Aircraft Plating Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 27, 1974

213 N.L.R.B. 664 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

664 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Aircraft Plating Company , Inc. and Metal Polishers,
Buffers, Platers & Allied Workers Union, Local No.
67, AFL-CIO. Cases 31-CA-4086, 31-CA-4088,
and 31-CA-4239
September 27, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND PENELLO
On May 29, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Jer-
rold H. Shapiro issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, except
as herein modified, and to adopt his recommended
Order.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that Leslie Wix-
on was an agent of Respondent within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act, and that, therefore, no viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act occurred when Leslie
undisputedly interrogated an employee concerning
her union activities and threatened employees with
loss of benefits. We disagree.
In determining whether or not Leslie Wixon is an
"agent" of Respondent within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act, the crucial question is whether, under
all the circumstances , the employees could reasonably
believe that Leslie was reflecting company policy, and
speaking and acting for management when he interro-
gated and threatened them with loss of benefits and
jobs. See American Door Company, Inc., 181 NLRB
37, 43 (1970).
Examining the record and the findings of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, we find that Respondent was
a closely held company z which operates a single
t We find no merit in the General Counsel's contention that Respondent's
mere placement of several Board election notices near the work area of
several employees had a restraining effect on employee exercise of their Sec.
7 rights. Upon the entire record, taking into account the implicit credibility
resolutions of the Administrative Law Judge, we have determined that, while
the choice of the posting sites was peculiar , we are unable to conclude on this
basis alone that Respondent 's conduct in this respect constituted a violation
of Sec . 8(a)(I) of the Act.
2 Leslie Wixon's father is president and owns 46 percent of Respondent's
shares; his uncle is vice president and along with six or seven others owns
the remaining shares . Leslie's cousin, Robert Wixon, is Respondent 's plant
plant. The employees knew that Leslie was the son of
Guy Wixon, Respondent's president, general manag-
er, and major shareholder, and the nephew of Robert
Wixon, the plant superintendent, also a shareholder.
Leslie was repeatedly seen by employees with his fa-
ther.' He spent a substantial portion of his time in
Respondent's office away from the production area,
and the employees had never been told by Respon-
dent that Leslie did not speak or act on Respondent's
behalf. Indeed, the record shows that Leslie, in his
capacity as Respondent's safety director of the safety
committee enforced OSHA's directives to Respon-
dent by instructing employees to wear safety equip-
ment. Unlike production and maintenance
employees, Leslie was paid a salary, approximately
that of the foreman's combined regular and overtime
pay, and did not punch a timeclock.
From these facts, it is evident that Leslie occupied
a status different from that of the production and
maintenance employees. While family relationship is
but one of the factors to be considered in determining
the employees' perceptions of Leslie's status, that rela-
tionship, when viewed in the context of the other fac-
tors, noted above, is sufficient to identify him with
management.
It is also clear that Leslie's conduct, as described
below, expressed and mirrored the antiunion manifes-
tations of representatives of management. We find, as
did the Administrative Law Judge, that Leslie ques-
tioned employees Phillips and Campbell on October
24, 1973, concerning their union sentiments, and
threatened that if the Union came in there would be
loss of benefits and jobs. On the following day, Leslie
again questioned Phillips, in Foreman James Facas'
presence, about whether she had mailed in her union
card. Leslie's questioning of employees concerning
their union sentiments was identical to the unlawful
interrogation of employee Anglin by Foreman Facas.
Furthermore, the subsequent unlawful changes in the
work rules (in the preparation of which Leslie partici-
pated) served as verification of Leslie's threats that
employees would lose benefits because of their union
sympathies, and employee Phillips was unlawfully
discharged for her union activities. The record makes
clear that Leslie's interrogation of and threats to em-
ployees were expressions of company policy which
were reflective of, and, in one respect identical to, the
statements and conduct of Respondent's admitted
representatives. Based upon these and the aforemen-
tioned factors, we conclude, contrary to the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, that the evidence shows that at the
time of the relevant events Leslie was speaking for
superintendent.
Two instances highlight this fact. Leslie drove with his father to the
parking lot on the day of the parking lot organizational meeting, and posted
Board notices with his father in front of employees.
213 NLRB No. 88
AIRCRAFT PLATING CO.
management and that the employees would reason-
ably have believed him to be doing so.4
Our conclusion that Leslie's conduct would be so
perceived by the employees is reinforced by the con-
duct of Respondent's president on November 5, 1973.
On that day, President Guy Wixon received a notice
that Respondent had been charged with engaging in
unfair labor practices. He called Leslie into his office,
inquired as to whether Leslie had discussed the Union
with anyone, and instructed him not to do so. Guy
Wixon followed the same procedure with only two
others: Plant Superintendent Robert Wixon and
Foreman James Facas. It is evident from the fore-
going that Guy Wixon knew that the employees con-
sidered that Leslie spoke for management.
Considering all of the circumstances, we conclude
that, in the light of Section 2(13) and (2) of the Act,
Leslie Wixon is an "agent" of Respondent within the
meaning of the Act, and that Leslie's conduct is there-
fore attributable to Respondent for the purposes of
the Act.5 See American Door Company, Inc., 181
NLRB 37, 43 (1970); South Shore Pontiac Co., Inc.,
203 NLRB 927 (1973).
We find, in agreement with the Administrative Law
Judge, that on October 24, 1973, Leslie Wixon en-
gaged in the interrogation of employees Phillips and
Campbell and made statements which threatened em-
ployees with the prospect of loss of benefits and jobs
if the Union came in. We find that by such conduct
Respondent committed a further violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
However, because of similar findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge we find that our additional
findings of 8(a)(1) violations do not affect the remedy.
Accordingly, we shall adopt the recommended Order
of the Administrative Law Judge.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Aircraft Plating Company, Inc., Haw-
thorne, California, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said rec-
ommended Order.
We do not find Phillips' remarks to Leslie to "mind his own business"
to be of any real significance in determining employee perceptions of Leslie's
agency status . The record reveals that Phillips was undeterred in expressing
her views strongly while Foreman Fakas was present on October 25, 1973,
and thus her remark to Leslie in no way indicates a perception of Leslie as
being a regular employee rather than an agent of Respondent.
5 Having elaborated our reasons for finding that Leslie is an agent of
Respondent , we find it unnecessary to consider what effect Respondent's
agreement to exclude Leslie from the stipulated bargaining unit would have
upon Leslie's agency status.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
665
JERROLD H. SHAPIRO, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
charges filed by the above-named Union in Case 31-
CA-4086 on November 6, 1973, and in Case 31-CA-4088
on November 8, 1973, as amended on December 3, 1973,
and in Case 31-CA-4239 on February 1, 1974, as amended
March 1, 1974, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional
Director of the Board, Region 31, on March 15, 1974, issued
an order consolidating these cases and a consolidated com-
plaint against Aircraft Plating Company, Inc., herein called
the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(axl)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called
the Act. Respondent filed an answer denying the commis-
sion of the alleged unfair labor practices. A hearing was held
on April 10 through 12, 1974.
Upon the entire record, from my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and having considered the post-
hearing brief of the Respondent, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Aircraft Plating Company, Inc., the Respondent , is a Ne-
vada corporation engaged in the business of anodizing, plat-
ing, and painting metal products at its principal office and
plant in Hawthorne , California, where it annually performs
services or makes sales valued in excess of $50,000 to a
nonretail business enterprise located in California which in
turn annually sells and ships goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to nonretail customers located outside Cali-
fornia. Respondent admits it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers & Allied Workers
Union, Local No. 67, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union,
is admittedly a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Issues
The Respondent is in the business of finishing metal parts
for machine shops and has been located at its current ad-
dress for about 10 years. During the time material to this
case, it employed about 26 persons of whom about 17 were
production employees. Its president and general manager is
Guy Wixon. Also employed is Guy Wixon' s son, Leslie
Wixon, whose status is one of the issues involved in this
666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
case . The General Counsel, over Respondent's objection,
contends that Leslie is an agent of Respondent acting on its
behalf. Also in question is the status of James Facas, who
the General Counsel contends is a statutory supervisor.
The Respondent's employees prior to the events material
to this case were not unionized. In October 1973, the Union
began a campaign to organize them and filed a petition with
the Board in Case 3I-RC-2623 on November 5, 1973, seek-
ing a representation election. Thereafter, pursuant to an
agreement approved by the Regional Director of the Board,
the Respondent and Union agreed to an election among the
Respondent's production and maintenance employees,
truckdrivers, shipping and receiving and working leadmen,
but excluding , among others , "sons of management" and
statutory supervisors. It is undisputed that the Respondent
was opposed to the unionization of its employees and that
the day before the election the Respondent's president, Guy
Wixon, by posted announcements , openly voiced the
Respondent's opposition to the Union and, in effect, asked
the employees to vote against the Union.
On January 4, 1974, an election was conducted in the
above-described bargaining unit with the Union receiving
eight votes, the Respondent six, with the ballots of two
voters not counted because their eligibility was challenged
by the Union. One of the challenged ballots was cast by
James Facas. Since the challenged ballots were sufficient in
number to affect the results of the election, the Regional
Director of the Board conducted an investigation and on
January 31, 1974, issued a Report on Challenged Ballots in
which he recommended that the Union's challenge to the
ballot of James Facas be sustained and that the other be
overruled. Thereafter the Respondent took exceptions to
the Director's report and on April 16, 1974, the Board re-
jected the exceptions, adopted the Director's report and
certified the Union as the employees' exclusive bargaining
representative in the appropriate unit.
The General Counsel alleges that prior to the January 4,
1974, election the Respondent engaged in the following un-
lawful conduct: James Facas and Leslie Wixon interrogated
employees about their union activity and threatened them
with loss of benefits and employment if they supported the
Union; Facas and President Wixon "interrupted and inter-
fered with a meeting between union representatives and
employees being held in Respondent's parking lot and cre-
ated the impression that the union activities of employees
were under their surveillance"; President Wixon "intimidat-
ed employees by publishing their union support in a dispar-
aging manner"; granted a general wage increase of 10 cents
per hour to discourage the employees from supporting the
Union; discharged Norma Phillips and laid off Charles Ha-
gen because its employees had engaged in union activities
and to discourage the employees from supporting the
Union.
Following the election, the General Counsel alleges that
the Respondent engaged in the following unlawful conduct:
granted paid sick leave and an improved vacation policy to
the employees; instituted or announced onerous terms and
conditions of employment; promoted two employees and
granted wage increases to three employees.
Respondent in its answer to the consolidated complaint
either denies it has engaged in the above-described conduct
or admits such conduct but affirmatively alleges that it was
motivated by legitimate business considerations or, even if
engaged in , is not a violation of the Act.
B. The Conduct Attributed to Leslie Wixon; His Status as
an Agent of Respondent
The General Counsel alleges that Leslie Wixon, herein
called Leslie, the son of the Respondent's president and
general manager , engaged in certain conduct which is at-
tributable to the Respondent and tended to restrain and
coerce the employees from supporting the Union in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is not urged that Leslie
is a statutory supervisor but rather that he is an agent of the
Respondent. Respondent contends the evidence is not suffi-
cient to demonstrate that Leslie, when he engaged in the
alleged unlawful conduct, was acting as its agent . The facts
pertinent to this issue, which are undisputed, are as follows.
Leslie's father, Guy Wixon, is the president and general
manager of Respondent; his uncle is Harold Wixon, the
vice president of the Respondent; and his cousin is Robert
Wixon, the plant superintendent. President Wixon owns 46
percent of the Company's outstanding stock, with the re-
mainder owned by individuals who were not identified on
this record. Leslie is 26 years old and has been employed by
Respondent for several years as a full-time employee. He is
the Company's quality control inspector who checks pro-
duction to insure that it meets the required specifications
and is the head of the employee safety committee that
makes sure the employees comply with the various Federal
and state safety regulations. Also, he types invoices in the
office, assists the employees in the paint shop, and occasion-
ally makes pickups and deliveries. Unlike the other produc-
tion employees, including Foreman Facas, Leslie is a
salaried employee and as such does not punch the time-
clock. He earns as much money as Facas but two of the
production employees who voted in the election earn as
much as Leslie. Leslie was not eligible to vote in the election
because the Respondent agreed that " sons of management"
were excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit and not
eligible to vote.
To sum up, the foregoing establishes that Leslie Wixon is
the son of the Respondent's president and general manager,
that he is a full-time employee who unlike the other produc-
tion employees has several jobs and is paid a salary rather
than an hourly rate and whom the Respondent agreed to
exclude from the voting unit in the representation case. I do
not believe that this is sufficient to establish that Leslie was
designated by the Respondent as its agent or that the em-
ployees could reasonably believe that in committing the acts
alleged he was speaking and acting for the Respondent.' In
Respondent 's agreement that Leslie was not a member of the voting
unit-the Stipulation for Certification upon Consent Election-was execu-
ted apparently in late November or early December 1973. The unlawful
conduct attributed to Leslie took place prior to the execution of this agree-
ment. Under the circumstances, I cannot find that , by agreeing to exclude
Leslie from the bargaining unit, Respondent engaged in an act calculated to
lead the other employees to believe that Leslie at the time he allegedly
coerced employees was someone special who was speaking about the Union
on behalf of management . Also, I doubt whether I can even consider
AIRCRAFT PLATING CO. 667
this regard, there is insufficient evidence to show that Leslie
normally speaks or acts for his father or for management.
Nor is there evidence, direct or circumstantial , that, in en-
gaging in the alleged unlawful conduct, he was speaking for
management or that the employees would have reasonably
believed that he was speaking for management .2 None of
the alleged unlawful conduct attributed to Leslie other than
an isolated act of interrogation occurred in the presence of
members of management, nor is there any evidence that his
father approved of his conduct. Also, there is no evidence
that either Leslie's father or other members of management
had made similar unlawful statements to employees? For
these reasons, I find that the evidence is insufficient to
establish that President Wixon authorized his son to convey
his feelings to the employees or that the employees reason-
ably believed that Leslie Wixon was speaking on behalf of
his father or that he intended to so speak. Under the circum-
stances, I cannot conclude that Leslie Wixon was an agent
of the Respondent when he engaged in the conduct alleged
to be unlawful in paragraphs 8(a) through (c) of the consoli-
dated complaint and that his conduct was binding upon the
Respondent. Accordingly, I shall recommend that these
allegations be dismissed.
C. The Conduct Attributed to James Facas; His Status as
a Statutory Supervisor
The General Counsel contends that James Facas is a
statutory supervisor and that, as such, the evidence of his
unlawful conduct, described below, is attributable to the
Respondent. Respondent takes the position that he is not a
statutory supervisor. I am of the opinion that a preponder-
ance of the evidence, set out below, demonstrates that Facas
is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act.
Facas, employed by the Company for about 8 years, with
Leslie Wixon and two other employees is the highest paid
Respondent 's agreement to exclude Leslie from the voting unit where, as
here , this fact was brought to my attention after the close of the hearing by
letter from the General Counsel enclosing a copy of the Board's Decision and
Certification of Representation in Case 31-RC-2623. The General Counsel
during the course of the hearing did not introduce into evidence or ask that
I take official notice that Respondent in the representation proceeding had
agreed that "sons of management" were excluded from the voting unit.
Under the circumstances , Respondent had no knowledge that the General
Counsel intended to rely upon this conduct to support the contention that
Leslie Wixon was an agent of the Respondent . I am of the opinion that
Respondent was entitled to a timely appraisal of this in order to have the
opportunity to rebut any adverse inference from its agreement in the repre-
sentation case. Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. N.L.R.B.
[Sagamore Shirt Co.], 365 F.2d 898 , 904-906 (C.A.D.C.).
2 This conclusion is supported by the reaction of employee Norma Phillips
to the advice of Leslie that the Union was no good , that the employees would
lose certain existing benefits if they supported the Union , and that Phillips
should not start any trouble by supporting the Union . Phillips, rather than
take Leslie seriously, simply told him, as she testified , "to mind his own
business."
3 This fact distinguishes the Board 's decision in International Van Lines,
177 NLRB 353, enforcement denied on this point 448 F .2d 905 (C.A. 9). This
case is also distinguishable for the reason that there the Board relied heavily
on the fact that the son specifically attributed the coercive statement to the
mouth of his father . Here, Leslie simply told employees that if the Union got
in, his father would close the plant . There is no evidence that his father in
fact told Leslie this rather than just being speculation on Leslie 's part or that
Leslie indicated to the employees that his father had told him this.
production employee. The employees regard Facas as hav-
ing the title "foreman" and there is no contention or evi-
dence that the Respondent employs any other person with
that title. Its posted rules and regulations require that all
overtime worked by the employees must be authorized by
the "shop foreman or other supervisory personnel" and that
employees tardy for work or injured must notify the "fore-
man" and that employees cannot leave the plant during
working hours without permission from the "foreman." (G.
C. Exh. 2, rules 4, 6, 11, and 24.) The president and general
manager of the Respondent, Guy Wixon, testified that Fa-
cas has the authority to hire employees," the authority "to
tell them what to do," the authority to "sometimes" direct
employees to work overtime, the authority to switch em-
ployees from one job to another,5 and when work is slow in
one department, Wixon testified Facas will transfer employ-
ees into another department. Finally, as described in con-
nection with Phillip's alleged unlawful termination, Wixon
testified that Facas effectively recommended that Phillips
be terminated.
Section 2(11) of the Act defines a supervisor as:
... any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such ac-
tion, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
In dealing with the statutory term "supervisor," it is well
settled that an employee must be classified as a supervisor
if he has any one of the powers set forth in Section 2(11) of
the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Fullerton Publishing Company, d/b/a
Daily News Tribune, 283 F.2d 545, 548 (C.A. 9, 1960).
Based on the foregoing, I find that, using his independent
judgment, James Facas at all times material has had the
authority in the interest of the Respondent to hire, transfer,
assign, and to responsibly direct employees and to effective-
ly recommend the discharge or layoff of employees. Ac-
cordingly, at all times material Facas has been a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. I shall now
consider the alleged acts of misconduct charged to the Re-
spondent by virtue of Facas' conduct.
Employee Doris Finn testified that during the Union's
organizational campaign and on a date or dates prior to
November 5, 1973, Foreman Facas, in effect, told her that
if the Union succeeded in organizing the plant, the employ-
ees would lose their bonuses and would be sent home rather
than transferred to another department when they ran out
of work. When she gave this testimony, as well as her other
testimony, Finn was so nervous that she impressed me as
being an unreliable witness. Facas testified he had no con-
versation with Finn about the Union and denied telling her
that if a union came in, the employees would be sent home
4 The undenied and credible testimony of employees Cheryl Asay Camp-
bell and Kathleen Maldonado establishes that they were in fact hired by
Facas. I have considered Facas' testimony that he has no authority to hire
and, inasmuch as it conflicts with the credible testimony of employees Camp-
bell and Maldonado and Wixon's testimony, I have rejected it.
3 The undenied and credible testimony of employees Porter , Hagen, Phil-
lips, Maldonado , Lockett and Finn establishes that, in practice , Facas using
his own judgment frequently assigns employees to different jobs.
668 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
when work was slow in their departments. Based on the
foregoing, I reject Finn's testimony and shall recommend
that paragraphs 8(f) and (g) of the consolidated complaint
be dismissed.
Employee Floyd Anglin credibly -testified that on or
about November 19, 1973, in a hallway inside the Company,
Foreman Facas asked if Anglin had signed a union card.
Anglin answered "no" which, as he testified, was a lie. Facas
did not specifically deny engaging in this interrogation but
generally denied talking about the Union with any employ-
ee. Anglin impressed me as a credible witness. Under the
circumstances, I cannot give weight to such a general denial
when a specific allegation goes unrebutted.
I am of the opinion that the conduct of Facas in asking
employee Anglin if he had signed a union card constitutes
unlawful interrogation violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Facas had no permissible business interest or other
justification for probing into the union sentiments of this
employee. Anglin's response-he lied-indicates an appre-
hension of reprisal. In these circumstances, and in the con-
text of the Respondent's unlawful discharge of Phillips, I
find that the interrogation had the reasonable tendency to
inhibit the free exercise of an employee's union activities or
sympathies and is proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. The Interruption, Interference and Surveillance by Guy
Wixon of the Union Meeting Held
on the Company's Parking Lot
The General Counsel alleges that on December 29, 1973,
the Respondent's president, Guy Wixon, "interrupted and
interfered with a meeting between union representatives
and employees being held in Respondent's parking lot and
created the impression that the union activities of employ-
ees were under [their] surveillance." The relevant facts can
be briefly stated.'
Respondent leases a part of a paved lot located about
one-half block from its plant for the use of its employees to
park their automobiles. The other part of the lot is leased
by the owner to another employer whose employees, use it
to park their automobiles. On Saturday, December 29, 1973,
a union meeting was scheduled to take place at the parking
lot immediately following work. The employees finished
work at 2:30 p.m., at which time between 12 and 14 of the
Company's approximately 1,7 production employees gath-
ered around Union Representative Rex Paud on the park-
ing lot. At the same time, the Respondent's president, Guy
Wixon, in his automobile and accompanied by his son,
Leslie, left the plant to deliver the January rent to the owner
of the parking lot. As he passed the lot on his way to the
house of the owner, which is adjacent to and overlooks the
lot, Wixon observed the employees gathered around,Paud.
Wixon had never seen Paud before and did not know he was
a union business representative. In Wixon's eyes, a group of
his employees appeared to be having a meeting with an
6 The facts herein , unless otherwise indicated , are based on a synthesis of
the testimony of all witnesses except that I have rejected Wixon's testimony
that he was only present for 3 or 4 minutes at the meeting , that he did not
gun the car motor when he arrived and found unconvincing his testimony
that he did not, hear what was being said at the meeting
unidentified man on the company parking lot. Wixon was
curious and wanted to determine what was taking place. He
stopped his automobile at a distance of about 10 feet from
where the employees were meeting with Paud. "It's my
parking lot. I have a right to know who is in my parking lot,"
Wixon testified is the reason why he stopped. In coming to
a halt, Wixon "gunned" the motor briefly and turned off the
engine . He remained parked at this location with his win-
dow all the way open for about 10 to 15 minutes. Employee
John Lockett informed Union Representative Paud that the
man in the auto observing the meeting was the boss, where-
upon Paud yelled out to Wixon words to the effect that a
union meeting was taking place and, since he was the owner
of the Company, Wixon was violating the employees' rights
by being present. At this point, or within minutes, Wixon
left the site of the meeting and proceeded to drive over to
the house of the parking lot owner to complete his errand.?
During the period he was parked adjacent to the union
meeting , Wixon, as was his habit, was playing with his com-
puter watch which made his upper arm move, thereby caus-
ing some of the employees to believe that he was taking
notes.
To sum up, the significant facts are that Union Represen-
tative Paud's meeting with the employees was no secret as
it was held in an open lot in close proximity to the plant and
could be observed by anybody who passed by, that Presi-
dent Wixon had no knowledge that Paud was a union repre-
sentative and stopped to observe the meeting out of
curiosity. In other words, the evidence does not establish
that Wixon visited the parking lot with the intent and pur-
pose of observing his employees' union activities., Rather, he
was in this area for a legitimate reason and out of curiosity
observed the meeting and left immediately upon being in-
formed that a union meeting was taking place. At best for
the General Counsel the record indicates that Wixon was
not candid when he testified he was at the meeting for only
3 or 4 minutes, or did not "gun" the auto's engine upon
arriving ,8 or did not hear what was being said because he
was not paying attention, or did not learn it was a union
meeting until Paud told him to leave. Although this makes
Wixon's conduct suspicious, it is not sufficient- to demon-
strate that his story is a fabrication and that he went to the
parking lot with the intent and purpose of observing his
employees' union activities or to interfere with or interrupt
their union activities.
E..,The Interruption , Interference, and Surveillance by
James Facas of the Union Meeting Held on the
Company's Parking Lot
The General Counsel alleges that on December 29, 1973,
Foreman James Facas "interrupted and interfered with a
7 The essential fact of Wixon's leaving immediately upon being informed
that a union meeting was taking place is based on the testimony of Guy
Wixon and James Facas as corroborated by the testimony of employees
Placio and Finn, witnesses called by the General Counsel.
8 There is no evidence that when he "gunned" the motor Wixon knew the
meeting was a union meeting
9 See Taylor-Rose Manufacturing Corp, 205 NLRB 262 (1973), where the
employer, unlike in the instant case , had a suspicion that the stranger talking
to his employees was a union organizer and attempted to monitor the conver-
sation in an effort to confirm that the stranger was a union organizer
AIRCRAFT PLATING CO.
meeting between union representatives and employees
being held in Respondent's parking lot and created the
impression that the union activities of employees were un-
der [their] surveillance." The relevant facts can be briefly
stated.10
On December 29, 1973, it was common knowledge in the
plant that immediately following the end of work the em-
ployees would hold a union organizational meeting on the
company parking lot. Facas, who does not park his auto on
this lot, had no reason to visit the lot after work but, never-
theless, attended the meeting along with about 13 other
employees, all of whom were addressed by Union Repre-
sentative Paud. Facas testified that he went to the parking
lot after work on December 29 because he heard there was
going to be a union meeting and "so I thought I'd go down
and see what it was about." No one invited Facas to attend
this meeting but, as Facas testified, he attended because he
"just was wondering what it was all about, why they were
trying to get us to join the Union." Facas went to the meet-
ing, stayed for about 15 minutes, asked a question, received
an answer, and left prior to the end of the meeting. No one
asked him to leave, as was the case with Respondent's
President Wixon, and there is no evidence that his atten-
dance, in fact, interfered with the meeting.
To recapitulate, the Union held an organizational meet-
mg on the company parking lot which was attended by
Foreman Facas, who went to the meeting with the intent
and purpose of observing the employees' union activities.
Facas, as I have found previously, is a statutory supervisor.
Under the circumstances, I find that his presence reason-
ably tended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce the em-
ployees in the exercise of their statutory right to engage in
union activities and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered that
there is no evidence that Facas' presence interfered with the
conduct of the meeting or employee participation, that he
was not asked to leave the meeting, and that Union Repre-
sentative Paud indicated he would be welcome to join the
Union.I i I have also kept in mind that "it is well settled that
the test of interference, restraint, and coercion under Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act does not turn on . . . whether the
coercion succeeded or failed. The test is whether the em-
ployer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said,
tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights
under the Act." American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146,
147, and cases cited therein at fn. 1. On balance, I conclude
that by the presence of Foreman James Facas at the union
meeting on December 29, 1973, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
10 The facts herein are based upon the testimony of Facas which was not
in any material way controverted except in one respect; namely, whether
Facas arrived at the meeting with President Wixon in Wixon's automobile
Wixon and Facas testified , in effect , "no," and they were corroborated by
General Counsel's witness employee John Lockett I credit Facas and find
that he came to this meeting on foot and by himself I am convinced that the
employees who recalled seeing Facas in Wixon's automobile were honestly
mistaken, inferring that since he was a foreman and a part of management
that he had arrived with President Wixon
11 Facas testified Union Representative Paud "just made the statement
that he wished that I could come into the Union."
669
F. The Intimidation of Employees by Publishing Their
Support for the Union in a Disparaging Manner
The evidence pertaining to this allegation can be briefly
stated. In late December 1973 or early January 1974, prior
to the election of January 4, the Board in connection with
the representation election mailed to the Respondent for
posting several notices which, in substance, announced the
holding of the election, the voting unit, the group of employ-
ees eligible to vote, and a picture of a ballot. Respondent
posted either one or two of these notices on the bulletin
board or boards normally used for the posting of notices
directed toward the employees. Another notice was posted
on the wall of the room used by the employees to eat lunch.
And three were posted immediately adjacent to the work
stations of employees John Lockett, Doris Finn, and Leon
Palacio. In the past, notices to employees had never been
posted at these work locations. Each of these employees
work in a different department. The notice posted adjacent
to Palacio was visible to all employees in or visiting his
department. The notices posted adjacent to Finn and Lock-
ett were easily visible only to employees visiting Finn and
Lockett. While there is evidence that the three employees
were union adherents, there is insufficient credible evidence
to indicate that the Respondent knew of the union sympa-
thies of either Palacio or Finn on the date it posted these
notices.12 If the notices were posted after December 29,
1973, of course, the Respondent knew that Finn and Palacio
were at the union meeting along with Lockett and about 10
or 11 other employees. Why would Respondent, however,
single out Finn, Palacio, and Lockett from the other 10 or
I I employees who attended the meeting?
By posting the election notices at the employees' work
stations , as descibed above, the General Counsel alleges
that "[Respondent] intimidated employees by publishing
their union support in a disparaging manner." In my view,
the Respondent's conduct in the circumstances, as de-
scribed above, viewed most favorably to the General Coun-
sel is equivocal and does not prove this allegation. Nor did
management make any comments or engage in conduct,
contemporaneous with the posting of these notices, which
establishes an unlawful motive in posting the notices adja-
cent to the employees' work stations. For these reasons, I
find that the evidence does not preponderate in favor of a
finding that the Respondent intimated employees by pub-
lishing their union support in a disparaging manner, nor
does it establish that the Respondent otherwise engaged in
conduct reasonably calculated to restrain or coerce the em-
ployees from engaging in union activity.
G. The 10-Cent-Per-Hour Wage Increase
The General Counsel alleges that during the week of
October 28, 1973, the Respondent granted its employees an
increase in pay of 10 cents per hour for the purpose of
discouraging them from seeking union representation.
Respondent pays its employees on Wednesday and its
pay period extends from Friday to Saturday. On Wednes-
12 The record does not establish the precise date of the postings but in its
answer to the consolidated complaint the Respondent appears to admit the
notices were posted "on or about January 3, 1974 "
670 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
day, October 31, 1973, the employees' paychecks contained
an hourly wage increase of 10 cents for the pay period of
October 19 through 27. The minutes of the Respondent's
board of directors' meeting held on October 17 and the
testimony of President Guy Wixon establish that on Octo-
ber 17 the Respondent's directors directed Wixon to grant
the shop employees a 10-cent hourly "cost of living" pay
increase and directed Wixon to tell the payroll department
to give the raise "immediately."
The Union was not contacted by an employee of Respon-
dent until 4:30 p.m. on October 23, when employee Lockett
telephoned Union Representative Paud. The Union did not
commence its organizational campaign until the next day
when, during the employees' lunch break, Paud distributed
union literature and authorization cards outside of the
plant.13 The first union authorization card was signed by
employee Norma Phillips on October 24. In short, the evi-
dence demonstrates that the Respondent had reached a
decision to grant a 10-cent hourly increase before its em-
ployees openly expressed any prounion sentiments and be-
fore the Union commenced its organizational campaign.14
Under these circumstances, the evidence does not establish
that in granting this wage increase the Respondent was
motivated by a desire to discourage its employees from
supporting the Union. In reaching this conclusion, I have
considered that President Wixon was instructed on October
17 by the Board of Directors to "immediately" institute the
10-cent wage increase , yet the pay raise was not granted
until October 31, even though October 24, a Wednesday,
was a payday. President Wixon was not questioned about
this time lapse. This and the fact that the employees appar-
ently were not given an explanation for the raise in pay
makes the timing suspicious. It does not, however, suffi-
ciently demonstrate that the minutes for the October 17
board of directors' meeting is a fabrication.
For the foregoing reasons, I shall recommend that this
allegation of the consolidated complaint be dismissed.
H. The Postelection Changes and Threats to Change
Employees' Terms and Conditions of Employment
The Respondent through the years has posted a number
of notices on its bulletin board dealing with plant rules and
regulations and its employees' terms and conditions of em-
ployment. On a date between Monday, January 7, 1974, and
Thursday, January 10, 1974, Respondent removed all of the
notices and replaced them all with a 4-page document enti-
tled "General Rules Governing Operations" which lists 34
separate rules and what I will call a 35th rule which in detail
13 Based on a composite of the testimony of Paud and Lockett. To the
extent that Paud testified he distributed literature at the Company before
October 24, it conflicts with the testimony of Lockett, as well as with his own
notes which indicate Lockett did not phone him until October 23 at 4:30 p.m.
14 I have carefully considered the admission made by Plant Superintendent
Robert Wixon that in late September or early October both Foreman Facas
and President Wixon informed him, in effect , that the Union had com-
menced a campaign to organize the employees. Although it is plain that they
communicated this knowledge to the plant superintendent prior to the dis-
charge of employee Phillips on November 5, the whole record demonstrates
that they could not have told this to him in early October because, as de-
scribed above, the Union did not begin its organizational campaign until
October 24.
sets out "rules governing new employees." I will refer to
these general rules for the sake of convenience as the "post-
election rules ." Respondent's President Guy Wixon, the
person responsible for the "post-election rules ," testified
that there were so many separate notices containing the
Company's rules and regulations scattered all over the bul-
letin board, some of which were fading with age, that it was
becoming impossible to make sense of them and that, be-
cause of this, he decided to remove all of the notices and
replace them with one multipage document, the "post-elec-
tion rules ." President Wixon gave the impression that the
"post-election rules" were virtually identical to the rules and
regulations previously posted. This is not true . A compari-
son between the old notices and the "post- election rules"
show that at least 20 of the numbered rules and policies
contained therein were not previously posted. The "post-
election rules" are all inclusive and, in fine detail , define
virtually every aspect of the employer-employee relation-
ship, including the Company's policies concerning wages
and fringe benefits . The General Counsel, in substance,
alleges that certain "post-election rules" constitute either an
actual change or a threat to change employees' existing
terms and conditions of employment because of their union
activities. I shall set out and evaluate the evidence surround-
ing each of the rules alleged to be unlawfully motivated.
Rule 4 of the "post-election rules" reads:
No shop employee will be permitted to leave the com-
pany premises for lunch or during break without first
obtaining permission from the foreman and then
punching out and back in when returning.
For several years prior to the election, the Respondent's
posted rules and regulations required employees "leaving
the shop for lunch or any other purpose must punch out and
back in on the time card" (Resp. Exh. 11). Although Re-
spondent on occasion was lax in enforcing this policy, the
record does not establish that the Respondent in effect had
adopted a policy of tolerating employees' leaving the plant
without punching the timeclock. But it is undisputed that
prior to the "post-election rules" the employees had never
been required to obtain permission when desiring to leave
the plant during the lunch period. They were just required
to punch the timeclock. Respondent presented no prior
written notice, replaced by the "post-election rules," stat-
ing that employees must seek permission before leaving the
plant during the lunch period. Nevertheless, President Guy
Wixon initially testified that throughout the years it was
common knowledge that company policy required employ-
ees to ask for permission to leave the plant during the
lunch period and that employees would ask permission
from either himself or Superintendent Robert Wixon.
When asked to explain the reason for the policy, President
Wixon's testimony was incredible-"because they some-
times leave and they sneak in the door without punching
back in"-and then reluctantly admitted that in fact it had
never been the practice for the Respondent to require em-
ployees to get permission before leaving the premises dur-
ing the lunch period. Also, Foreman Facas and Superin-
tendent Robert Wixon testified that it never had been
Respondent's practice to require employees to seek permis-
AIRCRAFT PLATING CO.
sion before leaving the plant during the lunch period but
that such a policy only applied if an employee desired to
leave the plant during break periods. Respondent offered
no explanation of why it instituted the rule forbidding em-
ployees from leaving the premises during lunch period
without first obtaining permission from the foreman. Based
on the foregoing, I find that Respondent on or about Janu-
ary 7, 1974, for the first time instituted a rule requiring
employees to obtain permission before leaving the
Company's premises during the lunch period and that Re-
spondent had no legitimate reason for instituting this new
rule.
Rule 33 of the "post-election rules" reads:
Bonuses : Each year it is our desire to give a Christmas
bonus and also to give another in March. However, this
is not one of our working conditions or promises and
is strictly up to the decision of the Board of Directors
of the Corporation.
It is undisputed that the Respondent's employees for the
past 10 years have received an "incentive bonus" during
Christmas and for "at least" 5 years a similar bonus in
March. The amount of money distributed is based on the
Company's profit picture and the amount given to each
employee depends on his seniority with the Company.
Employees with more seniority receive a larger bonus.
There is no evidence or contention that the employees prior
to the posting of the "post-election rules" had been told that
the annual bonuses were not a condition of their employ-
ment or were not a promise by the Company or that there
was a possibility the Board of Directors would not pay these
annual bonuses. The notices posted prior to the "post-elec-
tion rules" were silent on the subject of the bonuses. Re-
spondent did not explain why it felt compelled on or about
January 7 to tell its employees that, in effect, the bonuses
were not a condition of employment or a promise by the
Company and there was the possibility that the directors
would see fit not to grant bonuses. Under the circumstances,
I find that rule 33 was calculated to cause the employees to
believe that the Respondent intended to discontinue paying
bonuses and further find that the Respondent published this
rule with that intent.
Rule 22 of the "post-election rules" reads:
There shall be no congregating or group meetings held
in the parking lot, you must leave immediately after
reaching your car.
Respondent's President Wixon initially testified that this
rule had always been company policy and the employees
prior to the election had been orally notified about its con-
tents but that the rule was never reduced to writing and
posted on the company bulletin board prior to the posting
of the "post-election rules ." He was not a convincing wit-
ness and was unable to recall when, if ever, prior to the
election, particular employees were told about this rule.
Although first he testified that the rule had not been previ-
ously reduced to writing and posted, Wixon later testified
that he believed the rule was previously posted but then
reluctantly testified he did not believe there ever was such
a rule prior to the "post-election rules." He testified that the
671
reason he instituted this rule was that the owner of the
parking lot sometime about September or October 1973 told
him she had observed people standing in groups in the lot
and this made her nervous because her husband had just
died, and she did not want people standing in groups. As
indicated previously, President Wixon was not a convincing
witness when testifying on this subject and the owner of the
parking lot was not called on by the Respondent to corrobo-
rate his testimony. In any event, if the owner complained as
early as September or October, why did Wixon wait until
immediately after the election to institute this rule? In re-
sponse to this question, Wixon testified "I had no particular
reason." Based on the foregoing, I find that Respondent
prior to the election had no rule which expressly or by
implication forbade employees from congregating or hold-
ing meetings in the parking lot or requiring them to leave
the parking lot immediately upon reaching their automo-
biles.ts I further find that Respondent advanced no legiti-
mate reason for instituting rule 22.
Rule 23 of the "post-election rules" reads:
Group insurance will be provided for and paid by the
company for the employee only. Those wanting cover-
age for their dependents must make application for
same and pay the premium either by payroll deduction
or other satisfactory agreements.
It is undisputed that the Respondent for the past 10 years
has continually paid the group insurance premium for its
employees' dependents. Obviously, rule 23 announced a
change in this policy. But despite the clear language of the
rule, it is undisputed that even after its posting Respondent
continued to pay the group insurance premium for its em-
ployees' dependents. At first glance what occurred was a
mistake. As previously described, on or about January 7,
1974, the several notices on the Company's bulletin board
describing the Company 's existing rules were taken down
and, according to President Wixon, were all included in one
document herein referred to as the "post-election rules,"
which contained rule 23 described above. The person who
typed the "post-election rules" by copying from the existing
notices, President Wixon testified, was Leslie Wixon, his
son. Leslie was assisted by the plant's superintendent, Rob-
ert Wixon, who proofread the "post-election rules" after
they were compiled by Leslie. According to President Wix-
on, his son Leslie copied rule 23 from an existing rule,
Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, which was identical to rule 23
and had been posted on the bulletin board since March 22,
1967, the date it bears. Respondent's Exhibit No. 8 was
removed from the bulletin board with the other notices and
Leslie, according to President Wixon, copied it along with
the other rules. I do not believe him. This is perhaps a harsh
judgment but President Wixon's story smacks of fabrica-
131 reject Respondent 's contention that rule 22 was by implication previ-
ously contained in Respondent's existing rule stating "employees will not be
permitted to loiter on company premises at times other than working hours."
Also, I specifically find that Respondent had no unwritten policy as now
embodied in rule 22. President Wixon in effect virtually admitted that no
such policy had ever previously existed. Moreover, his testimony about the
so-called unwritten practice was vague and evasive and not corroborated by
either Foreman Facas or Plant Superintendent Robert Wixon.
672 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion . I have found that the "post-election rules" were not
simply a compilation of existing rules which had been em-
bodied in notices already posted but that at least 20 had
never been previously posted by the Respondent.
Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, which rule 23 in haec verba was
supposedly copied from, is a notice which on its face indi-
cates it was ostensibly posted on March 22, 1967, at a time
when, according to the testimony of President Wixon, the
Company was paying the group insurance of the employees'
dependents. Moreover, employee Palacio credibly testified
that Respondent's Exhibit No. 8 had never been posted on
the bulletin board and employee John Lockett credibly tes-
tified that his best recollection was he did not remember this
notice being posted. 16 The employees' failure to recall
Respondent's Exhibit No. 8 and the fact that it was suppos-
edly posted all during the time when Respondent was pay-
ing the group insurance premium for the employees'
dependents convinces me that the document is a fabrica-
tion. I find it incredible that the Respondent would allow
this notice which embodied a nonexistent company policy
to remain posted for approximately 6 years. I also find it
inconceivable that Leslie Wixon, who supposedly typed the
"post-election rules," and Superintendent Wixon, who
proofread them, each could have been so careless to have
allowed such a flagrant error in such a significant company
policy to escape their scrutiny. Neither person was called
upon by the Respondent to corroborate President Wixon's
story and I presume their testimony would not have corrob-
orated him. Based on the foregoing, I find that the reason
advanced by the Respondent to explain the publication of
rule 23, insofar as it announces a change in the Company's
policy of paying the insurance coverage of employees' de-
pendents, to be patently false . I further find that rule 23 was
calculated to cause the employees to believe that the Re-
spondent intended to discontinue paying the group insur-
ance premiums for the employees' dependents and that this
rule was published with that intent.
Rule 30 of the "post-election rules," in pertinent part
reads: "Sick Leave: The company will allow five (5) days
annual sick leave pay, payable at the last pay period of the
year...."
Rule 34 of the "post-election rules" in pertinent part
reads: "Vacations: Paid vacations will be allowed as fol-
lows:... After 2 years -two (2) weeks."
Admittedly, the Respondent prior to the posting of these
rules had not granted its employees paid sick leave and had
granted employees with 2 years' tenure only 1 week of paid
vacation. Respondent advanced no credible explanation of
why these improvements in the employees' terms and condi-
tions of employment were instituted immediately after the
t6 I have carefully considered that , when shown all of the copies of the old
notices which included Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, Plant Superintendent
Wixon testified he remembered seeing them all posted on the company
bulletin board until they were removed in January 1974 and replaced by the
"post-election rules ." I do not credit his testimony insofar as it indicates that
Respondent's Exhibit No. 8 was posted . It is incredible that Superintendent
Wixon, who testified he was familiar with the Company 's policies and proce-
dures and who allegedly proofread the "post-election rules" before they were
posted, would have allowed such a flagrant error in existing company policy
to escape his eye, or for that matter would have allowed this old notice
containing false information to remain posted for several years.
Union's election victory. President Wixon, in substance,
testified that these improved benefits were instituted be-
cause employees during the course of the Union's organiza-
tional campaign in December 1973 had complained to him
that other companies, competitors of the Respondent, gave
these benefits to their employees. Wixon was an incredible
witness whose testimony was vague and evasive on this
point and in significant respects was contradicted by other
evidence. When asked why the decision to grant the em-
ployees 5 days of annual paid sick leave was made in Janu-
ary immediately following the election, Wixon testified that
the decision was made "at least" 2 or 3 weeks before the
election by the Company's board of directors, at which time
Wixon had moved that the directors institute such a policy
and that the delay until January in notifying the employees
about the new policy was that Wixon wanted it to go into
the "post-election rules." The minutes of the board of di-
rectors' meeting for January 8, 1974, flatly contradicts
Wixon's explanation. It shows that the directors on January
8 held a meeting for the specific purpose of discussing the
subject of paid sick leave and that upon a motion by Direc-
tor Clute-not Wixon-the directors decided to grant the
5 days sick leave annually "in order that [employees) would
do better work and stay employed here as we are having too
much labor turnover." In short, Wixon's explanation that
the decision to institute the paid sick leave had been reached
before the election and delayed until after the election is
false . For the aforesaid reasons, I do not believe that Wixon
on this subject is a credible witness and specifically find that
the reasons advanced by him to justify the grant of the
improved sick leave and improved vacation policy to be
untrustworthy and that the true reason lies elsewhere.
I. The Postelection Increases in Wages Granted to Three
Employees and the Promotion and Wage Increases Granted
to Two Others
It is undisputed that during the week following the Janu-
ary 4 election the Respondent increased the hourly rate of
pay of John Lockett by 45 cents, Kathleen Maldonado by
10 cents, and Cheryl Asay Campbell by 10 cents. The em-
ployees did not ask for these raises. There is no evidence
that the Respondent ever gave the employees an explana-
tion for giving them wage increases, and the Respondent
during the hearing presented no evidence to explain the
increases.
It is undisputed that during January 1974, following the
election of January 4, the Respondent promoted Leslie Por-
ter to the position of leadman and Ernestine Thornton to
leadlady in their departments, with an increase in pay of 35
cents and 40 cents per hour, respectively. Respondent since
1969 had operated without anyone occupying the position
leadman and, although the Respondent until 1969 had em-
ployed one lead person, there is no evidence that Respon-
dent ever had designated two employees as lead personnel.
President Wixon testified that Porter and Thornton were
selected for promotion to the positions of lead personnel
because of their seniority and experience but did not explain
why Respondent suddenly decided to promote not one but
two employees to positions which had been vacant for over
4 years. Respondent presented no testimony on this point.
AIRCRAFT PLATING CO.
J. The Postelection Threats to Change and the Change in
the Employees' Conditions of Employment: Ultimate
Conclusions
Despite the Respondent's open opposition to the Union,
a majority of the employees on January 4 voted for the
Union and, I have found, shortly after the election the Re-
spondent threatened the employees it would discontinue
paying their annual bonuses, threatened employees it would
discontinue paying the group insurance coverage for the
employees' dependents, instituted a rule requiring employ-
ees to obtain permission from the foreman before leaving
the premises during the lunch period, and instituted a rule
prohibiting employees from congregating or meeting on the
company parking lot and requiring them to leave the park-
ing lot immediately. Respondent advanced no legitimate
reasons for issuing the warnings and imposing the more
stringent conditions of employment. This lack of legitimacy,
when coupled with the Respondent's opposition to the
unionization of its employees, the timing of conduct-com-
ing immediately after a majority of the employees had voted
for the Union-leads me to conclude that by engaging in
each of the aforesaid acts the Respondent was motivated by
a desire to retaliate against its employees because they sup-
ported the Union and to undermine the Union in its role as
the employees' majority representative. By engaging in this
conduct, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
I have found that shortly after the Union's election victo-
ry, the Respondent granted the employees 5 days of annual
paid sick leave, improved their vacation benefits, granted
wage increases to three employees, and promoted and
granted wage increases to two more employees. I have fur-
ther found that the Respondent, opposed to the unioniza-
tion of its employees, advanced no legitimate reasons for
instituting this massive improvement in benefits. In consid-
ering this matter, I have taken into account that the timing
of this action, after the union effort had not only ended but
apparently ended in a union victory, would normally cut
against a finding of antiunion motive in the granting of
benefits. This is true especially since the Respondent, as
found previously, punished its employees because they had
supported the Union. Nevertheless, the record demon-
strates that in granting the aforesaid benefits the Respon-
dent was motivated by a desire to undermine and undercut
the Union's status as the statutory representative of its em-
ployees when the Board issued its certification. In reaching
this conclusion, I have been influenced by the following
considerations.
In view of the nature of one of the Union's challenges
made in the election, the challenge to Foreman Facas' bal-
lot, the Respondent knew it was only a matter of time before
the Union would be certified by the Board as the employees'
exclusive bargaining representative. Thus, as already de-
scribed, the Respondent's president, Guy Wixon, at the
hearing in this case admitted that Facas has "the authority
to hire employees," admitted that Facas has "the authority
to direct employees in their work, to tell them what to do,"
and has the authority to transfer employees between depart-
ments and to work overtime. I would be blind to reality, in
these circumstances, not to find that the Respondent knew
that Foreman Facas was a statutory supervisor and that, as
673
such , the Union 's challenge to his ballot would be sustained
and that it was only a matter of time until the Board certi-
fied the Union as the employees ' exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative.
Also relevant in evaluating the Respondent 's postelection
grant of benefits is its preelection efforts to convince the
employees to reject the Union . In substance, the
Respondent's antiunion campaign posters informed the em-
ployees that the Respondent was responsible for the em-
ployees ' current good wages and good working conditions
and it did not see how union representation could help the
employees and, on the matter of wages, specifically told
them that the Respondent's wage policy would continue
"union or no union ." Consistent with its preelection an-
nouncement, the Respondent immediately after the Union's
election victory granted substantial improvements in the
employees ' terms and conditions of employment , improved
the vacation benefits , instituted a policy of paid sick leave,
increased the hourly wage rates of about 30 percent of the
unit employees , and promoted two of these employees. Un-
der these circumstances , the employees were "not likely to
miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred
is also the source from which future benefits must flow and
which may dry up if it is not obliged ." N.L.R.B. v. Exchange
Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 , 409. The timeliness of the
Respondent's massive grant of benefits was calculated to
demonstrate to the employees that it was the Company
whom they were beholden to for their terms and conditions
of employment and not the Union , despite the Union's
election victory. In the face of this conduct and the
Respondent 's unlawful punitive action described earlier, the
employees would be discouraged from supporting the
Union in the impending negotiation for an initial collective-
bargaining agreement . Moreover , the Respondent drastical-
ly limited the Union's role in the collective -bargaining nego-
tiations by taking credit in the eyes of the employees for
substantial improved benefits of employment.'
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Respondent, in
instituting the aforesaid postelection improved terms and
conditions of employment , was motivated by a desire to
undermine the Union in the eyes of the employees, to un-
dermine the status of the Union as the employees ' exclusive
bargaining representative, and in general to discourage the
employees from continuing to support the Union . Accord-
ingly, by granting the improved vacation benefits, by insti-
tuting sick leave benefits, by increasing the wages of five
employees and by promoting two of these employees, the
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
L. The Layoff of Charles Hagen
The General Counsel contends that employee Charles
r
17 In this regard , as described earlier, I have not credited President Wixon's
reasons for instituting the paid sick leave and improved vacation benefits
But, assuming that Wixon did, as in substance he testified , act out of a desire
to remedy the employees' grievances which surfaced during the Union's
organizational campaign , I am convinced that in the circumstances of this
case, this admission lends further support to the conclusion that, in instituting
these improved benefits , Respondent was motivated by a desire to undercut
the Union at the bargaining table and to undermine the Union in the eyes
of the employees
674 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hagen was discriminatorily laid off on November 7, 1973.
Hagen on Wednesday, November 7, at the start of the
workday, was sent home by Foreman Facas. Since this was
a regular payday, Hagen returned the same day at about
noontime for his paycheck at which time he was asked to
return to work . He refused, explaining to Facas that he had
quit to work for another employer. Respondent's payroll
records-Hagen's timecard-indicates he received pay for
a full day of work on November 7. These facts are not
contested but in dispute are the events which occurred on
November 6 and 7 which led up to Hagen's being told on
November 7 to go home.
Hagen testified that on November 6, as he left work at the
end of the day, Foreman Facas told him to come to work
the next day 1 hour early, 6 a.m. Hagen testified that he
refused to accommodate Facas and on November 7
punched the timeclock at his usual time shortly before 7
a.m. On his way to the work area, according to Hagen,
Facas came up to him and told him, "You are kind of slow
on work today. Why don't you go home and come back
tomorrow." Without objection, Hagen punched out, left the
plant and promptly secured employment with another em-
ployer. 18 He returned to Respondent 's premises later that
day, since it was payday, to pick up his paycheck at which
time Facas asked him to return to work. Hagen refused,
explaining to Facas that he had gotten another job. Hagen
testified that on November 7 the work he normally per-
formed was "kind of slow," that he did not have a full day
of work and when this situation previously had occurred, he
either was transferred into another department or would
finish up the little work he had, depending on whether the
customer needed the parts he was working on.
Foreman Facas testified that he was the person who made
the decision on November 7 to send Hagen home. Specifi-
cally, Facas testified that on November 6, at the end of the
workday, he asked Hagen to report for work the next day
1 hour earlier to do some dry-lube work, a type of spray
painting. Hagen is assigned this type of work only when his
own work is slow. Hagen on November 7, however, arrived
for work at his regular reporting time and, according to
Facas, once again Facas assigned Hagen to perform dry-
lube work because things were slow in Hagen 's department.
Hagen refused to do the dry-lube work. Facas told him to
go home until there was sufficient regular work.19 Later that
day, when Hagen came to the plant to pick up his paycheck,
Facas testified he observed there was regular work available
for Hagen to perform and that he asked Hagen to return to
work. Hagen, as described previously, informed Facas he no
longer worked for Respondent. Facas testified that prior to
November 7 he had not sent an employee home because of
a lack of work and that the only reason he sent Hagen home
18 In connection with the Facas-Hagen conversation which took place
early November 7, 1 have considered the testimony of Tommy Williams, a
witness called by the General Counsel to corroborate Hagen . Williams, who
quit the Company's employ within hours after Hagen was sent home , did not
impress me as a reliable witness.
Employee Jim Compton , called as a witness by Respondent, testified
that on November 7 Hagen told him he was not going to do work other than
his regular work and stated "I am going to quit and go home . The heck with
it." Compton, as was the case with the General Counsel 's corroborating
witness, did not impress me as a reliable witness.
on November 7 was because of his refusal to perform the
dry-lube work.
To sum up, it is undisputed that on November 7 work in
Hagen's department was slow and that it would not have
been unusual for the Respondent to assign Hagen to some
other job. Facas claims he did just this but that Hagen
turned the assignment down. Hagen's testimony is to the
contrary. The problem created by this sharp conflict in their
testimony is extremely difficult to resolve because both Ha-
gen and Facas generally speaking did not impress me as
trustworthy witnesses . Of the two, Facas impressed me as
the more reliable in presenting what took place between
himself and Hagen on November 6 and 7.
Based on the foregoing, I find that the General Counsel
has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Charles Hagen was discriminatorily laid off and shall rec-
ommend that this portion of the consolidated complaint be
dismissed.
M. The Discharge of Norma Phillips
The General Counsel alleges that Norma Phillips was
discharged by the Respondent on November 5, 1973, be-
cause of the employees' union activities.
On Friday, November 2, Respondent received a letter
from the Union's business representative, Rex Paud, notify-
ing it that "the employees of your company have selected
our organization to represent them in bargaining for wages,
hours and other conditions," and asked for a meeting with
the Respondent. On Monday, November 5, as she was leav-
ing the plant at the end of the workday, employee Norma
Phillips, without explanation, was handed an envelope by
Foreman James Facas. It contained a letter addressed to
Phillips, dated November 5, and was signed by the
Respondent's president, Guy Wixon, and read: "This is to
advise you that due to lack of work and reduction of work
force your employment with this company is hereby termi-
nated as of the above date." Previously, on the first day of
the Union's organizational campaign, October 24, Phillips
had signed a card authorizing the Union to represent the
employees and continuously until her termination actively
and openly, in the plant, voiced her prounion sentiments
and solicited other employees to support the Union.
Phillips had been employed in the Company's anodizing
department as a racker since April 1973. The Respondent's
president, Guy Wixon, testified that he made the decision
to terminate Phillips. President Wixon at first vaguely and
evasively advanced inconsistent reasons for the termina-
tion. He first testified that because of a lack of work in
Phillips' department, he selected her for layoff because she
refused to work in other departments. Then he testified that
the reason for her selection was that she was the least senior
employee. Later Wixon admitted that it was common prac-
tice when work was slow in an employee's department to
transfer the employee to another department 20 and, in ef-
fect, unequivocally testified that the only reason Phillips
was selected for layoff was because she had refused to trans-
fer from her own into another department when work was
20 Several witnesses called by the General Counsel credibly testified, in
effect, that it was company policy to transfer employees between depart-
ments when work was slow rather than lay them off.
AIRCRAFT PLATING CO. 675
slow. President Wixon was not a convincing witness and for
the reasons set out below I am of the opinion the reason he
advanced for terminating Norma Phillips was patently
false.
Wixon's reason for terminating Phillips is completely
without substance. Not an iota of evidence was introduced
by the Respondent to prove that Phillips had refused work
assignments or had indicated that she did not want to per-
form work in departments other than her own. The evidence
is to the contrary. Wixon admitted that Phillips did not
refuse such an assignment when made by him, but that
Foreman Facas had told him this. Facas completely contra-
dicted Wixon. Facas testified that on a number of occasions
Phillips, in fact, when work was slow had been transferred
into other departments. In no way did Facas indicate that
Phillips objected to these assignments or that she even re-
sented them. To the contrary, according to Facas, on the
day of her termination, because work in her department was
slow, Phillips requested that Facas transfer her into another
department and Facas did so. In sum, the uncontradicted
testimony of Phillips and several employee witnesses, as
well as the testimony of Foreman Facas, establishes that
during Phillips' employment she had been assigned on sev-
eral occasions, without objection to work in departments
other than the department she normally worked in.
Wixon's reason for terminating Phillips is not consistent
with Foreman Facas' description of what supposedly
prompted Wixon to terminate Phillips. Facas' testimony
flatly contradicts Wixon's. Wixon testified that his decision
was made under the following circumstances. On the morn-
ing of November 5, he was informed by Foreman Facas that
there was no work in Phillips' department and Facas said
"that Phillips wouldn't work in the other departments and
we should lay her off." Based upon this recommendation,
Wixon testified, he reached his decision to lay off Phillips.
In short, Foreman Facas effectively recommended Phillips'
layoff. Wixon simply placed his stamp of approval on the
transaction. Foreman Facas tells a completely different sto-
ry. Initially, Facas categorically denied having any discus-
sion with Wixon on November 5 about Phillips' termination
but testified that Wixon just handed him the written termi-
nation note, described above, instructed him to hand the
note to Phillips, and simply told Facas that Phillips was
going to be laid off since work had slowed down in her
department. Facas testified he has no idea why President
Wixon selected Phillips for layoff since it was Wixon who
made the decision and Wixon never explained the basis for
his decision to Facas?I Plainly, the story told by Wixon is
diametrically opposed to Facas' version of the events which
led to Phillips' termination.
21 During cross-examination , at one point, when asked if he had a conver-
sation with President Wixon about transferring Phillips to another depart-
ment, Facas testified "there was, now that I think of it, and I [told Wixon]
I can 't really use her in other departments because her work was not very
satisfactory." As described above, this does not jibe with the testimony of
President Wixon, the person who made the decision to terminate Phillips. It
is undisputed that Phillips' workmanship was not a factor in Wixon's decision
to terminate her. Indeed , Wixon in effect testified that he had no knowledge
of whether any of Phillips' work had ever been rejected . For this reason, I
need not decide whether Phillips, as contended by Facas, was not a satisfac-
tory employee.
The complete lack of substance to the reason advanced
by President Wixon to justify his decision to terminate Phil-
lips, and the completely different and inconsistent stories
told by Wixon and Foreman Facas to justify the discharge,
lead me to conclude that Wixon's testimony was a fabrica-
tion and indicates that the decision to discharge Phillips was
not based upon legitimate business considerations. Why
else would Wixon dredge up a reason which does not exist
to justify his conduct? 2
When one examines the conduct of the Respondent in its
context-the patently false reason advanced for terminat-
ing Phillips, the Respondent's opposition to the unioniza-
tion of its employees, Phillips' open support for the Union,
and the timing of Phillips' termination coming immediately
after the Respondent's receipt of the Union's demand for
recognition-from all this a design of discrimination ine-
luctably emerges. It indicates that the real reason for the
termination was the Respondent's opposition to the Union.
President Wixon, however, contends that he had no knowl-
edge of Phillips' prounion sentiments until several days after
her termination and did not even know that the Union was
attempting to organize the employees until November 7, 2
days after Phillips' termination. I do not believe him.
Wixon, in substance, testified that even though the Com-
pany on Friday, November 2, received the Union' s letter
which notified the Company it represented a majority of the
Company's employees, this letter did not come to his atten-
tion until Wednesday, November 7. In explaining why, de-
spite the receipt of the Union's letter on November 2, he did
not learn of the Union's organizational campaign until No-
vember 7, President Wixon late in November in a written
statement submitted under oath to the Board's Regional
Office made the following statement: "I first became aware
of the Union organizing my plant on November 7 at 10:30
a.m. when I received a letter from the Union. My secretary
received it on the second. I did not come to work that day
or the following Monday [November 5] or Tuesday [No-
vember 6]. No one called me to inform me of the letter. The
letter was addressed to my brother Harold who no longer
works here." This explanation is false. As described earlier,
Wixon admittedly was at the plant on Monday, November
5, when he made the decision to discharge Phillips. At the
hearing Wixon never did successfully explain the reason for
submitting this false explanation to the Board's Regional
Office. At the hearing Wixon adopted a different tack, now
he testified that the reason the Union's letter did not come
to his attention until 5 days after its receipt was that since
it was addressed to his brother, the office secretary filed it
away in a folder reserved for his brother's mail and that
President Wixon came across the letter on November 7
when he was going through this file. I shall now set out the
pertinent facts essential to a better understanding and eval-
uation of Wixon's testimony. The Union's letter was in fact
addressed to his brother-"Mr. H. Wixon, President, Air-
craft Plating Company, Inc." Harold Wixon, the brother of
President Wixon, had not been president since July 1970 at
which time he retired and has since been inactive in the
22 In view of these findings , it is not essential that I decide whether work
was sufficiently slow on November 5 to warrant Phillips' transfer from her
own to another department or her termination . Assuming work was suffi-
ciently slow , Wixon's reason for terminating Phillips is patently false.
676 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
business, residing about 100 miles from the plant and vis-
iting the plant less than once a month. The Respondent's
office secretary, Mildred Lee, on November 2 opened the
envelope of the Union's letter requesting recognition,
opened the letter itself and apparently on the face of the
letter marked "received 11/2/73" and initialed the letter.
That the Company's secretary would then just file away in
"Harold's" folder such a significant letter, the contents of
which vitally affected the Company's day-to-day operations
without showing it to President Wixon does- not, under the
circumstances, ring true. The secretary, Mildred Lee, who
at the time of the hearing was still employed by the Respon-
dent, for some unexplained reason was not called by the
Respondent to corroborate President Wixon and I presume
her testimony would not have supported his story. More-
over, Wixon's testimony of how he just happened to come
across this letter was not given in a convincing manner: "I
was going through [Harold' s] file , I guess." [Emphasis sup-
plied.] Based on the foregoing, including the patently false
reason submitted to the Board's Regional Office, I am con-
vinced that President Wixon's testimony that he had no
knowledge of the Union's letter requesting recognition until
5 days after it was received was manufactured from the
same cloth as his false testimony concerning the reason for
the posting of the threat to discontinue paying the group
insurance premiums covering employees' dependents and
his false reason for terminating Phillips.
President Wixon's contention that at the time he decided
to terminate Phillips he had no knowledge that she was a
union adherent likewise does not withstand scrutiny. The
following circumstances lead me to conclude that the Re-
spondent, and in particular President Wixon, knew that
Phillips was a union adherent at the time of her termination.
Phillips during the period immediately prior to his discharge
openly and actively, in the plant, voiced her union senti-
ments and solicited employees to support the Union. The
Respondent is a small employer which employs about 26
employees, of whom only about 16 were production em-
ployees. The record reveals that President Wixon and Fore-
man Facas were regularly in contact with the employees.
President Wixon admitted that in his regular walks through
the plant he overhears employees talking among themselves
and testified "I hear what I want to hear." Also, I cannot
ignore the fact that President Wixon's son, Leslie, is an
employee and his nephew, Robert Wixon, is plant superin-
tendent, and that they both are in contact with the employ-
ees. It would be unrealistic for me to blind my eyes to the
strong possibility that President Wixon's family would keep
him informed of an employee's union sentiments. In this
regard, it is undisputed that on October 24 Phillips in the
presence of Leslie Wixon solicited an employee to support
the Union and in no uncertain terms indicated to Leslie that
she was an adherent of the Union. The next day, it is undis-
puted, Leslie in the presence of Foreman Facas asked Phil-
lips if she had mailed her union card.23
The above circumstances, considered with the
Respondent's opposition to the Union, the timing of Phil-
23 Of course, Facas' knowledge of Phillips' prounion sentiments , which the
above episode establishes , is imputed to the Respondent . MacDonald Engi-
neering Co., 202 NLRB 645, fn. 7.
lips' discharge immediately after the Respondent's receipt
of the Union's demand for recognition, and the patently
false reason advanced to justify the discharge, establish that
the Respondent at the time it discharged Phillips had knowl-
edge that she was a union sympathizer. See Long Island
Airport Limousine Service Corp., 191 NLRB 94, 95, enfd. on
this point 468 F.2d 292, 294, 295 (C.A. 2). I further find that
in discharging Norma Phillips on November 5 the Respon-
dent acted on this knowledge and that the discharge, ?4 in
substantial part, was motivated by the Respondent's oppo-
sition to the Union and by a desire to discourage its employ-
ees from supporting the Union. By engaging in this conduct,
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the
entire record, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Aircraft Plating Company, Inc., the Respondent, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers & Allied Workers In-
ternational Union, Local No. 67, AFL-CIO, the Union, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By interrogating an employee about his union activi-
ties and sympathies; by its foreman's attendance at a union
meeting ; by threatening employees it would discontinue
their annual bonuses and the group insurance coverage for
their dependents; by instituting a rule requiring employees
to obtain permission before leaving the company premises
during the lunch period and another rule prohibiting em-
ployees from congregating or meeting in the company park-
ing lot and requiring them to immediately leave the lot; by
giving employees better terms and conditions of employ-
ment, a better vacation policy, paid sick leave , increasing
the wages of employees Lockett, Maldonado, and Camp-
bell, and promoting and increasing the wages of employees
Porter and Thornton, the Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging
in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act 25
4, By discharging employee Norma Jean Phillips because
of her union activities or sympathies and to discourage em-
ployees from supporting the Union, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section-8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
24I reject President Wixon 's contention that it was his intent only to
temporarily lay off Phillips. Wixon's written termination message to Phil-
lips-"your employment with this company is hereby terminated"-on its
face speaks in terms of a discharge . At no time did Respondent ever indicate
to Phillips that her termination was only temporary. To the contrary, the
abrupt manner in which she was informed of her termination was calculated
to cause her to believe that she had been discharged rather than laid off
temporarily . In any event , whether the Respondent's conduct be called dis-
charge or layoff, the record establishes that the conduct was discriminatorily
motivated.
25 The General Counsel has alleged that some of the aforesaid unlawful
conduct constitutes an independent violation of Sec. 8(aX3) as well as Sec.
8(axl) of the Act , a question which I have not decided because it does not
affect the remedy or the order in this case.
AIRCRAFT PLATING CO.
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It will also be
recommended, in view of the nature of the unfair labor
practices in which the Respondent has engaged (see
N. L. R. B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4,
1941) ), that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist
from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed
employees by Section 7 of the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully discharged
employee Norma Jean Phillips, I shall recommend that Re-
spondent offer Phillips immediate and full reinstatement to
her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, and make her whole for any loss
of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the dis-
charge with backpay computed on a quarterly basis as pre-
scribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest at 6 percent per annum as prescribed in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1963). In this
connection, I find that the Respondent' s telegram of Janu-
ary 26, 1974, which informed Phillips that it had an opening
for a job "in the Cad Dept" which was not Phillips' former
position did not satisfy the Respondent's obligation toward
Phillips and, as such, did not toll its backpay or reinstate-
ment liability. Also, I have considered President Wixon's
testimony that in December he tried without success to
contact Phillips over the telephone but that her phone had
been disconnected because, as the record establishes, she
had moved. Wixon did not give the reason for placing this
phone call. Assuming it was to make the same job offer as
made by him in the above-described telegram , it is not
sufficient to toll the Company's liability. Even assuming he
intended to offer Phillips her old job back and failed to
reach her for this purpose because she had changed phone
numbers, it would not, under the circumstances , satisfy
Respondent's obligation toward Phillips. Clearly, Respon-
dent had other available means to determine Phillips' new
phone number-employees, the Board's Regional Office or
even the telephone company. Moreover, if Wixon was seri-
ous about contacting Phillips for that purpose, he could
have written her a letter or sent a telegram . In this regard,
I note that the addresses on the telegram sent by Respon-
dent on January 26, received by Phillips, and the termina-
tion letter of November 5 are the same. A telegram or a
letter would have been received by Phillips.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
26 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48
ORDER 26
677
Respondent, Aircraft Plating Company, Inc., Haw-
thorne, California, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Metal Polishers, Buff-
ers, Platers & Allied Workers International Union, Local
No. 67, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by dis-
charging employees, or in any other manner discriminating
against any employee in regard to hire, tenure, or any other
term or condition of employment.
(b) Interrogating employees concerning their union
membership, sympathies or activities.
(c) Placing the union activities of employees under sur-
veillance by the presence of supervisors at union meetings.
(d) Threatening employees with the loss of existing em-
ployment benefits and discontinuing employees' benefits
and privileges previously enjoyed because they supported
the above-named Union or for the purpose of discouraging
them from supporting said Union.
(e) Granting employees higher wages or other improved
benefits of employment for the purpose of discouraging
them from supporting the above-named Union.
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such
rights may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment,
as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Norma Jean Phillips immediate and full rein-
statement to her former position or, if this position no long-
er exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges previous-
ly enjoyed, and make her whole for any loss of earnings
suffered by reason of her discharge, in the manner set forth
in the section herein entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Rescind rule 22 of its "General Rules Governing Op-
erations" which prohibits employees from congregating or
holding group meetings in the parking lot and requires them
to leave the lot immediately.
(c) Rescind rule 4 of its "General Rules Governing Oper-
ations" insofar as it prohibits employees from leaving the
premises of the Respondent during lunch break without first
obtaining permission.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of rein- i
statement under the terms of this Order.
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(e) Post at its place of business in Hawthorne, California,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 27 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 31, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the consolidated complaint be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifi-
cally found.
27 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give evi-
dence, the National Labor Relations Board found that we,
Aircraft Plating Company, Inc., violated the National La-
bor Relations Act, and ordered us to post this notice and to
keep our word about what we say in this notice.
The law gives you the right:
To form, join, or help unions;
To choose a union to represent you in bargaining
with us;
To act together for your common interest or pro-
tection; and
To refuse to participate in any or all of these
things.
WE WILL NOT discharge you or otherwise discriminate
against you because you are a member of or have as-
sisted Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers & Allied Work-
ers International Union, Local No. 67, AFL-CIO, or
any other union.
WE WILL NOT question you about your union member-
ship or union activities.
WE WILL NOT place your union activities under sur-
veillance by the presence of supervisors at union meet-
ings.
WE WILL NOT discontinue, or threaten you with the
loss of, existing employment benefits because you join
or support the above-named Union or any other union.
WE WILL NOT give you higher wages or other improved
benefits of employment for the purpose of discourag-
ing you from supporting the above-named Union or to
undermine this Union.
WE WILL NOT in any way interfere with, restrain, or
coerce you in exercising the rights guaranteed to you by
the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL rescind rule 4 of our "General Rules Gov-
erning Operations," to the extent that it prohibits you
from leaving the premises during lunch break without
first obtaining permission.
WE WILL rescind rule 22 of our "General Rules Gov-
erning Operations," which prohibits you from congre-
gating or holding group meetings in the parking lot and
requires you to immediately leave the lot.
The National Labor Relations Board found that we
violated the law by discharging Norma Jean Phillips.
WE WILL offer to reinstate Norma Jean Phillips to her
former job or, if that job is not available , to a substan-
tially equal one without loss of seniority or other rights
and WE WILL reimburse her for any loss of earnings she
may have suffered because we discharged her, together
with 6-percent interest.
Dated By
AIRCRAFT PLATING COMPANY,
INC.
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, Federal Building, Room 12100,
11000 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90024,
Telephone 213-824-7351.