Allied Barton Security Service, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Oct 24, 2014

07-CA-093970 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 24, 2014)

JD–60–14
Dearborn, MI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ALLIED BARTON SECURITY SERVICES LLC
Respondent Employer
and CASES 07-CA-093970
07-CA-094197
LOCAL NO. 1, UNITED PROTECTIVE WORKERS OF 07-CA-098547
AMERICA 07-CA-100217
Respondent Union 07-CA-103476
and CASES 07-CB-093332
07-CB-093740
JOHN CLARK, an Individual 07-CB-098190
07-CB-100242
07-CB-103508
and
KARISSA THOMPSON, an Individual
and
LESLIE SMITH, an Individual
Robert Buzaitis, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Matthew Crawford, Esq., of Atlanta, Georgia,
for the Respondent Employer.
James R. Andary, Esq., of Mt. Clements, Michigan,
for the Respondent Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Eric M. Fine, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Detroit, Michigan on
June 4, 2014, without the calling of any witnesses. The record was opened via conference call
in the presence of a court reporter, wherein the parties entered into evidence a written
stipulation, as well as certain agreed upon exhibits.1 Charging Party John Clark filed the charge

1 The hearing was left open solely for the Union to tender Union Exh. 1, which has been
done and is admitted into evidence thereby closing the record.
JD–60–14
2
in case 07-CB-093332 against Local No. 1, United Protective Workers of America (Respondent
Union or the Union) on November 15, 2012; and Clark filed the charge in case 7-CA-93970
against Allied Barton Security Service, Inc. (Respondent Employer or Allied Barton) on
November 28, 2012.2 The General Counsel issued an Order Further Consolidating Cases,
Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing on June 28, 2013.3 The issues presented as 5
framed in the General Counsel’s post-hearing brief are:
1. Whether the Union failed to provide Clark the required apportionment of expenditures
after he objected to payment of dues and fees for non-representational activities?
2. Whether Allied Barton and the Union maintained an unlawful dues deduction form?10
3. Whether the Union demanded dues without appropriately advising employees of their
rights, without a valid union-security clause, and/or prior to the statutory 30-day period
after execution of a contractually valid union-security clause?
4. Whether the appropriate remedy is for Allied Barton and the Union to return all dues
received from September 2012 to the present?15
On the entire record, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, Allied
Barton, and the Union, I make the following:
Findings of Fact20
I. Jurisdiction
Allied Barton, a corporation, with an office and place of business in Conshohocken,
Pennsylvania, has been engaged in providing security and protective services to various firms 25
and institutions located throughout the United Stated, including Ford Motor Company facilities in
Dearborn, Michigan. In conducting business operations during calendar year ending December
31, 2012, Allied Barton performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for various commercial
enterprises located in states other than Michigan. At all material times, Allied Barton has been
engaged in commerce under Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor 30
organization under Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
The following employees of Allied Barton constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes 35
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All protective service officers including all lobby receptionist officers,
mobile patrol officers, foot patrol officers, access point officers, fire
compliance officers and risk reduction officers employed by 40
Respondent Employer at the Ford Motor Company facilities described
in the Respondents’ collective bargaining agreement; but excluding
training instructors, office, clerical employees and supervisors as
defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.
45

2 All dates are in 2012 unless otherwise indicated.
3 As reflected in the parties’ stipulation, and as a result of a settlement agreement entered
into prior to the opening of the record, the General Counsel withdrew paragraphs 10, 14 through
23, 26, 27, and 30 from the consolidated complaint.
JD–60–14
3
On about July 1, 2011, Allied Barton recognized the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of the unit employees described above. During the period July 1, 2011, through
December 31, 2012, Allied Barton and the Union did not have a collective-bargaining agreement
in effect.
5
On May 14, union secretary-treasurer Madeline Stokes sent a letter to employee John
Clark. The letter stated:
It is with concern that I send this reminder. The U.P.W.A. appreciates your
membership and contribution to the unit. However, our records indicate that you are 10
$350 delinquent on your dues.
Should the status reach or currently be at sixty (60) days you will become a member
“not in good standing” (without any rights or privileges). Our ability to defend and/or
represent you is dependent upon your willingness to pay your dues.
15
On August 6, Stokes sent an email to around 40 members of the bargaining unit,
including charging Party Karissa Thompson stating:
Dear Union Members,
Your union dues for the month of August are soon approaching. Your dues are due on 20
August 10, 2012. You will have until Thursday August 16, 2012 to pay the sum of
$35.00 or $110.00 if you are still paying initiation fees. Please come see your UPWA
Secretary/Treasurer to make your payment I am located in Building 6 from 7am -3pm
Mon-Fri). If you have any questions or further concerns please feel free to contact me…
25
On September 24, Stokes sent a letter to Thompson stating as follows:
It is with concern, and that I send this notice to you. The U.P.W.A. appreciates your
membership and contribution to the unit. However, our records indicate that your dues
are in a delinquent status now at (60) days past due, which makes you a member “not in 30
good standing” (without rights or privileges). Our ability to defend and or represent you
is dependent upon your willingness to pay your dues.
In November 2012 Allied Barton issued the following posting to bargaining unit
members:35
ECC Post Openings
There is a level 1 post open for the ECC on the midnight shift. All level one officers,
in good standing with the Union interested in this position should contact their committee
person, shift supervisor and Site Supervisor by the close of business Thursday, 40
November 8th, 2012.
Only current level 1 officers in good standing with the Union are eligible for this
position.
The shift change will be effective Friday, November 9, 2012.
Site Supervisor Union President45
Geoffrey Campau William Hester
As represented by Allied Barton’s counsel at the hearing, the same position was
reposted in April 2013, following the issuance of the initial complaint in this matter. This posting
was submitted into evidence and reads as follows:50
JD–60–14
4
LEVEL 1 SHIFT BID OPENING
There is one opening for shift preference for all level 1 officer 36 hours. Only level 1
officers are eligible to apply.
The opening is on Nights 36 hours (11 pm-7 am) with working Saturday’s (11 pm
Friday to 11 am Saturday).5
If you are interested in the shift opening please notify your shift supervisor, shift
committee person and Geoffrey Campau no later than Wednesday, April 24, 2013.
The Officer awarded the shift preference will be selected by seniority. The shift
change will be effective Friday, April 26, 2013.
Site Supervisor Union President10
Geoffrey Campau William Hester
On January 4, 2013, Clark sent Hester a letter with the subject: “Opting out of United
Protective Workers of America Union Local # 1.” Clark stated he was choosing at that time to
opt out of the Union. He stated, “As I indicated back in June 2012, I have since learned I should 15
submit this format to ensure you are made aware of my intentions to not be an active member
of” the Union. Clark stated he was willing to pay what is sometimes called an administration
fee. By the terms of the letter it was sent by email and hand delivered to Hester, Stokes, and
Gary Wellman, the district manager.
20
Allied Barton and the Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement dated
January 30, 2013, and effective by its terms January 1, 2013 to June 30, 2015. At all material
times since January 1, 2013, the Union and Allied Barton have maintained and enforced a
collective-bargaining agreement covering the terms and conditions of employment of the Unit,
including the following union-security provisions:25
Section 1: Requirement of Union Membership. Employees are covered by
this Agreement at the time it becomes effective and who are members of the
Union at the time shall be required as a condition of continued employment to
continue membership in the Union for the duration of this Agreement. 30
Employees covered by this Agreement who are not members of the Union at the
time this Agreement becomes effective shall be required as a condition of
continued employment to become members of the Union or within ten days after
the 30th day following such to become members of the Union or within ten days
after the 30th day following such effective date. Employees hired, rehired, 35
reinstated or transferred into the Bargaining Unit after the effective date of this
Agreement and covered by this Agreement shall be required as a condition of
continued employment to become members of the Union on or within ten days
after the 30th day following the beginning of their employment. An Employee who
shall tender the initiation fees (if not already a member) and the periodic dues 40
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership shall be
deemed to meet this condition. The Company shall grant all newly hired
employees who are to be in the Bargaining Unit up to two hours of paid release
time for orientation by the Union President of his designee. The Union President
of his designee shall likewise be granted up to two hours of paid release time to 45
orient newly hired Union members.
Section 2: Discharge for Failure to Tender Dues or Initiation Fees:
Employees to whom membership in the Union is denied or whose membership is
terminated by the Union by reason of the failure or refusal of the Employee to
tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, or reinstatement fees (equal to/greater or 50
less than the initiation fee) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
JD–60–14
5
retaining membership shall not be retained in the Bargaining Unit. No Employee
shall be terminated under this Article, however, unless:
a. The Union first has notified the Employee by letter addressed to the Employee
at the address last known to the Union concerning the Employee's delinquency in
not tendering the periodic dues and initiation fees required under this Section, 5
and warning the Employee that unless such dues, initiation fees, or other fees
are tendered within seven days the Employee will be reported to the Company
for termination from the Bargaining Unit as provided herein; and
b. Notice to the Employee as provided hereinabove includes information as to the
amount of delinquency in dues and/or initiation fees; and10
c. The Union has furnished the Company with written proof that the foregoing
procedure has been followed but the Employee has not complied, and on this
basis the Union has requested in writing that the Employee be discharged from
the Bargaining Unit.4
15
On February 13, 2013, Stokes sent Clark a letter by regular and certified mail stating, “It
is with great concern that I send this letter to you. According to the U.P.W.A. records, as of the
date of this letter your delinquent dues equal $810.” The letter stated:
In accordance with Article IX, Section 6 of the Constitution and By-Laws which state as 20
follows:
Should you currently be, or herein after the adoption of this amendment dated June
18, 2012 become thirty (30) days past your due date, you will be delinquent, and a
notice mailed.
At sixty (60) days past your due date, you will be considered a member not in good 25
standing (without any rights or privileges of the U.P.W.A.) and a notice will be mailed.
At ninety (90) days past due, your membership will be automatically terminated and
must be paid in full (lump sum) to include an (re)initiation fee of six hundred ($600)
dollars whichever is greater upon your first day of return to duty.
30
The letter went on to state:
In accordance with the contract between the U.P.W.A. and Allied Barton Article III,
Section 1 which states as follows:
Requirement of Union Membership. Employees covered by this agreement at the 35
time it becomes effective and who are members of the Union at the time shall be
required as a condition of employment to continue membership in the Union for the
duration of this agreement. Employees covered by this agreement who are not
members of the Union at the time of this Agreement becomes effective shall be required
as a condition of continued employment to become members of the Union on or within 40
ten (10) days after the 30th day following such effective date.

4 The collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and Guardsmark, a prior employer
for this bargaining unit running from July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, contained identical language
to section 2 of the above union security provision as well as that in section 2(a) and (c) of the
provision with one change to section 2(c) stating that instead of being discharged from the
bargaining unit as reflected above, the employee would be discharged as contained in the 2005
agreement version. The same language pertaining to section 2 in the 2005 Guardsmark
agreement was contained in the 2001 and 1998 agreements for this bargaining unit for
contracts with the Union directly with Ford Motor Company.
JD–60–14
6
On February 22, 2013, Hester sent Thompson a letter regarding “Financial Core
Membership.” The letter stated:
As a financial core member of the UPWA you are obligated to pay the Union
Service fees that relate to collective bargaining, contract administration, 5
grievance administration and adjustment and other fees and costs that relate to
the Union’s chargeable duties.
Accordingly you are obligated to pay all initiation fees and monthly charges of
$35. You are required to be current on these fees. If you have any further
questions please direct them to the Union and in writing.510
The parties stipulated that the Union did not advise employees of their rights
under NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963), during the period September 1,
2012, through April 30, 2013.
15
The General Counsel entered into evidence approximately 21 documents signed
by employees between January 11 and June 9, 2013, reading:
United Protective Workers of America
Employee Authorization for Payroll Deduction of Union Security Dues and/or20
Service Fees
I understand that because I am employed by the Company in a classification
represented by the United Protective Workers of America, I am subject to the
provisions of the Recognition Clause of the Labor Agreement between the 25
Company and the Union applicable to my classification, pursuant to the
Recognition Clause: I hereby authorize the Company to deduct from my monthly
earnings a sum, as the Company, in a manner to be determined, is advised from
time to time by the Secretary Treasurer of the United Protective Workers of
America to be due the Union under the terms of the Union Constitution and 30
Bylaws, and to remit this amount to the Secretary Treasurer, such sum to be full
payment of monthly membership dues or as fees equal to the sum required of a
Union Member. The appropriate amount of this deduction will be taken out of the
pay period of each month. This authorization shall be irrevocable; this
authorization shall automatically terminate in the event of the termination of the 35
collective-bargaining agreement between the Company and the United Protective
Workers of America, or in the event that my employment with the Company is
terminated.
I further understand that entitlement to receive the “lump sum payment under
contract ratification” and entitlement to the waiver of the obligation to pay union 40
dues for the period prior to January 1, 2013, is conditioned upon granting of
consent and authorization to the Company to deduct the requisite initiation fee or
reinstatement fee, as applicable. In consideration thereof, I hereby consent and
authorize the Company, Allied Barton, to deduct from the “lump sum payment
upon contract ratification” the amount of45
Specified amounts to be deducted from the lump sum payment were handwritten into
each of the forms ranging from 0 to $600.

5 This letter is not listed in any of the remaining complaint paragraphs.
JD–60–14
7
The General Counsel entered into evidence three other signed forms, dated
between June 10 to October 31, 2013,6 reading:
United Protective Workers of America Local No. 1-Box 2277
Dearborn, Michigan 481235
I, the undersigned, ask the Allied Barton Security Services, to deduct from
succeeding paychecks the sum of $75 per month until the full initiation fee of
$600 is paid in full to the United Protective Workers of America, (Local No. 1). I
also understand that an additional $35 per month will be deducted from my pay 10
for my monthly union dues.
I further understand and agree that should the above Company and or any
named company (Ford Motor Company or contracted) herein after, not deduct
said amount, I am solely/personally responsible to pay in full any and all past
fees and or past dues owed to the United Protective Workers of America, (Local 15
No. 1), in accordance to its Constitution and Bylaws in which I have received,
read, understand, and agree to. ‘
From at least February 6, 2013 to at least August 23, 2013, Allied Barton deducted dues
and initiation fees from employees paychecks.20
The General Counsel entered into evidence a position statement to the Region
dated February 7, 2013, filed by Union Attorney James R. Andary stating:
William Hester, although not certain of the dates, would have indicated to the 25
member that they had to pay their dues and be a member of the Union because
the Collective Bargaining Agreement provided for a closed shop. The alternative
that was provided to him was that if you didn’t want to work at a Union site, the
Company would be notified to see if they could find a non-union site at which he
could work. 30
The position statement by its terms was copied to Hester.
A. Analysis
35
1. The Union failed to provide Clark the required apportionment of expenditures after he
objected to payment of dues and fees for non-representational activities.
On May 14, Union Secretary-Treasurer Stokes sent employee Clark, a letter stating
Clark was $350 delinquent in his dues. Clark was told if this status reached 60 days he was in 40
danger of becoming a member “not in good standing” (without any rights or privileges). Clark
was told “Our ability to defend and/or represent you is dependent upon your willingness to pay
your dues.”
On January 4, 2013, Clark sent Union President Hester a letter with the subject: “Opting 45
out of United Protective Workers of America Union Local # 1.” Clark stated he was choosing to
opt out of the Union. He stated, “As I indicated back in June 2012, I have since learned I should
submit this format to ensure you are made aware of my intentions to not be an active member

6 The General Counsel represents in its brief that six of these forms were entered into
evidence, but there were only three in the bound version of the exhibits.
JD–60–14
8
of” the Union. Clark stated he was willing to pay an administration fee. The letter was copied to
Stokes and Wellman, the district manager.
Allied Barton and the Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement on
January 30, 2013, containing a union security provision. The agreement stated it was 5
effective January 1, 2013 to June 30, 2015.
On February 13, 2013, Stokes sent Clark a letter stating, “It is with great concern that I
send this letter to you. According to the U.P.W.A. records, as of the date of this letter your
delinquent dues equal $810.” The letter stated:10
In accordance with Article IX, Section 6 of the Constitution and By-Laws which state as
follows:
Should you currently be, or herein after the adoption of this amendment dated June
18, 2012 become thirty (30) days past your due date, you will be delinquent, and a 15
notice mailed.
At sixty (60) days past your due date, you will be considered on member not in good
standing (without any rights or privileges of the U.P.W.A.) and a notice will be mailed.
At ninety (90) days past due, your membership will be automatically terminated and
must be paid in full (lump sum) to include an (re)initiation fee of six hundred ($600) 20
dollars whichever is greater upon your first day of return to duty.
The letter went on to state:
In accordance with the contract between the U.P.W.A. and Allied Barton Article III, 25
Section 1 which states as follows:
Requirement of Union Membership. Employees covered by this agreement at the
time it becomes effective and who are members of the Union at the time shall be
required as a condition of employment to continue membership in the Union for the
duration of this agreement. Employees covered by this agreement who are not 30
members of the Union at the time of this Agreement becomes effective shall be required
as a condition of continued employment to become members of the Union on or within
ten (10) days after the 30th day following such effective date.
In Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 4, (Safeway, Inc.), 353 NLRB 469, 470 35
(2008),7 the Board stated:
In California Saw, the Board held that a union breaches its duty of fair representation if it
fails to inform unit employees of their Beck rights. Supra, 320 NLRB at 233. The Board
also held that once an employee objects to paying dues for nonrepresentational 40
activities and seeks a reduction in fees for such activities, the employee must be
apprised of the percentage of the reduction, the basis for the calculation, and the right to
challenge the union's figures. Id. To ascertain whether the information given objectors
satisfies the union's duty of fair representation, the Board assesses whether the
information is sufficient to enable the objector to determine whether to challenge the 45
dues reduction calculations. Id. at 239. In KGW Radio, the Board required that such
expenditure information be audited “within the generally accepted meaning of the term,

7 The Board’s two member panel decision here was subsequently adopted following a New
Process Steel remand by the Board at Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 4,
(Safeway, Inc.), 355 NLRB 634 (2010).
JD–60–14
9
in which the auditor independently verifies that the expenditures claimed were actually
made rather than accepts the representations of the union.”[FN6] See KGW Radio, supra,
327 NLRB at 477.
In Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 4, supra, the Board concluded the union 5
failed to provide an objecting employee sufficiently verified expenditure information, and
therefore violated its duty of fair representation under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The Board
ordered the union, for all accounting periods covered by the complaint, to provide the objecting
employee with information concerning the union’s expenditures that had been verified by an
independent auditor. The Board stated if the employee, with reasonable promptness after 10
receiving this information, challenges the dues reduction calculation for any such accounting
period, the union was required to process such challenge as it would otherwise have done, in
accordance with the principles set forth in California Saw & Knife, 320 NLRB 224 (1995).
Here, the evidence shows Clark filed on January 4, 2013, a letter with the Union stating 15
he was opting out of the Union and it was his intent not to be an active member, but that he was
willing to pay an administration fee. On January 30, 2013, Allied Barton and the Union entered
into a collective-bargaining agreement containing a union security provision. The collective-
bargaining agreement, although signed on January 30, stated it was effective date of January 1,
2013. On February 13, 2013, the Union sent Clark a letter citing the contractual union security 20
clause and informed Clark he was delinquent in his dues in the amount of $810. The Union
cited to Clark provisions of the Union’s constitution containing the consequences of his
delinquency including his becoming a member not in good standing as well as the eventual
termination of his membership. The facts reveal the Union never acknowledged Clark’s objector
status, nor provided him with any information concerning the breakdown of its dues in terms of 25
the percentage of the reduction in fees for objecting nonmembers for chargeable and non-
chargeable expenses, the verified basis for the union’s calculation and the right to challenge
these figures and by failing to do so it violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.8 Thus, I find that
the Union is barred from enforcing the contractual union security clause against Clark and all
similarly situated employees until and such time as it provides them with an independently 30
verified break down of its dues structure for chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, and a
breakdown of his current and past dues obligation under that assessment dating back only to a
40 day period after January 30, 2013, which is 40 days after the Union entered into its
collective-bargaining agreement with Allied Barton. In this regard, under the collective-
bargaining agreement, the Union was only entitled to demand dues from Clark as a condition of 35
his employment for the time period following 40 days after the effective date of the contractual
union security clause. The Union is also required to inform Clark of an appeals process for
Clark to challenge the Union’s calculations, and a reasonable time to challenge the Union’s
accounting should he desire to do so.9

