AGA Gas, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 17, 1992

307 N.L.R.B. 1327 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

1327
307 NLRB No. 201
AGA GAS
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 We adopt the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to provide the Union with requested
information. We do not find the names, addresses, and dates of hire
of the team drivers presumptively relevant, but agree that the Union
sufficiently established the relevance of the requested information.
We find this case distinguishable from Blue Diamond Co., 295
NLRB 1007 (1989), in which, in our view, the relevance of re-
quested information about nonunit employees was not demonstrated.
Member Devaney agrees with the judge that the Union’s request
for the team drivers’ names, addresses, and hire dates sought infor-
mation relevant to the performance of its representation duties. In
this regard, he notes that the Union’s grievance is based on the as-
sertion that, under the parties’ agreement, the team drivers are unit
employees and that it is undisputed that, at a minimum, Union Busi-
ness Representative Thompson told the Respondent that the team
drivers should be in the Union if they were doing unit work and that
the union-security clause of the parties’ agreement, on which the
grievance is based, provides that unit employees shall be members
of the Union and that the term ‘‘employee’’ includes, in relevant
part, truckdrivers. Core information, such as the data sought here, is
presumptively relevant as to unit employees. Colonna’s Shipyard,
293 NLRB 136, 141 (1989). Moreover, even if the team drivers are
not unit employees, albeit employed by the same employer, Member
Devaney agrees that the Union has demonstrated that the requested
information concerning them is actually relevant to the grievance.
We agree with the judge that Thompson provided the Respondent
an adequate explanation of the Union’s need for the requested infor-
mation and also that the Union’s reasons for requesting the informa-
tion were self-evident. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to pass on
the judge’s discussion of Washington Star Co., 273 NLRB 391
(1984).
We further agree with the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent
is obligated to provide the Union with the requested names of cus-
tomers serviced by the team drivers from the Canton facility. First,
the Union established the relevance of the names it requested. It
sought the identities of only those customers with a direct relation
to the grievance. As to the Respondent’s present confidentiality
claim, we find, as did the judge, that the Respondent’s evidence as
to its reasons for withholding the information failed to establish that
it had a significant interest in keeping such information confidential.
The Respondent did not request that Thompson keep the customers’
names confidential, much less seek to bargain over conditions on
disclosure or alternatives to disclosure.
AGA Gas, Inc. and Oil, Chemcial and Atomic
Workers International Union, Local 7–450.
Case 8–CA–23030
July 17, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On May 14, 1991, Administrative Law Judge Mi-
chael O. Miller issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings,1 findings, and con-
clusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, AGA Gas, Inc., Canton,
Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order.
Victoria Belfialio, Esq. and Mark Carissimi, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
T. Merritt Bumpass, Jr., Esq. (Thompson, Hine and Flory),
of Cleveland, Ohio, for the Respondent.
Gary Thompson, International Representative, of Chagrin
Falls, Ohio, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Cleveland, Ohio, on February 5, 1991,
based on a charge filed by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Work-
ers International Union, Local 7-450 (OCAW or the Union),
on September 11, 1990 and a complaint issued by the Re-
gional Director of Region 8 of the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board), on October 26, 1990, as amended at hear-
ing. The complaint alleges that AGA Gas. Inc. (AGA, Re-
spondent, or the Employer) failed and refused to bargain in
good faith with the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), by refus-
ing to furnish information requested by the Union which was
necessary for, and relevant to, the Union’s functioning as
collective-bargaining representative of Respondent’s employ-
ees. The Respondent’s timely filed answer denies the com-
mission of any unfair labor practices.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs
filed by Respondent and the General Counsel, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Employer, an Ohio corporation with an office and
place of business in Canton, Ohio (the terminal), is engaged
in the manufacture, storage, sale, and delivery of liquid
gases. In the course and conduct of its business, it annually
sells and ships products, goods, and materials from that loca-
tion directly to points located outside the State of Ohio
which are valued in excess of $50,000. The Employer admits
and I find and conclude that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
1328 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The contract, between the Union and AGA at its Canton, Ohio
terminal, effective July 1, 1989, through June 30, 1992, defines the
bargaining unit as ‘‘all truck drivers and truck mechanics, but [ex-
cluding] all production, production maintenance, office clerical,
sales, professional employees, guards and supervisors.’’ Art. I, Union
Security, sec. 1. This is a unit appropriate for collective bargaining
within the meaning of Sec. 9(b) of the Act.
2 All dates hereinafter are 1990 unless otherwise specified.
3 The contract does not include any express subcontracting provi-
sion; it includes the following management-rights clause:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in the Agreement,
the Company is entitled to all rights, privileges, and prerogatives
of management, which shall include, but in no way be limited
to, the right to determine production methods and processes, the
right to determine the size, duties and hours of the work force,
the right to direct the work force, the right to allocate and assign
work to employees, to select, hire, classify, assign, promote,
transfer, to discipline, demote or discharge for just cause.
Art. VIII permits the Company to employ casual employees in a
ratio of 1 to 10 regular employees and provides that they will be-
come regular employees if employed for 6 months wherein they
have worked at least 1000 hours.
4 It is also consistent with his filing of a grievance, discussed infra,
alleging a violation of the union-security clause, and with his expla-
nation that the Union always asks for and receives the names, ad-
dresses, phone numbers, and dates of hire of new employees ‘‘for
seniority purposes and such.’’
The complaint alleges, the parties admit, and I find and
conclude that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Respondent has terminals, for the storage and delivery of
its liquid gases, in five cities: Canton and Dayton, Ohio, Par-
kersburg, West Virginia, Kalamazoo, Michigan, and
Waukesha, Wisconsin. OCAW has represented the drivers at
the Canton terminal since about 1982; there are about 17–
18 drivers in that unit at the present time.1 It also represents
drivers at one or more of the other terminals. The drivers at
the Parkersburg terminal are represented by a local of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Prior to January 1990,2 the Union had been aware that
AGA occasionally used subcontractors to deliver its product
from the Canton terminal during peak periods, when unit
drivers were working as many hours as they could handle.
No grievances were filed over such assignments because
Gary Thompson, the OCAW International representative re-
sponsible for this unit, did not believe that the collective-bar-
gaining agreement prohibited such practices.3 Daniel Pais,
Respondent’s employee relations supervisor, testified that
AGA had occasionally sent non-OCAW drivers from other
terminals to pick up and deliver product from Canton ter-
minal; Thompson credibly denied knowledge of any such
practice.
In January, the Employer instituted a team driver system,
utilizing four or five two-man teams, driving sleeper-
equipped tractors, to pick up and deliver product out of all
the terminals, including Canton. The teams are employed at
the Parkersburg terminal, allegedly because of tax advantages
granted by the State of West Virginia. These employees are
covered by the Teamsters contract at that location.
Thompson learned that AGA-employed drivers from out-
side the Canton unit were picking up product at that terminal
in early 1990 and, on February 19, requested a meeting to
discuss the matter. He asserted his understanding regarding
the existence of these outside drivers and stated that ‘‘Since
OCAW represents the drivers at your Canton terminal, we
naturally believe that all such work should be performed by
members of our union.’’
Thompson met with Pais and Terminal Manager Jack Tay-
lor on March 28. In the course of the meeting (and subse-
quently), Pais acknowledged the use of these team drivers to
make pickups in Canton, delivering product to customers
otherwise served by the Canton drivers, and explained why
they had been hired in Parkersburg (the tax concessions).
The Union proposed that AGA not use team drivers to make
deliveries within a 150-mile radius of Canton and not have
team drivers load at Canton whenever Canton drivers were
on layoff.
In the meeting and in a followup letter of the same date,
Thompson asserted the Union’s belief ‘‘that the use of non-
bargaining unit employees to perform bargaining unit work
is a clear violation of our Labor Agreement’’ and he re-
quested the following information:
1. The name, address and date of hire for each of the
non-bargaining unit employees who are employed as
‘‘Team Drivers’’ and who performed bargaining unit
work out of the Canton facility.
2. The name of each customer that has been serviced by
these ‘‘Team Drivers’’ from the Canton facility.
3. The daily hours worked for each bargaining unit em-
ployee at the Canton facility for the first three months
of 1990 and for the first three months of 1989.
Thompson acknowledged telling Pais that these drivers
should belong to ‘‘our’’ local if they were going to perform
‘‘our’’ work. Pais testified that the only reason Thompson
gave for requesting the information was so that he could sign
these drivers up for the OCAW unit. Thompson had no
recollection of making such a statement. I find that he prob-
ably did, or at least that such was a reasonable interpretation
of his claim that they should belong to the OCAW local.4
According to Thompson, he asked for the information re-
garding the drivers in order to process any grievance the
Union might decide to file. The Union, he said, needed the
names and additional information regarding the team drivers
to determine who they were, how many had been hired,
where they had been hired, what conditions they had been
hired under, what they were told when hired, whether they
were covered under the Teamsters’ contract, and the nature
and frequency of the deliveries they made out of the Canton
terminal. He requested the names of the customers serviced
by the team drivers to determine whether there had been a
significant impact on the unit members. He understood that
there had been days when unit drivers had been told to report
late or not at all when the team drivers were servicing their
customers and wanted to determine whether the unit was los-
ing existing work or work involving new customers.
Thompson claims that he stated the reasons for his re-
quests in the March 28 meeting; Pais denied that he did so.
To the extent that it is relevant, I credit Thompson. I find
him to be a credible witness and deem it highly unlikely that
1329AGA GAS
the reasons would not have been stated. Moreover, given that
Thompson proposed solutions to the matter in the March 28
meeting and also alluded to the possibility that a grievance
would be filed, I deem the rationale for the requests to be
essentially self-evident. I also note the reference in Pais’ let-
ter of April 12, discussed infra, concerning ‘‘information
[Thompson] indicated [he needed] to understand how team
operations impact Canton drivers.’’
On April 5, the Union filed a grievance alleging that the
Company’s use of nonbargaining unit employees (the team
drivers) to perform bargaining unit work violated article I of
their agreement (the union-security clause, including the unit
description.) On April 11, Taylor responded, denying that the
use of team drivers violated the agreement. He wrote:
The management of AGA Gas, Inc. reserves the right
to determine the size, duties and hours of the work
force, the right to direct the work force and the right
to allocate and assign work to employees as stated in
Article II of the labor agreement.
On April 12, Pais responded to the request for information.
Without specifically addressing the request for information
about the team drivers, he refused to provide ‘‘customer lists
for competitive reasons.’’ However, he offered to provide the
teams’ trip reports which would ‘‘contain the information
you’ve indicated you need to understand how team oper-
ations impact Canton drivers.’’ The information regarding the
hours worked by the Canton drivers in the first 3 months of
1989 and 1990 was furnished. Pais pointed out that there had
been no layoffs at Canton due to the team operations and
that the drivers had worked and earned more in 1990 and
than they had in 1989.
The solutions which Thompson had proposed on March 28
were rejected. Management indicated that, while they in-
tended to use the team drivers for longer runs, they wanted
the flexibility to use them for shorter runs when necessary.
Pais denied that there were any plans to lay Canton drivers
off, assured Thompson that it would bargain, as required,
over any permanent layoffs, stated that the use of contract
haulers had been largely eliminated because of the team driv-
ers, and asserted that there were no plans to increase the
team operations above their present levels.
Subsequent to issuing this letter, Pais was instructed by
higher management not to release the team drivers’ trip re-
ports. To do so would involve disclosing the names of cus-
tomers, which management considered to be proprietary in-
formation.
A third-step meeting was held on May 14. The Union’s
request for information was repeated and was again rejected.
According to Pais, the Company offered to provide the
Union with a list of the cities to which the team drivers had
made deliveries, the number of such deliveries and the miles
involved. Thompson, who denied that this offer was made at
that time, testified that this information would not have been
sufficient for the Union to determine the seriousness of its
grievance and the extent of income lost to its members. Driv-
ers, he testified, know the names of their regular customers
and the frequency with which they got deliveries and, if
given the names of customers to whom the team drivers
made deliveries, would have a better idea of the number of
trips they had lost.
According to Respondent, the request for the names of the
customers to whom the team drivers made deliveries was re-
fused because its customer list is proprietary information
which they keep confidential. Pais alluded to a fear that, if
competitors knew the names of its customers, it would be
able to deduce the technology it used in servicing those cus-
tomers. Additionally, he claimed, the customers would lose
a competitive edge if their competition knew they were buy-
ing gases from AGA. He acknowledged that the drivers, who
know who their customers are, are not required to sign
pledges of confidentiality. Respondent did not ask the Union
to sign any such pledge as a condition of furnishing the in-
formation.
The request for information regarding the team drivers was
denied, Pais testified, because it is deemed confidential infor-
mation not to be released without a good reason, not present
here. He justified the refusal on management’s right to make
such assignments and on a belief that the team drivers would
be harassed if their names and addresses were released.
However, he refused to support his claim of potential harass-
ment, notwithstanding an order that he disclose the source of
that contention, and his claim is entitled to no weight.
Thompson knows who the Teamsters representative is in
Parkersburg; he has not called that Union for information re-
garding the team drivers.
There have been no layoffs of Canton-based drivers since
the team driver program was instituted.
B. Discussion
In Washington Gas Light Co., 273 NLRB 116 (1984), the
Board stated:
It has long been held that an employer has an obliga-
tion to provide a union with information which is rea-
sonably necessary for the union’s performance of its
representative duties, including the processing of griev-
ances. [Citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co. 351 U.S. 149
(1956); Doubarn Sheet Metal, 243 NLRB 821 (1979).]
The test for the union’s need for the information is
whether the information sought is probably or poten-
tially relevant to the execution of those statutory duties.
[Citing NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967).]
‘‘The appropriate standard in determining the potential rel-
evance of information sought . . . is a liberal discovery type
standard.’’ Westinghouse Electric Corp., 239 NLRB 106, 107
(1978); Blue Diamond Co., 295 NLRB 1007 (1989).
Grievance processing includes the determination whether
or not the union should file or pursue a grievance. Doubarn
Sheet Metal, supra; A. O. Smith Corp., 223 NLRB 838
(1976).
Applying the appropriate standard to the facts as set forth,
I am convinced that the information requested by the Union
is reasonably necessary and potentially relevant to the proc-
essing of the Union’s grievance.
Thus, immediately on learning of the use of the team driv-
ers, the Union filed a grievance contending that those drivers
were doing the work of the unit employees. It sought to de-
termine exactly what work was being done by the team driv-
ers, including what customers were being served by them
and how frequently that service was taking place. From the
1330 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 While I believe that the reasons for requesting such information
are obvious, it is sufficient that Thompson explained them at hear-
ing. Washington Star Co., 273 NLRB 391 (1984). These employees,
moreover, are legitimate sources of the information which the Union
sought. Blue Diamond Co., supra.
6 Assuming, arguendo, that the Union desired the information in
order to solicit the team drivers for membership, I would reach no
contrary result. Under the union-security clause, the Union had a
colorable argument that it should represent these drivers. Even if it
did not, however, the Union’s request for information for a proper
and legitimate purpose would not be negated by the existence of an
additional reason for the request or the possibility that the Union
would put the information to other uses. Blue Diamond Co., supra;
Associated General Contractors, 292 NLRB 891, 894 (1979).
team drivers, whose names and addresses it requested, the
Union could learn, as Thompson testified, who they were,
how many had been hired, where they had been hired, what
conditions they had been hired under, what they were told
when hired, whether they were covered under the Teamsters’
contract, and the nature and frequency of the deliveries they
made out of the Canton terminal.5 The Union also requested
the names of the customers serviced by the team drivers to
determine whether there had been a significant impact on the
unit members.
All of this information is relevant to a determination of
whether the Employer’s actions violated the collective-bar-
gaining agreement; it is particularly relevant to the Employ-
er’s contention that, absent harm to the unit employees, there
was no contract violation and therefore no duty to bargain.
See Western Massachusetts Electric Co., 228 NLRB 607,
623 (1977). Having this information and investigating the
grievance by questioning these drivers would enable the
Union to determine whether it had a viable grievance, wheth-
er it wanted to pursue such a grievance, even if meritorious,
in light of the purported union representation of those driv-
ers, and whether the impact of the team drivers on unit work
warranted the expenditure of time, money, and energy re-
quired by such a grievance. Depending on the results of that
investigation, the Union might be better prepared to litigate
the grievance or encouraged to drop it.6
The Respondent implies that the information sought by the
Union is unnecessary inasmuch as it has conceded that team
drivers are delivering to customers serviced by unit members
and has shown that the unit drivers are doing at least as well
now as they did in the same quarter a year ago, before the
advent of the team drivers. This information is simply inad-
equate, in and of itself, for the Union either to make an ade-
quate presentation before an arbitrator or to decide to drop
its grievance. The Union is entitled to know whether, in fact,
the unit employees have lost earnings, actual or potential,
and/or whether the team drivers should become members of
its unit. It is entitled to know the extent to which others are
doing unit work and to be able to present such details to an
arbitrator.
The Respondent further contends that its management-
rights clause gives it the right to assign bargaining unit work
to persons outside that unit, negating both its obligation to
bargain and to furnish information regarding such assign-
ments. It cites Litton Systems v. NLRB, 868 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1989), and Acme Markets, 277 NLRB 1656 (1986).
These cases are inapposite. In Litton, where the issue was
the employer’s obligation to furnish information and bargain
over the relocation of work resulting in layoffs, the manage-
ment-rights clause expressly reserved to management the
right to transfer work, determine production methods and the
size of the work force, and lay off workers. Additionally,
there was a clear practice, not objected to by the union, of
transferring production work to other locations. Similarly, in
Acme, the union had expressly agreed that the employer had
the right ‘‘to determine whether and to what extent the work
required in its business shall be performed by employees
covered by the Agreement.’’
No such management-rights clause exists here. The clause,
while permitting the Employer to determine the size of the
work force and to assign work, does not expressly permit the
assignment of work to nonunit personnel. Indeed, it is argu-
able that the management-rights clause, which begins ‘‘Ex-
cept as otherwise specifically provided in the Agreement,’’
restricts management’s power to assign unit work only to
unit employees by the union-security clause, which defines
employees as truckdrivers required to join the Union, and by
the limitations on casual and part-time workers set forth in
the seniority clauses.
Similarly, there is no Litton-like practice of transferring
work here. The Union’s toleration of occasional subcon-
tracting in peak periods, and its conclusion that it could not
win a grievance over such subcontracting, cannot be con-
strued ag the requisite ‘‘clear and unitakable’’ waiver or
‘‘conscious relinquishment’’ of its statutory right to bargain
over an entirely different type of work reassignment. WCCO
Radio, 844 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 109 S.Ct.
72; Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310
(8th Cir. 1979); Globe-Union, 233 NLRB 1458 (1977).
As stated in the factual exposition, Respondent has con-
tended that both the names of its customers and the names
and addresses of the team drivers are confidential informa-
tion, to which the Union is not entitled. With regard to such
contentions, the Board, in Washington Gas, supra, stated:
The Supreme Court held in Detroit Edison [440 U.S.
301 (1979)] . . . that a union’s interest in arguably rel-
evant information does not always predominate over
other interests. Rather, the Court indicated that deter-
mining the employer’s duty to supply such information
when it is assertedly confidential requires a balancing
of the union’s need for the information against the le-
gitimate and substantial confidentiality interests of the
employer. The party asserting a claim of confidentiality
has the burden of proof. [Citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 224 NLRB 881, 890 (1976]).
In this case, I must find that Respondent has failed to sus-
tain its burden of establishing substantial confidentiality in-
terests in either the employees’ names and addresses or the
names of those customers to whom the team drivers made
deliveries.
Other than asserting an unsupported concern that the
Union might harass the team drivers and an alleged practice
of not disclosing information about its employees without
good cause, Respondent has not justified its claim of con-
fidentiality concerning the team drivers names and addresses.
As noted, the Union has established the potential relevance
of this information, which is information of a type normally
furnished to the collective-bargaining representative. See, for
1331AGA GAS
7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
example, Blue Diamond Co., supra; WCCO Radio, supra,
Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 NLRB 2097 (1954),
enfd. 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955). The latter two cases deal
with employee earnings, in which the employees might have
a greater expectation of confidentiality.
Similarly, I cannot find that the purported reasons for
withholding the names of the customers serviced by the team
drivers sufficient to justify withholding them. The names of
the customers whom they had serviced is known to the unit
employees; those employees are under no legal constraints to
hold such information secret. Competitors of either the Re-
spondent or Respondent’s customers could, if they go de-
sired, obtain that information from those employees. ‘‘Infor-
mation which may be so freely disclosed at the whim of any
employee possessing it is not a trade secret.’’ WCCO, supra,
844 F.2d at 516, 282 NLRB at 1206. Moreover, there is no
more reason to fear that the Union would disclose such infor-
mation to either Respondent’s competitors or the competitors
of its customers than there is to fear such disclosures by the
employees.
Similarly, it is difficult to accept that there is a legitimate
concern among Respondent’s customers that their competi-
tors not learn their source of liquid gases. That AGA was
that source would be readily discernible to any competitor
who took the time to observe deliveries. Presumably, Re-
spondent does not disguise its trucks or sneak them in at odd
hours to prevent such observations and its customers do not
ask them to do so.
Finally, while Respondent refers repeatedly to the con-
fidentiality of its ‘‘customer lists,’’ the Union’s demand was
more narrow. It sought only the names of those customers
served by the team drivers out of the Canton terminal, infor-
mation clearly relevant to its contention that the team drivers
were performing unit work. The Union’s demand is narrowly
drawn so as to provide it with the information it needs with-
out unduly compromising the alleged confidentiality concerns
of either Respondent or Respondent’s customers.
In sum, I find that Respondent has failed and refused to
bargain in good faith with the Union by failing to furnish the
Union with the information requested in items 1 and 2 of its
letter of March 28, 1990.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By failing and refusing to timely furnish the Union with
the records and information which it requested, which infor-
mation is relevant and necessary to the performance of the
Union’s duties as the statutory bargaining representative of
Respondent’s employees in an appropriate collective-bargain-
ing unit, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
2. The unfair labor practice set forth in paragraph 1 above
affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) as set forth above, I recommend that it be required to
cease and desist from such conduct or related conduct. Af-
firmatively, in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, I
recommend that Respondent be required to furnish the Union
with the information it requested in items 1 and 2 of its
March 28, 1990 letter to Respondent. I also recommend that
Respondent be required to post an appropriate notice to em-
ployees.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended7
ORDER
The Respondent, AGA Gas, Inc., Canton, Ohio, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to timely furnish Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 7-950, as the
exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate
unit, the information requested by the Union in items 1 and
2 of its letter of March 28, 1990, which information is rea-
sonably necessary for the Union’s performance of its rep-
resentative duties.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed the by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Inter-
national Union, Local 7-450, as the exclusive representative
of all employees in the appropriate unit, the information re-
quested by the Union in items 1 and 2 of its letter of March
28, 1990, which information is reasonably necessary for the
Union’s performance of its representative duties.
(b) Post at its terminal in Canton, Ohio copies of the at-
tached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’8 Copies of the notice, on
form provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notice are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relation Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
1332 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively and in good
faith with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, Local 7-450 as the exclusive representative of our
employees in the appropriate unit by failing and refusing to
furnish it with requested information which is relevant and
necessary to the performance of its duties as collective-bar-
gaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 7-450, as the exclusive representa-
tive of all employees in the appropriate unit, the information
requested by the Union in items 1 and 2 of its letter of
March 28, 1990.
AGA GAS, INC.