Alaska Steamship Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 30, 1955

114 N.L.R.B. 1264 (N.L.R.B. 1955)

1264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
thereby placing a premium on delay. Does this further stability !
Finally, as earlier pointed out in the dissent to the Ludlow decision,
"the employer's absolute duty to bargain with a newly certified union
will henceforth be measured by the contract term rather than by the
1-year rule, [and] employers [particularly those who harbor hopes
of ousting the certified union] will of course prefer short-term con-
tracts." An employer, although intent upon a short-term contract,
may not always succeed in obtaining the union's agreement thereto,
for the union may be forced to make substantial concessions as a barter
to avoid the risk of a challenge to its majority status within the certi-
fication year and before it could reasonably demonstrate its capabilities
as the employees' representative.
I believe the certification-year rule, with which Ludlow is funda-
mentally in conflict, has become effectively embedded in the law.
It is not difficult to See that the net effect of the Ludlow rule is an
overall lessening of an employer's statutory duty to bargain. No
reasonable and valid basis has been shown for departing from the 1-
year rule in order to adopt a formula such as contained in. Ludlow.
Accordingly, in view of the principles, authorities, and arguments
discussed herein, I would overrule the Ludlow case and hold the con-
tract in the present case a bar to the petition.s'
MEMBER PETERSON took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Direction of Election.
66 Ludlow Typograph Company , supra.
87 E. g., Willborn Brothers Co., 77 NLRB 1026; Texas Paper Co., 75 NLRB 799.
Alaska Steamship Company and Horace W. Underwood
American Radio Association, CIO and Horace W. Underwood.
Cases Nos. 19-CA-277, 19-CB-90, 19-CA-358, and 19-CB-136.
November 30, 1955
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
On February 11, 1952,' the Board issued its Decision and Order in
the above-entitled case, finding that the Respondent Company had
violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act by discriminating against
Horace W. Underwood, the Charging Party, and that the Respondent
Union had violated Section 8 (b) (1) and (2) of the Act by causing
such discrimination. The Board, among other remedies, ordered the
Respondents, jointly and severally, to make Underwood whole for any
loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him. Thereafter, on February 26,1954, the Board's Order was
198 NLRB 22.
114 NLRB No. 188.
ALASKA STEAMSHIP COMPANY 1265
enforced by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 On September 30,
1954, the record in this case was reopened for the purpose of adducing
additional evidence as to the amount of back pay due Underwood
from the Respondents.
On March 29, 1955, Trial Examiner David F. Doyle issued his Sup-
plemental Intermediate Report, finding that the total net back pay
due Underwood from Respondents was $1,771.87, as set forth in the
copy of the Supplemental Intermediate Report attached hereto. The
Respondents and the General Counsel have filed exceptions to the
Supplemental Intermediate Report together with supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Sup-
plemental Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following ad-
ditions and modifications :
In its decree enforcing the Board's Order the court of appeals called
to the attention of the Board the well-established principle of law that
an employee subject to discrimination is under a duty to mitigate his
loss. That principle derives from the Supreme Court's decision in
Phelps Dodge Corporation v. N. L. R. B.3 in which the Court held
that "deductions should be made not only for actual earnings by the
worker but also for losses which he wilfully incurred." The Board
has, consistently applied this principle to cases involving back-pay
issues.' In the instant case the court of appeals has expressed concern
whether Underwood justifiably refused certain job opportunities and,
independently, made an adequate search for employment to mitigate
his loss. The Board, of course, shares the court's concern as to these
matters. Our.findings in this case are made in full agreement with
the court as to the applicable principle of law and the necessity to
carefully scrutinize Underwood's conduct in refusing job opportuni-
ties and seeking employment during the period of discrimination.
The record shows that on May 7,1950, 2 days after he was unlawfully
denied employment aboard the S. S. Alaska, Underwood applied, by
letter, for employment with the Employer. His letter was un-
answered. Thereafter, on unspecified dates up to July 20,1950, Under-
wood applied for radio officer's work with four canning companies.
On July 7, 11, and 18, 1950, he registered as a "radio officer" with the
Washington State Unemployment Insurance Agency. On July 23,
2 N. L. R . B. v. Alaska Steamship Co and Ameri'an Radio Association, 211 F. 2d 357
(C. A. 9).
3 313 U. S. 177, 199-200
4 See Ohio Public Service Company, 52 NLRB 725; Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Com-
pany, 90 NLRB 320; Seamprufe, Inc., 106 NLRB 1143; Venetian Blind Workers, Local
No. 2565, 110 NLRB 780; Efco Manufacturing, Inc., 111 NLRB 1032.
1266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1950, as a result of one of his personal applications for employment,
Underwood obtained a job as a shoreside radio operator with an
Alaska cannery, which job lasted until September 30, 1950. Immedi-
ately upon his return from Alaska, Underwood presented himself to
the Union's port agent in charge of administering the Union's 'em-
ployment system and requested a radio officer's position of the type he
would have had aboard the S. S. Alaska absent the discrimination.
On December 1, 1950, he again registered with the State Unem-
ployment Agency and thereafter regularly registered with that agency
during all times material to the case. On December 5, 1950, he again
requested employment through the Union's employment system. On
February 27, 1951, the Union offered and Underwood accepted a job
aboard the S. S. Paci fiicus and remained almost continually employed
thereafter aboard various ships sailing the Alaska trade.
Thus, Underwood made several personal applications for work
which resulted in employment for more than 2 months, registered
with the State Unemployment Agency, and sought employment
through the Union's employment office. On these facts we find, in
agreement with the Trial Examiner, that Underwood made sufficient
affirmative efforts to obtain employment.
The question remains, however, whether Underwood justifiably re-
fused certain job opportunities offered him by the Union during the
period of discrimination. As did the Trial Examiner, we shall
consider these offers seriatim.
On April 16, 1950, the Union offered Underwood a job on board
the Flemish Knot on condition that Underwood withdraw his charges
against the Union. Had Underwood accepted this offer under this
condition the effectuation of the Act in forbidding discrimination of
this kind would have been thwarted. Accordingly, we find that
Underwood was justified in refusing this offer.'
In July 1950, the Union referred Underwood to a job as a flying
radio operator with Northwest Airlines. This position required a
minimum of 80 hours flying time, a requirement that Underwood
could not meet. The job was, in addition, substantially different from
the seagoing duty to which Underwood was accustomed. In view of
Underwood's lack of qualification for this job and the nature of the
job itself, we find that he was justified in refusing to accept it.
On October 13, 1950, and again on December 19, 1950, respectively,
the Union referred Underwood to jobs aboard ships operated under
United States Government regulations. Both of these jobs were of-
fered at a time when the S. S. Alaska was not in operation, a period
during which Respondents' back-pay liability would not accrue.
There is no-evidence in the record that either of these jobs would have
6 See St Marys Sewer Pipe Company, 54 NLRB 1226; Briggs Manufacturing Companyy
75 NLRB 569.
ALASKA STEAMSHIP COMPANY 1267
extended beyond that period. Under these circumstances, we find that
Underwood's refusal of these jobs does, not affect the award of back
pay, which is limited in time to the actual operation of the S. S.
A laska.6
On February 19, 1951, 7 days before the date of the original hearing
in this case, Underwood was offered a job as a relief operator aboard
an unspecified ship. As this job,. if accepted, would have made it
impossible for Underwood to attend the hearing in this case, we find
his refusal to accept the offer to be justified.'
The adequacy of Underwood's search for employment involves still
another question, which has been considered at length by the Trial
Examiner. This question requires a determination by the Board that
Underwood, absent the discrimination against him, either would have
"stood by" the S. S-. Alaska during its inoperative periods or would
have accepted employment on other ships, thereby forfeiting his turn
under the Union's rotational plan for the next available job on the
S. S. Alaska. The determination of this question is admittedly diffi-
cult, involving, as it does, conclusions as to Underwood' s course of
action had he not been subjected-to unlawful discrimination. The court
of appeals understandingly points to the Union's contention that these
events occurred shortly after the outbreak of the Korean war when
employment for radio operators became relatively plentiful and such
operators usually did not stand by a particular ship. The issue, how-
ever, is not whether Underwood would have acted reasonably or un-
reasonably in this respect. Under the Union's rules he was given the
absolute right to make a choice of this kind for personal reasons.
The problem before the Board, then, is essentially a subjective one and
requires a determination of what this particular radio officer would
or would not have done had he not been deprived of the opportunity
to make such a choice. Obviously, a determination of this nature pre-
sents certain hazards. To decide that a particular individual would
make a particular choice where the reasonableness of the choice is not
a guide to his action requires analysis more psychological than judicial.
It is clear, however, from the record that Underwood ardently desired
a place on board the S. S. Alaska of which he had been unlawfully de-
prived. Despite the availability through the Union's referral system
of jobs on other ships and the fact that other radio operators might
have taken a contrary course , we are of the opinion that Underwood,
who had demonstrated so strong a preference for employment on board
e It also appears that the Union , on certain unspecified dates , offered Underwood two
jobs of unspecified duration. As the record does not show when these jobs were offered or
that, if accepted , employment would have occurred during periods when the S S . Alaska
was in operation , we find that Underwood 's refusal of these jobs does not affect the award
of back pay.
7 See West Texas ljt¢litties Co , 109 NLRB 936.
387644-56-vol. 114-81
1268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the S. S. Alaska, would have elected to stand by that ship had he been
given that opportunity.
Accordingly, we find that Underwood did not wilfully incur any
losses during the period of discrimination and is entitled to the award
of back pay found by the Trial Examiner.
[The Board ordered that Alaska Steamship Company and American
Radio Association, CIO, pay to Horace W. Underwood net back pay
in the amount of $1,771.87.]
SUPPLEMENTAL INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE, CASE
This report computes the amount of back pay due Horace W. Underwood from
the above-named Respondents' pursuant to an order of the Board dated February
11, 1952.
1. BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT PROCEEDING
(a) Findings and remedy of Trial Examiner
Upon charges filed by Underwood, the General Counsel of the Board issued a
consolidated complaint against the two Respondents herein, alleging that they had
engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of the Act. Thereafter, on February 26
and 27 and March 26 to 28, 1951, inclusive, a hearing was conducted by Trial Exam-
iner A. Bruce Hunt at Seattle, Washington.
As a result of the hearing, the Trial Examiner found that the Company, in filling
a vacancy in the position of second assistant radio officer aboard its S. S. Alaska, a
permanent position, had discriminated against Underwood, and that the Union had
caused the discrimination. To effectuate the purposes of the Act, the Trial Examiner
recommended that the Respondents be"required to perform certain acts as a remedy.
The pertinent section of the report is as follows:
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that they cease and desist therefrom and that they take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. I have found
that on May 5, 1950, in filling a vacancy aboard the Alaska, the Company dis-
criminated against Underwood in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of
the Act, and that the Union caused the Company to discriminate against
Underwood, thereby violating Section 8 (b) (2) and (1) (A). The posi-
tion aboard the Alaska as second assistant radio officer was a "permanent"
one, and the vessel was in service for the period of May 3 to October 14,
1950. On the latter date, the Alaska was removed from service and its crew was
paid off. I shall recommend that the Company and the Union, jointly and sev-
erally, make whole Underwood for any loss of pay he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against him by payment to him of a sum of money
equal to the amount which he normally would have earned as wages from May
3 to October 14, 1950, inclusive, less his net earnings (Crossett Lumber Com-
pany, 8 NLRB 440, 497-8) during said period, the payment to be computed
upon a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289. I shall also recommend, in accordance with the
Woolworth decision, that the Company, upon request, make available to the
Board and its agents all pertinent records. The Company's argument in its
brief that Underwood should not be awarded back pay because his unwillingness
to accept employment opportunities with other employers amounted to "a will-
ful incurrence of wage loss" is not persuasive. Within approximately 2 months
after the Respondents' discrimination against Underwood, he accepted em-
ployment in Kake, Alaska, which continued for about the period that the
Alaska was in service during 1950.
The next question is whether the Company shall be required to offer Under-
wood employment aboard the Alaska, or a substantially equivalent position-
As related, the Alaska was removed from service on October 15, 1950. As of
3 The Respondents are referred to individually as the Company and the Union.
ALASKA STEAMSHIP COMPANY - - 1269
February 20, 1951, the vessel had not been returned to service. While the record
is not specific on the point, it appears that the Alaska was laid up for the winter,
rather than permanently removed from service 28 Under such circumstances,
Underwood would have enjoyed the right to stand by the vessel during the
period it was laid up, thereby retaining his position.29 It is perhaps questionable
that Underwood would have chosen to stand by.30 Whatever doubt there may
be should not be resolved in favor of the Respondents, however, because their
discrimination against Underwood gave rise to the doubt. I believe, therefore,
that the Company should be required to offer Underwood immediate employment
in the position of chief radio operator aboard the Alaska, to which position he
would have advanced under the Union's shipping rules,31 or to a substantially
equivalent position,32 without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges. I shall recommend accordingly. I shall also recommend that the
Union and the Company, in the manner above provided, make Underwood
whole for any additional loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the dis-
crimination against him by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that
which he normally would have earned as wages from the date the Alaska was
returned to service after October 15, 1950, to the date of the Company's offer
of employment,33 provided, however, that the Union may terminate its liability
for further accrual of back pay to Underwood by notifying the Company, in
writing, with a copy of such notification to Underwood, that the Union has no
objection to his employment as recommended therein. The Union shall not be
liable for back pay accruing after 5 days from the giving of such notice. Absent
such notice, the Union shall remain jointly and severally liable with the Com-
pany for all back pay that may accrue to Underwood until the Company offers
him employment as recommended. George W. Reed, 94 NLRB 698.
As found above, the 1950 agreement and applicable shipping rules are lawful
and nondiscriminatory as to nonmembers of the Union. Their continued ob-
servance by the Respondents as to all radio officers, including Underwood, would
not be unlawful. Accordingly, nothing herein is intended to exempt Under-
wood from the requirements of lawful shipping rules and collective labor agree-
2 The Company's practice is to withdraw certain vessels from service at the end
of its busy season each year. The Alaska is a passenger vessel which is not operated
the year around. It was laid up from October 1, 1949, to May 2, 1950, when it re-
turned to service for the period ending May 14, 1950
29 While the Union for some time has had a rule limiting standbys, under certain
circumstances , to maximum periods of 90 days, the rule is not enforced in the Seattle
area in instances of vessels which are operated only in the spring and summer
seasons . See the next footnote Counsel for the Union indicated by his questions of
a witness that the reason lies partly in the seasonal nature of the Company' s business.
so During the period of October 1, 1949, to May 2, 1950, when the Alaska was laid
up, two of its radio officers, Dittberner and Johnston, chose to stand by. The third
radio officer, Jesse D Sneff, did not stand by for the entire period, and was succeeded
on May 3, 1950, by Deyo. This period was one of slack employment for radio officers,
and the -record shows that those who held permanent positions aboard desirable
vessels made it a practice to stand by when the vessels were laid up in order not to
lose the positions. After the Alaska was laid up on October 15, 1950, when em-
ployment opportunities had greatly increased following the beginning of hostilities
in Korea, Dittberner, Johnston, and Deyo gave up their rights to stand by the vessel,
as is shown by certain port assignment lists.
31 [This footnote is not reproduced herein, because it is not pertinent to the
instant issue.]
32 See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico,
Branch, 65 NLRB 827.
33 Since Underwood was employed aboard the Pacif eus before the Alaska com-
menced operations in 1951, there can be no question of willful loss of earnings for
this period. The Pacificus is not operated by the Company, but by Coastwise Line, a
member company of PMA. In its brief, the Company contends that it should not be
required to employ Underwood because he has obtained substantially equivalent em-
ployment. I believe, however, that the policies of the Act will best be effectuated by
the recommendation of Underwood's employment, regardless of whether Underwood
has obtained equivalent employment elsewhere. Atlantic Company, 79 NLRB 820.
Moreover, the record does not disclose sufficient facts about the position aboard the
Paeifleus to determine whether it is equivalent to that of chief radio operator aboard
the Alaska.
1270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ments at the conclusion of such employment as shall be offered to him by the
Company as above provided.
(b) The Order and remedy of the Board
On February 11, 1952, the Board, by Decision and Order, adopted the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with certain modifications.
the portion of the decision of the Board pertinent to this proceeding is set forth
below:
1. The Trial Examiner apparently found the effective date of the discrimination
against Underwood to be May 5, 1950, the date Underwood was not offered
the position of radio officer on the ship Alaska. This resulted, as found by the
Trial Examiner, from Underwood's name being discriminatorily stricken from
the national assignment list of the Respondent Union. We find that the act of
removing Underwood's name from the assignment list in itself constituted
discrimination in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3), of the Act by the
Respondent Employer and Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act by the
Respondent Union. However, we agree with the Trial Examiner in his finding
that Underwood was also discriminated against on May 5, 1950, and in his set-
ting that date as the date from which Underwood's right to back pay shall run.
2. The Alaska operated from May 5 to October 14, 1950, at which latter
date it was laid up for the winter season. At that time, had Underwood been
employed on the ship as radio officer, as it has been found he should have been,
he would have been entitled, according to the rules of the Respondent Union, to
"stand by" the ship, retaining his right to the radio officer's position when it
resumed operation. Or he could have relinquished his position and presumably
had his name restored to the Union's assignment lists. The Trial Examiner found
that Underwood would have elected to stand by the Alaska and would therefore
have had the right to return to it when the ship went back into operation in
the spring of 1951. The Trial Examiner further found that through the opera-
tion of the rules of the Union, Underwood would have been automatically pro-
moted to the position of chief radio operator on the Alaska. He therefore
recommended that the Respondent Company be required to offer Underwood
that position or a substantially equivalent one. In our opinion, a finding that
Underwood would have attained the position of chief radio operator involves too
much speculation as to a series of contingent events to be a proper finding for us
to make. We will therefore order that the Respondent Company offer Under-
wood the position of radio officer aboard the vessel Alaska, or a substantially
equivalent position. We do not intend by this modification, however, to change
in any way the Trial Examiner's recommendations as to the back pay due
Underwood, except to the extent of any differential between the wage rates of a
radio officer and a chief radio operator.
(c) The decree and conditions of the court of appeals
Thereafter the Board filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit seeking the enforcement of its Order. On February 26, 1954, the Court of Ap-
peals handed down its decree enforcing the Order of the Board, but the court at-
tached certain conditions to its decree. That portion of the decision which sets forth
the conditions of the decree is set forth below:
One feature of the remedy recommended by the trial examiner and approved
by the Board should be noticed, namely the requirement of lost pay to Under-
wood, imposed by the order jointly on the Union and the Company.4 We are
of opinion that back-pay computation may not include losses accruing to a
worker through his willful refusal of equivalent employment. The record indi-
cates that certain jobs of equivalence were refused by Underwood for the reason
that they were not with the Company. The proposed award for losses accruing to
him in the period commencing with the year 1951 appears to assume that Under-
wood would have stood by awaiting the recommencement of operations by the
Alaska, the Company ship on which he was discriminatorily denied employment
: The Company appears to contend that joint liability cannot, under the terms of
§ 10 (c), be imposed. This court has held the contrary. N. L. R. B. v. Pinkerton's
Nat. Detective. Agency, 9 Cir., 202 F. 2d 230, 231-232. Cf. also Radio Officers'
Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union, A. F. L. v. N. L. R. B, 347 U. S. 17, 74
S. Ct 323.
ALASKA STEAMSHIP COMPANY 1271
on May 5, 1950. The respondents tell us that usually all radio operators did
not stand by after the outbreak of the Korean war when employment for
radio operators became relatively plentiful.
The Board has not discussed this subject here, either in brief or oral argu-
ment. Naturally no determination of the amount of lost pay flowing from the
discriminatory treatment of Underwood has yet been made. Our purpose here
is to express for the benefit of the Board our view that the worker discriminated
against is under the necessity of mitigating his loss.
Our decree enforcing the Board's order will be subject to the condition that
after the award of back pay has been made exceptions to it on the grounds
indicated will be entertained by the court.
Subject to this condition a decree will be entered enforcing the order.
2. THE INSTANT PROCEEDING
On September 30, 1954, the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region (Seattle,
Washington), issued a notice of hearing to the Respondents , reopening the record here-
in for the purpose of adducing evidence as to the amount of back pay due Underwood
from fthe Respondents . Pursuant to said notice , on November 4, 1954, a hearing
was held before the duly designated Trial Examiner, at Seattle, Washington. All
parties were represented by counsel , were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross -examine witnesses , to introduce evidence bearing on the issues, to
argue the issues orally upon the record , and to file briefs and proposed findings.
All parties have filed briefs which have been carefully considered.
(a) The positions of the parties
At the hearing, the General Counsel argued as a first position that the question of
"willful loss" of earnings had been decided adversely to the Respondents in the pro-
ceeding before Trial Examiner Hunt . As a second position , the General Counsel pre-
sented his computation of the back pay due Underwood , with legal precedents as to
the method of computation , and the oral testimony of Underwood . By his reckoning
the amount of back pay due is $1,771.87.
The Company and the Union took the position that they were not foreclosed
from presenting evidence on any feature of the back-pay computation by virtue of
the findings of either Trial Examiner Hunt, or the order of the Board, and both
Respondents were then permitted to introduce any evidence pertinent to any feature
of the computation.
As to the amount of back pay involved, the Company argued that Underwood
should not be awarded any back pay because his unwillingness to accept employ-
ment opportunities amounted to a willful incurrence of wage losses. As its second
point is urged, without prejudice to its first position, that any back pay awarded
to Underwood should terminate not later than October 14, 1950, the date on which
the S. S. Alaska was laid up for the winter, inasmuch as Underwood accepted
employment on the Pacificus on February 27, 1951.
The position of the Union was that it could not be held responsible for any part
of $1,771.87, and that Underwood was not entitled to any back pay for three
principal reasons: (1) The claimant had incurred willful loss by refusing equiva-
lent employment; (2) that a finding that Underwood would have stood by the
vessel Alaska is contrary to the evidence in the record; (3) that radio operators
were in short supply during the period of the Korean war, and that Underwood
would have been employed if he had made himself available?
(b) The issue
At this point in this report, I deem it proper, in the interests of clarity, to state
that I hereby overrule the objection of the General Counsel to the receipt of cer-
tain evidence on the ground that certain issues involved in the computation had been
previously decided by Trial Examiner Hunt, and affirmed by the Board. In my
opinion, it is clear that in the prior proceeding certain evidence was received, not
as bearing on the question of back pay here involved, but as bearing on other fea-
tures of the litigation. Furthermore, counsel for each party has designated certain
portions of the transcript of record, court of appeals, which he presents for my
consideration in this proceeding . To assure a final adjudication of this matter, and
2 These three principal contentions were urged in many variations , all of which were
outlined in the Union 's brief All have been considered.
1272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to comply with the conditions laid down by the court of appeals, I have overruled
all objections to the receipt of evidence based on materiality and relevancy and
have received and considered all evidence thus presented. However, certain phases
or items of this evidence, pertaining to offsets claimed by the Company and the
Union, I deem improper for inclusion in this computation, not because of the rules
of evidence, but because of certain equitable principles, which constitute the sub-
stantive law, governing such computations. One of such principles has been referred
to by the court of appeals, namely that back pay may not be granted to reimburse
a discriminatee for wage loss incurred by his willful refusal to accept or seek equiv-
alent employment. With that principle I am in complete agreement, but as will ap-
pear herein, the principle has limitations as to its application, and the question of
equivalence is a question of fact.
There is one ultimate issue in this proceeding which can be stated thus: Is the
computation of back pay due Underwood from the Respondents, as computed by
the General Counsel, correct, on the facts and under applicable law?
(c) The computation and the evidence
The figures involved in the computation are not in dispute. Prior to the 'hear-
ing, the Company had supplied to the General Counsel the pay data of radio
officers aboard the S. S. Alaska, and the General Counsel had supplied to the Re-
spondents pay data as to Underwood's interim earnings in other employment. There
was no factual dispute as to the accuracy of any such items or figures so exchanged.
The controversy between the parties is related entirely to whether various sums set
forth in the data should be included or excluded from the computation, under the
law and on the facts. The contention of the Respondents is confined exclusively
to the point of whether certain losses of wages, resulting from Underwood' s refusal
of job opportunities have been properly excluded from the counsel's computation, thus
depriving Respondents of a credit due them.
Review of the sequence of events in this case is helpful in appraising the validity
of the contentions of the Respondents as to certain of the alleged offers of employ-
ment to Underwood. The sequence of events may be summarized as follows:
On January 17, 1950, the original charge in this case was filed. It was amended
on March 17, 1950.
On April 16, 1950, the Union offered a position on the vessel Flemish Knot to
Underwood. He did not accept the position.
May 5, 1950, the Respondents discriminatorily deprived Underwood of a posi-
tion on the S. S. Alaska. This was the issue determined by the Trial Examiner,
the Board, and the court, at later dates. The Trial Examiner's report is dated July
3, 1951.
On an unspecified date in July 1950, the Union offered Underwood a job as
a flying radio operator on an airline. He did not accept the position.
On October 13, 1950, the Union offered Underwood a position on a Military Sea
Transport Service vessel. This he also refused.
On February 19, 1951, with the hearing of Underwood' s case scheduled before
a Trial Examiner, the Union offered him a job as relief operator with an unspeci-
fied company. He refused the offer.
On February 26 and 27 and March 26 to 28, 1951, the scheduled hearing before
Trial Examiner Hunt took place.
Also on February 27, 1951, the Union made an offer to Underwood of a job
on the vessel Pacificus, of the Coastwise Line. He accepted the position and was
employed practically continuously during the season of 1951.
On July 3, 1951, Trial Examiner Hunt issued his Intermediate Report and rec-
ommended order in the case. On February 11, 1952, the Board affirmed the order
of Trial Examiner Hunt, with certain modifications which are not involved in the
instant proceeding.
In addition to the above, the Respondent Union claims that it offered Underwood
employment on two other occasions. One offer was on an unspecified date, on a
vessel operated by an unspecified company, on a voyage of unspecified duration,
and to an unspecified port. On a second unspecified date, the Union offered em-
ployment for one trip as a relief operator on the S. S. Baranof. which was operated
by the Company Underwood declined this job.
The parties stipulated to a statement of facts of which the General Counsel's
computation is a part. This document furnishes a convenient starting point for a'
consideration of the contentions of all parties. It reads as follows:
ALASKA STEAMSHIP COMPANY 1273
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arose upon charges filed by Horace W. Underwood, herein called
Underwood, on January 17, 1950 and March 20, 1950, against Alaska Steam-
ship Company, herein called Respondent Company, and American Radio As-
sociation, herein called Respondent Radio, collectively referred to as Respond-
ents. The issues were tried February 26 and 27 and March 26 to 28, 1951, all
inclusive. The Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report on July 3, 1951,
finding violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) by Respondents. Exceptions
were filed and upon consideration of the record anew, the Board independently
affirmed the findings and conclusions, as reported in 98 NLRB 22.
The Board and the Court of Appeals fixed the discrimination as beginning
May 5, 1950. On May 16, 1952, Respondent Company made a valid offer
of employment to Underwood. He declined it at that time. Following May 5,
1950, Underwood first was employed by the Keku Canning Co. at Kake, Alaska,
as a radio operator from July 23 to September 30, 1950. His earnings were
$1157.71. Next he was employed aboard the Pacificus from March 2, 1951,
to October 15, 1951. His earnings were $3249.00. He served as radio officer
aboard the Coastal Monarch operated by Respondent Company. This was a relief
trip for the period from November 2, 1951, to November 26, 1951. His earn-
ings were $371-83. He was employed by Ocean Tow, Inc., aboard the MS
Alaska Cedar from January 1, 1952, to February 4, 1952, and earned $639.70.
The vessel Alaska was operated by Respondent Company during the following
periods:
1. May 5, 1950 to October 14, 1950.'
2. June 11, 1951 to October 5, 1951.
3. November 21, 1951 to December 6; 1951.
4. In 1952 the vessel was planned to enter service about June 11.
On March- 17, 1952, Respondent Company supplied copies of wage vouchers
showing earnings for second assistant radio officer on the SS Alaska during
her periods of operation since May, 1950:
On April 16, 1952, the General Counsel supplied Respondents with a com-
putation of interim earnings of Underwood, together with computation of
earnings of second radio officer aboard the Alaska for the period from May 5,
1950, to May 16, 1952, limited, however, to the times -when the Alaska was in
operation. A- copy of that computation is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "A."
In addition to the employment described-in the second paragraph of page 3
herein, Underwood next obtained employment as a relief operator aboard the
vessel Baranof operated by Respondent Company for two relief trips. The
first was from March 24 to April 2, and the second from April 3 to April 16,
1952. His aggregate gross earnings for the two trips was $456.84.
Beginning on May 14, 1952 he worked as radio officer at the Kake, Alaska
cannery of Keku Canning Company, which continued until September 12, 1952.
Since that employment was coincident with the offer of reinstatement of the
company made and received on May 14 and May 16 , respectively , his income
from that employment is not in issue.
Respectfully submitted,
(Signed by all counsel).
Attached to this statement of facts was a copy of the computation. A copy of
the computation is attached hereto and marked "Exhibit A."
At the hearing herein, it was undisputed that on May 16, 1952, the Company
transmitted to Underwood a valid offer of reinstatement thereby terminating the
period for which it might be liable for back pay. However, it was not proven that
the Union had similarly notified Underwood, and thus terminated its possible liability
as of the same date. On November 18, 1954, the General Counsel, pursuant to a
stipulation of counsel, and with the consent of Underwood, notified the Trial Ex-
aminer that neither the General Counsel nor Underwood claimed back pay after
May 16, 1952. The parties also stipulated that in the seasons of 1953 and 1954
Underwood was employed on the S. S. Aleutian of the Company, a sister ship of
the S. S. Alaska, and that his employment on that passenger vessel was equivalent
to his employment on the S. S. Alaska. These stipulations, therefore, define the
controversial period as being from May 5, 1950, to May 16, 1952.
Examination of the computation discloses that it has been made in accordance
with the standard practice of the Board which has been approved by the highest
,authority.3
3 N. L. R B. v. Seven-Up bottling Company of Miami, Inc., 344 U. S 344.
1274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The first question which arises is the usual one in cases involving the back pay
due employees who are employed in positions of a seasonal nature, or who are
employed in more than one position. The Board has uniformly held that a mone-
tary loss does not result to an individual against whom discrunination has been
practiced, unless someone is actually occupying the position to which the individual
was entitled. On that basis, the back-pay liability of an employer of seasonal
workers is suspended in the off season. In like manner, if an employee has a job
during the day, and another one during the night, and he is discriminatorily dis-
charged by the employer for whom he works during the day, the discriminating
employer may not claim the employee's wages from the night job as an offset to
his liability. This procedure, and the cases thereon, is based on equitable con-
siderations.
Following these equitable principles, the General Counsel in this case has charged
the Respondents with those sums which Underwood would have earned as the second
radio officer of the S. S. Alaska, during those times that the S. S. Alaska was oper-
ated by the Company, in the years 1950 and 1951, and has given a credit to the
Respondents of all interim earnings of Underwood during the same period. That
appears to be entirely proper.
There were times during the winter 1950-51 and 1951-52 that the vessel Alaska
was not operated. The Respondents seek to relieve themselves of a part of their
duty to reimburse Underwood by claiming as a credit monies earned in this "off-
season" employment. This they may not do, since Underwood's "off-season"
employment was no concern of the Respondents at any time. They could not be
liable for any earnings in the off season, because S. S. Alaska was not operating, and
so could not have caused any financial loss to Underwood. Consequently, they are
not entitled to a credit for earnings during the off season. Any other manner of
assessment would be highly inequitable.