8 Although not specifically alleged in the complaint on February 22, 2013, Hester sent
Thompson a letter regarding “Financial Core Membership.” The letter acknowledged
Thompson’s status as a financial core member, but did not inform her of her right to
object to paying full membership dues, provide her with a verified breakdown of the
Union’s dues structure pertaining to the Union’s claims as to the amount she owed, nor a
means for her to appeal the Union’s calculations. I find the Union’s conduct pertaining to
Thompson to have been fully litigated, similar in nature to that pertaining to Clark, and
also violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
9 In this regard, the contractual union security clause provides for an additional 10 day grace
period to the statutory 30 day grace period for nonmember payments to the Union. Thus, as I
explain in a later section of this decision, the union security clause was only effective for
JD–60–14
10
2. The Union issued and Allied Barton accepted and implemented a dues check off
authorization form that did not meet the requirements of Section 302(c)(4) of the Labor
Management Relations Act.
5
Section 302(c)(4) of the Labor Management Relations Act states a dues
authorization, “shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the
termination date of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, whichever occurs
sooner.” The General Counsel contends, without citing any case authority, that certain
of the Union’s dues authorization forms state they are irrevocable without stating the 10
irrevocability period does not exceed one year as required by Section 302(c)(4) therefore
Allied Barton and the Union have violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act, respectively, by maintaining invalid dues deduction forms.
The General Counsel entered into evidence approximately 21 documents signed 15
by employees dated between January 11 and June 9, 2013, reading, “United Protective
Workers of America Employee Authorization for Payroll Deduction of Union Security
Dues and/or Service Fees.” The dues authorization form reads, in part:
I hereby authorize the Company to deduct from my monthly earnings a sum, as 20
the Company, in a manner to be determined, is advised from time to time by the
Secretary Treasurer of the United Protective Workers of America to be due the
Union under the terms of the Union Constitution and Bylaws, and to remit this
amount to the Secretary Treasurer, such sum to be full payment of monthly
membership dues or as fees equal to the sum required of a Union Member. The 25
appropriate amount of this deduction will be taken out of the pay period of each
month. This authorization shall be irrevocable; this authorization shall
automatically terminate in the event of the termination of the collective-bargaining
agreement between the Company and the United Protective Workers of America,
or in the event that my employment with the Company is terminated.30
I further understand that entitlement to receive the “lump sum payment under
contract ratification” and entitlement to the waiver of the obligation to pay union
dues for the period prior to January 1, 2013, is conditioned upon granting of
consent and authorization to the Company to deduct the requisite initiation fee or
reinstatement fee, as applicable. In consideration thereof, I hereby consent and 35
authorize the Company, Allied Barton, to deduct from the “lump sum payment
upon contract ratification” the amount of
Specified amounts to be deducted from the lump sum payment were handwritten into
each of the forms ranging from 0 to $600.40
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, 253 NLRB 721, 726 (1980),
enfd. 663 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1981), the following principles were set forth, with Board approval:
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act specifically preserves “the right 45
of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein.” In addition, a proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act,
under stated conditions, authorizes union-security agreements between employers and
labor organizations” to require as a condition of employment membership therein.” On

nonmembers as of March 11, 2013.
JD–60–14
11
the other hand, under the statute the manner in which an employee fulfills financial
obligations to a labor organization is left to his or her personal choice. Pursuant to the
statutory scheme, a dues-checkoff agreement between an employer and labor
organization is authorized, but in its implementation must comply with certain statutory
conditions. Foremost is the safeguard that the employee's participation be purely 5
voluntary and free from compulsion.
The central reference to congressional design in this area is found in Section 302 of
the Act, the premise of which is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or any person
who acts as a labor relations expert, advisor, or consultant to an employer or who 10
acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend,
or deliver, any money or thing of value .... to any labor organization, or any officer
or employee thereof ....
This broadly stated ban would include the checkoff of union dues. However, an
exemption therefrom is set forth in Section 302(c)(4) which provides, in material part, as 15
follows:
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable ... with respect to money
deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership dues in a
labor organization: Provided, That the employer has received from each
employee, on whose account such deductions are made, a written assignment 20
which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the
termination date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs
sooner....
Congress specifically conferred jurisdiction on the Federal courts to enforce Section
302 through criminal sanctions. However, the options afforded employees under that 25
provision with respect to checkoff also are protected under Section 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act. Thus, the Board, with court approval, has held “that the dues
checkoff arrangement must be with the employee's consent, and that an employer who
checks off union dues from an employee's pay and remits the proceeds to the union
without the employee's written authorization violates Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.” 30
N.L.R.B. v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, et al. [Yellow Cab
Company], 498 F.2d 1105, 1109 (1974). And further, “if a union causes the employer to
deduct and remit dues after a valid revocation by the employee of his dues authorization,
it violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2).” N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta Printing Specialties, 523 F.2d
783, 784-785 (5th Cir. 1975). Such violations also inure where employers continue to 35
deduct dues from the wages of an employee who has revoked checkoff. See Merchants
Fast Motor Lines, 171 NLRB 1444 (1968); Bedford Can Manufacturing Corp., 162 NLRB
1428 (1967); Penn Cork & Closures, Inc., 156 NLRB 411 (1965), enfd. 376 F.2d 52 (2d
Cir. 1967).
40
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, supra, it was found that the
respondent employer violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act and the respondent union
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing a provision of their
collective-bargaining agreement which requires that employees use a particular form in order to
revoke their dues-checkoff authorizations or requiring employees to appear in person at the 45
union hall in order to revoke their dues-checkoff authorizations, where these restrictions on
revocation were not set forth in the dues-checkoff authorizations signed by the employees.
There, the respondents, in a right to work state, were found to be jointly and severally liable for
any union dues deducted from employees’ wages after they effectively revoked their dues
checkoff authorizations and were also order to cease and desist from maintaining the offending 50
requirements in their collective-bargaining agreement.
JD–60–14
12
Similarly, in Atlanta Printing Specialties, 215 NLRB 237, 237-238 (1974), enfd. 523 F.2d
783 (5th Cir. 1975), in relying on Section 302(c)(4) to find an unfair labor practice the Board
stated:
5
We disagree with the Respondent's contention, and affirm the finding of the
Administrative Law Judge. As we read the Act, Section 302(c)(4) guarantees an
employee two distinct rights when he executes a checkoff authorization under a
collective-bargaining agreement: (1) a chance at least once a year to revoke his
authorization, and (2) a chance upon the termination of the collective-bargaining 10
agreement to revoke his authorization. The Respondent's interpretation of the statutory
phrase “applicable collective-bargaining agreement,” however, would enable it to negate
the second right forever by the simple strategy of always negotiating a new agreement
prior to the contractually created escape period, which here began 15 days before the
termination date. In our view, the most reasonable identification of the “applicable” 15
contract is the one that had not yet expired when the new agreement was executed and
prematurely put into effect.
We do not believe that Congress, in enacting Section 302(c)(4), intended that the
second of the two distinct employee rights guaranteed thereby could be negated by the
device of such a premature contract renewal. If we were to sanction the effectiveness of 20
such a premature contract renewal, we would permit the parties to entirely eliminate the
statutorily guaranteed escape period.[FN2]
It is true, as the Respondent contends, that the parties are free to change the
termination date or other pertinent provisions of their agreement. But this does not
mean that they are at liberty thereby to extinguish statutory rights or to escape the 25
legislative mandate of Section 302(c)(4) of the Act.
In changing termination dates, therefore, parties must preserve the statutory right of
the employees to revoke their checkoff authorizations during the previously established
escape period occurring before the originally intended expiration date of the old contract.
For the above reasons and those advanced by the Administrative Law Judge, we 30
conclude that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by causing the Employer
to dishonor the employees' revocation notices here in question, thus restraining and
coercing the employees in the exercise of their statutory right to revoke their checkoff
authorizations.[FN3] We further conclude that the Union violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act
by causing the Employer to discriminate against the employees who gave notice of 35
revocation of their checkoff authorizations, thus encouraging membership in the
Union.[FN4]
In the current case, by the terms of the Union’s checkoff form, the employees’
receipt of a contractual ratification lump sum payment from Allied Barton was contingent 40
upon their executing the checkoff form. The Union’s checkoff form stated its
authorization is “irrevocable; this authorization shall automatically terminate in the event
of the termination of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Company and the
United Protective Workers of America, or in the event that my employment with the
Company is terminated.” Thus, the form did not meet the Section 302(c)(4) requirement 45
that an employee could terminate the check off obligation following the year anniversary
date of their signature. The lump sum payment being contingent on the signature of the
checkoff form was incorporated in the Union’s collective-bargaining agreement with
Allied Barton.10 Thus, I find the employees signing of the checkoff form was not

10 The maintenance of this provision in the collective-bargaining agreement was incorporated
JD–60–14
13
voluntary, but their receipt of a substantial contractual benefit was contingent on their
doing so. While this aspect concerning the signing of the form was not before me as an
independent unfair labor practice, it makes all the more compelling the finding of a
violation concerning the language of the form which states the authorization is
irrevocable and fails to give employees their Section 302(c)(4) right to revoke the form 5
following the first year anniversary date. Accordingly, I find that by maintaining the
checkoff form without the employees’ one year revocation right the Union has violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, and by relying on the form Allied Barton has violated
Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. See, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Company, 253 NLRB 721, 726 (1980), enfd. 663 F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1981); and Atlanta 10
Printing Specialties, 215 NLRB 237, 237-238 (1974), enfd. 523 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1975).
This is particularly so when the check off form by stating it is irrevocable exceeds the
permissible authority of the collective-bargaining agreement which at article IV, section
1, states “The Company shall deduct from the pay of Employees all current Union
membership dues and any fees, if, at the time of such deduction, there is in the 15
possession of the Company an existing written assignment in a form acceptable to the
Company, executed by the Employee and revocable by the Employee at any time,
authorizing such deduction by the Company.” Thus, the contract only permitted a dues
authorization form that was revocable at any time, which was much more restrictive than
the Section 302(c)(4) requirements.1120
3. The Union failed to inform employees of their right to be nonmembers and of their
related rights when it sought dues under the contractual union security clause.
In UFCW, Local 700 (Kroger), 361 NLRB No. 39 (2014), the Board majority affirmed its 25
pronouncements in California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. 133 F.3d 1012
(7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S. 813 (1998), concerning a
union’s obligations under the Act in informing an employee of their right to be nonmembers and
the opportunity to pay reduced fees in situations where there is a contractual union security
clause. The Board majority in U FCW, Local 700 (Kroger), supra at slip op. 2, stated that:30
In Communications Workers of America v. Beck (Beck),[FN7] the Supreme Court held
that Section 8(a)(3) of the Act does not permit a collective-bargaining representative,
over the objection of a dues paying nonmember employee, to expend funds collected
from the objector under a union-security agreement on activities unrelated to collective 35
bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment. In California Saw & Knife
Works,[FN8] the Board announced a comprehensive set of procedures designed to
implement the Beck decision. The Board created a three stage process: the initial notice
stage (stage 1), the objection stage (stage 2), and the challenge stage (stage 3).

in paragraph 10 of the consolidated complaint and alleged to be a separate violation of the Act.
However, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement prior to the opening of the
current record, and the parties’ stipulation for this proceeding included the withdrawal of
paragraph 10 of the complaint. Nevertheless, the collective-bargaining agreement is in
evidence and it reveals that Allied Barton is more than a passive bystander as to the terms of
the Union’s check off authorization form. Moreover, Allied Barton relied upon the check off form
signed by the employees in order to deduct Union dues and other fees from their wages.
11 In finding a violation, I am aware of the Board majority’s pronouncements in Frito-Lay, 243
NLRB 137, 138-139 (1979), concerning Section 302(c) (4). However, there the Board found the
checkoff form in dispute did not violate the requirements of Section 302(c)(4).
JD–60–14
14
At stage 1, before the union has collected any money from an employee under a
union-security clause, the union is required to inform the employee that she has the right
not to join the union and that employees who choose to remain nonmembers have the
right (a) to object to paying for union activities not germane to the union's duties as
bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities; (b) to be given 5
sufficient information to enable the employee to decide intelligently whether to object;
and (c) to be apprised of any internal union procedures for filing objections.[FN9] That
bundle of information is often referred to as the “initial notice” under Beck.[FN10] If an
employee decides not to join the union and also exercises her Beck right to object,
California Saw mandates under stage 2 that the union apprise the “Beck objector” of the 10
percentage of dues reduction she will receive, the union's basis for that determination,
and the right of an objector to challenge those figures.[FN11] Stage 3 concerns those
objectors who, unlike Sands, challenge the union's determination of which of its
expenses are chargeable (those related to representation) or the computations
underlying that determination.[FN12]15
There, the Board noted that a union has the ability to choose to waive their right to collect any
money from objectors rather than expend time and money calculating and administering
reductions.
20
In California Saw and Knife Works, supra at 231, the Board stated, “We find, in general,
for the reasons set forth below, that if a union seeks to apply a union-security clause to unit
employees, it has an obligation under the duty of fair representation to notify them of their Beck
rights before they become subject to obligations under the clause.” In California Saw, the Board
went on to state:25
It is undisputed that the IAM failed to notify employees newly hired into a bargaining
unit of their Beck rights at the time it first sought to obligate these employees to pay
dues. Newly hired employees are typically presented at the commencement of their
employment with both a union membership application form and a dues-checkoff 30
authorization form. [FN56] The presentation to a newly hired nonmember employee of
both the dues-checkoff authorization form and the membership form may, absent
concurrent notification of Beck rights, mislead these newly hired nonmember employees
to believe that payment of full dues and assumption of full membership is required. The
presentation of the membership application and dues-check-off form to a newly hired 35
nonmember employee constitutes an attempt to obligate an employee to pay full dues.
Basic considerations of fairness require that the union at that time inform newly hired
employees of their Beck rights and that therefore the Union acts arbitrarily and in bad
faith by not giving such notice, in violation of its duty of fair representation. We
accordingly find, as alleged, that the IAM violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing 40
to notify newly hired nonmember employees of their rights under Beck at the time it first
sought to obligate these newly hired employees to pay dues. [FN57]. Id. at 235.
In Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260, 260-261 (1997), affd. 194 F.3d 1311 (6th Cir.
1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1066 (2000), the Board stated:45
In California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), and Paper Workers Local
1033 (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320 NLRB 349 (1995), the Board resolved a wide
range of issues under the Supreme Court's Beck decision. These issues include the
extent to which unions which are parties to union-security clauses must apprise (1) 50
nonmember bargaining unit employees of their Beck rights, and (2) all bargaining unit
JD–60–14
15
employees of their rights under General Motors, supra, to be or remain nonmembers of
the union that represents their bargaining unit.
Regarding the Beck notice, California Saw, supra, held that a union violates its duty
of fair representation when, in seeking to obligate employees to pay fees and dues
under a union-security clause, it fails to notify bargaining unit employees who are not 5
union members that they have the right to limit their payment of union-security dues and
initiation fees to moneys spent on activities germane to their union's role as a 9(a)
bargaining representative.
California Saw and Weyerhaeuser also addressed the separate issue of General
Motors notice obligations: First, California Saw noted that the exercise of Beck rights is 10
restricted to unit employees who are nonmembers, i.e., to those who have chosen not to
become members of the union and whose obligations under the union-security clause
are therefore limited to the “financial core” obligations of paying the union's initiation fees
and dues. 320 NLRB 235 fn. 57. Second, California Saw observed that, without notice of
General Motors rights, employees could be misled into believing that full union 15
membership was required as a condition of employment. To dispel the fostering of this
misconception, the Board stated that, in addition to informing nonmember bargaining
unit employees that Beck rights accrue only to nonmembers, a union must also tell them
of their General Motors rights to be and remain nonmembers. Id.
The Board further explained that these notice requirements furnish significant 20
protection to the interests of individual employees covered by union-security clauses
requiring “membership” in the union as to their Beck rights, without compromising the
countervailing collective interests of bargaining unit employees in ensuring that every
unit employee contributes to the cost of collective bargaining. The Board emphasized
that, in satisfying Beck notice obligations, a union is afforded a wide range of 25
reasonableness under the duty of fair representation. [FN3] California Saw, supra, 320
NLRB at 233:
[W]e stress that the union meets [its notice] obligation as long as [the union] has
taken reasonable steps to insure that all employees whom the union seeks to
obligate to pay dues [under a union-security clause] are given notice of their 30
[Beck] rights.
In the companion Weyerhaeuser decision, the Board extended these requirements
and held that unions must provide Beck and General Motors notice to members as well
as nonmembers. Weyerhaeuser concluded that “the rationale of California Saw for
concomitant notice of Beck and General Motors rights applies with no less force to those 35
who are still full union members and who did not receive those notices before they
became members.” Supra, 320 NLRB 349.
The “inextricable link” that Weyerhaeuser identified between Beck and General
Motors rights was the legal predicate for the General Motors notice violation found in
Weyerhaeuser. An employee necessarily must be informed of and exercise the General 40
Motors right to be a nonmember before that employee can exercise Beck rights, for Beck
rights apply only to nonmembers. Weyerhaeuser held that
[I]n order for all unit employees subject to a union-security provision to exercise their
Beck rights meaningfully, the law requires that notice of those rights include notice that
the only way in which they can do so is to exercise the right under General Motors to be 45
nonmembers. [Id. at 350.]
By failing to provide notice of both sets of rights, the Board found that the Union had
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
***
By attacking the facial validity of “members-in-good-standing” language in the union-50
security clause, as executed and maintained by the Respondent Union, the complaint
JD–60–14
16
essentially alleges that the clause misleads employees into believing that full union
membership is required. We reject this contention. In light of the Union's obligations to
apprise employees of their rights to be nonmembers and to apprise nonmembers of their
right to pay less than full dues and fees, there is no warrant for declaring the union-
security clause unlawful on its face. The clause is clarified by the required notices. 5
Indeed, in this case, the remedial order will require the Union to give those notices. [FN4]
On the other hand, as discussed supra, the Respondent Union has failed to apprise
employees of their Beck and General Motors rights. [FN5] Consistently with California
Saw and Weyerhaeuser, we find that failure to be unlawful. [FN6]
10
The facts in the current case show that on about July 1, 2011, Allied Barton recognized
the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees at issue. During the
period July 1, 2011, through December 31, 2012, Allied Barton and the Union did not have a
collective-bargaining agreement in effect. On May 14, 2012, union secretary-treasurer Stokes
sent a letter to employee Clark stating Clark was delinquent in his dues and “Our ability to 15
defend and/or represent you is dependent upon your willingness to pay your dues.” On
September 24, 2012, Stokes sent a similar letter soliciting purported delinquent dues from
employee Thompson. In November 2012 Allied Barton issued a job posting to unit employees,
under the typewritten signature of Site Supervisor Campau and Union President Hester, which
included the statement that “Only current level 1 officers in good standing with the Union are 20
eligible for this position.”12
On January 4, 2013, Clark sent Hester a letter opting out of the Union stating it was his
intent not to be an active member but that he would pay an administration fee. Between
January 11 and June 9, 2013, the Union had approximately 21 employees sign dues check off 25
forms labeled “United Protective Workers of America Employee Authorization for Payroll
Deduction of Union Security Dues and/or Service Fees.” On January 30, 2013, Allied Barton
and the Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement containing a union security
clause, which by the terms of the agreement became effective on January 1, 2013. The parties
stipulated that the Union did not advise employees of their rights under NLRB v. General 30

12 Allied Barton issued a subsequent posting in April 2013, omitting the good standing with
the Union requirement for eligibility of the position. However, I do not find that Allied Barton’s
April 2013, posting cured the statement contained in its November 2012, posting which clearly
tied the ability to apply for a position to being a union member in good standing. The Board
established the criteria for an effective disavowal of unfair labor practices in Passavant
Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138-139 (1978), where the Board stated such repudiation
must be “timely,” “unambiguous,” “specific in nature to the coercive conduct,” and “free from
other proscribed illegal conduct.” There must be adequate publication of the repudiation to the
employees involved and there must be no proscribed conduct on the employer's part after the
publication. The Board has also pointed out that such repudiation or disavowal of coercive
conduct should give assurances to employees that in the future their employer will not interfere
with the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Here, the April 2013 posting was issued five months
after the one containing the offending statement. The April 2013 did not mention the first
posting, nor expressly disavow it. No assurances were given against future proscribed conduct.
Moreover, I have found that Allied Barton in concert with the Union subsequently implemented a
dues deduction form containing unlawful terms. In the circumstances here, I find Allied Barton’s
April 2013 posting did not cure the coercive effects of the November 2012 posting. However,
the allegation concerning Allied Barton’s November 2012 posting was withdrawn from the
complaint as part of a pre-trial settlement and has only been submitted into evidence as
background evidence for the remaining active alleged unfair labor practices.
JD–60–14
17
Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963), during the period September 1, 2012, through April 30, 2013.
From at least February 6, 2013, to at least August 23, 2013, Allied Barton deducted dues and
initiation fees from employees paychecks.
On February 13, 2013, the Union sent Clark a letter stating he was delinquent in his 5
dues in the amount of $810. The Union cited a section of the collective-bargaining agreement
union-security clause in the letter to Clark requiring union membership and never responded to
Clark’s prior letter withdrawing from the Union and Clark’s offer to pay administrative fees.
I find the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by demanding dues payments from 10
employees pursuant to a contractual union security clause without informing them of their right
to be nonmembers, and any ensuing rights derived from becoming nonmembers. See, UFCW,
Local 700 (Kroger), 361 NLRB No. 39, (2014); Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260, 260-261
(1997), affd. 194 F.3d 1311 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1066 (2000); and California
Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 15
sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S. 813 (1998). The evidence reveals the Union obtained
signatures on dues check off forms citing contractual union security provisions on January 11,
2013, establishing the Union violated employees General Motors rights and concomitantly their
Beck rights, as early as that date if not before.13
20
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union 492 (United Parcel Service, Inc.,
346 NLRB 360, 365 (2006), the Board stated, “To remedy the Union's failure to inform unit
employees of their General Motors and Beck rights, we shall order the Union to provide the
required notices to all unit employees. The Union will have the opportunity to show, in
compliance proceedings, that it provided appropriate notices in October 1998 or thereafter. In 25
addition, we shall order the Union to provide appropriate notices to the Charging Parties who
filed Beck objections.” The Board stated, “We shall also order the Union to notify in writing
those employees whom it initially sought to obligate to pay dues or fees under the union-security
clause on or after June 5, 1997, of their right to elect nonmember status and to file Beck
objections with respect to one or more of the accounting periods covered by the complaint. 30
With respect to any such employees who, with reasonable promptness after receiving the
notices, elect nonmember status and file Beck objections for any one of those periods, we shall
order the Union, in the compliance stage of the proceeding, to process their objections, nunc
pro tunc, as it otherwise would have done, in accordance with the principles of California Saw.
The Union shall then be required to reimburse the objecting nonmembers for the reduction, if 35
any, in their dues and fees for nonrepresentational activities that occurred during the accounting
period or periods covered by the complaint in which they have objected.” Thus, I will fashion a

13 While the General Counsel asserts the Union engaged in coercive behavior vis-a-vis the
solicitation of dues based on a statements made in September 2012 to Clark and Thompson
concerning the Union’s ability to represent them if they did not pay dues, neither of those
remarks, even if found to be coercive where tied to the consequences of discharge relating to a
union security provision. Thus, I have concluded the Union was not obligated to inform unit
employees of their General Motors or Beck rights until January 1, 2013, the date the
Respondents backdated their contract to and began relying on the contractual union security
clause. I have considered the statement concerning a closed shop attributed to Hester in the
Union’s pre-hearing position statement. However, there was no showing as to the
circumstances in which the remark was made, and it was not established that the remark
predated the contractual union security clause.
JD–60–14
18
similar remedy in this case for the Union’s failure to inform unit employees of their General
Motors and Beck rights.14
4. The viability of the contractual union security clause
and the Union’s demands related thereto.5
The current collective-bargaining agreement union security clause reads as follows:
Section 1: Requirement of Union Membership. Employees are covered by
this Agreement at the time it becomes effective and who are members of the 10
Union at the time shall be required as a condition of continued employment to
continue membership in the Union for the duration of this Agreement.
Employees covered by this Agreement who are not members of the Union at the
time this Agreement becomes effective shall be required as a condition of
continued employment to become members of the Union or within ten days after 15
the 30th day following such to become members of the Union or within ten days
after the 30th day following such effective date. Employees hired, rehired,
reinstated or transferred into the Bargaining Unit after the effective date of this
Agreement and covered by this Agreement shall be required as a condition of
continued employment to become members of the Union on or within ten days 20
after the 30th day following the beginning of their employment. An Employee who
shall tender the initiation fees (if not already a member) and the periodic dues
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership shall be
deemed to meet this condition. The Company shall grant all newly hired
employees who are to be in the Bargaining Unit up to two hours of paid release 25
time for orientation by the Union President or his designee. The Union President
or his designee shall likewise be granted up to two hours of paid release time to
orient newly hired Union members.
Section 2: Discharge for Failure to Tender Dues or Initiation Fees:
Employees to whom membership in the Union is denied or whose membership is 30
terminated by the Union by reason of the failure or refusal of the Employee to
tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, or reinstatement fees (equal to/greater or
less than the initiation fee) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership shall not be retained in the Bargaining Unit. No Employee
shall be terminated under this Article, however, unless:35
a. The Union first has notified the Employee by letter addressed to the Employee
at the address last known to the Union concerning the Employee's delinquency in
not tendering the periodic dues and initiation fees required under this Section,
and warning the Employee that unless such dues, initiation fees, or other fees

14 The record contains a stipulation that the Union failed to inform employees of their
General Motors rights for a specified time period. The Union argues this is just a technical
violation of the Act. However, the case law cited above suggests otherwise. I find the failure to
inform the employees of their rights to be nonmembers, undermines any statements the Union
may have made at the time concerning the employees’ Beck rights, and requires those rights to
be stated or restated by the Union to the employees at the same time it informs them of their
right to be nonmembers. Moreover, the Union’s non-action to Clark’s resignation, and the
failure to acknowledge his objector status, as well as its response to Thompson in seeking full
dues without informing her of her rights to seek reduced payments reveals that in addition to its
failure to inform employees of the General Motors rights, that it was also remiss in properly
informing them of the Beck rights.
JD–60–14
19
are tendered within seven days the Employee will be reported to the Company
for termination from the Bargaining Unit as provided herein; and
b. Notice to the Employee as provided hereinabove includes information as to the
amount of delinquency in dues and/or initiation fees; and
c. The Union has furnished the Company with written proof that the foregoing 5
procedure has been followed but the Employee has not complied, and on this
basis the Union has requested in writing that the Employee be discharged from
the Bargaining Unit.
The General Counsel contends that section 2 of the union-security clause is 10
invalid on its face in that it states that two different situations may result in an individual
not being retained in the bargaining unit: (1) having his or her membership denied and
(2) having his or her membership terminated for failure of or refusal to pay uniformly
required dues or fees. It asserted that by having one of the situations for not being
retained being the denial of membership the clause goes beyond termination for only 15
non-payment of dues. It is asserted that this language in section 2 is clear and
unambiguous on its face. Therefore, parole evidence would not be appropriate to be
considered and even if it was appropriate there is no probative evidence relative to this
issue in the record. It is contended Allied Barton violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the
Act, and the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining an unlawful union security 20
clause.
I do not find the General Counsel’s argument to be persuasive. First, section 2,
is entitled “Discharge for Failure to Tender Dues or Initiation Fees” therefore the title
clearly defines the purpose of the article as relating solely to the failure to pay dues or 25
initiation fees. Moreover, the article goes on to state “No Employee shall be terminated
under this Article, however, unless:” and goes on to discuss notice requirements to the
employee for delinquent dues and initiation fees. Thus, I find the article is perfectly clear
that it only applies concerning issues of termination to employees who are delinquent in
their dues and initiation fees, and therefore I reject the argument that this article is 30
ambiguous or unlawful on its face. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the
supposedly offending provisions of this article were maintained in collective-bargaining
agreements with the Union by predecessor employers, and despite the longstanding use
of the provision no evidence was presented that the Union attempted to have an
employee discharged for anything beyond the non-payment of dues. Thus, I find based 35
on the plain reading of section 2 of the union security clause that it is limited to
circumstances of non-payment of dues and initiation fees by employees.
The General Counsel contends that the term “member” in section 1 of the union
security clause is ambiguous in this case in the context of the Union’s actions. In this 40
regard, the General Counsel asserts the Union failed to provide employees with their
General Motors rights; told employees they worked in a closed shop; demanded and
deducted dues after Clark made his Beck objection and failed to provide him required
information. The General Counsel also asserts that prior to April 2013 neither Allied
Barton nor the Union corrected employees’ belief that membership in good standing was 45
required to apply for job postings. It is asserted that given this context, the term
“membership” in the union-security clause is ambiguous. It is asserted Allied Barton and
the Union violated the Act by maintaining an unlawful union security clause based upon
their actions which caused to the clause to be read as requiring full union membership
as a condition of employment. I reject this argument for the same reasons the Board 50
rejected such an argument in Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260, 260-261 (1997), affd.
JD–60–14
20
194 F.3d 1311 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1066 (2000), holding that the term
“members-in-good-standing” language in the union-security clause, was not unlawful on
its face as it was consonant with the statutory requirements; and the other violations
found there relating to checkoff and Beck rights could be independently remedied
through a Board notice. It was noted there that any ambiguity pertaining to employees 5
concerning the union security clause would be explained to them when the union
informed them of their Beck rights as required by the Board’s order and by the Board’s
notices themselves. Accordingly, I reject the contention that the union security clause
was unlawful on its face, or unlawfully applied, except as set for below.
10
The General Counsel contends that the Union demanded dues at a time when
there was no union security clause in effect. It is asserted the Union’s demand for dues
prior to January 2013 was not voluntary. In this regard the Union tied its demands to
pay dues to Clark and Thompson to its “ability to defend” employees based on their
“willingness to pay” dues. It is asserted that a job posting by Allied Barton and the Union15
informed employees that union membership in good standing was required to apply for
the posting even though no collective-bargaining agreement was in effect at that time. It
is thus asserted that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by demanding the payment of
dues when no union-security clause was in effect.
20
In American Postal Workers (Postal Service), 300 NLRB 34, 34-35 (1990), it was stated
that:
It is axiomatic that a collective-bargaining agent is required to represent all members
of the bargaining unit, irrespective of their membership in the union. Machinists Local 25
697 (Canfield Rubber), 223 NLRB 832, 834 (1976). Thus, the Act proscribes as
discriminatory union practices that effectively deny to unit members fundamental rights
of union representation, such as access to grievance procedures[FN1] and exclusive union
hiring halls.[FN2] In the case at hand, the judge concluded that a union's exclusion of
nonmember unit employees from meetings at which possible reactions to job issues are 30
discussed was tantamount to a denial of those employees' fundamental rights to union
representation. We cannot agree.
Here, neither grievance representation nor any other right fundamental to union
representation is at issue. Indeed, the record shows that no grievance was filed by the
Respondent as an immediate result of the March 10 meeting, and there is no showing 35
that any unit employee was denied the right to file a grievance over the changes or was
denied proper assistance in filing a grievance.[FN3]
***
We agree with the judge's finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act by coercively refusing to answer nonmember unit employee Patrick Crawley's 40
questions at the March 10, 1988 meeting at the union hall unless he agreed to join the
Union on the spot. We find that the remarks by the Respondent's president, Richards,
carry the implication of a rebuke of nonmember status and, under the circumstances,
convey the impression that the Respondent intended to treat the nonmember
disparately. See Colgate-Palmolive, supra at 743.[FN7]45
Thus, not all acts of disparate treatment by a union of nonmembers such as
exclusion from certain union meetings are violative of the Act. Here, the consolidated
complaint, in paragraph 24(a) cites three letters by Hester demanding employees pay
union dues on various dates; however these letters were not placed into evidence. 50
Similarly, a letter cited in complaint paragraph 24(c) was not placed into evidence.
JD–60–14
21
There were several letters cited in complaint paragraph 24(b) authored by union official
Stokes placed into evidence. One dated May 14, sent to Clark and another dated
September 24 sent to Thompson, who each at the time were union members, informing
them they were delinquent in their dues, and stating, “Our ability to defend and/or
represent you is dependent upon your willingness to pay your dues.” The General 5
Counsel does not cite any case authority in his brief that such a statement would
independently violate the Act. The Union argues that such a statement is true, as its
financial strength impacts on its ability to represent bargaining unit employees. Here, I
agree with the Union that such a statement is somewhat of a truism that if employees do
not pay dues it impacts on the financial viability of the Union, and I do not find within the 10
statement the inference that the Union intended to treat dues delinquent members
differently from other bargaining unit members in its representational functions. Nor is
there a sufficient link between the May and September letters seeking delinquent dues
from current members, and the November posting linking union membership to a job bid
to render those letters unlawful. The job posting occurred months after the dues 15
reminders were issued, and the complaint allegation concerning the posting has been
removed from the complaint as a result of a pre-trial settlement. Similarly, I do not find
an August 6 letter from Stokes to union members reminding them that their dues were
scheduled to be paid soon to be independently coercive.
20
Therefore, I do not feel it appropriate in the circumstances here to grant a
remedy of a refund of paid dues during the period prior to January 1, 2013, based upon
allegations currently before me. I also note that no union security clause was in effect
during this period, nor is there any claim that the Union cited pain of discharge based on
the failure to pay dues to any employee prior to January 1, 2013. In fact, Clark, who was 25
the subject of the Union’s May 2012 letter concerning its ability to represent him due to
delinquent dues was not so moved by the letter to pay those dues as the Union was still
requesting back dues from him by letter dated February 13, 2013.
On the other hand, I find the Union’s attempt the enforce the Union security 30
clause in 2013, prior to March 11 of that year to be violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act for employees who were nonmembers at the time of the execution of the collective-
bargaining agreement; and Allied Barton’s deduction of any dues during or covering that
period pursuant to the Union’s request to be violative of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the
Act for nonmembers. Similarly, I find the Respondents’ application of the union security 35
clause to employees who were union members at the time of the execution of the
collective-bargaining agreement on January 30, 2013, retroactive to January 1, 2013
was also violative of the Act.15 In this regard in International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

15 The consolidated complaint alleges in paragraph 25 that the Union made specific
demands for dues cited in paragraph 24, and in paragraph 33 of the complaint it alleges this
conduct to be violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. There is no similar allegation pertaining
to those paragraphs with respect to Allied Barton. However, the consolidated complaint does
seek joint and severable liability pertaining to both Allied Barton and the Union regarding dues
deducted pursuant to the union security clause; and asserts the maintenance and use of the
dues check off forms by the Respondents was unlawful. I find here that for period in which
Allied Barton unlawfully deducted dues pursuant to those dues checkoff forms for which there
was no valid union security clause in effect as set forth above was fully litigated, and that it is
jointly and severably liable for those dues with the Union. I also find the matter of back dating
the contract, and therefore the application of the union security clause has been fully litigated
regarding both Respondents. Pertaining to nonmembers for dues owing after March 11, 2013,
JD–60–14
22
Local Union 492, (United Parcel Service, Inc.), 346 NLRB 360, 364 (2006), the following
was stated:
The Board has held that a union may not require employees to pay union dues and fees,
as a condition of employment, for periods in which no contractual union-security 5
provision is in effect. Teamsters Local 25 (Tech Weld Corp.), 220 NLRB 76, 77 (1975).
Consistent with this reasoning, the Board has held that a union-security clause may not
be applied retroactively, and therefore that a union cannot demand dues as a condition
of employment for periods before the execution of the agreement. Id. Accordingly, the
Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by attempting to obligate the Charging Parties to pay 10
dues for periods during which there was no union-security clause in effect.
In the present case, the Union distributed dues checkoff forms to employees
beginning on January 11, 2013, and Allied Barton began checking off dues from
employees as early as February 6, 2013. The check off forms stated “United Protective 15
Workers of America Employee Authorization for Payroll Deduction of Union Security
Dues and/or Service Fees.” Thus, it clearly referenced the union security provisions of a
collective-bargaining agreement. The form stated that signing the form was required to
obtain the contract ratification lump sum payment. Thus, the employees were required
to sign the form in order to receive a negotiated contractual benefit. The Union passed 20
out these forms without informing employees of their rights to be nonmembers, which I
have concluded also means they were not given their Beck rights to pay reduced dues,
or at least to challenge the Union’s claim, if any, that dues should not be reduced.16
Moreover, On January 4, 2013, Clark. sent the Union a letter with the subject: “Opting 25
out of United Protective Workers of America Union Local # 1.” Clark stated he was willing to
pay what is sometimes called an administration fee. Thus, Clark opted out the Union before the
collective-bargaining agreement was executed. Yet, On February 13, 2013, Stokes sent Clark a
letter “It is with greater concern that I send this letter to you. According to the U.P.W.A. records,
as of the date of this letter your delinquent dues equal $810.” The letter went on to cite the 30
contractual union security clause stating:
In accordance with the contract between the U.P.W.A. and Allied Barton Article III,
Section 1 which states as follows:

and members owing after January 30, 2013, I do not find either the Union or Allied Barton liable
for dues owing following those dates, as I find the union security clause would have been in
effect for each of these categories of employees following these the dates. While dues were
improperly checked off following those dates, and I have required the check off of dues based
on the improper forms to cease, the employees would have still owed the dues under the union
security provisions and therefore, I have not required dues to be refunded after those dates,
except possible partial refunds by the Union for employees who implement their General Motors
and Beck rights as described in this decision.
16 The consolidated complaint alleges in paragraph 9 (a) that the Union expends monies “on
activities not germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment (nonrepresentational activities.)”. However, the specifics of the Union’s spending
activities were not placed on this record. Regardless, should the Union contend it only spends
money only on “representational activities,” it is required to inform employees of their rights to
challenge that contention, and to support it by a verified financial statement, which was not done
in this case.
JD–60–14
23
Requirement of Union Membership. Employees covered by this agreement at the
time it becomes effective and who are members of the Union at the time shall be
required as a condition of employment to continue membership in the Union for the
duration of this agreement. Employees covered by this agreement who are not
members of the Union at the time of this Agreement becomes effective shall be required 5
as a condition of continued employment to become members of the Union on or within
ten (10) days after the 30th day following such effective date.
Similarly, on February 22, 2013, Hester sent employee Thompson a letter regarding
“Financial Core Membership.” The letter stated: 10
As a financial core member of the UPWA you are obligated to pay the Union
Service fees that relate to collective bargaining, contract administration,
grievance administration and adjustment and other fees and costs that relate to
the Union’s chargeable duties.15
Accordingly you are obligated to pay all initiation fees and monthly charges of
$35. You are required to be current on these fees. If you have any further
questions please direct them to the Union and in writing.
Concerning Clark, he had resigned his membership prior to the date the contract 20
was executed. Since I have concluded the Respondents could not apply the union
security provision retroactively, Clark and other similarly situated employees who
resigned membership prior to the execution of the collective-bargaining agreement had a
30 day grace period, plus 10 additional days per the union security clause itself, prior to
owing the Union dues under the union security clause, which by my calculation would be 25
March 11, 2013. Moreover, by its letter the Union was seeking an additional $810 in
back dues from Clark which were obviously for a period in which there was no union
security clause in effect, although the Union tied the collection of those dues to the
contractual union security clause, which I have found to be violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act. Concerning Thompson, as reflected in the Union’s February 22, 2013, letter 30
she had resigned her membership. If the resignation had taken place prior to January
30, Thompson like Clark would not have owed any dues until March 11, 2013.17
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
35
1. Allied Barton Security Services LLC (Allied Barton) is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local No. 1 United Protective Workers of America (the Union) is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By maintaining a dues deduction form for employees stating the form is irrevocable, not 40
allowing employees to revoke the form at a minimum as required by statute as of the year
anniversary date of their signature; and in contravention of the current collective-bargaining
agreement which states dues deduction forms can be revoked at any time, the Union has
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
4. By applying a dues deduction form for employees stating the form is irrevocable, thereby 45
not allowing employees to revoke the form at a minimum as required by statute as of the year
anniversary date of their signature; and in contravention of the current collective-bargaining

17 The contractual union security clause requires employees who were currently members to
maintain their membership; and this aspect of the union security provision has not been alleged
to be unlawful.
JD–60–14
24
agreement which states dues deduction forms can be revoked at any time, Allied Barton has
restrained and coerced employees in violation of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
5. By since around January 4, 2013, failing to acknowledge nonmember employee John
Clark’s objector status to the payment of full dues, failing to provide Clark with any information
concerning the breakdown of the Union’s dues structure in terms of the percentage of reduction 5
in dues and fees for objecting nonmembers for chargeable and non-chargeable expenses,
including a properly verified basis for the Union’s calculations, including Clark’s right to
challenge the Union’s calculations including a procedure for doing so; and by seeking dues from
Clark via a contractual union security clause predating the effective date of that clause the
Union has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.10
6. By since around February 22, 2013, failing to inform financial core member Karissa
Thompson that she could object to paying full membership dues, failing to provide her with any
information concerning the breakdown of the Union’s dues structure in terms of the percentage
of reduction in fees for objecting nonmembers for chargeable and non-chargeable expenses,
including a properly verified basis for the Union’s calculations, including Thompson’s right to 15
challenge the Union’s calculations including a procedure for doing so the Union has violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
7. By signing a collective-bargaining agreement with a union security clause and then
demanding dues payments from employees without informing them of their rights to become or
remain nonmembers including their right to object to paying the full dues of a member along 20
with rights pertaining to any such objection the Union has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
8. By signing a collective-bargaining agreement with a union security clause on January 30,
2013, and attempting to make the union security clause retroactive to January 1, 2013, thereby
not providing nonmembers a 30 day grace period as required by law from the date of the
signing of the agreement, with an extra 10 days as provided by the agreement itself thereby 25
seeking to collect dues from nonmembers prior to March 11, 2013, and by seeking to enforce
said union security clause against members prior to January 30, 2013, the Union has violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
9. By applying the contractual union security clause concerning the collection of dues
retroactive to January 1, 2013, when the collective-bargaining agreement was not signed until 30
January 30, 2013, Allied Barton has violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
10. All remaining outstanding allegations of unfair labor practices of the consolidated
complaint, not previously withdrawn, are dismissed.
REMEDY35
Having found that Respondents have engaged in certain unfair labor practices,
Respondents must cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, by failing to honor
Charging Party Clark’s resignation, and by requiring Clark under the contractual union security 40
clause to pay back dues pre-dating the effective date of the union security clause for
nonmembers, that is March 11, 2013, I shall recommend that the Union be required to rescind in
writing to Clark, and to any similarly situated employees, its demand for back dues or fees as a
condition of employment pre-dating March 11, 2013. I shall also recommend that the Union be
required to refund any dues to employees collected pursuant to the union security clause after 45
January 1, 2013, for any back dues for nonmembers due prior to March 11, 2013, and for
members due prior to January 30, 2013.
JD–60–14
25
To remedy the Union's failure to inform unit employees of their General Motors and Beck
rights, I shall recommend that the Union be required to provide the required notices to all unit
employees. The Union will have the opportunity to show, in compliance proceedings, that it
provided appropriate notice on or after April 30, 2013, which is the stipulated date up until which
it did not provide employees with notice of their General Motors right. In addition, I shall require5
the Union to provide appropriate notice of Beck rights to employees such as and including Clark
and Thompson, who filed Beck objections, or who subsequently file said objections pursuant to
this recommended Order. In this regard, I shall recommend that the Union be required to notify
in writing those employees whom it sought to obligate to pay dues or fees under the union-
security clause on or after January 1, 2013, of their right to elect nonmember status and to file 10
Beck objections with respect to accounting periods including and subsequent to January 1,
2013. With respect to any such employees who, with reasonable promptness after receiving the
notices, elect nonmember status and file Beck objections for any one of accounting periods, I
shall recommend that the Union be required, in the compliance stage of the proceeding, to
process their objections, as it otherwise would have done, in accordance with the principles of 15
California Saw. The Union shall then be required to reimburse the objecting nonmembers for
the reduction, if any, in their dues and fees for nonrepresentational activities that occurred
during the period beginning January 1, 2013, through at a minimum of April 30, 2013, and until
such time thereafter until when the Union establishes it has provided bargaining unit employees
in writing with their General Motors and Beck rights as required by this decision. 20
I shall also recommend that Allied Barton and the Union immediately cease giving effect
to any dues check off form signed by employees that states the form is irrevocable, and/or that
does not allow revocation at a minimum for a reasonable time period relating to an employee’s
anniversary date for signing the form, or that otherwise contravenes the provisions of the 25
collective-bargaining agreement in effect, which in this case states the checkoff form could be
revoked at any time. I will not require the Respondents to refund dues concerning the checkoff
forms that I have found to be unlawful, except for such time periods when there was no union
security provision in effect, i.e., from January 1 to January 30, 2013, for employees who were
union members on January 30, 2013, and from January 1, to March 11, 2013, for employees 30
who had resigned their membership prior to January 30, 2013. Since the recommended
remedy in this decision requires the Union to retroactively inform employees of their rights to be
nonmembers, any employee who signed a dues check off form during the period of January 1 to
January 30, 2013, shall be offered the right to be a nonmember during that period, at which
point their dues reimbursement period will be for dues do between January 1 to March 11, 2013, 35
if they promptly notify the Union of their desire to be a nonmember. Since, I have found the
signing of certain dues checkoff forms to be coercive in that they state employees must sign the
forms to receive a negotiated bonus contained in the collective-bargaining agreement, I find the
Respondents to be jointly and severably liable for the reimbursement of dues for the stated
period stated period in which I have found the union security provision to be unlawfully applied.40
Any amounts to be reimbursed under this recommended Order will be with interest
compounded daily as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), and
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010).
45
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended.18

18 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–60–14
26
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that:
5
A. Respondent, Allied Barton Security Services LLC (Allied Barton) its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining, enforcing, or otherwise giving effect to a dues deduction form for employees
stating the form is irrevocable, thereby not allowing employees to revoke the form at a minimum 10
as required by statute as of the one year of anniversary date of the employee’s signature; and in
contravention of the current collective-bargaining agreement which states dues deduction forms
can be revoked at any time.
(b) Applying the contractual union security provision concerning the collection of dues and
fees retroactive to January 1, 2013, when the collective-bargaining agreement was not signed 15
until January 30, 2013.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, notify employees in writing, who signed the 20
above dues check deduction form stating that it is irrevocable, that the form will no longer be
applied for the payroll deduction of their dues and fees to Local No. 1 United Protective Workers
of America (the Union).
(b) Jointly and severally with the Union reimburse employees who signed the dues check off
form stating it was irrevocable for their dues deducted from their pay for all employees who were 25
nonmembers of the Union prior to January 30, 2013, for the period of January 1, 2013, to March
11, 2013, and for all those who were members of the Union as of January 30, 2013, for the dues
deducted from their pay for the period January 1, 2013 to January 30, 2013, with interest in the
manner described in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Jointly and severally with the Union reimburse employees who did not sign a dues check 30
off form but nevertheless paid dues as a result of the contractual union security clause for all
employees who were nonmembers of the Union prior to January 30, 2013, for the period of
January 1, 2013 to March 11, 2013, and for all those who members of the Union as of January
30, 2013, for dues paid for the period January 1, 2013 to January 30, 2013, with interest in the
manner described in the remedy section of this decision.35
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board, or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of refunded dues due under the terms of 40
this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at the Ford Motor Company facilities in
Michigan where Allied Barton bargaining unit employees represented by the Union work or
perform services copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A.”19 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the Allied Barton’s45
authorized representative, shall be posted by Allied Barton and maintained for 60 consecutive

19 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in all the
notices ordered herein reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD” shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
JD–60–14
27
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Allied Barton to insure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, Allied Barton has gone out of business, or is no longer providing services at
the facilities involved in these proceedings, it shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a 5
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by Allied Barton at
those facilities at any time since January 1, 2013. Similarly, Allied Barton shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense copies of the attached notice to all employees who are on layoff, and
former employees who have left Allied Barton’s employ who worked at the involved facilities on
or after January 1, 2013. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be 10
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means to all bargaining unit employees represented by Local No. 1 United Protective
Workers of America.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn 15
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent Allied Barton has taken to comply.
B. Respondent Local No. 1 United Protective Workers of America (the Union), its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall:20
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Maintaining, enforcing, or otherwise giving effect to a dues deduction form for employees
stating the form is irrevocable, thereby not allowing employees to revoke the form at a minimum
as required as required by statute as of the year anniversary date of the employees’ signature;
and in contravention of the current collective-bargaining agreement which states dues deduction 25
forms can be revoked at any time.
(b) Failing to inform employees whom it seeks to obligate to pay dues and fees under a
union-security clause of their right under NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963),
to be and remain nonmembers, and of the rights of nonmembers under Communications
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying for union activities not germane to the 30
Union's duties as bargaining agent, and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such
activities.
(c) Demanding that employees pay union dues, as a condition of employment, for periods of
time in which no valid union-security provision is in effect by signing a collective-bargaining
agreement with a union security clause on January 30, 2013, and attempting to make the union 35
security clause retroactive to January 1, 2013, thereby not providing nonmembers a 30 day
grace period as required by law from the date of the signing of the agreement, and with an extra
10 days grace period as provided by the agreement itself, and seeking to collect dues from
nonmembers pursuant to the union security clause for periods prior to March 11, 2013, and for
members prior to January 30, 2013.40
(d) Failing to acknowledge and give effect to employees' resignations from union
membership and their objections to paying full dues.
(e) Failing to provide objecting nonmembers with information concerning the breakdown of
the Union’s dues structure in terms of the percentage of reduction in fees for objecting
nonmembers for chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, including a properly verified basis 45
for the Union’s calculations; and failing to provide objecting nonmembers the right to challenge
the Union’s calculations and with a procedure for doing so.
(f) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
50
JD–60–14
28
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, notify all bargaining unit employees in writing,
who signed a dues checkoff deduction form stating that it is “irrevocable” during the life of the
collective-bargaining agreement, that the form will no longer be applied for the payroll deduction
of their dues and fees to Local No. 1 United Protective Workers of America .5
(b) Jointly and severally with the Allied Barton Security Services LLC reimburse employees
who signed the dues checkoff form stating it was irrevocable for their dues deducted from their
pay for all employees who were nonmembers of the Union prior to January 30, 2013, for the
period of January 1, 2013 to March 11, 2013, and for all those who were members of the Union
as of January 30, 2013, for the dues deducted from their pay for the period January 1, 2013 to 10
January 30, 2013, with interest in the manner described in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Jointly and severally with Allied Barton reimburse employees who did not sign a dues
checkoff form but nevertheless paid dues as a result of the contractual union security clause for
all employees who were nonmembers of the Union prior to January 30, 2013, for the period of
January 1, 2013 to March 11, 2013, and for all those who members of the Union as of January 15
30, 2013, for dues paid for the period January 1, 2013 to January 30, 2013, with interest in the
manner described in the remedy section of this decision.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, notify, in writing, all bargaining unit
employees and all former bargaining unit employees employed by Allied Barton on or after
January 1, 2013, of their right to be and remain nonmembers, and that any such request if made 20
in a reasonable time will be retroactive to January 1, 2013, and inform all bargaining unit
employees in writing of the rights of nonmembers to object to paying for union activities not
germane to the Union's duties as bargaining agent, and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees
for such activities. In addition, this notice must include sufficient information to enable
employees intelligently to decide whether to object, as well as a description of any internal union 25
procedures for filing objections.
(e) Process the objections of nonmember bargaining unit employees made pursuant to this
Order and reimburse, with interest, nonmember bargaining unit employees for any dues and
fees exacted from them for nonrepresentational activities, if any, for each accounting period
since January 1, 2013, for which they file an objection in exercise of their rights as nonmembers 30
under Communications Workers v. Beck, supra.
(f) Within 14 days of this Order acknowledge in writing to John Clark that he is a
nonmember, that the Union acknowledges his objector status effective January 4, 2013 to the
payment of full dues, provide Clark with information concerning the breakdown of the Union’s
dues structure in terms of the percentage of reduction in fees for objecting nonmembers for 35
chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, including a properly verified basis for the Union’s
calculations, and inform Clark of his right to challenge the Union’s calculations and the
procedure for doing so.
(g) Within 14 days of this Order inform in writing financial core member Karissa Thompson
that she can object to paying full membership dues retroactive to her becoming a financial core 40
member, and if she does so in a reasonable time provide her with information concerning the
breakdown of the Union’s dues structure in terms of the percentage of reduction in fees for
objecting nonmembers for chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, including a properly
verified basis for the Union’s calculations, and inform her of her right to challenge the Union’s
calculations, and the procedure for doing so. 45
(h) Within 14 days of this Order inform employees John Clark and Karissa Thompson in
writing that any dues and fees the Union claims were owed prior to March 11, 2013, will not be
required to be paid as a condition for their continued employment, and reimburse them for any
dues they may have paid for the period since January 1, 2013, for any dues or fees owed prior
to March 11, 2013, with interest as calculated in the remedy section of this decision.50
JD–60–14
29
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its offices and meeting halls copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix B.” 20 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the Union’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Union and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees and members are customarily posted. 5
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Union to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Union customarily communicates with Allied Barton
bargaining unit employees and/or its members who are Allied Barton employees by such means 10
to all Allied Barton bargaining unit employees represented by Local No. 1 United Protective
Workers of America.
(j) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the Notice for posting for 60
days by Allied Barton Security Services LLC, if willing, at all places where notices to bargaining
unit employees are customarily posted.15
(k) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent Union has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 24, 201420
_______________________
Eric M. Fine
Administrative Law Judge25

20 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in all the
notices ordered herein reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD” shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
JD–60–14
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or otherwise give effect to a dues deduction form for
employees which states the form is irrevocable, thereby not allowing employees to revoke the
form at a minimum as required by statute as of the year anniversary date of the employees’
signature; and in contravention of the current collective-bargaining agreement which states dues
deduction forms can be revoked at any time.
WE WILL NOT apply the contractual union security provision concerning the collection of
dues and fees retroactive to January 1, 2013, when the collective-bargaining agreement was
not signed until January 30, 2013.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, notify employees in writing,
who signed the described dues deduction form stating that it is irrevocable, that the form will no
longer be applied for the payroll deduction of their dues and fees to Local No. 1 United
Protective Workers of America (the Union).
WE WILL jointly and severally with the Union reimburse employees who signed the
dues deduction off form stating it was irrevocable for their dues deducted from their pay for all
employees who were nonmembers of the Union prior to January 30, 2013, for the period of
January 1, 2013 to March 11, 2013, and for all those who members of the Union as of January
30, 2013, for the dues deducted from their pay for the period January 1, 2013 to January 30,
2013, with interest in the manner the Board’s decision.
WE WILL jointly and severally with the Union reimburse employees who did not sign a
dues check off form but nevertheless paid dues as a result of the contractual union security
clause for all employees who were nonmembers of the Union prior to January 30, 2013, for the
period of January 1, 2013 to March 11, 2013, and for all employees who members of the Union
as of January 30, 2013, for dues paid for the period January 1, 2013 to January 30, 2013, with
interest in the manner described in the Board’s decision.
ALLIED BARTON SECURITY SERVICES LLC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
JD–60–14
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue, Room 300, Detroit, MI 48226-2543
(313) 226-3200, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/07-CA-093970 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National
Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (313) 226-3244.
JD–60–14
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or otherwise give effect to a dues deduction form for
employees which states the form is irrevocable, thereby not allowing employees to revoke the
form at a minimum as required by statute on the year anniversary date of the employee’s
signature; and in contravention of the current collective-bargaining agreement which states dues
deduction forms can be revoked at any time.
WE WILL NOT fail to inform employees we seek to obligate to pay dues and fees under
a union-security clause of their right under NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963),
to be and remain nonmembers, and of the rights of nonmembers under Communications
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) to object to paying for union activities not applicable to
the Union's duties as bargaining agent, and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for monies
spent by Local No. 1 United Protective Workers of America (the Union), if any, for such
activities.
WE WILL NOT demand that employees pay union dues, as a condition of employment,
for periods of time in which no valid union-security provision is in effect by signing a collective-
bargaining agreement with a union security clause on January 30, 2013, and attempting to
make the union security clause retroactive to January 1, 2013, thereby not providing
nonmembers a 30 day grace period to pay dues as required by law from the date of the signing
of the agreement, with an extra 10 days as provided by the agreement itself, and seeking to
collect dues from nonmembers pursuant to the union security clause prior to March 11, 2013,
and for members prior to January 30, 2013.
WE WILL NOT fail to acknowledge and give effect to employees' resignations from union
membership and objections to nonmembers to paying full dues.
WE WILL NOT fail to provide objecting nonmembers of the Union with information
concerning the breakdown of the Union’s dues structure in terms of the percentage of reduction
in fees for objecting nonmembers for chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, including a
properly verified basis for the Union’s calculations, and their right to challenge those calculations
and with a procedure for doing so.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, notify all bargaining unit
employees in writing, who signed a dues checkoff deduction form stating that it is “irrevocable”
during the life of the collective-bargaining agreement, that the form will no longer be applied for
the payroll deduction of their dues and fees to the Union.
JD–60–14
WE WILL jointly and severally with Allied Barton Security Services LLC (Allied Barton)
reimburse employees who signed the dues check off form stating it was irrevocable for their
dues deducted from their pay for all employees who were nonmembers of the Union prior to
January 30, 2013, for the period of January 1, 2013 to March 11, 2013, and for all those who
were members of the Union as of January 30, 2013, for the dues deducted from their pay for the
period January 1, 2013 to January 30, 2013, with interest in the manner described in the
Board’s decision.
WE WILL jointly and severally with Allied Barton reimburse employees, who did not sign
dues check off forms, who were nonmembers of the Union prior to January 30, 2013 for any
dues paid pursuant to a union security clause after January 1, 2013, for the period of January 1,
2013 to March 11, 2013, and to any employees who were members as of January 30, 2013, for
any dues paid after January 1, 2013, for the period of January 1, 2013, to January 30, 2013,
with interest in the manner described in the Board’s decision.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, notify, in writing, all
bargaining unit employees and all former bargaining unit employees employed by Allied Barton
on or after January 1, 2013, of their right to be and remain nonmembers of the Union, and that
any such request if made in a reasonable time will be retroactive to January 1, 2013, and inform
all bargaining unit employees in writing of the rights of nonmembers to object to paying for union
activities not applicable to the Union's duties as bargaining agent, and to obtain a reduction in
dues and fees for such activities, if any, including providing objectors with a verified breakdown
of our structure pertaining to chargeable and non-chargeable costs, and a description of the
Union’s appeals procedure for the employee to challenge that break down.
WE WILL process retroactively the objections of nonmember bargaining unit employees
made within a reasonable period of time pursuant to this Order and reimburse, with interest,
nonmember bargaining unit employees for any dues and fees exacted from them for
nonrepresentational activities any time since January 1, 2013, for which they file an objection in
exercise of their rights as nonmembers.
WE WILL within 14 days of the Board’s Order acknowledge in writing to John Clark that
he is a nonmember, that the Union acknowledges his objector status effective January 1, 2013,
to the payment of full dues, provide Clark with information concerning the breakdown of the
Union’s dues structure in terms of the percentage of reduction in fees for objecting nonmembers
for chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, including a properly verified basis for the Union’s
calculations, and inform Clark of his right to challenge the Union’s calculations and the
procedure for doing so.
WE WILL within 14 days of the Board’s Order inform in writing financial core member
Karissa Thompson that she can object to paying full membership dues retroactively to January
1, 2013, or the date she became a financial core member, whichever is sooner, and if she does
so in a reasonable time provide her with information concerning the breakdown of the Union’s
dues structure in terms of the percentage of reduction in fees for objecting nonmembers for
chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, including a properly verified basis for the Union’s
calculations, and inform her of her right to challenge the Union’s calculations, and the procedure
for doing so.
JD–60–14
WE WILL within 14 days of the Board’s Order inform employees John Clark and Karissa
Thompson in writing that any dues and fees the Union claims were owed for time periods prior
to March 11, 2013, will not be required to be paid as a condition for their continued employment,
and reimburse them for any dues they may have paid after January 1, 2103, for the period
January 1, 2013 to March 11, 2013, with interest as calculated in the Board’s decision, and we
will not seek to apply the contractual union security clause against Clark and Thompson, until
we have fully complied with their General Motor and Beck rights, as required by the Board’s
Order and we will notify them of this in writing.
LOCAL NO. 1, UNITED PROTECTIVE WORKERS
OF AMERICA
(Union)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue, Room 300, Detroit, MI 48226-2543
(313) 226-3200, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/07-CA-093970 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National
Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (313) 226-3244.