Alexander W. Odawa et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 5, 2019

14168274 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 5, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/168,274 01/30/2014 Alexander W. Odawa SQ-0183-US1 3966
151231 7590 09/05/2019
Schott P.C.
610 Old York Road, Suite 400
Jenkintown, PA 19046
EXAMINER
ZARE, SCOTT A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/05/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
patents@schottpc.com
square@clairvolex.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALEXANDER W. ODAWA, KYLE E. CALLENDER,
MICHAEL STRATTON and HUNTER FRANCOEUR
___________

Appeal 2018-003074
Application 14/168,274
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JEFFREY S. SMITH and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.

WHITEHEAD JR., Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants1 are appealing the final rejection of claims 1–10, 12–14,
and 16–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). Appeal Brief 12. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellants identify Square, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Brief
2.
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Introduction
The invention is directed to a “technique of associating a payment
object, such as a payment card, with multiple payment accounts” wherein
the “payment card is referred to herein as a proxy card.”
Specification ¶ 17.
Representative Claim
1. A method for selecting a payment account to use for a financial
transaction between a merchant and a consumer, the method comprising:

receiving, from a point-of-sale (POS) system and by a computer
system, transaction information associated with the financial transaction,
wherein the financial transaction involves a payment for an amount of funds,

the financial transaction involving a swipe of a proxy card
through a card reader associated with the POS system,

the proxy card being associated with a plurality of payment
accounts,

the payment accounts each being associated with one of a credit
card, a debit card, or a gift card;

receiving, from the POS system and by the computer system, proxy
card information obtained from the proxy card by the card reader;

accessing, by the computer system and based on the proxy card
information, a database to obtain the payment accounts that are associated
with the proxy card;

selecting, by the computer system, a particular payment account
associated with the proxy card to use for the financial transaction by
applying a policy associated with the consumer, wherein the policy is based
on funds available from the payment accounts or incentives associated with
the payment accounts;
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determining that neither a first payment account associated with the
proxy card nor the particular payment account individually have sufficient
funds available for the amount of funds of the payment; and

sending, by the computer system, information associated with the
particular payment account and information associated with the first
payment account to one or more financial systems to cause funds for the
financial transaction to be transferred from the particular payment
account and the first payment account to an account associated with the
merchant, such that the policy is satisfied and such that a sum of funds
obtained from the first payment account and the particular payment account
corresponds to the amount of funds of the payment.

Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–10, 12–14, and 16–27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the claimed invention is directed to patent ineligible subject matter
Final Action 2–6.
Claims 1–10, 12–14, and 16–27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Morgan (U.S. Patent Application Publication
2011/0180598 A1; published July 28, 2011) and Friedman (U.S. Patent
Application Publication 2004/0138999 A1; published July 15, 2004). Final
Action 6–21.
ANALYSIS
Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner,
we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed October 11, 2017), the Reply Brief (filed
January 29, 2018), the Final Action (mailed May 19, 2017) and the Answer
(mailed November 29, 2017), for the respective details.

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35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines the claims are patent ineligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claims are directed to an abstract idea
comprising organizing human activity, and do not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract
idea. Final Action 2–3 (“The claimed invention is not directed to patent
eligible subject matter. Based upon consideration of all of the relevant
factors with respect to the claim as a whole, claims [1–10, 12–14, and 16–
27] are determined to be directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract
idea) without significantly more.”); see Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (describing the two-part framework “for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts”).
After the mailing of the Answer and the filing of the Briefs in this
case, the USPTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Memorandum”). Under the Memorandum, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP2 § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. 2018)).

2 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the
claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum.
We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. We adopt
the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as our own and we add the
following primarily for emphasis and clarification with respect to the
Memorandum.
Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance
Step 2A, Prong One
Appellants argue the pending claims are not directed to an abstract
idea because “[T]he Examiner has not set forth a prima facie case under
either Step 2A or Step 2B, as required by MPEP §2106, that can support a
proper rejection of independent claims 1, 4, 13, and 24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.” Appeal Brief 15, 17–18 (“By failing to recite claim limitations and
analyze the claim elements versus any relevant judicial exception for
independent claims 1, 4, 13, and 24, the Final Office Action fails to meet the
requirement to set forth the required prima facie case.”).
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claims are
directed to an abstract idea. See Final Action 3. The Abstract discloses that,
“Various embodiments are related to apparatuses and methods for selecting
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a payment account to use for a financial transaction involving a payment
made using a proxy object, for example a proxy card similar to a credit
card.”
The Specification discloses:
This application discloses technology related to a technique of
associating a payment object, such as a payment card, with
multiple payment accounts. Such a payment card is referred to
herein as a proxy card. A proxy card can be associated with
several payment accounts. For example, a proxy card can be
associated with multiple credit card accounts, debit card
accounts, pre-paid gift card accounts, and the like. The consumer
can have access to all of the multiple payment accounts while
carrying only the proxy card, and can use the proxy card to pay
for purchases or other financial transactions.

A policy can be created and customized for the consumer, with
the policy determining the selection of the payment account to
use for a financial transaction involving a payment made using a
proxy card. In some embodiments, the consumer customizes the
policy so that the policy selects, for example, a pre-paid gift card
associated with the proxy card to pay for a financial transaction
before selecting any other type of card. As a second example, the
consumer customizes the policy so that the policy selects a
payment account that has an associated frequent flyer program in
order to obtain frequent flyer miles needed to obtain an airline
ticket for an upcoming vacation.

Specification ¶ ¶ 17, 18.
Claim 1 recites a “method for selecting a payment account to use for a
financial transaction between a merchant and a consumer” wherein the
method comprising:
1. receiving, from a point-of-sale (POS) system and by a computer
system, transaction information associated with the financial
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transaction, wherein the financial transaction involves a payment for
an amount of funds
2. the financial transaction involving a swipe of a proxy card through a
card reader associated with the POS system

3. receiving, from the POS system and by the computer system, proxy
card information obtained from the proxy card by the card reader

4. accessing, by the computer system and based on the proxy card
information, a database to obtain the payment accounts that are
associated with the proxy card

5. selecting, by the computer system, a particular payment account
associated with the proxy card to use for the financial transaction by
applying a policy associated with the consumer, wherein the policy is
based on funds available from the payment accounts or incentives
associated with the payment accounts

6. determining that neither a first payment account associated with the
proxy card nor the particular payment account individually have
sufficient funds available for the amount of funds of the payment

7. sending, by the computer system, information associated with the
particular payment account and information associated with the first
payment account to one or more financial systems to cause funds for
the financial transaction to be transferred from the particular payment
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account and the first payment account to an account associated with
the merchant, such that the policy is satisfied and such that a sum of
funds obtained from the first payment account and the particular
payment account corresponds to the amount of funds of the payment.

These steps recite fundamental economic principles or practices
and/or commercial or legal interactions; thus, the claim recites “certain
methods of organizing human activity,” an abstract idea. See Memorandum,
Section I (Groupings of Abstract Ideas); see also Specification 18–19. Our
reviewing courts have found claims to be directed to abstract ideas when
they recited similar subject matter. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674
F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (claims directed to abstract idea of
processing loan information through a clearinghouse); Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving,
selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving
payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath &
Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence
of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and
transmission was abstract). Therefore, we conclude the claims recite an
abstract idea pursuant to Step 2A, Prong One of the guidance. See
Memorandum, Section III(A)(1) (Prong One: Evaluate Whether the Claim
Recites a Judicial Exception).

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Step 2A, Prong Two
Under Prong Two of the Revised Guidance, we must determine
“whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of the exception” it is noted that a “claim that
integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Memorandum, Section
III(A)(2).
Appellants contend, “that independent claims 1, 4, 13, and 24 clearly
do not attempt to tie up the identified Abstract Idea so others cannot practice
it.” Appeal Brief 19.
The U.S. Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives this
exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent
eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 216.
However, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent
eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for
patent eligibility. As our reviewing court has explained, “[t]he Supreme
Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the
judicial exceptions to patentability,” and “[f]or this reason, questions on
preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). And, although “preemption may signal
patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. Moreover, “[w]here a patent’s
claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the
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[Alice/Mayo] framework . . . , preemption concerns are fully addressed and
made moot.” Id.; see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 701 (2015)(“[T]hat
the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”).

Appellants further contend:
Like the claims at issue in DDR Holdings “recite a specific way
to automate the creation of a composite web page by an
‘outsource provider’ that incorporates elements from multiple
sources in order to solve a problem faced by websites on the
Internet[,]” the present claims (which are lengthy, detailed,
heavily integrated, and allowable over the prior art) recite
specific devices, processing, and policies solve a problem
presented by payment devices and networks. Id. at 1259.
Appeal Brief 19.
We find Appellants’ claims are distinguished from those claims that
our reviewing court has found to be patent eligible by virtue of reciting
technological improvements to a computer system. See, e.g., DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1249, 1257 (holding that claims reciting computer
processor for serving “composite web page” were patent eligible because
“the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order
to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks”); Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that claims directed to “an improved computer
memory system” having many benefits were patent eligible).
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In McRO3, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim, when
considered as a whole, was directed to a “technological improvement over
the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques” through the “use [of] limited
rules . . . specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result in
conventional industry practice.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed rules allowed
computers to produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial
expressions in animated characters that previously could only be produced
by human animators; and the rules were limiting because they defined
morph weight sets as a function of phoneme sub-sequences. Id. at 1313.
We find no evidence of record here that the present situation is like the
one in McRO where computers had been unable to make certain subjective
determinations, e.g., regarding morph weight and phoneme timings, which
could only be made prior to the claimed invention by human animators. The
Background section of one of the patents at issue in McRO, Rosenfeld (US
Patent 6,307,576 B1; issued Oct. 23, 2001), includes a description of the
admitted prior art method and the shortcomings associated with that prior
method. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1303–06. There is no comparable
discussion in Appellants’ Specification or elsewhere of record. See Appeal
Brief 20–21. Further, as the Federal Circuit has explained, a “claim for a
new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsis, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Even assuming the technique
claimed was “[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,” that would

3 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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not be enough for the claimed abstract idea to be patent eligible. See Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
Subsequently, we do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive
because the claims utilize a consumer’s personal computing device such as a
laptop or smart phone without any improvement to the functioning of the
devices themselves. See Specification ¶ 31; see also Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e find it
relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to
computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea . . . the focus
of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer database) or,
instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool.”). The claims do not recite an additional
element or elements that reflect an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field. See
also Final Action 5–6 (“These computer-based method steps, when
considered both individually and in combination, are merely a generic
computer implementation performing generic computer network functions
such as receiving data, processing data, and outputting data.”); see also
Alice, 573 U.S. at 222 (“In holding that the process was patent ineligible, we
rejected the argument that ‘implement[ing] a principle in some specific
fashion’ will ‘automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject matter of
§ 101.’” (Alterations in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
593 (1978))).
Accordingly, we determine the claims do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Memorandum, Section III(A)(2)
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(Prong Two: If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception, Evaluate Whether the
Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical Application).

Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance
Step 2B
Next, we determine whether the claims include additional elements
that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby
providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 72–73). Appellants contend:
that the manner in which combination of the elements in each of
independent claims 1, 4, 13, and 24 amount to ‘something more’
is best illustrated by reference to Example 35: Verifying A Bank
Customer’s Identity To Permit An ATM Transaction of Subject
Matter Eligibility Examples: Business Methods (‘BM
Guidance’), which published on December 15, 2016.

Appeal Brief 21.
Appellants further contend that the claimed invention is similar to the
hypothetical claim 2 from the BM Guidance4 where hypothetically, the claim
was determined to be eligible. See Appeal Brief 23–27; see also BM
Guidance 5 (“Claims 2 and 3 are directed to the same abstract idea, but are
eligible because they have additional elements that amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea (i.e., provide an inventive concept) because they
implement the abstract idea with specific meaningful limitations.”). We are
not persuaded and, as we addressed above, we find the claims do not include

4 2014 Interim Guidance on Subject Matter Eligibility (2014 IEG), 79 Fed.
Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014).
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a specific limitation or a combination of elements that amounts to
significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Final Action 5–6
(“[T]he use of these limitations is limited to merely insignificant
pre-solution data gathering, and consequently, does not amount to
‘significantly more’ than the abstract idea.”); see Memorandum, Section
III(B) (Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception, Evaluate
Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept); see also Aatrix
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (“the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the
abstract idea itself”).
Accordingly, we conclude claims 1–10, 12–14, and 16–27 are directed
to a fundamental economic practice, which is one of certain methods of
organizing human activity identified in the Memorandum and thus an
abstract idea wherein the claims do not recite limitations that amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself. We sustain the Examiner’s
§ 101 rejection of claims 1–10, 12–14, and 16–27.
35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection
Appellants argue:
Morgan and Friedman fail to disclose at least that a “financial
transaction [that] involves a payment for an amount of funds,”
“determining that neither a first payment account associated with
the proxy object nor the particular payment account individually
have sufficient funds available for the amount of funds of the
payment,” and “causing the financial transaction to be processed
from both the first payment account and the particular payment
account.”
Appeal Brief 29.
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Appellants further argue that while the Final Action indicates that
“Morgan fails to provide such disclosure (Final Action at p. 9),” Friedman
fails to address Morgan’s alleged deficiency because:
Friedman is related to associating a credit account with a
healthcare expense account. Friedman’s ¶ [0038], while
discussing Friedman's FIG. 4, describes a two-step process in
which it is first determined that a healthcare expense account
lacks sufficient funds for a customer payment portion, and if so,
it is next “ascertain[ed] whether the second credit component has
credit available for paying at least a part of the customer
payment portion.” Friedman at ¶ [0038] (Emphasis added).
Notably, a determination that the second credit component can
pay at least a part of the customer payment portion is not a
determination that the second credit component individually
does not have sufficient funds available for the amount of funds
of the payment.
Appeal Brief 29.
Appellants contend:
Friedman thus teaches away from checking whether the
full amount of funds can by paid by the credit component. The
only circumstance in which the full amount would be checked
from the credit account would be if the healthcare expense
account has no funds available for payment. However, in this
circumstance there will be no payment from the healthcare
expense account, and thus no payment from both of the accounts
as claimed. Thus, Friedman would fail to disclose causing the
financial transaction to be processed from both the health care
expense payment account and the second credit component in
this circumstance.
Appeal Brief 31.
We do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive. We find
Appellants’ assertion that Friedman “teaches away from checking whether
the full amount of funds can by paid by the credit component” is not
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supported by Friedman’s disclosure. Appeal Brief 31. “A reference may be
said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the
reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the
reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was
taken by the applicant.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also In re Fulton, 391
F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that merely disclosing more than
one alternative does not teach away from any of these alternatives if the
disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the
alternatives).
Morgan discloses an invention for processing payments for a proxy
card wherein, “[T]he request is triggered at a merchant server, by the use of
a proxy card of the customer. The processor attempts to identify at least one
desired payment mode for making the payment, from among payment
mode(s) associated with the proxy card.” Morgan, Abstract. Morgan further
discloses that “a customer may set preferences to split the amount of a
transaction between multiple payment modes.” Morgan ¶ 48; see Final
Action 9. Morgan also discloses that the customer can set their preference
for how payments are made while utilizing the proxy card. Morgan ¶ 58
(“The term ‘preferences’ refers to any rules and/or settings associated with
the payment modes, and configured by the customer.”). Morgan discloses
that the proxy card can be associated with various payment vehicles such as
flexible spending accounts and health saving accounts. Morgan ¶ 59.5

5 “The virtual payment wallet stores information related to one or more
payment modes such as, but not limited to, a debit card account, credit card
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The Examiner acknowledges that Morgan does not determine “that
neither a first payment account associated with the proxy card nor the
particular payment account individually have sufficient funds available for
the payment.” Final Action 9. However, it is evident that it is within the
purview of one of ordinary skill in the art to modify or incorporate within
Morgan’s invention, the ability to determine the amount of funds associated
with each payment vehicle including the amount that would be sufficient at
the time of the commercial transaction. In addition, Morgan discloses that
authorization checks can be performed on the selected payment vehicles or
accounts. See Morgan ¶ 65; see also Final Action 9. Nonetheless, the
Examiner relies upon Friedman to disclose that determining a payment
vehicle or account has sufficient funds at the time of a commercial
transaction was known in the art at the time of the invention. See Final
Action 10 (citing Friedman ¶¶ 386, 70). Friedman further discloses, “[T]he
funds available in the healthcare expense account may be combined with the
credit available in the second credit component.” Friedman ¶ 38. “As our

account, bank account, pre-paid gift card, free savings account, flexible
spending account, health savings account, reward points, redemption
coupons, and the like, etc., in a secure environment.” Morgan ¶ 59.

6 “Further, in one embodiment, the entity responsible for management of the
credit account may receive a credit for the customer payment portion from
the healthcare expense account, when it is determined that that the
healthcare expense account has sufficient funds available to pay for
the customer payment portion (step S.60). If, on the other hand, the
healthcare expense account does not have sufficient funds available to pay
for the customer payment portion, then a determination may be made to
ascertain whether the second credit component has credit available for
paying at least a part of the customer payment portion (step S.70).”
Friedman ¶ 38.
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precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for
a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s findings and sustain the
obviousness rejection of claim 1, as well as, claims 2–10, 12–14, and 16–27
not separately argued. See Appeal Brief 31.

DECISION
The Examiner’s patent ineligible subject matter rejection of claims 1–
10, 12–14, and 16–27 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1–10, 12–14, and 16–
27 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(v).

AFFIRMED