The conduct of the General Counsel in the above computations is consistent with
the holding of the court of appeals in N. L. R. B. v. Hudson Motor Company, 136
F. 2d 385 (C. A. 6). In that case the order of the Board had omitted from back-
pay calculations a period of time when the Intermediate Report dismissing the com-
plaint was outstanding. Respondent contended to the court that the claimant's
interim earnings during that period should be assessed against gross back pay, even
though no back-pay liability attached during the same period. The court rejected
that contention, saying: "However, the order of the Board is to be construed like
other written instruments. The determinative factor is the intention of the Board
as gathered from all parts of the order. In applying this rule, effect must be given
to that which is implicit in the order as well as that which is expressed in its language.
Paragraph (b) of the order in question expresses a purpose on the part of the Board
'to make whole' respondent's employees on account of its discrimination for the
two periods stated in the order of the Board. The employees would not be made
whole if they received no credit for the wages they would have earned if they had
been employed by respondent for the period from September 1, 1940, to August 23,
,1941, and were charged with outside earnings for the same period."
On the basis of the above, if interim earnings of Underwood for periods when
the S. S. Alaska was not in service were allowed as offsets to Respondents' back-pay
liability, he would not be made whole as directed by the order.
Therefore, I find on the basis of applicable law, that earnings of Underwood, at
times when the Alaska was not in operation, cannot be included in the computation.
And, for the same reason, offers of other employment during the off season, are
ineffective to terminate or diminish the Respondents' liability for their "on season"
discrimination .4
In his second argument, the General Counsel contends that the various alleged
offers of employment were not valid for various reasons. Upon the evidence pre-
sented, I make the following specific findings of fact in regard to these alleged offers:
The first offer, made April 16, 1950, was for employment with the Company
aboard the S. S. Flemish Knot. However, this offer was conditioned upon Under-
wood withdrawing his charges in this proceeding-an illegal condition. Because of
this illegal condition, I find it was not a valid offer of employment.
The second offer was made in July 1950. This was the offer of a job as a flying
radio operator on Northwest Airlines. Underwood declined because he was not
qualified by previous flying time to accept the position. Furthermore, the Union
had no contractual relationship with the airline, so Underwood's employment would
not be on the same terms as upon commercial surface vessels, under the regulations
of the contract. I find this offer was not a valid offer of equivalent employment.
' Seven-Up Bottling Co., supra.
ALASKA STEAMSHIP COMPANY 1275
The third offer was made on an unspecified date, of a position as relief operator
on the S. S. Baranof operated by the Company. Underwood declined the position
because it was one of'relief, and temporary in nature.
The fourth offer was made on an unspecified date, of a position aboard an unspeci-
fied vessel, for an unspecified company, for an unspecified voyage. I find this
offer invalid for uncertainty.
The fifth offer was made on October 13, 1950, of a position aboard a Military Sea
Transport Service vessel. Underwood declined because of the probable duration of
the voyage, 4 months, and because the terms of this employment were not those
prevailing on commercial vessels pursuant to the contract. I find this was not a
valid offer of equivalent employment.
The sixth offer was made on December 19, 1950, of a position aboard a Fish
and Wildlife Service vessel. This offer was not accepted, and the record does not
disclose why it was not. However, this position is similar to the M. S. T. S. position,
and I likewise find it was not a valid offer of equivalent employment.
The seventh offer was made on February 19, 1951, of a position as relief operator
on an unspecified vessel, for an unspecified company, for an unspecified voyage.
Underwood declined this offer, after consulting the General Counsel, who informed
him that his presence was necessary at the hearing of the complaint herein, which
hearing was held beginning February 27, 1951.5
I further find that the offers of April 16, 1950, December 19, 1950, February 19,
1951, and February 27, 1951. all were made outside the period for which Respondents
owe a liability for back pay. I also find that the offer of October 13, 1950, of a posi-
tion aboard a vessel operated by the M. S. T. S. and the offer of a position aboard a
vessel of the Fish and Wildlife Service were not offers of equivalent employment.
The vessels which are operated by the Government are manned by personnel sub-
ject to the Civil Service rules and regulations, which are far different from the rules
and regulations governing radio operators on commercial vessels. Furthermore,
the offer to Underwood on October 13, 1950, occurred on the day the Alaska ceased
operating for the season of 1950. To require Underwood to accept this position
would be to require him to accept off-season employment, to reduce the on-season
damage caused to him by the Respondents.
There is a third consideration which moves me to the same result. The argu-
ment of the Union herein seems to miscomprehend the rights of American citi-
zens to seek employment to their liking, and to misconstrue the determination of
the Board and the court herein.
The Union points out, at several places in its brief, that Underwood sought em-
ployment only with the Alaska Steamship Company and only on the Alaska run.
The Union's brief also refers to the evidence adduced before Trial Examiner Hunt,
that Underwood opposed the Union's rotational system of assigning radio officers,
refused to compete with other radio officers for jobs, and opposed the spread-the-
work limit of 90 days "stan4y" which was found desirable by the Union and its
members. At another point in its brief, the Union points out that Underwood
claimed, in a series of 11 letters to the Company, that (1) his only interest was to
get a job with the Company to the exclusion of all other companies; (2) he was
opposed to the Union's rotational system; (3) hiring into the Company, based only
on seniority with it alone, would afford Underwood a better chance for a job.
These points are prominently mentioned in the Respondent Union's brief, and
seem to be coupled with the inference that Underwood had no right to do any of
these things. However, I can see nothing either unlawful or illegal in Underwood's
ambition to gain for himself a position as radio officer, one, with a particular com-
pany, and two, on a particular run. Nor, is there any law of which I am aware that
forbids a radio operator to disagree with the Union's rotational system of assigning
radio operators.
Reviewing that much of the case before Trial Examiner Hunt which has been
submitted to me, it is evident that Underwood believed that the Union's rotational
system did not inure to his benefit. For that reason, he resigned from the Union,
and as a nonunion radio officer he then sought assignment to a vessel of the Alaska
Steamship Company, on the Alaska run, pursuant to the Union's system of dispatch.
In the hearing before Trial Examiner Hunt, a finding was made that the Union had
caused the Employer to discriminate against Underwood, and deprived him of the
job which exactly met his requirements, with the Alaska Steamship Company, and
on the Alaska run. In that proceeding, which was affirmed by the Board and the
court, this discrimination was found. As part of that finding, it was found that
Underwood had a right to join or to refuse to join the Union, that he exercised his
right to refrain from joining the Union, and that as a nonunion radio officer he sought
6 Underwood advised the Union of this reason at the time.
1276 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employment with the Employer on the run of his choice, and that he was prevented
from obtaining a position aboard the Alaska only because of the discrimination of
the Union and the Alaska Steamship Company. The Respondent Union seems not
to understand the point that the decision of the Board and the court, is to the effect
that Underwood was well within his rights in doing these things, and that the Union
and the Company committed unfair labor practices in their discrimination against
Underwood. I make this observation because the Union, and to a lesser extent the
Employer, now urge that although Underwood has been declared justified in his
refusal to submit to the rotational system, now the damage to him caused by the
Respondents' discrimination should be assessed, pursuant to the Union's rotational
system. I cannot see how the National Labor Relations Act, and the decision of
the court, can be perverted to reach the result that in mitigation of damages, the
victim of discrimination can be required to submit to the rotational system, which
he had previously refused to do.
The entire position of the Respondent Union seems to be based on the premise,
that what it considers right for radio operators cannot be questioned by anyone. I
do not agree that the personal initiative of employees has been that far diminished.
In no uncertain terms the Act says that employees may join or refrain from joining
labor organizations. Underwood resigned from this labor organization because he
found that its rules and regulations were a detriment rather than a benefit to him.
There could be no better reason for resigning from a labor organization. But, be-
cause he did so, the Respondent Union and Respondent Employer practiced dis-
crimination against him, and deprived him of the job to which he was entitled and
which suited his personal desires. Now, it is the contention of the Respondents, in
effect, that in mitigation of damages, he was required to submit himself to the union
rules and regulations, and the same rotational system to which he refused to submit
as a nonunion operator.
The remedy of Trial Examiner Hunt and the Board precludes any such argument
or procedure, for the Trial Examiner's remedy, affirmed by the Board, reads as fol-
lows in part:
As found above, the 1950 agreement and applicable shipping rules are lawful
and nondiscriminatory as to nonmembers of the Union. Their continued ob-
servance by the Respondents as to all radio officers, including Underwood,
would not be unlawful. Accordingly, nothing herein is intended to exempt
Underwood from the requirements of lawful shipping rules and collective labor
agreements at the conclusion of such employment as shall be offered to him
by the Company as above provided. [Emphasis supplied.]
The Union also seems to assume that because its members accept the rotational
system, and accept the assignments given to them without protest, that it was
Underwood's duty to do the same in mitigation of damages. And the Union further
argues that all these jobs in effect were equivalent. Evidently they were not con-
sidered equivalent by Underwood, and I share his view. The job of which Under-
wood was deprived by the Respondents was on the S. S. Alaska, a passenger vessel, on
regular schedule, with voyages of 2 weeks' duration between American ports.
Though the pay of radio operators sailing to Hawaii, Australia, India, or round,
the-world, or flying in aircraft, was the same, certainly such employment, on voyages
of indefinite duration, to unspecified ports, on unscheduled tramp freights, or by
aircraft, was not the equivalent of a berth on the S. S. Alaska. The Union's con-
tention that Underwood was required to take such positions to mitigate the damages
it had caused him, is, to my mind, without validity in either law or equity. The
Alaska Steamship Company and the Union well knew they had deprived Under-
wood of a job with the company of his choice, the Alaska Steamship Company, on
the run of his choice, the Alaska run-the Company's run. Justice required that he
be returned to that position, or one of genuine equivalence. Underwood was not
required to accept off-season employment, employment at night, hazardous flying
employment, or employment which would take him from his family for long periods
of time, and entail voyages to the ends of the earth, or employment on Government
vessels on voyages of indefinite duration and subject to different regulations, to
mitigate the damage that the Respondents had caused him.
At all times for which the Union and the Alaska Steamship Company are held
responsible in this proceeding, the Union was dispatching its members on the S. S.
Alaska, and the Company was operating the S. S. Alaska on the Alaska run. At
all times the Respondents had it within their power to quickly terminate their liability
under the order, by giving Underwood the job found to be his, by the Board and
the court, or a genuine equivalent. They failed and refused to take that step which
would terminate their liability. The Union sought to fob off on Underwood the
ALASKA STEAMSHIP COMPANY 1277
nondescript jobs of his trade , while it assigned his job to others. It is admitted
that the Company made no offer of employment to Underwood until May 16, 1952.
Underwood had a right to reject the Union 's offers of not-equivalent employment
and to place reliance on the law which required that he be reinstated in his job
or a genuine equivalent . Ultimately he was restored to the S . S. Aleutian , a sister
ship of the Alaska, a passenger vessel on the Alaska run, and all parties agree that
position was a genuine equivalent.
In the Seven- Up Bottling Company case, supra, Justice Frankfurter referred to the
"practical interplay" of the remedies of reinstatement and back pay. If we scrutinize
the conduct of the Respondents in the light of such interplay , we see that : ( 1) Until
May 16, 1952, no offer of reinstatement was made by either Respondent ; 6 (2) prior
to that date the Respondent Union offered Underwood other employment , while with-
holding dispatch on the Alaska , thus doing less than required by the law ; 7 ( 3) now,
the Respondents claim , (a) that these offers of other employment to Underwood
had to be accepted by him to mitigate their damage , and (b ) acceptance of any
such employment constituted the acceptance of equivalent employment , thereby ter-
minating their liability . In short, the Respondents continued to deprive Under-
wood of his job , which they gave to others , and by offers of other employment
forced Underwood to a Hobson 's choice, with Respondents claiming "willful loss
of wages" in mitigation of damages as to all offers rejected , and "acceptance of
equivalent employment ," as to any offers of employment accepted . Both contentions
they now urge , despite the fact , that it is undisputed that neither made a valid offer
of reinstatement to Underwood until May 16 , 1952 . Viewed in the context of the
evidence as a whole, the offers of employment do not meet the remedial require-
ments of the statute ; nor were they such valid offers of equivalent employment as
would relieve the Respondents of the liability for the damage their discrimination
had caused Underwood.
The Union and the Company also argue that it is doubtful that Underwood would
have "stood by" the S. S. Alaska after the outbreak of the Korean hostilities. As
proof of this doubt , the Union points out that others of its members did not stand by
under similar circumstances , and that radio operators were in short supply at that
time. I do not accept those facts as proof that Underwood would not have stood by.
In fact , the evidence as a whole is to the contrary . The whole evidence before me
constitutes the detailed history of Underwood 's effort to attain the professional posi-
tion of his choice . He wanted to be a radio operator on a reputable steamship line,
plying a regular run between American ports. That was an ambition which was law-
ful and laudable. Some men have ambitions to be judges on a particular bench, or
surgeons at a particular hospital , or professors at a particular university . And like
such men, Underwood strove, within and without the Union , to attain the position
which was his objective . He succeeded , and was prevented from realizing his ambi-
tion only by the unlawful conduct of the Respondents . When he was deprived of
the position to which he was entitled , and which he had gained only after a consider-
able struggle with the Union , he immediately instituted legal steps before the Board
to obtain the position by law . To say that it is doubtful that he would have stood by
the Alaska , is to disregard the whole purport and tenor of all of Underwood's con-
duct, as illustrated by the evidence in this proceeding . There can be no question, in
the light of this record , as to the sincerity of Underwood 's ambition and his dogged
determination to attain it. That evidence overwhelmingly supports Underwood's
contention that he in fact did stand by the Alaska.
It is also clear that Underwood 's appraisal of an Alaskan berth was far different"
from the appraisal of other radio operators , who accepted the Union 's dispatch sys-
tem. That other union members acted differently than Underwood , under similar
circumstances , is no evidence whatever of what Underwood would have done. The
whole evidence in this proceeding demonstrates Underwood 's difference from his
colleagues in regard to the Alaskan run and a job with the Company . Underwood
and the others were poles apart , in their thinking and conduct, in regard to the.
Union's system of dispatch and an Alaskan job. That the others took a certain course
of action is no evidence at all that Underwood would have taken similar action. I
find that the evidence establishes that Underwood sought a job with the Company on
the Alaskan run, and that when he was deprived of it by the Respondents, he insti-
tuted legal steps to obtain the position, and that there is no evidence in this record
6 See letter of Respondent Company, dated May 14 , 1952, offering position on the
S. S. Alaska ( General Counsel 's Exhibit No. 4).
4 See letter of Respondent Union, dated March 7, 1952 ( Respondent Union's Exhibit
No 1), which notifies the Company that the Union had no objection to the reemployment
of Underwood pursuant to the Board 's order.
1278 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that he ever faltered in this purpose, or surrendered his right to the position, by
failing or refusing to stand by his job on the S. S. Alaska.
I also find on the evidence as a whole that Underwood did not incur any loss by
willfully refusing to accept or seek equivalent employment. His oral testimony, and
the undisputed record of his employment, establishes that fact.
I find that the General Counsel has correctly computed the back pay due Under-
wood from the Respondents, jointly and severally, in the sum of $1,771.87.
'It is recommended that unless on or before twenty (20) days from the receipt of
this Supplemental Intermediate Report and Recommended Order the Respondents
notify said Regional Director in writing that they will jointly and severally pay said
sum to Underwood forthwith, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order
requiring each Respondent to take such action.
EXHIBIT A
ABSTRACT OF BACK PAY OF Hop-ACE W. UNDERWOOD
Quarters
A S S
Co. 2nd
Radio
Officer
Underwood,
Income
Gain
Net
Loss
1950
May--------------------------------------------------- $213 74 None ------------
June--------------------------------------------------- 255 55 ------------ ------------ $826 20
Do------------------- ---------------------------- 183 68 ------------ ------------
Do------------------------------------------------- 1 173 03 ------------ ------------
Total------------------------------------------- 826 20
July---------------------------------------------------- ------------ $128 81 ------------ ------------
August------------------------------------------------ 2 47 10 552 05 ------------
September- ----------------------------------------- 192 43 476 85 ------------ 133 43
Do------------------------------------------------- 204 68 ------------ ------------ ------------
Do------------------------------------------------- 209 46 ------------ ------------ ------------
Do------------------------------------------------ 194 40 ------------ ------------ ------------
Do------------------------------------------------- 224 08 ------------ ------------
Do------------------------------------------------- 218 99 ------------ ------------
Total-------------------------------------------- 1,291 14 3 1, 157 71
October------------------------------------------------ 4 211 99 None 211 99
1951
June----------------------------------- ---------------
Do------------------- -----------------------------
256 38
5 87 47 ----6 275 72 -------68 13
Total------------------------------------------- 343 85
July---------------------------------------------------- 7 157 53 ------------ ------------ ------------
August----------------------------------------------- 224 15 ------------ ------------ ------------
September------------------------------------------- 291 48 ------------ ------------ ------------
Do------------------------------------------------- 250 60 ------------ ------------ ------------
Do------------------------------------------------ 288 71 ------------ ------------ ------------
Do------------------------------------------------ 214 06 8 1, 313 00 ------------ 532 12
Do------------------------------------------------- 0 418 59 ------------ ------------
Total------------- ------------------------------ 1,845 12
October--------------------------------------------- ------------ 10 222 00 ------------ ------------
November----- --------------------------------------
-----
11 371 83 ------------ --------------
December---------------------------------------------- 271 93 ------------ $321.83 ------------
Total--------------------------------------------
Total due Mr Underwood-----------------------
593 83
----1,771 87
1 Voyage No 24 extended from 6-20 to 7-3 Total earnmes for voyage $220 13. Ectent of voyage 14 days.
6-20 to 6-30-11 days or 78 6% of 14 78 6% of $220 13 is $173 03.
2 Voyage No 24-7-1 to 7-3-3 days or 21 4%0 of 14 days. 21 4% of $220 13 is $47.10.
1 3 Employer-Keku Canning Company
4 Voyage No 31 extended from 9-29 to 10-14 Since Underwood had no earnings for the existing quarter
and the voyage consumed only 2 days in the preceding quarter, this entire sum was allocated to the existing
quarter since the calculations even though fractionally assigned to different quarters would result in the
same figures
5 Voyage No 33 extended from X26 to 7-9 or 14 days 6-26 to 6-30 is 5 days or 35 7% of 14. Total earnings
on voyage $245 35 7% of $245 is $87 47
6 Employer Coastwise Line for the period from 6-11 to 6-30 inclusive.
7 Voyage No 33, 7-1 to 7-9, is 9 days or 64.3% of 14 days 64 3% of $245 is $157.53.
8 Employer is Coastwise Line
0 Voyage No 39 9-19 to 10-5 Allocation of total earnings for voyage were not made by quarters as
fractional assignment of earnings to quarters would not alter the ultimate back-pay figures.
10 Employer-Coastwise Line.
11 Employer-Alaska Steamship Company.