have been reduced in the specific amounts actually
reduced for the local drivers because of economic reasons,
regardless of their union activities. The massive evidence
marshalled against Respondent in this case behooves it to
prove with precise, probative, convincing testimony and spe-
cific documentation that the Burlington employees’ loss of
hours was attributed to clear, specific economic factors. This
is particularly so given the vulnerability of the credibility of
its witnesses and the enigmatic, shifting testimony of Sidney
Alterman in the representation petition and his vague, gener-
alized references to a ‘‘loss of business’’ in both cases.
Sidney Alterman’s testimony and that of Operations Man-
ager William Culberson make passing reference on cross-ex-
amination to certain customers who cancelled orders. Some
of those businesses clearly are only of peripheral significance
to Respondent’s overall business. No data was produced to
reveal the precise tonnage loss for any specific customers.
No business records were produced to reveal the precise fi-
nancial status or volume sales for either the Burlington termi-
nal nor any other terminal. No records were proffered that
might have provided comparative data either between termi-
nals or as to seasonal fluctuations. No precise information
was adduced by Respondent that might demonstrate why Re-
spondent’s glowing economic expectations had suddenly
soured. Clearly the aberration was localized, as Sidney
Alterman admitted that Respondent’s overall operations for
November were ‘‘very good.’’
Respondent’s economic defense rests on its assertion that
documentary evidence reveals that the tonnage into and out
of the Burlington terminal jurisdiction for the relevant time
period conclusively shows a uniform reduction of driving as-
signments for all drivers, i.e., Burlington hourly drivers and
non-Burlington over-the-road drivers servicing the area.
It is admitted that nonhourly paid drivers on occasion in
the past had been assigned local pickup and delivery in con-
junction with work that brought them into the Burlington ter-
minal jurisdiction. However, it is clear from dispatcher Lee’s
pretrial affidavit that he always looked first to available local
hourly drivers for local service. In his unconvincing, often
leading examination by Respondent counsel, which I do not
find credible, he sought to mitigate his affidavit testimony by
referring to circumstances where this policy was not always
followed. However, neither he nor Culberson, when exam-
ined in reference to instances after November 5 of local serv-
ice by road drivers, could with any precision explain what
specific factors compelled the deviation from general prac-
tice. Rather, the answers were laden with such qualifications
as ‘‘probably,’’ ‘‘maybe’’ and ‘‘might.’’
Respondent’s documentation of the actual status of post-
November tonnage picked up and delivered in the Burlington
jurisdiction would have been of some probative force had it
established clearly and convincingly the exact inflow and
outflow of all such tonnage by all possible means. Given
Sidney Alterman’s representation case testimony that Re-
spondent had various means of moving increased local ton-
nage with fewer drivers, the actual documentation relied on
by Respondent must be scrutinized with the utmost caution
and suspicion.
Respondent did not adduce delivery manifests that would
have documented all deliveries in the Burlington jurisdiction
whether it be dispatched from Burlington, Hackensack, Char-
lotte, Winterhaven, Pittsburgh, or any of its 18 terminals. The
delivery documentation (MDE forms) adduced by Respond-
ent, and upon which it relied for its summarizations and
analysis, admittedly referred to service runs of nonhourly
paid drivers, whereas Alterman and Culberson admitted that
mileage paid drivers were often paid hourly rates when en-
gaged in local service. Thus, there is no documentation of
the number of over-the-road drivers who made local delivery
service on an hourly compensation basis. Similarly, the pick-
up documentation (D-10 forms) would have disclosed all
possible pickups had they been all adduced. Culberson ad-
mitted, however, that all were not necessarily produced. He
testified that at best the ‘‘greater majority of pickups will
have a corresponding D-10 [documentation].’’
Because of the confusing morass of shipping records, the
complexity of recorded data and the admitted flexibility of
the ability to move larger tonnage with fewer drivers where,
according to Sidney Alterman, Respondent has a will to do
so, even the limited documentation of all possible local serv-
ice by all possible drivers would have required a convincing,
irrefutable, highly credibly foundation. Respondent’s unlaw-
ful coercion of its employees, inclusive of the discharging of
a valued lead loader to the detriment of its own economic
self-interest demands, such a rigorous test. Respondent’s lack
of veracity as to its motivations with respect to that discharge
and other areas of its low credibility reinforce that conclu-
1294 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
sion. However, Respondent has failed to adduce even that
level of documentation. Accordingly, I conclude that Re-
spondent has failed to sustain its burden of proof, and I find
that it reduced the driving assignments and consequently the
income of its local hourly paid drivers and dock loaders for
unlawful retaliatory motivations in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I further find that Respondent en-
gaged in that conduct with the awareness and expectation
that it would force the termination of at least two more
prounion employees, Tablas and Rease. I find that the reduc-
tion in income effectuated by Respondent is sufficient to
constitute such onerous conditions as to effectuate a con-
structive discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act as alleged in the complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. As found above, Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act, and the Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. As found above, the Respondent, at its former Bur-
lington terminal, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coer-
cively interrogating employees about their union activities,
by threatening them with discharge and other unspecified re-
prisals because of their union activities, and by directly or
indirectly telling employees that their work hours were re-
duced because of their union activities.
3. As found above, Respondent, at its former Burlington
terminal, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by dis-
charging employee Gordon Bennett on November 14, 1990;
and by on and after November 5, 1990, reducing the work
hours of its hourly paid drivers and dock loaders and thereby
causing the constructive discharge of employees Richard
Tablas on February 8, 1991, and Perry Rease on March 16,
1991, because of the employees’ support and assistance on
behalf of the Union.
4. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act,
I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully discharged em-
ployees Gordon Bennett, Richard Tablas, and Perry Rease
and reduced the work hours of its Burlington hourly drivers
and dock loaders, I shall recommend that Respondent be or-
dered to offer those discharged employees immediate and
full reinstatement to their former positions or, if those posi-
tions no longer exists, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privi-
leges, and to make them and all its Burlington hourly paid
drivers and dock loaders whole for any loss of earnings suf-
fered as a result of its unlawful conduct by payment of a
sum equal to that which they would have earned absent the
discrimination, with the backpay and interest computed in ac-
cordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Co.,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), and with interest thereon to be com-
puted in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). I shall also recommend that
any reference to the terminations be expunged from their em-
ployment records.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., Bur-
lington, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Coercively interrogating employees as to union sym-
pathies and activities.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge or unspecified
reprisals because of their union activities.
(c) Telling employees directly or indirectly that their work
hours were reduced because of their union activities.
(d) Discharging employees or reducing the work hours of
employees because of their activities on behalf of Food Driv-
ers, Helpers and Warehousemen Employees Local 500 a/w
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO.
In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer those employees whom it unlawfully discharged,
Gordon Bennett, Richard Tablas, and Perry Rease, immediate
and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if those
positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and
privileges, and make them and all Burlington terminal hourly
paid drivers and dock loaders whose work hours were unlaw-
fully reduced whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a
result of its unlawful conduct in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this decision, and expunge any reference
of the discharge from the work record of Gordon Bennett.
(b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other
(c) Post at its Bridgeport, New Jersey terminal copies of
the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’3 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized rep-
resentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
1295ALTERMAN TRANSPORT LINES
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that all allegations in the
complaint not found violative of the Act in this decision are
dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees as to
union sympathies and activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge or un-
specified reprisals because of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT tell employees directly or indirectly that
their work hours were reduced because of their union activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT discharge employees or reduce the work
hours of employees because of their activities on behalf of
Food Drivers, Helpers and Warehousemen Employees Local
500 a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer those employees whom we unlawfully dis-
charged, Gordon Bennett, Richard Tablas, and Perry Rease,
immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or,
if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights
and privileges, and make them and all Burlington terminal
hourly paid drivers and dock loaders whose work hours were
unlawfully reduced whole for any loss of earnings suffered
as a result of our unlawful conduct, and expunge any ref-
erence of the discharge from the work record of Gordon
Bennett.
ALTERMAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC.