ADOBE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 8, 2021

2020001224 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 8, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/871,707 09/30/2015 DAMIEN ANTIPA P5452-US/235168 4157
121363 7590 06/08/2021
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
(Adobe Inc.)
Intellectual Property Department
2555 Grand Blvd
Kansas City, MO 64108
EXAMINER
MERCADO VARGAS, ARIEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2176
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/08/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
seaton@shb.com
shbdocketing@shb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAMIEN ANTIPA, ANTONIO SANSO, and GABRIEL WALT
_____________

Appeal 2020-001224
Application 14/871,707
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–20. Appeal Br. 1. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We Affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is
Adobe, Inc. See Appeal Br. 3.
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Application 14/871,707

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
Introduction
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates generally to “generating
adaptive grid layouts, for example, for webpages or application pages (i.e.,
content pages),” in which “a content page with a grid layout can adapt its
presentation, including various properties of its grid layout, for various
displaying devices having different characteristics.” Spec., Abst. A content
page is “presented to users with a suitable layout even while presented via
various display devices,” and “breakpoints are used to delineate different
screen sizes or ranges of screen sizes.” Id. “The grid layout can be rendered
differently in association with different breakpoints.” Id.

Representative Independent Claim 15
15. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
receiving, from a requesting device, a request to modify a grid
layout in a content page;
parsing, from the request, an intended modification of the grid
layout corresponding with a breakpoint, the breakpoint
representing a plurality of display settings; and
updating a resource node with the intended modification under
the breakpoint, wherein the resource node is a data structure
having information of a specific count of columns to be used by
a component on the grid layout under the breakpoint.
Appeal Br. 33–34, Claims App. (disputed limitations emphasized).

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed Sept. 24, 2018 (“Final
Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed June 18, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s
Answer, mailed Oct. 2, 2019 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief, filed Dec. 2,
2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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Application 14/871,707

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Prior Art Evidence
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence:
Name Reference Date
Marseille US 2014/0372874 A1 Dec. 18, 2014
Hale et al. US 2015/0020010 A1 Jan. 15, 2015
Ambrose et al. US 8,996,150 B1 Mar. 31, 2015

Rejections
A. Claims 1, 3–10, 12–17, 19, and 20 are rejected as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Marseille and Hale. Final Act. 3–23.
B. Claims 2, 11, and 18 are rejected as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 over Marseille, Hale, and Ambrose. Id. at 23–26.

ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. In our analysis below, we highlight and address specific findings
and arguments for emphasis.

Rejection A of Independent Claim 15 under § 103
Issues: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, we focus our analysis on the
following argued limitations that we find are dispositive regarding Rejection
A of claim 15.
Did the Examiner err by finding that the cited references teach or
suggest the disputed receiving, parsing, and updating limitations:
receiving, from a requesting device, a request to modify a grid
layout in a content page;
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parsing, from the request, an intended modification of the grid
layout corresponding with a breakpoint, the breakpoint
representing a plurality of display settings; and
updating a resource node with the intended modification
under the breakpoint, wherein the resource node is a data
structure having information of a specific count of columns to
be used by a component on the grid layout under the
breakpoint[,]
within the meaning of representative claim 15?3 See Final Act. 14–18
(emphasis added).
Appellant contends Marseille does not teach the “parsing” limitation.
Appeal Br. 12. Appellant specifically argues, “Not only is Marseille void of
any discussion of parsing, but there is certainly no teaching or suggestion of
parsing, from a request, an intended modification of the grid layout
corresponding with a breakpoint.” Appeal Br. 13. Appellant notes that
“varying numbers of columns in Marseille [are] related to rendering data;”
however, Appellant urges that “[i]n contrast, parsing, from a request, an
intended modification of the grid layout, as in claim 15, is related to editing
the grid layout.” Appeal Br. 12.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. We find a
preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s underlying factual
findings. We find Marseille’s description of a user requesting content using
different devices and/or orientation of the device teaches or at least suggests
that the system is parsing the request. See, e.g., Marseille ¶ 65. We further
find Marseille’s method for allocating content based upon the size of the

3 Throughout this opinion, we give the contested claim limitations the
broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification.
See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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screen width and size of the content teaches or suggests parsing the request
to provide the appropriate layout. See Marseille ¶¶ 65, 77–79, 100–103;
Ans. 28–30.
Appellant further contends that Marseille “fails to teach or suggest
‘updating a resource node with the intended modification under the
breakpoint, wherein the resource node is a data structure having information
of a specific count of columns to be used by a component on the grid layout
under the breakpoint,’ as recited in claim 15.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant
also argues that Hale fails to teach or suggest “updating a resource node with
the intended modification under the breakpoint or a special data structure
having information of a specific count of columns to be used by a
component on the grid layout under the breakpoint.” Appeal Br. 16.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because we find
Hale’s breakpoint display widths, which Hale’s computing device refers to
in determining how many columns to use, given a particular display width,
in addition to the specific breakpoint examples provided by Hale, teach or at
least suggest the disputed limitation. See Hale ¶ 111.
Appellant also argues: “Marseille does not discuss a requesting device
for sending any requests to modify a grid layout, or a receiving device for
receiving any such requests to modify the grid layout as claimed. Instead,
Marseille is directed to rendering content.” Appeal Br. 17.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because we find
Marseille’s tool 710, which receives a specification for a data set including
content such as widths and heights of groups and sub-groups, teaches
modifying and adjusting the number of grid columns, and at least suggests
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the disputed “receiving” limitation. See Marseille ¶¶ 78, 97–98, Figs. 12a–
12b; Ans. 35–36.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because we are of the
view that receiving a request to modify a grid layout, and parsing from the
request an intended modification of the grid layout and updating the resource
node with the intended modification as claimed would have merely been a
“predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).4
We conclude the claim is broader (under BRI) than the interpretation
imputed by Appellant’s argument, given that the Specification does not
contain limiting definitions for the disputed claim terms and Appellant has
not pointed to any such definitions. We emphasize that, because “applicants
may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during
prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” In re ICON
Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
We also emphasize that “the question under 35 USC 103 is not merely
what the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to
one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.” Merck
& Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In
re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)) (emphasis added). See also
MPEP § 2123.

4 “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a
predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417.
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Therefore, on this record, and based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying
factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding
Rejection A of independent claim 15.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A of independent
claim 15.
Rejection A of Dependent Claims 16, 17, 19, and 20
Regarding dependent claims 16, 17, 19, and 20, Appellant contends
that the recited parsing, updating, and other argued limitations are not taught
or suggested by the cited references. See Appeal Br. 18–20.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument and agree with the
Examiner because we find these arguments to be unsupported attorney
arguments that do not specifically address the Examiner’s findings. It is
well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements, which
are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little probative value. In
re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Pearson,
494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is not evidence).
Thus, counsel’s arguments cannot take the place of factually supported
objective evidence. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-40 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2145 (I)
(“Attorney argument is not evidence unless it is an admission, in which case,
an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection.”) (MPEP Ninth
Edition, Rev. 10.2019, Last Revised June 2020).
Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded of error regarding the
Examiner’s ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness for Rejection A of
dependent claims 16, 17, 19, and 20, and we sustain the rejection.
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Rejection A of Independent Claim 1
Independent claim 1 recites:
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
receiving, from a requesting device, a request for a
content page:
generating a grid layout for hosting at least one
component of the content page, the grid layout having a first
number of columns associated with a plurality of breakpoints;
determining a display property of the requesting device
being within a range of display properties specified in one of
the plurality of breakpoints;
allocating a specific count of the first number of columns
to the at least one component within the grid layout based on
the display property being within the range of display properties
specified in the one of the plurality of breakpoints; and
providing the content page with the grid layout and the at
least one component to the requesting device.
Appellant argues the “allocating” limitation is not taught by Marseille.
Appeal Br. 21. Appellant contends “Marseille is not concerned with the
issue of allocating a specific count of columns from a fixed total number of
columns.” Appeal Br. 22. Appellant further argues “Marseille has no
discussion of ‘a first number of columns associated with a plurality of
breakpoints.’” Appeal Br. 25.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because we find
Marseille’s “one group columns for a first range of screen widths” and “two
group columns” for a “second range of screen widths” teach or at least
suggest “allocating a specific count of the first number of columns to the at
least one component within the grid layout based on the display property
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being within the range of display properties specified in the one of the
plurality of breakpoints,” as recited in claim 1. See Marseille ¶ 86; see also
id. ¶¶ 87–90.
Therefore, on this record, and based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying
factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding
Rejection A of independent claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejection A of
claim 1. We also sustain Rejection A of independent claim 9, because
Appellant’s summary arguments are similar to those advanced and addressed
above regarding independent claims 15 and 1. See Appeal Br. 27–28.
Remaining Dependent Claims
We sustain the following remaining dependent claims for essentially
the same reasons as explained by the Examiner, which we agree with and
adopt.5 See Ans. 50–60. We sustain Rejection A of dependent claims 3–8,
which each depend directly from independent claim 1, and we sustain
Rejection A of dependent claims 10 and 12–14, which each depend directly
from independent claim 9. We also sustain Rejection B of dependent
claims 2, 11, and 18, for essentially the same reasons explained by the
Examiner. See Ans. 56–60.

5 See Icon Health and Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“As an initial matter, the PTAB was authorized to incorporate
the Examiner’s findings.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.13
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the PTAB’s findings, although it “did not
expressly make any independent factual determinations or legal
conclusions,” because it had expressly adopted the examiner’s findings).
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CONCLUSION

The Examiner did not err with respect to the obviousness rejections of
claims 1–20 over the cited prior art of record, and we sustain the rejections.

DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–10,
12–17,
19, 20
103 Marseille, Hale 1, 3–10,
12–17,
19, 20

2, 11, 18 103 Marseille, Hale,
Ambrose
2, 11, 18
Overall
Outcome
1–20
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED