Acklin Stamping Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2010

355 N.L.R.B. 824 (N.L.R.B. 2010)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
355 NLRB No. 160
824
Acklin Stamping Company and Niles Menard

United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, UAW, Local 12
and Niles Menard. Cases 8–CA–36788 and 8–
CB–10622
August 27, 2010
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS SCHAUMBER
AND PEARCE
The central issue in this case, before us again after our
remand to the judge, is whether the Respondent Union
rebutted the presumption that its action in seeking the
discharge of Charging Party Niles Menard was unlaw-
ful.1 Contrary to the judge, we find that it did.
I. MATERIAL FACTS
Menard was hired by Acklin Stamping Company
(Acklin) as an electrician in early February 2006.2 He
had been recruited by a friend, Cheryl Lyons, who
worked in Acklin’s human resources department and
knew Menard from a previous employer. The position
Menard was hired for required journeyman certification
or “eight years of proven experience working as an elec-
trician in a manufacturing environment, along with a
minimum of two years related experience.” When offer-
ing him the position, Lyons requested that Menard sub-
mit a written summary of his electrician experience.
Menard submitted a letter from his previous employer,
dated February 15, giving his dates of employment
(March 10, 1970, through May 9, 2005) and stating that
Menard had “performed electrician jobs” for that em-
ployer. The letter provided no additional work details;

1 On May 4, 2007, Administrative Law Judge Bruce D. Rosenstein
issued his initial decision in this case. On December 28, 2007, the
Board remanded the case to the judge for additional findings. Acklin
Stamping, 351 NLRB 1263 (2007).
On February 15, 2008, the judge issued the attached supplemental
decision. The Union filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel and Acklin Stamping Company filed briefs in opposi-
tion.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision, supplemental decision, and
the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to af-
firm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent
consistent with this Supplemental Decision and Order.
The Union has implicitly excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 All dates hereafter are in 2006 unless stated otherwise.
nor did it state the signatory’s title or contact number.
Menard began working for Acklin on February 20.
About the third week in February, Menard’s letter was
given to union official Linda Straub, as required under
the terms of a 2003 grievance settlement concerning a
new hire who purportedly did not possess the required
qualifications. That settlement established the Union’s
right to “review all new hires for the skilled trade posi-
tions [in order] to check if the applicant has the qualifica-
tions for a journeyman card or has the credentials to ap-
ply for one.”
The Union admitted Menard as a member in March.
Based on past practice, and consistent with the job de-
scription for Menard’s position, Straub reviewed
Menard’s letter and, in April, told Menard that he would
have to provide more specific documentation of his
qualifications. Straub added that, alternatively, Menard
could provide the contact information for the signatory of
the February 15th letter from his former employer.
Menard admittedly agreed but failed to comply in either
respect, even though Straub again reminded him of this
requirement later during his probationary period.3
In early May, Straub showed Menard’s letter to Ack-
lin’s new plant superintendent, Vince Curtis, and to
Daniel Twiss, the Union’s International representative.
Both agreed with Straub that the letter was inadequate to
verify Menard’s electrician experience. Straub and Joel
McVicker (who succeeded Straub as the Union’s unit
chairman) each testified, without contradiction, that dur-
ing Menard’s probationary period a number of employ-
ees complained to them, separately, that Menard was
unqualified and that his performance was creating safety
concerns. They also testified that Menard’s supervisor,
Bob LeBarr, agreed that Menard was not qualified when
they informed him of the complaints they had received.
Several times in May or early June, Straub asked Cur-
tis about the ending date of Menard’s probationary pe-
riod. Although Menard’s probationary period was
scheduled to end on June 20, under the parties’ contract
any overtime Menard worked would cause that period to
end earlier. Each time Straub inquired, Curtis responded
that he needed to check on the actual date.
On June 10, Straub and Curtis met to discuss Menard.
During this meeting, Curtis acknowledged that he did not
believe Menard was qualified to be an electrician, and
added that he believed Menard lacked the skills neces-
sary to work independently in the facility. Curtis sug-

3 Menard admitted at trial that “I kind of forgot; that was my slip-
up.” The judge, on remand, specifically discredited Menard’s testi-
mony that Straub’s then-imminent successor as union chair, Joel
McVicker, told Menard he did not need to provide additional documen-
tation if Acklin did not request it.
ACKLIN STAMPING CO.

825
gested creating a skilled trade position for Menard.
Straub rejected this idea because the collective-
bargaining agreement required that skilled trade positions
be posted, bid, and filled on a seniority basis. She sug-
gested that management instead post an opening for a
lower-skilled production job for which Menard could bid
successfully. Curtis admittedly replied that this was “a
good idea,” but took no further action in this respect.
Straub also again asked Curtis when Menard’s proba-
tionary period would end, but Curtis did not follow up
with her on this either.
Because of the amount of overtime he worked,
Menard’s probation period ended on June 12. That day,
Lyons called Curtis and informed him that Menard had
“gotten his time in.”4 Despite his earlier conversations
with Straub, Curtis informed Menard that he was a per-
manent employee. Two days later, Curtis advised Ack-
lin’s corporate director of human resources, Mark Echler,
that although Menard’s probation period had ended, he
was unqualified. Echler testified that he asked Curtis if
he had performed the customary written evaluations on
Menard during the probation, and Curtis admitted that
“no, we really didn’t.”5 Echler then said “Shame on
you,” and told Curtis that Menard was now a permanent
employee and that Curtis would have to “deal” with the
problem by documenting Menard’s deficiencies in the
future.
Later on June 14, when Straub asked Curtis what was
being done about Menard, Curtis replied that Echler had
overruled him and that Menard was a permanent em-
ployee. Straub immediately informed Twiss of this, and
Twiss called Echler. During this conversation, Twiss
reiterated the Union’s concerns about Menard’s lack of
qualifications and requested that Menard be terminated.
As a result of that conversation, Echler ordered Menard
discharged.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In his initial decision, the judge found that the Union
had violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act by
requesting Menard’s discharge for reasons other than the
failure to pay union dues.
On review, we reversed and remanded. We observed
that when a union causes the discharge of an employee, a
rebuttable presumption that the union has acted unlaw-
fully arises because that conduct “‘demonstrates its
power to affect the employees’ livelihood in so dramatic

4 Curtis testified that he was surprised to learn that Menard’s proba-
tion had ended so early.
5 Curtis, who become plant manager after Menard was hired, admit-
ted at trial that “[a]t that point, I was learning a lot about the plant, it’s a
very complex plant, a lot of things moving in and out, and I wasn’t . . .
as aware of evaluations at that point as I am now.”
a way as to encourage union membership among the em-
ployees.’” Acklin Stamping, supra, 351 NLRB at 1263,
quoting Graphic Communications Local 1-M (Bang
Printing), 337 NLRB 662, 673 (2002). We explained,
however, that the judge had erred by considering only
whether Menard’s discharge was based on a failure to
pay dues, and not whether it was necessary to the Un-
ion’s performance of its representative function. Id. Be-
cause we agreed with the judge that the Union clearly
prompted the discharge in this case, we remanded the
case for further findings as to “whether the Union’s as-
serted concerns [about Menard’s qualifications and per-
formance] were sufficient” to rebut the applicable pre-
sumption of unlawful action. Id.
In his supplemental decision, the judge again found
that the Union and Acklin had acted unlawfully. In his
view, the necessary inquiry was whether the Union had
“introduce[d] conclusive evidence to provide or establish
a legitimate or substantial concern that Menard created a
safety concern” or “was not qualified to become a full-
time electrician.” The Union had not provided such evi-
dence, the judge found, and “[its] concerns about
Menard’s qualifications, work performance, and safety
record are built on innuendo, speculation, and hearsay
evidence.”
III. ANALYSIS
To the extent that the judge required the Union to
prove that Menard was in fact unqualified for the electri-
cian’s slot for which he was hired, the judge applied the
wrong standard. While the Union was required to rebut
the applicable presumption of unlawful action, it was not
required to prove to the Board that Menard’s skills were
deficient.6 Rather, as Board precedent holds, the Union
was only required to demonstrate that its actions were
“done in good faith, based on rational considerations, and
were linked in some way to its need effectively to repre-
sent its constituency as a whole.” Operative Plasterers
Local 299 (Wyoming Contractors Assn.), 257 NLRB
1386, 1395 (1981). This showing was clearly made here.
A.
There is no evidence that the Union harbored animus
against Menard because of any perceived lack of union

6 Our dissenting colleague asserts that neither he nor the judge would
require the Union to prove that Menard was unqualified. But his insis-
tence that the Union present “hard evidence to substantiate performance
deficiencies,” including testimony from witnesses having “first-hand
knowledge,” would impose precisely that requirement. Moreover, in
insisting that the Union acted unlawfully based on his assertion that not
“a single [such] witness” testified, our colleague gives no weight even
to the testimony of Acklin’s plant manager, Curtis, who admittedly
agreed with Straub that Menard was unqualified and that finding a
lower-skilled job for him would be “a good idea.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

826
support (Menard had been admitted into the Union), or
that the Union’s actions were motivated by any other
unlawful considerations.7 Rather, the record evidence
shows that the Union sought Menard’s discharge based
on its belief that he was unqualified to perform electrical
work expected of a journeyman electrician and that he
jeopardized the safety of coworkers.
Furthermore, the Union demonstrated that its belief
was an honest one based on rational considerations.
First, by Menard’s and Acklin’s own admissions,
Menard never met the threshold application requirement
of documenting that he was certified as a journeyman
electrician or had “eight years of proven experience as an
electrician in a manufacturing environment.” Both the
Union and management were aware of this deficiency
during Menard’s probation.
Second, during Menard’s probationary period, both
Straub and McVicker were approached by employees
expressing concern about Menard’s lack of qualifications
and their related safety concerns, which the Union con-
sidered important enough to convey to management dur-
ing his probationary period. In criticizing the Union for
relying on “innuendo, speculation, and hearsay evi-
dence,” the judge implicitly credited Straub’s and
McVicker’s testimony that they received that input.
There is nothing to suggest that the opinions of Menard’s
coworkers regarding his work performance were suspect
or unreliable. To the contrary, when Straub and
McVicker reported those complaints to Menard’s super-
visor, LeBarr, he too acknowledged that he did not be-
lieve Menard was qualified to perform electrician work.
Moreover, contrary to the judge and our dissenting col-
league, Straub’s and McVicker’s testimony that they
received complaints from unit employees about Menard
was not hearsay for the purpose of resolving the issue in
this case: whether the Union acted in good faith, based
on rational considerations. See, e.g., Vencor Hospital –
Los Angeles, 324 NLRB 234, 234 250–251 fn. 18 (1997).
Third, Plant Manager Curtis’ confirmation to Straub
(during Menard’s probationary period), and his later ad-
mission to Human Resources Director Echler, that
Menard was unqualified support the Union’s concerns, as
does the opinion of Menard’s supervisor.8 There could

7 See Millwrights Local 1102 (Planet Corp.), 144 NLRB 798, 800
(1963) (union may overcome presumption of unlawful action in seek-
ing discharge of employee by showing that its action was referable to
considerations “lawful in themselves, and wholly unrelated to the exer-
cise of protected employee rights or to other matters with which the Act
is concerned”).
8 We find that it was reasonable for the Union to rely on Curtis’sand
LeBarr’s opinions that Menard was not qualified. The judge declined
to give weight to Curtis’ “expressed . . . opinion that Menard lacked the
skills necessary,” on the ground that Curtis failed to document or oth-
hardly be stronger evidence that the Union’s objection to
Menard’s continued employment as an electrician was
based on a rational concern about his qualifications than
Acklin management’s own contemporaneous admissions
that Menard was not qualified.9 See, e.g., Moving Pic-
ture Projectionists Local 150 (Mann Theatres), 268
NLRB 1292, 1295–1296 (1984) (union did not violate
Sec. 8(b)(2) by refusing to refer employee to jobs, fol-
lowing employers’ complaints about performance). By
themselves, these admissions establish that the Union
carried its burden here and that our dissenting col-
league’s assertion that the Union “increase[d] the threat
of union power being arbitrarily exercised against unit
employees” has no basis.
Finally, as mentioned above, nothing in the Union’s
various attempts to address Menard’s deficiencies sug-
gests that the Union acted on a pretext.10 The Union, in
fact, appears to have done exactly what was contem-
plated under the terms of the earlier grievance settlement:
it timely informed both Menard and Acklin’s manage-
ment of his documentation deficiency, raised the issue of
his qualifications with management repeatedly—while
simultaneously expressing concern over Menard’s quali-
fications and communicating employee concerns—and
even suggested that Menard be allowed to bid for a
lower-skilled position as a means for keeping him em-
ployed. Only after it learned that Acklin had erroneously
made Menard a permanent electrician did the Union re-
quest his discharge on the basis of its earlier objections.
The Union’s actions did not depart from the objective
procedure it had established for checking the qualifica-
tions of new hires, but rather conformed with it.11

erwise act on this opinion. Although Curtis’ failure to document and
timely act on those deficiencies was rightly criticized by Echler, there
is, however, no evidence suggesting that Curtis’ opinion of Menard’s
skills was unfounded. For the same reason, we find that Supervisor
LeBarr’s failure to counsel Menard regarding his deficiencies does not
render his opinion of Menard’s skill unreliable.
9 The letter of recommendation that Acklin subsequently chose to
give Menard, cited by our dissenting colleague, is therefore irrelevant.
10 In addition, even if the Union had alternatives to seeking Menard’s
discharge, that alone would be insufficient to compel the finding of a
violation. As stated in Planet Corp., supra:
It is immaterial to the issue here that the Union might have been able
to obtain redress by other means – by action against Planet, or as it ac-
tually did, by disciplining [the employee] through internal union pro-
cedures. As the [union]’s effort to seek enforcement of the contrac-
tual provision through discharge of the individual who created the
problem of enforcement was not otherwise unlawful, it could not be-
come so simply because the [union] may have had other avenues of
recourse open to it.
144 NLRB at 802.
11 Contrast Stage Employees IATSE Local 720 (Production Support
Services), 352 NLRB 1081, 1085–1086 (2008) (unlawful denial of
work referral for employee’s failure to pay union fine for one-time use
of racial epithet, where there was no issue of his qualifications and no
ACKLIN STAMPING CO.

827
We do not agree with the judge’s inference that the
earlier grievance settlement, confirming the Union’s
right to review new hires’ qualifications, was “only ap-
plicable during the probationary period,” at least to the
extent this suggests that the Union was barred from pur-
suing the qualification issues it had raised on a timely
basis.12 Even assuming that some justification were re-
quired, as the judge believed, for the Union’s failure to
take additional action to contest Menard’s employment
before his probation ended, the record provides that ex-
planation. Menard did not, as he promised, provide
Straub with more definitive documentation, and Curtis
failed to reply to Straub’s queries on when Menard’s
probation would end and follow up on Straub’s “good
idea” of posting a production job for Menard to bid on.
Particularly under these circumstances, to hold that the
Union acted unlawfully would effectively penalize the
Union for Menard’s failure and Acklin’s negligence.
B.
In addition to establishing the legitimacy of its con-
cerns about Menard, the Union established that its ac-
tions were related to the enforcement of a contractual
grievance settlement. Insofar as safety concerns were
involved, the Union’s representational role was clearly
implicated. “Few matters can be of greater legitimate
concern to individuals in the workplace, and thus to the
bargaining agent representing them, than exposure to
conditions potentially threatening their health, well-
being, or their very lives.” Minnesota Mining & Mfg.,
261 NLRB 27, 29 (1982).
Just as a union may lawfully protect its role as a sup-
plier of competent employees by refusing to refer un-

employer complaints); Stagehands Referral Service, 347 NLRB 1167,
1168–1171 (2006), enfd. 2009 WL 648622 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting
union’s defense that employee was unqualified where union had been
referring him for 2 years, no employers complained about him, and
record showed disparate treatment); Service Employees Local 1877
(American Building Maintenance), 345 NLRB 161, 163–166 (2005)
(unlawful denial of work referral where union departed from estab-
lished dispatch procedure with no showing of lawful reason or neces-
sity).
12 The judge’s inference was apparently based on the following ex-
change at trial between McVicker and counsel for the General Counsel:
Q: Is it your belief that you have to question the qualifica-
tions and pass upon the person before the 90 days is over?
A: I’m sorry, if?
Q: Is it your understanding that that right that you have to re-
view and evaluate and accept or not accept the qualifications of a
trade skillsman [sic] has to occur within the probationary period?
A: Yes.
In light of the questions he was asked, we read McVicker’s testi-
mony as confirming that the Union was required to raise any issue of
qualification during probation, not that the Union’s right to pursue such
an issue vanished when probation ended with management having
failed, due to its own admitted inattentiveness, to address the matter.
qualified workers, it may also properly act to ensure that
the employees it represents are not harmed by unquali-
fied coworkers. See, e.g., Operative Plasterers Local
299 (Wyoming Contractors Assn.), supra, 257 NLRB at
1395 (refusal to place employee in priority referral group
was lawful because employee had marginal experience
and was a substandard performer); Moving Picture Pro-
jectionists Local 150 (Mann Theatres), 268 NLRB 1292,
1295–1296 (1984) (refusal to refer applicant was lawful
given applicant’s history of job misconduct).
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we conclude that the Union showed
that, in seeking the discharge of Menard, it acted on a
good-faith belief based on rational considerations that
Menard was unqualified. Accordingly, we find that the
Union’s action did not violate Section 8(b)(2) and
(b)(1)(A). It follows that Acklin, in discharging Menard
at the Union’s behest, also did not violate the Act. We
will therefore dismiss the complaint.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

MEMBER SCHAUMBER, dissenting.
It is well-settled Board law that “whenever a labor or-
ganization ‘causes the discharge of an employee, there is
a rebuttable presumption that [the labor organization]
acted unlawfully because by such conduct [the union]
demonstrates its power to affect the employees’ liveli-
hood in so dramatic a way as to encourage union mem-
bership among the employees.’” Graphic Communica-
tions Local 1-M (Bang Printing), 337 NLRB 662, 673
(2002) (citation omitted) quoting Operating Engineers
Local 478 (Stone & Webster), 271 NLRB 1382, 1382 fn.
2 (1984). The roots of this presumption of illegality lie in
the exclusive representative status the Union enjoys and
its concomitant duty to refrain “from taking action
against any employee upon considerations or classifica-
tions which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.”
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181, 185 (1962). A labor
organization can rebut the presumption of unlawfulness
by affirmatively showing that its action was “necessary
to the effective performance of its function of represent-
ing its constituency.” Graphic Communications Local 1-
M, supra at 673.
The Board remanded this case to the judge and in-
structed him to address “whether, on the existing record,
the Respondent Union has shown that its request to dis-
charge [employee Niles] Menard was necessary to repre-
sent its members, and thereby sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption of a violation.” Acklin Stamping Co., 351
NLRB 1263, 1263 (fn. omitted) (2007). After carefully
evaluating the evidence, the judge found that the Union
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

828
failed to make such a showing. The judge concluded that
any concerns the Union had about Menard were “built on
innuendo, speculation, and hearsay evidence.” My col-
leagues disregard the judge’s thoughtful findings. I
would adopt them and his further conclusion that
Menard’s discharge violated the Act. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.1
Charging Party Menard began working for the Em-
ployer in February 2006 and there is no contention that
the lone 30-day evaluation of his work conducted during
his 90-day probationary period disclosed any deficien-
cies. The Respondent Employer did not conduct 60- or
90-day evaluations of his work, as is its custom, and
these evaluations are typically relied upon to support a
termination. Nevertheless, 2 days after he completed his
probationary period, the Union sought Menard’s termina-
tion and the Employer acceded to its request.
The Union defends its action relying on alleged com-
plaints about Menard’s work performance, but it failed to
produce a single witness who testified to first-hand
knowledge of his performance, causing the judge to con-
clude that “no concrete facts were produced by the Re-
spondent Union to substantiate these allegations.” Fur-
ther, and significantly so, the record fails to explain the
discrepancy between the apparently favorable perform-
ance evaluation that Menard received and the alleged
complaints, causing the judge to conclude that the Un-
ion’s actions were founded on “mere supposition, rumor,
and innuendo . . . without documentation.”
My colleagues disagree and rely on testimony of union
representatives describing what Menard’s first-line su-
pervisor, Bob LeBarr, allegedly said about Menard’s
abilities. But my colleagues fail to point out that LeBarr
was never called as a witness to substantiate these state-
ments and the union representatives’ testimony was un-
corroborated. LeBarr never memorialized these alleged
concerns in writing or otherwise counseled Menard about
them. Accordingly, the judge properly rejected the rep-
resentatives’ hearsay testimony as insufficient to rebut
the presumption of illegality.2

1 My colleagues indicate that in deciding this case the judge may
have applied the wrong legal standard. They say that the judge erred
“to the extent that [he] required the Union to prove that Menard was in
fact unqualified for the electrician’s slot for which he was hired.” The
judge imposed no such burden when he found the Union had not intro-
duced “conclusive evidence to provide or establish a legitimate or
substantial concern that Menard created a safety concern.” The judge’s
requirement that the Union provide a “legitimate or substantial con-
cern” is compatible with the requirement that the Union prove its ac-
tions were done “based on rational considerations,” which is the stan-
dard my colleagues set forth and the one I also apply.
2 Contrary to the majority, the judge was also correct to characterize
testimony from union representatives that a number of unit employees
had complained about Menard’s work as hearsay. It is clear from its
My colleagues also rely on the testimony of employer
official Curtis who claimed that he believed Menard
lacked the necessary work skills. But Curtis did not tes-
tify to first-hand knowledge of Menard’s deficiencies. He
also said that he understood that in order to terminate an
employee you must have supporting documentation, in-
cluding performance evaluations, only emphasizing the
judge’s point that no 60- and 90-day evaluations were
conducted on Menard.
On top of this jumble of loose and contradictory evi-
dence, following Menard’s discharge, the Respondent
Employer wrote a letter of recommendation for Menard
which stated that, due to circumstances with the Union,
Menard was relieved of duty through no fault of his own.
The letter recommended Menard for employment, stating
that he was a valued worker with an exemplary atten-
dance record and a positive work attitude. Although my
colleagues characterize this letter as “irrelevant,” the
letter of recommendation suggests that the Respondent
Employer viewed Menard’s discharge as being driven
more by union matters than by lack of qualifications or
performance deficiencies.
On this state of the record, I agree with the judge that
“in the absence of any hard evidence to substantiate per-
formance deficiencies,” the Union and Employer had no
justifiable basis supporting the discharge.
My colleagues, however, emphasize the absence of
any evidence that the Union acted in bad faith. But it is
not for the General Counsel or Charging Party to prove
that the Union acted in bad faith. It is for the Union to
prove that its action “was taken to fulfill its overriding
duty to represent the legitimate interests of its constitu-
ency.” Plasterers Local 299 (Wyoming Contractors As-
sn.), 257 NLRB 1386, 1395 (1981). The Union does not
fulfill this evidentiary burden by offering only a “bare
assertion” that it was representing the interests of its con-
stituency. See Stone & Webster, supra at 1385.
Nor does the case law support my colleagues’ conclu-
sion. For example, in Plasterers, supra at 1391–1392, the
union met its burden by presenting testimony from those
who observed that the employee in question lacked the
necessary tools, did not know how to perform the “basic
techniques” of the job, and had a poor attendance record.
And in Moving Picture Projectionists Local 150 (Mann
Theaters), 268 NLRB 1292, 1295–1296 (1984), the un-
ion met its burden with uncontradicted evidence that it

exceptions that the Union is arguing first and foremost that Menard was
unqualified to do his job and it is fair to say this testimony was offered
to prove the truth of that assertion. In these circumstances, the judge’s
characterization was apt, and this case is factually distinguishable from
Vencor Hospital-Los Angeles, 324 NLRB 234 (1997), cited by the
majority.
ACKLIN STAMPING CO.

829
received numerous requests from employers that an em-
ployee no longer be dispatched to their jobs because of
his poor performance. The Union presented no such evi-
dence here and my colleagues’ conclusion that the Un-
ion’s actions were “done in good faith, based on rational
considerations and were linked in some way to its need
effectively to represent its constituency as a whole,” Op-
erative Plasterers, supra, at 1395, neatly relieves the
Union of its rebuttal burden and ignores the record evi-
dence. Indeed, the Board’s decision today unwittingly
increases the threat of union power being arbitrarily ex-
ercised against unit employees.
In sum, I agree with the judge that the Union presented
“no hard evidence,” “no concrete facts,” and no “written
record or other documentation” to support its discharge
request. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Rudra Choudhury, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Joan Torzewski, Esq., of Toledo, Ohio, for the Respondent
Union.
Renisa A. Dorner, Esq., of Toledo, Ohio, for the Respondent
Employer.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BRUCE D. ROSENSTEIN, Administrative Law Judge. On De-
cember 28, 2007, the Board issued a Decision and Order (351
NLRB 1263) remanding the above captioned matter to the un-
dersigned for further appropriate consideration and analysis. In
its decision the Board stated “whenever a labor organization
‘causes the discharge of an employee, there is a re-buttable
presumption that [the labor organization] acted unlawfully be-
cause by such conduct [it] demonstrates its power to affect the
employees’ livelihood in so dramatic a way as to encourage
union membership among the employees.’” Graphic Commu-
nications Local 1-M (Bang Printing), 337 NLRB 662, 673
(2002), quoting Operating Engineers Local 478 (Stone & Web-
ster), 271 NLRB 1382 fn. 2 (1984). As the Board further ex-
plained in Graphic Communications, supra at 673, quoting
Operating Engineers Local 18, 204 NLRB 681 (1973), en-
forcement denied on other grounds 496 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir.
1974) (emphasis added).

No question that read literally, Sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) of
the Act specify only, in essence, failure to satisfy union secu-
rity obligations as a basis for allowing labor organizations to
lawfully cause or attempt to cause an employer to discharge
an employee. That, of course, is not the situation presented
here. Even so, under the Act a labor organization can engage
in statutory “cause or attempt to cause” conduct “not only
when the interference with employment was pursuant to a
valid union-security clause but also in instances where the
facts show that the union action was necessary to the effec-
tive-performance of its function of representing its constitu-
ency.”

The Board framed the issue to rebut the presumption that the
discharge of Menard was unlawful, the Respondent Union must
show that its action was “necessary to the effective perform-
ance of its function of representing its constituency.” The
Board directed the undersigned to apply the applicable standard
and determine on the existing record whether the Respondent
Union has shown that its request to discharge Menard was nec-
essary to represent its members, and thereby sufficient to rebut
the presumption of a violation.
On January 14, 2008, after a previous conference call with
the parties, I issued an Order holding that the record would not
be reopened to take additional evidence. It was agreed, in lieu
of filing additional posthearing briefs that I would rely on the
record as a whole including the objections, answering and reply
briefs and opposition brief filed previously with the Board and
would prepare and serve a supplemental decision in due course.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent Union requested
the Respondent Employer to discharge its employee Niles
Menard because it refused to allow Menard membership in the
Union and for reasons other than the failure to tender uniformly
required initiation fees and periodic dues. Pursuant to the Re-
spondent Union’s request, the Employer discharged Menard.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Employer, with an office and place of business in
Toledo, Ohio, is engaged in the business of metal stamping.
The Employer, during the past calendar year, in conducting its
business operations purchased and received goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of
Ohio. The Respondent Employer admits and I find that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Respondent Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The parties are subject to a collective-bargaining agreement
effective by its terms from October 18, 2005, to October 18,
2008 (GC Exh. 2). Pertinent provisions subject to this case
include articles 3,1 6,2 and 50.3
Since 1996, Daniel Twiss has been the International repre-
sentative of Respondent Union in Region 2-B, which oversees
the Union at the Respondent Employer. Twiss served as the
Union’s lead negotiator for the parties’ current collective-
bargaining agreement, executed it on behalf of the Union, and

1 New employees’ have a probationary period of 90 workdays. After
the expiration of 90 workdays employees can become members of the
Union.
2 The Company agrees to discharge any employee covered by this
contract when the Union submits proof to the Company that the em-
ployee is not in good standing in the Union because of the failure of the
employee to pay his or her union dues.
3 New employees will have no seniority until they have been with
the Company for a period of 90 workdays, at the termination of which
they are accepted by the Company as permanent employees.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

830
regularly assists the Union in the administration of their collec-
tive-bargaining agreement including the processing of griev-
ances.
Linda Straub served as chairman of the Union at the Em-
ployer between 1997 and July 5, 2006.4 In an internal union
election held on May 31, Joel McVicker was elected chairman
and informally assumed the duties of the position on June 30,
during the time that Straub was winding down her term of of-
fice.
Mark Echler holds the position of corporate director of hu-
man resources for Ice Industries and is headquartered in Sylva-
nia, Ohio. Ice Industries owns the Respondent Employer and
Echler oversees the human resources function at the facility
assisted by onsite human resource assistant Cheryl Lyons.
Vince Curtis serves as the Employer’s plant superintendent
and has held the position since April 10. Bob LeBarr was
Menard’s first-line supervisor during the pertinent period
herein.
Menard was contacted by Lyons in early February 2006,5 to
discern whether he was interested in an electrician position at
the Respondent Employer. Around the same time, Menard saw
an advertisement in the Toledo Blade newspaper seeking appli-
cants for the electrician position.6 Menard interviewed for the
position in February 2006, submitted a written application
along with a resume and reference letters, and was offered the
position by Lyons, who scheduled a starting date of February
20. Lyons requested Menard to provide a written summary of
his related electrical experience to both the Employer and the
Union. Menard complied with this request when he submitted
a letter from his prior employer on or about February 15 (U.
Exh. 4).
B. The 8(a)(1) and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) Allegations
1. The position of the parties
The General Counsel alleges in paragraph 8 of the complaint
that about June 14, Respondent Union requested that Respon-
dent Employer discharge its employee Menard because it re-
fused to allow Menard membership in the Union and for rea-
sons other than the failure to tender uniformly required initia-
tion fees and periodic dues. On or about June 14, pursuant to
the Union’s request, Respondent Employer discharged Menard.
Under these circumstances, the General Counsel alleges that the
Respondent Union and Respondent Employer engaged in viola-
tions of the Act and both are jointly and severally liable for
wages and benefits the employee lost due to the unlawful dis-
charge.
The Respondent Employer argues that in an effort to main-
tain a positive relationship and avoid an expensive grievance

4 All dates are in 2006, unless otherwise indicated.
5 Lyons worked in human resources at Techneglas, where Menard
had worked for 35 years.
6 The advertisement stated in pertinent part under educa-
tion/experience required: must possess a journeyman’s electrician’s
card or certification of having completed a U.S. Department of Labor
recognized apprenticeship as a journeyman electrician, or have 8 years
of proven experience working as an electrician in a manufacturing
environment, along with 2-years related experience.
with the Union, it acquiesced to the Union’s demand to dis-
charge Menard on the basis that the Union did not find Menard
qualified under its membership requirements. Further, the Re-
spondent Employer asserts that it had no intention of discharg-
ing Menard until the Union demanded that he be terminated.7
The Respondent Union asserts that it did not affirmatively
request that Menard be terminated and therefore, it is not re-
sponsible for his subsequent discharge. Additionally, the Un-
ion argues that Menard did not have an apprenticeship or jour-
neyman card and lacked the required 8 years’ experience re-
quired for the electrician position. Since Menard lacked the
requisite qualifications and experience, the Employer termi-
nated his employment.
2. The facts
Menard, on March 6, completed a union membership appli-
cation and dues-checkoff authorization (U. Exh. 2). He contin-
ued to remit dues to the Union for the months of April, May,
and June 2006 (U. Exh. 6). On the date of his termination,
Menard had fully paid all periodic dues and initiation fees to
the Union.
In or around April 2006, Straub approached Menard and re-
quested that he supplement his electrical experience as the Un-
ion needed more detailed information to augment the letter that
he had provided from his prior employer.8 According to
Menard, McVicker informed him that he did not need to give
additional documentation to the Union if his supervisor was not
requesting it. McVicker, however, denied that he informed
Menard that supplemental documentation did not have to be
provided to the Union. In any event, Menard did not supply
any additional information to the Union.9
In or around early May 2006, Straub showed the letter that
Menard had provided from his prior employer to both Twiss
and Curtis. Straub noted that both individuals agreed that there
wasn’t enough information to verify Menard’s electrical ex-
perience. Straub testified that after she asked Menard for more
information, LeBarr told her that he did not think Menard was
qualified to be an electrician. McVicker testified that between
May and June 2006, a number of skilled tradesmen in the facil-

7 By letter dated June 16, the Employer stated in pertinent part: Due
to circumstances with the International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW),
Local 12, Menard was relieved of duty through no fault of his own (GC
Exh. 9).
8 Pursuant to a 2003 grievance settlement between the parties, it was
agreed that the union chairman would be able to review all new hires
for the skilled trade positions to check if the applicant has the qualifica-
tions for a journeyman card or the credentials to apply for one (GC
Exh. 3, item 2). McVicker confirmed in his testimony that this entitle-
ment only applied during the 90-day probationary period of the new
hire.
9 Menard’s assertion that McVicker told him that he did not need to
provide any additional information about his electrician credentials is
not credited. In this regard, the letter that Menard submitted did not
detail the type of electrical experience that Menard possessed nor did it
provide the title of the person who signed the letter (U. Exh. 4). Like-
wise, when McVicker allegedly made the statement he was not offi-
cially the union chairman and could not counter prior instructions given
by Straub for Menard to produce additional evidence of his qualifica-
tions.
ACKLIN STAMPING CO.

831
ity apprised him that they were not sure of Menard’s skill level.
Likewise, McVicker spoke with LeBarr prior to the completion
of Menard’s probationary period. LeBarr told McVicker that
he knew that Menard was not qualified to be an electrician.
McVicker told LeBarr that he had heard things from other
skilled tradesmen to the same effect. On or about June 10,
Curtis called Straub into his office and informed her that in his
opinion Menard was not qualified for the electrician’s job and
he would like to create a position for him because he is a nice
guy. He further told Straub that Menard lacked the skills nec-
essary to be on his own in the facility because the machines
were old and hard to work on. Straub informed Curtis that a
skilled trade position could not be created for Menard because
there were other workers with more seniority that would be
entitled to bid on the job. Straub suggested that Curtis could
create a production job and if Menard bid on the job and got it,
it was fine. Curtis thought that was a good idea.
On June 12, a meeting occurred in Curtis’s office that was
attended by Lyons and Menard. During the meeting, Curtis
informed Menard that he was happy to have him aboard as a
full-time employee since he had successfully completed his 90-
day probationary period.10
During the morning of June 14, Straub asked Curtis what had
happened with Menard. Curtis informed Straub that Menard
had completed his probationary period and was a member of
the Union. Straub asked Curtis if Menard was coming on board
as a permanent employee in production. Curtis replied that
Echler had overruled him and Menard would remain in mainte-
nance performing electrical work. Straub immediately tele-
phoned Twiss to apprise him of the situation with Menard.
Twiss, after talking with Straub on the morning of June 14,
placed a telephone call to Echler who was unavailable but left a
message for him to return the call.
Earlier on June 14, before Echler received the telephone
message from Twiss, Curtis had called Echler and informed
him that Menard was slow and did not catch on quickly. Echler
informed Curtis that since Menard had completed his proba-
tionary period, the responsibility falls on either you or Lyons.
Echler inquired if Curtis had performed the proper evaluations
on Menard during the probationary period, and Curtis replied
that we really did not do so.
Echler testified that he returned the telephone call to Twiss
either later that morning or early afternoon.
Twiss testified that he informed Echler that the Union had a
problem with Menard’s qualifications and he did not hold a
journeyman’s card. According to Twiss, Echler said he did not
know what Twiss was talking about. Twiss said, “We need to
resolve the situation with Menard’s qualifications.” Twiss
informed Echler that Curtis had told McVicker that he would
take care of the problem. According to Twiss, Echler said he
would just terminate Menard. Twiss said, “I am not asking you
to do this.”

10 Menard completed his 90 days prior to June 20, because he
worked sufficient overtime hours. Straub testified, without contradic-
tion, that when somebody is satisfactory to the Company and they get
their probation time in, they are acceptable to the Respondent Union.
According to Echler, after he returned the telephone call,
Twiss informed him that the Union has an issue with Menard as
he is not qualified to be an electrician. Echler said, “He has
already reached his 90 days and he’s beyond that point.” Twiss
said, “It doesn’t matter, I don’t care, this guy’s not an electri-
cian, you need to get him out of there.” Echler said, “What you
are trying to tell me is I should terminate him.” Twiss said
“yes.” Echler said, “I will call Vince Curtis and I will let him
know.” Echler then telephoned Curtis and instructed him to
terminate Menard.
Curtis testified that Echler telephoned him during the after-
noon of June 14, and stated that Twiss asked that Menard be
terminated. Echler then instructed Curtis to terminate Menard.
Curtis contacted Menard to offer him a production job. Menard
turned the offer down since it would be at a reduced rate of pay.
Thereafter, on the afternoon of June 14, Lyons telephoned
Menard at home and told him not to come into work. She in-
formed Menard that the Union would not accept him as an elec-
trician, and therefore, she had to terminate him.
3. The agency status of Daniel Twiss
The Board and the courts have uniformly held that whether
someone acts as an agent under the Act must be determined by
common law principles of agency. See, e.g., NLRB v. Plaster-
ers Local 90 (Southern III Builders Assn.), 606 F.2d 189 (7th
Cir. 1979), enfg. 236 NLRB 329 (1978).
Applying these principles to the subject case, the evidence
establishes that Twiss negotiated four contracts including the
parties’ current collective-bargaining agreement on behalf of
the Union and routinely visits the facility to participate in dis-
cussions with the parties to resolve disputes including the proc-
essing of grievances. Additionally, Twiss acknowledged that
he has a longstanding relationship with Echler on behalf of the
Union and routinely deals with him on issues related to the
administration of their collective-bargaining agreement.
Further evidence that impacts on the agency status of Twiss
was his testimony that when he made the June 14 telephone call
to Echler concerning Menard, it was on behalf of the Respon-
dent Union.
For all of the above reasons, and contrary to the Respondent
Union’s denial of his agency status, I find that Twiss is an agent
of the Union for all matters associated with this case.
4. Analysis
In Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), the Board
announced the following causation test in all cases alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(3) or violations of Section 8(a)(1)
turning on employer motivation. First, the General Counsel
must make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the in-
ference that protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in the
employer decision. On such a showing, the burden shifts to the
employer to demonstrate that the same action would have taken
place even in the absence of the protected conduct. The United
States Supreme Court approved and adopted the Board’s
Wright Line test in NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399–403 (1983). In Manno Electric, 321
NLRB 278 fn. 12 (1996), the Board restated the test as follows.
The General Counsel has the burden to persuade that antiunion
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

832
sentiment was a substantial or motivating factor in the chal-
lenged employer decision. The burden of persuasion then shifts
to the employer to prove its affirmative defense that it would
have taken the same action even if the employee had not en-
gaged in the protected activity.
The Supreme Court has held in Air Line Pilots Assn. v.
O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991), that the “arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith” standard applies to all union activity.
The Board has held that a labor organization violates Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the Act when pursuant to a union-
security agreement it seeks the discharge of employees who
have been denied membership on grounds other than their fail-
ure to tender periodic dues uniformly required as a condition of
employment. In addition, an employer violates Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act when it discharges an employee, pursuant to
a valid union-security agreement, if it is aware that the em-
ployee has tendered his periodic dues. AMF Wheel Goods Div.
of AMF Inc. & Kenneth D. Schwartz, 247 NLRB 231 (1980).
As discussed above, the Board has previously held in statu-
tory cause or attempt to cause conduct issues, not only when
the interference with employment was pursuant to a valid un-
ion-security clause but also in instances when the facts show
that the action was necessary to the effective performance of its
function of representing its constituency, a union may lawfully
cause an employer to discharge an employee. For example, in
Ashley, Hickham-UHR Co., 210 NLRB 32 (1974), and Carpen-
ters Local 1243, 240 NLRB 1118 (1979), the Board found that
the Respondent Union’s action in placing experienced stewards
on potentially troublesome jobsites was in furtherance of le-
gitimate and valid concerns of the union membership. And in
Philadelphia Typographical Union 2 (Triangle Publica-
tions),189 NLRB 829 (1971), the Board dismissed a complaint
when the union’s interference with a member’s employment
was necessary to deter felonious and egregious conduct which
could seriously threaten the union’s very financial survival—
the offending employee there having embezzled a very substan-
tial amount of union funds.
In the subject case, I find that the Respondent Union’s con-
cerns about Menard’s qualifications, work performance, and
safety record are built on innuendo, speculation, and hearsay
evidence. For example, Straub and McVicker testified that a
number of skilled tradesmen in the facility had concerns about
his performance and Menard’s first-line supervisor expressed
doubts to them about his skill level and experience. No con-
crete facts were produced by the Respondent Union to substan-
tiate these allegations and LeBarr was not called as a witness by
Respondent Union to substantiate them. While Curtis ex-
pressed his opinion that Menard lacked the skills necessary to
be in the facility because the machines were old and hard to
work on, he never informed Menard of these shortcomings and
did not prepare 60- or 90-day evaluations of his progress during
the probationary period documenting these perceived deficien-
cies.11 Likewise, LeBarr never counseled Menard or put in

11 Curtis testified that to support the termination of an employee, it is
necessary to have supporting documentation including performance
evaluations. The evidence established that only a 30-day evaluation
was completed but the Respondent Employer neglected to conduct a
writing any of his perceived concerns about his skill level or
performance on the job. Lastly, the Respondent Union did not
introduce conclusive evidence to provide or establish a legiti-
mate or substantial concern that Menard created a safety con-
cern nor did it ever file a grievance with the Respondent Em-
ployer raising any issues of safety involving Menard. Accord-
ingly, and in the absence of a written record or other documen-
tation to establish that Menard was not qualified to become a
full-time electrician or complete his probationary period, the
Respondent Union’s argument that the termination was under-
taken to represent the interests of its constituency must fail. To
the contrary, the Employer made him a permanent employee on
June 12, based on his unblemished job performance.
As the Board found in Graphic Communications Local 1-M
(Bang Printing), supra, a statutory labor organization commits
an unfair labor practice by reporting the possibility of miscon-
duct without a genuine belief that such conduct occurred.
Likewise, in the subject case, mere supposition, rumor, and
innuendo about Menard’s work performance without documen-
tation cannot serve to protect the Union from its request to the
Respondent Employer to terminate Menard’s employment that
was thereafter effectuated.
The record evidence fully establishes that Menard complied
with his membership requirements including the tendering of
periodic dues and initiation fees and the Employer had never
been apprised otherwise by the Union. Indeed, the Employer
was aware through the check-off process that Menard had re-
mitted his dues and initiation fee to the Union.
Contrary to the Union’s argument that Twiss never requested
that Menard be terminated, I find otherwise for the following
reasons. It is not in dispute, and the Union did not contend
otherwise, that Menard completed his 90-day probationary
period on June 12. The grievance settlement, that the Union
relies upon to check whether an applicant has the qualifications
for a journeyman card or has the credentials to apply for one, is
only applicable during the probationary period. On June 12,
the Employer determined that Menard qualified as a permanent
full-time employee and considered him part of its maintenance
department that was responsible for the performance of electri-
cal work. Indeed, Curtis apprised Straub of this fact on the
morning of June 14, which prompted Straub’s telephone call to
Twiss. Therefore, it strains credulity that Echler would have
independently terminated Menard without having first been
requested to do so by the Union. Further, I credit Curtis’s tes-
timony that when Echler called on June 14, immediately after
talking with Twiss, he told him that Twiss asked that Menard
be terminated and he should carry out this act.
Lastly, I note that on June 16, the Employer prepared a letter
to “whom it may concern” that due to circumstances with the
Union, Menard was relieved of duty through no fault of his
own. The letter further stated that the Employer would recom-

60- or 90-day evaluation for Menard. No evidence was introduced to
establish that Menard experienced any work problems during the first
30 days of employment. Thus, in the absence of any hard evidence to
substantiate performance deficiencies, the Respondent Employer and
Respondent Union have no justifiable basis to support Menard’s termi-
nation.
ACKLIN STAMPING CO.

833
mend him and viewed him as a valued worker with an exem-
plary attendance record and a positive work attitude who would
hire him again if the opportunity should arise (GC Exh. 9).
Under these circumstances, and for all of the above reasons,
I find that the Respondent Employer and the Respondent Union
acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner and the Union
breached its duty of fair representation owed to Menard. They
further violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) and
(b)(2) of the Act when the Employer discharged Menard based
on the Union’s request for reasons other than the tendering of
periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required and without
substantial evidence to support that the action was necessary to
the effective performance of its function of representing its
constituency.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Acklin Stamping Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)
of the Act when it requested Acklin Stamping Company to
terminate Menard for reasons other than the failure to tender
uniformly required initiation fees and periodic dues and without
substantial evidence to support that the action was necessary to
the effective performance of its function of representing its
constituency.
4. Respondent Employer violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act when it terminated Menard based on the Union’s re-
quest for reasons other than the failure to tender uniformly-
required initiation fees and periodic dues.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent Employer and Respondent
Union have engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that
they must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Accordingly, I order the Respondent Employer to immedi-
ately reinstate Menard to his former or substantially equivalent
job and that the Respondent Employer and Respondent Union
jointly and severally make Niles Menard whole for any loss of
earnings, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as com-
puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
A. Acklin Stamping Company, it’s officers, agents, and rep-
resentatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
(a) Terminating Niles Menard for reasons other than the fail-
ure to tender uniformly required initiation fees and periodic
dues.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Immediately reinstate Niles Menard to his former or a
substantially equivalent position and jointly and severally make
him whole, with interest, for any loss of earnings suffered be-
cause he was terminated in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of the decision.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
the files of Acklin Stamping Company, any reference to the
unlawful termination of Niles Menard, and within 3 days there-
after, notify him in writing that we have done so and that we
will not use the termination against him in any way.
(c) We will preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or
such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by
the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security pay-
ment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records, including an electronic copy of such records if
stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at our
offices, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A.”13
Copies of the notices, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 8, after being signed by the Respondent Em-
ployer’s authorized representatives, shall be posted and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent Employer has gone out of business it shall duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all em-
ployees at any time since June 14, 2006.
(e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies
of the notice for posting at all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that it
has taken to comply.
B. Respondent United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Local 12, its offi-
cers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

834
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Acklin Stamping Com-
pany to discriminate against Niles Menard or any other em-
ployee in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Jointly and severally make whole Niles Menard, with in-
terest, for any loss of earnings suffered because he was termi-
nated in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
the Union’s files, any reference to the unlawful termination of
Niles Menard, and within 3 days thereafter, notify him in writ-
ing that we have done so and that we will not use the termina-
tion against him in any way.
(c) We will preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or
such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by
the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security pay-
ment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records, including an electronic copy of such records if
stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at the
union office, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix
B.”14 Copies of the notices, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 8, after being signed by the Respondent
Union’s authorized representatives, shall be posted and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees and members are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent Union has gone out of business or
closed the union office involved in these proceedings, it shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all employees and current members employed by Acklin
Stamping Company at any time since June 14, 2006.
(e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies
of the notice for posting by the Union at all places where no-
tices to employees and members are customarily posted.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that it
has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.

14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
offer Niles Menard full reinstatement to his former job or, if
that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL, jointly and severally, make Niles Menard whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of
the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of the decision.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge,
and within 3 days thereafter notify the employee in writing that
this has been done and that the discharge will not be used
against him in any way.

ACKLIN STAMPING COMPANY
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce
you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
ACKLIN STAMPING CO.

835
WE WILL, jointly and severally, make Niles Menard whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from our re-
quest to Acklin Stamping Company to terminate Niles Menard
for reasons other than the failure to tender uniformly-required
initiation fees and periodic dues, less any net interim earnings,
plus interest and without substantial evidence to support that
the action was necessary to the effective performance of our
function in representing our constituency.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from our files, any reference to our request to Acklin Stamping
Company to terminate Niles Menard, and WE WILL, within 3
days thereafter, notify him in writing that we have done so and
that we will not use the termination against him in any way.

UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA,
UAW, LOCAL 12