ADOBE INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 8, 20212020001224 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 8, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/871,707 09/30/2015 DAMIEN ANTIPA P5452-US/235168 4157 121363 7590 06/08/2021 Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. (Adobe Inc.) Intellectual Property Department 2555 Grand Blvd Kansas City, MO 64108 EXAMINER MERCADO VARGAS, ARIEL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2176 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/08/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): seaton@shb.com shbdocketing@shb.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DAMIEN ANTIPA, ANTONIO SANSO, and GABRIEL WALT _____________ Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1–20. Appeal Br. 1. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We Affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Adobe, Inc. See Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 Introduction Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates generally to “generating adaptive grid layouts, for example, for webpages or application pages (i.e., content pages),” in which “a content page with a grid layout can adapt its presentation, including various properties of its grid layout, for various displaying devices having different characteristics.” Spec., Abst. A content page is “presented to users with a suitable layout even while presented via various display devices,” and “breakpoints are used to delineate different screen sizes or ranges of screen sizes.” Id. “The grid layout can be rendered differently in association with different breakpoints.” Id. Representative Independent Claim 15 15. A computer-implemented method, comprising: receiving, from a requesting device, a request to modify a grid layout in a content page; parsing, from the request, an intended modification of the grid layout corresponding with a breakpoint, the breakpoint representing a plurality of display settings; and updating a resource node with the intended modification under the breakpoint, wherein the resource node is a data structure having information of a specific count of columns to be used by a component on the grid layout under the breakpoint. Appeal Br. 33–34, Claims App. (disputed limitations emphasized). 2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed Sept. 24, 2018 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed June 18, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed Oct. 2, 2019 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief, filed Dec. 2, 2019 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 3 Prior Art Evidence The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence: Name Reference Date Marseille US 2014/0372874 A1 Dec. 18, 2014 Hale et al. US 2015/0020010 A1 Jan. 15, 2015 Ambrose et al. US 8,996,150 B1 Mar. 31, 2015 Rejections A. Claims 1, 3–10, 12–17, 19, and 20 are rejected as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Marseille and Hale. Final Act. 3–23. B. Claims 2, 11, and 18 are rejected as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Marseille, Hale, and Ambrose. Id. at 23–26. ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. In our analysis below, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis. Rejection A of Independent Claim 15 under § 103 Issues: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, we focus our analysis on the following argued limitations that we find are dispositive regarding Rejection A of claim 15. Did the Examiner err by finding that the cited references teach or suggest the disputed receiving, parsing, and updating limitations: receiving, from a requesting device, a request to modify a grid layout in a content page; Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 4 parsing, from the request, an intended modification of the grid layout corresponding with a breakpoint, the breakpoint representing a plurality of display settings; and updating a resource node with the intended modification under the breakpoint, wherein the resource node is a data structure having information of a specific count of columns to be used by a component on the grid layout under the breakpoint[,] within the meaning of representative claim 15?3 See Final Act. 14–18 (emphasis added). Appellant contends Marseille does not teach the “parsing” limitation. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant specifically argues, “Not only is Marseille void of any discussion of parsing, but there is certainly no teaching or suggestion of parsing, from a request, an intended modification of the grid layout corresponding with a breakpoint.” Appeal Br. 13. Appellant notes that “varying numbers of columns in Marseille [are] related to rendering data;” however, Appellant urges that “[i]n contrast, parsing, from a request, an intended modification of the grid layout, as in claim 15, is related to editing the grid layout.” Appeal Br. 12. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. We find a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s underlying factual findings. We find Marseille’s description of a user requesting content using different devices and/or orientation of the device teaches or at least suggests that the system is parsing the request. See, e.g., Marseille ¶ 65. We further find Marseille’s method for allocating content based upon the size of the 3 Throughout this opinion, we give the contested claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 5 screen width and size of the content teaches or suggests parsing the request to provide the appropriate layout. See Marseille ¶¶ 65, 77–79, 100–103; Ans. 28–30. Appellant further contends that Marseille “fails to teach or suggest ‘updating a resource node with the intended modification under the breakpoint, wherein the resource node is a data structure having information of a specific count of columns to be used by a component on the grid layout under the breakpoint,’ as recited in claim 15.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant also argues that Hale fails to teach or suggest “updating a resource node with the intended modification under the breakpoint or a special data structure having information of a specific count of columns to be used by a component on the grid layout under the breakpoint.” Appeal Br. 16. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because we find Hale’s breakpoint display widths, which Hale’s computing device refers to in determining how many columns to use, given a particular display width, in addition to the specific breakpoint examples provided by Hale, teach or at least suggest the disputed limitation. See Hale ¶ 111. Appellant also argues: “Marseille does not discuss a requesting device for sending any requests to modify a grid layout, or a receiving device for receiving any such requests to modify the grid layout as claimed. Instead, Marseille is directed to rendering content.” Appeal Br. 17. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because we find Marseille’s tool 710, which receives a specification for a data set including content such as widths and heights of groups and sub-groups, teaches modifying and adjusting the number of grid columns, and at least suggests Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 6 the disputed “receiving” limitation. See Marseille ¶¶ 78, 97–98, Figs. 12a– 12b; Ans. 35–36. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because we are of the view that receiving a request to modify a grid layout, and parsing from the request an intended modification of the grid layout and updating the resource node with the intended modification as claimed would have merely been a “predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).4 We conclude the claim is broader (under BRI) than the interpretation imputed by Appellant’s argument, given that the Specification does not contain limiting definitions for the disputed claim terms and Appellant has not pointed to any such definitions. We emphasize that, because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We also emphasize that “the question under 35 USC 103 is not merely what the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.” Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)) (emphasis added). See also MPEP § 2123. 4 “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 7 Therefore, on this record, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding Rejection A of independent claim 15. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A of independent claim 15. Rejection A of Dependent Claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 Regarding dependent claims 16, 17, 19, and 20, Appellant contends that the recited parsing, updating, and other argued limitations are not taught or suggested by the cited references. See Appeal Br. 18–20. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument and agree with the Examiner because we find these arguments to be unsupported attorney arguments that do not specifically address the Examiner’s findings. It is well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is not evidence). Thus, counsel’s arguments cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-40 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2145 (I) (“Attorney argument is not evidence unless it is an admission, in which case, an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection.”) (MPEP Ninth Edition, Rev. 10.2019, Last Revised June 2020). Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness for Rejection A of dependent claims 16, 17, 19, and 20, and we sustain the rejection. Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 8 Rejection A of Independent Claim 1 Independent claim 1 recites: 1. A computer-implemented method, comprising: receiving, from a requesting device, a request for a content page: generating a grid layout for hosting at least one component of the content page, the grid layout having a first number of columns associated with a plurality of breakpoints; determining a display property of the requesting device being within a range of display properties specified in one of the plurality of breakpoints; allocating a specific count of the first number of columns to the at least one component within the grid layout based on the display property being within the range of display properties specified in the one of the plurality of breakpoints; and providing the content page with the grid layout and the at least one component to the requesting device. Appellant argues the “allocating” limitation is not taught by Marseille. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant contends “Marseille is not concerned with the issue of allocating a specific count of columns from a fixed total number of columns.” Appeal Br. 22. Appellant further argues “Marseille has no discussion of ‘a first number of columns associated with a plurality of breakpoints.’” Appeal Br. 25. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because we find Marseille’s “one group columns for a first range of screen widths” and “two group columns” for a “second range of screen widths” teach or at least suggest “allocating a specific count of the first number of columns to the at least one component within the grid layout based on the display property Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 9 being within the range of display properties specified in the one of the plurality of breakpoints,” as recited in claim 1. See Marseille ¶ 86; see also id. ¶¶ 87–90. Therefore, on this record, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding Rejection A of independent claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejection A of claim 1. We also sustain Rejection A of independent claim 9, because Appellant’s summary arguments are similar to those advanced and addressed above regarding independent claims 15 and 1. See Appeal Br. 27–28. Remaining Dependent Claims We sustain the following remaining dependent claims for essentially the same reasons as explained by the Examiner, which we agree with and adopt.5 See Ans. 50–60. We sustain Rejection A of dependent claims 3–8, which each depend directly from independent claim 1, and we sustain Rejection A of dependent claims 10 and 12–14, which each depend directly from independent claim 9. We also sustain Rejection B of dependent claims 2, 11, and 18, for essentially the same reasons explained by the Examiner. See Ans. 56–60. 5 See Icon Health and Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“As an initial matter, the PTAB was authorized to incorporate the Examiner’s findings.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the PTAB’s findings, although it “did not expressly make any independent factual determinations or legal conclusions,” because it had expressly adopted the examiner’s findings). Appeal 2020-001224 Application 14/871,707 10 CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err with respect to the obviousness rejections of claims 1–20 over the cited prior art of record, and we sustain the rejections. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–10, 12–17, 19, 20 103 Marseille, Hale 1, 3–10, 12–17, 19, 20 2, 11, 18 103 Marseille, Hale, Ambrose 2, 11, 18 Overall Outcome 1–20 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation