Abitibi Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 13, 1972

198 N.L.R.B. 1249 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

ABITIBI CORPORATION 1249
Abitibi Corporation and International Woodworkers
of America, AFL-CIO-CLC and Muncie S. Ward.
Cases 11-CA-4488, 11-CA-4506 11-CA-4482,
and I1-RC-3247
September 13, 1972
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
OF SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
KENNEDY AND PENELLO
On December 13, 1971, Trial Examiner George L.
Powell issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Respon-
dent filed exceptions and supporting briefs and
Respondent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions, except as modified
below.'
The Trial Examiner finds that Respondent did not
violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as the
Union had not obtained valid authorization cards
from a majority of Respondent's employees. We
agree with the Trial Examiner's dismissal of the
8(a)(5) and (1) violation but for different reasons.2
In our view the evidence fails to establish that a
bargaining order would be warranted even if the
Union has obtained valid authorization cards from a
majority of Respondent's employees.
The Supreme Court, in setting forth general
principles applicable to the issuance of bargaining
orders, held that the Board has authority to issue
such orders to remedy unfair labor practices "so
coercive that, even in the absence of a §8(a)(5)
violation, a bargaining order would have been
necessary to repair the unlawful effect of those
[unfair labor practices j."3 In addition, the Court
approved the Board's authority to issue a bargaining
order ". . . in less extraordinary cases makred by less
pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Trial Examiner . It is the Board 's established policy not to overrule a
Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear
preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544,
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 The Trial Examiner finds that a large number of the authorization
cards must be excluded because the employees were told the card was to be
used to obtain an election . Because of our finding that a bargaining order is
not warranted even if the Union has obtained authorization cards from a
tendency to undermine majority strength and impede
the election processes."4 In such a situation, the
Board must examine the nature and extent of the
employer's conduct and ascertain the likelihood that
the use of traditional remedies would ensure a fair
election. The Court instructed the Board to decide
whether ". . . even though traditional remedies
might be able to ensure a fair election, there was
insufficient indication that an election . . . would
definitely be a more reliable test of the employees'
desires than the card count taken before the unfair
labor practice occurred." 5 The Court also stated that
the Board did not have the authority to issue a
bargaining order in the category of cases where the
unfair labor practices are "minor or less extensive"
and which because of "their minimal impact on the
election machinery, will not sustain a bargaining
order." 6
In our view, this case is properly included in that
category of cases where the Court has indicated that
the unlawful conduct will not sustain a bargaining
order. Respondent's unfair labor practices were
neither pervasive nor extensive, involving only 3 of
the 78 employees. The violations consisted of
interrogations of two employees and threats of
discharge to two employees, neither of which threats
was carried out. Although clearly sufficiently serious
to require the setting aside of the election held on
February 25, 1971,7 there is, in our view, substantial
likelihood that application of our traditional reme-
dies will erase the past effects of these unfair labor
practices and ensure the holding of a fair rerun
election. Accordingly, we shall adopt the Trial
Examiner's recommendation that the 8(a)(5) allega-
tion of the complaint be dismissed.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders
that the Abitibi Corporation, Roaring River, North
Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election conducted
in Case I I-RC-3247 on February 25, 1971, be, and it
majority of Respondent 's employees , we find it unnecessary to pass on the
validity of each card excluded or to ascertain whether the Union has
obtained valid authorization cards from a majority of Respondent's
employees.
3 N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 615.
4 Id. at 614.
.5 Id at 616.
6 Id. at 615.
7 As recommended by the Trial Examiner , we shall direct a second
election.
198 NLRB No. 176
1250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
hereby is, set aside and that said case be, and it
hereby is, remanded to the Regional Director for
Region 11 to conduct a second election when he
deems circumstances permit a free choice of a
bargaining representative.
[Direction of Second Election and Excelsior foot-
note omitted from publication.]
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
1. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
GEORGE L. POWELL , Trial Examiner : This proceeding
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act as
amended , 29 U.S .C. Sec. 151 et seq. (Act), based upon an
Order Consolidating Cases. Complaint and Notice of
Hearing issued by the Regional Director for Region 11 of
the National Labor Relations Board (Board) on April 30,
1971, and an Order Consolidating Cases with Supplemen-
tal Decision , Direction , and Amended Order Consolidat-
ing Cases , Complaint and Notice of Hearing issued by the
said Director of the Board on May 28, 1971 , founded upon
charges: filed by the above Union , in Case 11 -CA-4458,
on February 17, 1971; filed by Muncie S. Ward , in Case
I 1-CA-4482, on February 12, 1971; and filed by the above
Union , in Case 11 -CA-4506, on March 8 , 1971;1 was tried
before me in Wilkesboro , North Carolina , in a 2-week
period in August , with all parties participating throughout
by counsel , who also filed briefs , received on October 1,
pursuant to time extended on Respondent 's application.
Those briefs , together with the entire record as made at the
trial, have been carefully considered.
The issues presented apse from some seven categories
alleging: interference , restraint , or coercion of employee's
rights under Section 7 of the Act; the discriminatory
discharges of two employees ; and a refusal to bargain in
good faith with the Union as the majority representative of
the employees ; all in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) of the Act . In its duly filed answer , Respondent, while
admitting certain allegations of the complaint, denied the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
Upon the entire record , my observation of the witnesses
as they testified , and the briefs filed by Respondent and
General Counsel , I find , for the reasons hereinafter set
forth, that the General Counsel has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in certain particulars.
On the other hand , I find , for the reasons hereinafter set
forth , that the General Counsel has not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Respondent discrimi-
natorily discharged Muncie S . Ward or William E . Pegram
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, or that
Respondent failed to bargain in good faith in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act ; and I will recommend that the
allegations be dismissed and that another election be
directed among the employees for the selection or rejection
of the Union as their collective -bargaining agent in the
appropriate unit.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
II. PARTIES; JURISDICTION
At all material times , Respondent Abitibi Corporation, a
Delaware Corporation with a plant at Roaring River,
North Carolina, was engaged in the business of manufac-
turing hardboard. During the 12-month period immediate-
ly preceding issuance of the complaint, in the course and
conduct of that business, Respondent made, sold, and
shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points
and places outside the State of North Carolina, and
received products valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
points and places outside the State of North Carolina.
I find that at all material times Respondent has been,
and is, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
I also find that the Union, International Woodworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, at all these times, has been, and is, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
Jurisdiction is properly asserted in this proceeding.
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Case 11-RC-3247
Pursuant to a Decision and Direction of Election in an
appropriate unit of:
All production and maintenance employees including
testers at the Employer's Roaring River, North Caroli-
na, plant, excluding the office clerical employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act,
issued by the Regional Director for Region 11 on February
1, a secret ballot election was held on February 25 in which
38 votes were cast for the Union and 43 were cast against it
out of approximately 80 eligible voters.2 The parties were
notified of the election result; and on March 3, the Union
filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of
the election. The Respondent denied the acts and conduct
alleged in the objections and the Regional Director
determined that certain of the alleged acts and conduct, if
established, would raise substantial and material issues
affecting the voters' free choice in the election. Charges
were filed by the Union and Ward, above, in Cases
1l-CA-4488 and 11-CA-4482 covering the acts and
conduct which the said Regional Director had found, if
established, would raise substantial and material issues
affecting the voters' free choice in the election.
B. Case 11-CA-4488 and Case 11-CA-4482
These two cases were consolidated in the Complaint and
Notice of Hearing which were issued on April 30, 1971,
and will be dealt with in the order set out in the complaint.
The following named persons are admitted to be
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2( 11) of the Act:
Ray Langevin, Plant Manager ; Willard Swift , Personnel
Supervisor ; Larry Sloop , Foreman , Manufacturing Depart-
I Unless otherwise specified, all dates herein are in 1971 challenged, but these would not affect the results of the election.
2 Counting one void ballot, 86 votes were cast of which 5 were
ABITIBI CORPORATION 1251
ment ; Tom Bolick, Plant Engineer; Jess Coleman, Shift
Foreman, Second Shift, Manufacturing Department; Don
Rinehardt, Foreman (Fabricating); Will Voge, Electrical
Engineer . The complaint, in paragraphs 7(a) through 7(g),3
alleged, and Respondent denied, specific instances of
violation of Section 8(a)(1) since January 1.
Complaint-Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7 of the complaint alleged in essence, that,
Respondent, by the following named agents and supervi-
sors , at times specified, interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in exercising rights guaranteed them
in Section 7 of the Act when:
(a) Larry Sloop on February 21 and Willard Swift on
February 18, threatened its employees that they might be
discharged because of the Union. Respondent denied this
allegation.
Larry Sloop: Perry Welborn testified that a few days
before the February 25 election, his foreman in the
woodyard, Larry Sloop, "... called me aside from the
other workers in the woodyard and he told me the
Company was thinking about terminating me because of
my attitude. I asked him what was wrong with my attitude,
and, he turned and started to walk away like he wasn't
going to answer. I said, `It isn't because of the union , is it?'
And he said, `Not altogether.' Welborn also testified that
he had never before been criticized about his attitude. On
the other hand, Sloop testified that Welborn was not doing
good work, that he talked to him, "Maybe once a week."
"When I caught him in the corner goofing off." Sloop
could not remember when he first talked to Welborn about
his attitude, but testified that he talked to him about his
attitude during the union campaign, "No more than I had
any other time." The union campaign lasted some 3
months and Sloop was foreman over Welborn for some 8
or 9 months. Sloop categorically denied Welborn's testimo-
ny above. Accordingly, I am left with this sharp credibility
issue.
Sloop's testimony that he talked to Welborn about his
attitude "maybe once a week" and that his attitude was
one of "goofing off," does not ring true . At this time,
Respondent was striving to get the plant in operation and
was bending every effort including the use of employees on
overtime in order to do so. I do not believe Respondent or
Foreman Sloop would countenance any employee in some
kind of a regular "goofing off" in this period. Such an
employee would have been fired and should have been
fired. There is no evidence that the work Welborn was
doing required any special training nor was there any
evidence that a replacement for him could not be easily
found. Hence, I cannot believe that Welborn was told that
his attitude was not good until at the time the Union made
its appearance. I therefore credit Welborn and find that
Sloop told him the Respondent was thinking about
.terminating him for reasons including the advent of the
Union. Sloop said, "Not altogether." That phrase is an
admission that the Union had some part to play in the
decision which in turn means that Welborn was threatened
with discharge because of the Union, as alleged in the
complaint, and I so find. Respondent will be ordered to
cease and desist from this type of activity and post a notice
to that effect.
Willard Swift: John Allen arranged to meet Swift, in the
latter's office, to apply for a transfer from the manufactur-
ing department to the engineering department as an oiler.
According to the credited testimony of Allen, this meeting
occurred shortly before the election of February 25.4 After
Swift had filled out the transfer form and Allen had signed
it, Swift told him he couldn't promise the job right then but
"things look good that you might get it." Swift then said,
"Now I want to talk to you concerning the Union." "I
guess you have heard about the Union." Allen admitted he
had heard "the Union was trying to get in ." Swift told him,
"Well, me and the Company both object to its coming in."
Swift then told Allen he had heard of Allen's past
experience with the Union at Chatham Mills (a previous
employer) and told Allen, "We don't want you to have any,
you know, active part in it here," and asked Allen, "How
do you feel about the Union?" Allen told him that he "was
all for it" at first, but "became neutral" as things went on
as he "didn't want to get mixed up." Swift then wanted to
know if Allen planned to vote in the election. Allen told
him the election day was his day off and he had planned to
stay home and not vote. Swift then urged Allen to
"promise us to come in and vote."
Swift then told Allen of a telephone call he had had with
Mr. Folger, a vice-president of the bank which was Allen's
main creditor. Swift told Allen that Folger was concerned
about Allen's welfare and in "keeping [Allen's] bills up."
Also that Folger told Swift that "if [Allen] promised him
anything that he could depend on it." Swift said that if a
man didn't have a job he couldn't pay his bills. Swift again
asked Allen if he had decided to come in and vote, and
when Allen replied, "I hadn't decided to," said, "John,
talking about your job. . . . your present job may be at
stake and you may not even get the job that you signed
for." Swift again asked Allen, "Promise me that you will
come in and vote my way." Allen agreed to "come in and
vote" and was let out of the office.
Even though Swift may have never intended to do more
than tell Respondent's side of the union story and even
motivated by the best intentions, I find this conversation
amounts to a threat to employee Allen, that he might be
discharged because of the Union, as alleged in the
complaint. Swift has categorically denied the essential
elements of this allegation but, as noted above, I credit
Allen. Respondent will be ordered to cease and desist from
this type of activity and post a notice to that effect.
(b) The General Counsel alleged that Respondent, by
Jess Coleman on February 4, interrogated its employees as
to the identity of those who were pushing the Union.
Respondent denied this allegation.
Robert Beasley, second shift tester, credibly testified that
a week or a week and a half before Pegram was fired, his
foreman, Coleman, told him that he had seen Pegram with
union cards and that Respondent "knew or thought that he
3 Par. 7(g) of the complaint was withdrawn by the General Counsel at election and then testified, "I believe it was three or four days" before the
the hearing and is no longer in the case . election. Therefore , the time was somewhere between February 18. as in the
4 Allen testified, at one point, that it was "about a week" before the complaint, and February 22, the exact date being immaterial.
1252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
[Pegram] was more or less involved" in the Union.
Coleman also asked Beasley if Pegram was pushing the
Union. Coleman denied this testimony of Beasley but as
noted above, Beasley is credited. He appeared to be more
frank and open and less concerned about the possible
consequences of his testimony.5 Accordingly, I find the
Respondent, by Coleman, on or about February 4,
interrogated its employees as to the identity of those who
were pushing the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Respondent will be ordered to cease and desist
from this activity and post a notice to that effect.
(c) The General Counsel alleged that Respondent, on
February 18, by Willard Swift interrogated its employees
concerning their union or other concerted activities.
As noted above under Willard Swift, Allen credibly
testified that Swift asked him, "How do you feel about the
Union?" This took place on or about February 12.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent did interrogate an
employee concerning his union or connected activity. This
likewise violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent
will be ordered to cease and desist from this activity and
post a notice to that effect.
(d) The General Counsel alleged that Respondent by
Swift on February 18 informed its employees that it had
contacted their creditors for the purpose of putting
pressure on them to vote against the Union: This was
established by substantial evidence through the credited
testimony of Allen as set out above under Willard Swift.
Swift told Allen that he had had a telephone conversation
with the vice president of the bank that was Allen's main
creditor during which time Allen's character was discussed.
Swift then told Allen that if a man didn't have a job, he
couldn't bay his bills. As this conversation was linked to
Swift's requests that Allen come in and vote against the
Union, I find that Swift was pressuring Allen as alleged in
the complaint, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent will be ordered to cease and desist from this
activity and post a notice to that effect.
(e) The General Counsel alleged that Respondent, by
Larry Sloop on January 27, threatened its employees that it
thought they were pushing for the Union and that it was
seeking a pretext to discharge them.
The evidence in support of this allegation was the
following testimony of employee William Pegram: "He
[Larry Sloop] told me ["In January, around the 25th or
27th"] that he'd heard that me and Sherrill Ward were big
pushers for the Union, and they wanted to fire us but they
had no reason because of our work.6 We did good work."
I need not decide credibility here because, contrary to
the allegation in the complaint, I find a fair reading of this
testimony, even if credited, establishes the fact that the
Respondent would discharge an employee for being a poor
worker but would not discharge him for his known union
activity. The threat of discharge in this statement relates
only to poor work and not to union activity. I can see no
hidden meaning that Respondent was seeking a pretext to
S Beasley was nervous and confused at the beginning of his testimony
but calmed down as the questioning developed
6 The motion of the General Counsel in his brief to correct the record to
this quote is granted based upon my notes, recollection , and the sentence
that followed in the record which tends to show that the witness was talking
about the Company and not Sloop
fire Ward and Pegram for their union activity. According-
ly, I will recommend that paragraph 7(e) of the complaint
be dismissed for failure of proof.
(f) The General Counsel alleged that Respondent, by
Larry Sloop and Jess Coleman on February 10, told its
employees that others of its employees had been dis-
charged because of their union activity.
The testimony relating to this allegation in the complaint
was that of employee Richard Watson.? He testified that
he asked both Coleman and Sloop why Ward was fired.
According to him, the conversations were not on the same
day but on succeeding days; and a Mr. Anderson was
present at both occasions. According to Watson, the day
after Ward was fired, Coleman came to where Watson and
Anderson were working and started talking to Watson that
the Company "couldn't afford to lose any maintenance
men." Watson (testifying, on cross-examination) then "just
asked him right straight out-Do you have any under-
standing as to why Muncie [Ward] was fired?" Coleman
replied (Watson's direct testimony), "I have to say to you
that they got rid of him because of his union activities."
Watson then added that Coleman said, ". . . once the
plant knew about my involving with the union, my chances
would be very slim also."
Coleman, on the other hand, had a different recollection
of the conversation with Watson. First, he said it happened
after both Ward and Pegram had been fired and it was on
a "downday." That Saturday Coleman had brought in his
crew to give the maintenance men some help. Coleman
testified that he came by where Andy Anderson was
working at the press and asked how things were going.
Anderson replied, "pretty good right now . . . Floyd
Callicut has come down and joined the Company." After
another comment relating to Tom Bolick, Anderson
commented that "Muncie [Ward] had talked himself out of
a job." Coleman testified that he did not ask Anderson
what he meant by this last remark. According to Coleman,
later on that day, Watson said to him, "if you work for this
company, you don't have any security . . . you see what
happened to Muncie [Ward] and Pegram." Coleman
replied, "as far as Muncie was concerned, I hated to see
him leave the company, and him being fired for the union I
thought was a bunch of bull." He then related to Watson
"what Andy had just stated to me." He then added, "as far
as Pegram, I couldn't care less." Coleman specifically
denied telling Watson that Ward or Pegram had been fired
because of the Union.
As to Sloop, Watson testified that after Ward was fired,
and the day before his conversation with Coleman above:
"I was at a machine at a breakdown. Mr. Larry Sloop
walked up to me, and he said it was kind of a bad deal that
Mr. Ward got fired. I said I thought so also. And he said,
`Well, I happen to think and believe that he was involved
with the union activities and that's why he was let go.' On
the other hand, Sloop testified that he never talked with
Watson about the Union.
r Richard Watson left Respondents' employ on March 14, 1971, because
his wife "was sick." He testified that he didn't think Respondent had a
conscience because it wouldn't take him back when he wanted to return
within 24 hours after quitting The General Counsel did not issue a
complaint on his subsequent charge
ABITIBI CORPORATION 1253
I do not credit Watson as to these Coleman and Sloop
conversations but rather credit the accounts given by
Coleman and Sloop. Watson appeared to be an extremely
biased witness with considerable ill will to Respondent.
Further, Watson testified that Anderson heard these
remarks but no Anderson testified in corroboration; yet,
two different Andersons testified. Of course, corroboration
is never necessary if the one witness is credited but there is
a risk in that approach in situations like these where there
is a sharp issue on credibility. As I credit Sloop and
Coleman against Watson, I find no substantial evidence to
support the allegations of paragraph 7(f) of the complaint
and will recommend its dismissal.
In conclusion, as the General Counsel has established
that Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees with respect to their right to freely engage in
concerted activities before the election on February 25, the
election cannot fairly be said to have been conducted
under the laboratory conditions required by the Board and
a new election will be ordered. The closeness of the vote in
the February election has been taken into account.
Complaint-Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8 of the complaint alleged that Respondent
discharged Muncie S. Ward on February 4 and William E.
Pegram on February 9 and thereafter failed and refused to
reinstate them. These discharges allegedly were made
because of the union activities of Ward and Pegram. The
Respondent denied the allegations and maintained in
defense that the discharges were made for cause, and
moved for dismissal in the case of Ward because he was a
supervisor and hence not protected under the Act.
Muncie S. Ward: Muncie Sherrill Ward worked for
Respondent about 8 months from June 8, 1970, until his
discharge on February 4, 1971. He was fired as an "A" rate
maintenance mechanic. At his discharge, he was a working
leadman, a classification he had held since October 1970-a
period of over 3 months. It seems clear to me that Ward
was fired in part for his union activities and that
Respondent does not seriously contest this point. Swift,
who discharged Ward, admitted that Respondent "had
become completely dissatisfied with [Ward's] behavior and
performance as a supervisor" during this critical period in
the life of Respondent.
As to why Ward had been selected for his job, Swift
testified that employees were working a tremendous
number of hours because long hours were needed to repair
equipment that was tearing up as the plant was beginning
its operations around the clock. Tom Bolick and Will
Vogel needed help in mechanical and electrical mainte-
nance respectively. "They needed additional help in their
area, particularly in the form of supervision." According to
Swift, "And at this time, we discussed it; and we felt that
we could not justify a full, absolute supervisor who did
nothing but supervise all the time; so we agreed what we
needed was a supervisor who would be responsible for the
work of his men but who might assume some work
responsibilities; and so we approached the manager." Swift
continued, ". . . we sought his [the plant manager]
approval; and it was so approved; and Mr. Ward was
picked as leadman.... " As noted earlier, this was in
October 1970 before the advent of the Union.
When Ward was selected, according to Swift, "he was
informed that his duties and responsibilities were that he
would be responsible for supervision of approximately
eight men and he was expected to carry out work rules and
company policy; and in this capacity we felt that he was just
not the man he should be. " (Emphasis supplied.)
Swift admitted, "We were dissatisfied with his behavior
and performance. . . . In a supervisory capacity." He
admitted knowing Ward was involved in the union
campaign, and ". . . it did concern me," and it played a
role in Ward's discharge on February 4. In Swift's own
words
The fact that he [Ward] did not uphold company
policy and did not show a loyalty in enforcing the work
rules . . . did not uphold management at the time we
felt he should; yes, we expected loyalty from all
supervisors; and we expected them to uphold the
company position in this issue; and it was a contribut-
ing factor among several things. [Emphasis supplied.]
Continuing with the record testimony,
Q. When you say "this issue," you are referring to
this issue of unionization at the plant?
A. Yes.
Q. All right, so it is a fair statement then that Mr.
Ward was at least partially discharged for union
activity?
A. It was one of several things.
Q. Wasn't this your sole reason for discharging Mr.
Ward?
A. No, I couldn't say that. I think it was a
combination of many things.
In view of this admission by Swift that Ward was
discharged, in part, for his union activities, it is unnecessary
to write of other evidence establishing the same point.
Suffice it to say that the overwhelming evidence estab-
lished the fact that Ward was a hard worker, was
conscientious and held the respect and trust of the
employees and manager. According to Plant Engineer
Bolick, Ward ". . . was able to get a job done better than
practically anyone else in the crew." If Ward were an
employee within the meaning of the Act, his discharge
under these circumstances would violate Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act under well established law. However, if he were a
supervisor, he would receive no protection under the Act as
he was actively engaged in union activities against
company policy.s
Was Ward a supervisor?
Section 2(11) of the Act defines "supervisor" as follows:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances,
or effectively to recommend such action, if in connec-
tion with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is
8 There was additional evidence about Ward's inability to get the
maintenance crew to observe the rule of only one coffeebreak and some
evidence the Respondent was not too pleased with the crew's total
performance.
1254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.
As noted earlier, Respondent defended in its answer and
moved for dismissal of the allegation as to Ward because
of the fact that he was a supervisor. When the General
Counsel attempted to introduce evidence that Ward was
only an employee, the Respondent objected to relitigating
the issue because just 3 days before his discharge of
February 4, he had been found to be a supervisor (and
excluded from the unit) by the Board in the representation
case involved herein. Respondent argued orally and in its
brief that under the authority of Heights Funeral Homes,
Inc., 159 NLRB 723, and Thrifty Supply Co., 153 NLRB
370, this issue could not be relitigated under the Board's
rules, Section 102.67.
I believe great weight should be given to the argument
that an employer can safely rely on a determination made
by the Board in a representation proceeding that an
employee is a supervisor and thereafter (at least within a
week) discharge the supervisor under circumstances such
as these.
However, regardless of this possible theory in the nature
of estoppel, I overruled Respondent's objection and
permitted the taking of evidence relating to the question of
whether Ward was an "employee" or a "supervisor" within
the meaning of the Act, under the doctrine enunciated by
Judge Leventhal, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America [Sagamore Shirt Co.] v. N.L.R.B., 365 F.2d 898
(1966). In that case, the court remanded the case to the
Board (which in turn remanded the case to the Trial
Examiner) to "litigate" the supervisory status of floorladies
employed by Sagamore Shirt Co. who had been found
(before the unfair labor practice case began) to be
supervisors in representation Case 11-RC-1886. In Saga-
more Shirt, the supervisory status of the floorladies was
important, because if not found to be supervisors their
alleged antiunion statements could not bind Sagamore
Shirt and no violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act could
be found. Judge Leventhal discussed the difference
between the application of findings in previous representa-
tion cases and unfair labor practices involving alleged
8(a)(5) violations as against unfair labor practices involving
alleged 8(a)(1) violations, (same reasoning would apply to
alleged 8(a)(3) violations as in the instant case) and
concluded as follows:
In our opinion, the Board's rule against relitigation "in
a subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding" does
not give an employer sufficient notice that his failure to
pursue all of his remedies in the representation
proceeding means he will be disabled, regardless of the
context of the subsequent proceeding, from challenging
each and every issue "which was, or could have been,
raised in the representation proceeding." A more
natural reading of the rule, in the absence of express
provision to the contrary, is one which precludes
relitigation only in a "related" subsequent unfair labor
practice proceeding, construed in accordance with the
doctrine announced in Niederriter a few months prior
to the new regulation. Where a company is charged
with refusal to bargain with a union certified after
election, the proceeding is sufficiently "related" to the
representation proceeding to preclude relitigation of
such common issues as the scope of the appropriate
unit and employees therein. Where, however, as in this
case, the part of the charge involved in the relitigation
issue is not refusal to bargain, but rather interference
with rights of organization, the proceedings are not so
related as to foreclose presentation to the Board of the
underlying issues.
This construction of section 102.67(f) of the Board's
rules which estop relitigation in a related proceeding, is
in accordance with the long-held objective of avoiding
undue and unnecessary delay in representation elec-
tions. There will be cases where an employer will be as
interested as the Board in holding a speedy election
and will be willing to forego the presence of a given
employee in the unit or his vote in the tally. We see no
basis for assuming that the Board wishes to require
such an employer to delay the election while he
completely litigates subsidiary questions, such as
supervisory status, in an effort to protect his rights in
the future on matters other than the determination of
the unit and eligible voters therein. [Footnote omitted.]
In the interest of clarity we may note that the Trial
Examiner and the Board need not allow the Company
to relitigate the issue completely. The evidence at the
earlier hearing need not be reheard but could, as it was
in this case, be incorporated into the record, upon
being specifically identified. The findings of the
Regional Director may be accorded "persuasive rele-
vance," a kind of administrative comity, aiding the
Examiner and the Board in reaching dust decisions,
subject however to power of reconsideration both on
the record already made and in the light of any
additional evidence that the Examiner finds material
and helpful to a proper resolution of the issue.
The Evidence as to Ward's Supervisory Status
Tom Bolick was no longer an employee of Respondent
when he testified. But he had been employed at Respon-
dent approximately 2 years until he quit in May. He was
the plant engineer 'and was responsible for maintenance,
engineering, power plant, steam plant, water facilities, and
fuel and had approximately 15 people under him. He was
directly responsible to Plant Manager Langevin.
Bolick testified that shortly after full operation of the
plant began by late 1970 he "wasn't able to handle the crew
efficiently by [himself ]" so he asked Langevin for "supervi-
sory assistance preferably of the lead man type." He "felt
the crew was too small for a full-time foreman." With
Langevin's approval, he appointed Ward as mechanical
leadman and Roger Meade as electrical leadman.
Bolick further testified that he called Ward and Meade
into his office (at separate times) and told them that they
would be leadmen with an increase in pay and that they
would directly supervise the crews, Meade's crew to be
composed of electrical-oriented people and Ward's crew
would be mechanically-oriented; and they were to assign
jobs to these men and to check that the jobs were done
properly. The leadmen were responsible that the jobs were
done right.
ABITIBI CORPORATION 1255
Bolick called a meeting the following day of the entire
maintenance crew and told them that Ward and Meade
would be leadmen and for the crews to report directly to
them. He told them the leadmen would assign jobs and
check on them to make sure the work orders were properly
filled out and report back to him. He read a list of the
names of those who would report to Ward and those who
would report to Meade. Bolick also told the crews that only
he or Will Vogel or the leadmen could approve overtime.
And he testified that both Ward and Meade requested and
approved overtime for their crew members. They did not
have to check with Bolick before approving overtime.
On work priorities, according to Bolick, he had periodic
discussions of job orders or shutdown lists with Vogel and
the leadmen in order to determine which person would be
the best to do the particular job. Usually the production
people would give him the priorities, but sometimes the
priorities would be set according to the suggestions of the
leadmen . In situations where anyone could do the job, or
where particular skill was not needed, there was generally
no discussion and job orders would be given the leadmen
for job assignment by them to whom they wished to do the
job.
In emergencies , the department heads or supervisors
would come to Bolick or the leadmen and the jobs would
be done before ajob order was even written up. Bolick had
informed the department heads of this emergency proce-
dure, and the leadmen (when the department head came to
them and not to Bolick) would get the job done without
first checking with Bolick, unless they disagreed with its
needing to be done. Ward admitted that Berkenbine and
Coleman had come directly to him for men to be sent to
the manufacturing department. On occasion, Ward direct-
ed employees in the maintenance department to come in at
night to do emergency work and had come in himself, all
without first securing Bolick's approval.
Bolick testified that the leadmen had recommended
hiring persons. Meade had recommended hiring a boiler
operator, and Ward had recommended hiring Billy Ray
Billings who was hired as an oiler on Ward's recommenda-
tion after first having been turned down by Bolick.
Leadmen were told by Bolick to enforce work rules.
Bolick testified that Ward argued against and did not
enforce the work rule about having only one coffeebreak
per day.
There was evidence by Bolick that if men in Ward's crew
wanted time off of work they were to call,him (Bolick). If
he were not available, they were to call Ward; if he were
not available, they were to call Vogel; and finally, if he
were not available, they were to call Swift. Ward, on the
other hand, testified that he had no authority to let a
person off and he referred all requests to Bolick. I credit
Bolick , yet it is understandable that Ward may not have
exercised his powers to the fullest possible extent.
Employee Sidney O. Anderson, called as a witness by the
General Counsel, testified that he "worked for him
[Ward ]."
From all the evidence as to Ward's supervisory status
developed at this trial, crediting Bolick where there was
conflict, and being mindful of the "persuasive relevance"
of the findings of the Regional Director in the previous
representation case that Ward was a supervisor, I find that
Ward was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. The
critical factors are subtle and vaned. Possession of any one
of the powers enumerated in the statue is sufficient to
establish supervisory status N.L.R.B. v. Elliott-Williams
Company, 345 F.2d 463 (C.A. 7); Ohio Power Company v.
N.L.R.B., 176 F.2d 385 (C.A. 6). Ward did exercise
responsible independent judgment in assigning jobs to the
maintenance crew. He periodically engaged in meaningful
discussions with Bolick and Vogel in priority as to job
assignments to the men in his crew, and his recommenda-
tions were given serious consideration and often followed.
And he had the authority to enforce work rules, make
overtime assignments, and grant time off.
Because he was a supervisor, his discharge under the
circumstances of this case when he was not carrying out
lawful company policy was not a violation of the Act.
Respondent's motion to dismiss this allegation in the
complaint made at the hearing, and on which ruling was
reserved until this discussion, is hereby granted.
William E. Pegram: William E. Pegram was discharged
on February 9. He was employed by Respondent from July
1970 until February 9. He had been hired as a class B
mechanic and when discharged was a class A mechanic
scheduled to attend a special hydraulic school in Michigan
on February 15. Respondent was going to pay for this
additional schooling. It is also uncontested that when
Pegram was hired he listed as previous employers Bethle-
hem Steel Corporation and Southern Screw which were
both unionized companies; and he testified that, when
Swift interviewed him, he was told that Respondent would
check all previous employers as references. According to
Pegram, he first became aware of union activities in
December 1970 and signed a union card on December II
which had been given him by Ward. Apparently, he had
never received any warnings about his job or attitude prior
to his discharge; and he had had no arguments with -bosses,
nor had he been accused of being insubordinate prior to
the discharge incident. As to direct knowledge of Pegram's
union activities, Swift admitted that he did not know if
Pegram personally was sympathetic toward the Union, but
he was within that group that was sympathetic toward the
Union; and the evidence tends to show' that Swift was'
referring to the maintenance group in which Pegram was
employed.- However, as noted above, Beasley credibly
testified that his foreman, Coleman, had told Beasley that
he had seen Pegram with union cards and that Respondent
"knew or thought that he [Pegram] was more or less
involved" in the Union. Coleman had also asked Beasley if
Pegram was pushing the Union. Pegram did not testify as
to his union activities other than signing his own card. As
noted earlier, Pegram testified that in January, around the
25th or 27th, Larry Sloop told him that he had heard that
Pegram and Ward were big pushers for the Union.9
Pegram also testified that, on February 6 after Ward's
9 This was the extent of Pegram's testimony when first questioned He 9 a in when he said he told it to employees including Ward , Rhmehard,
later added that Sloop told him Ward would be first to go and he would be Pardue , Watson, Higgings. and Foster But Pegram had not linked Sloop to
number two The first time he told his latter story was on February 4 about the story All Pegram told the group of employees was that he had heard
(Continued)
1256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
discharge, he went to Sloop and asked him if his prediction
still held true that Ward was the number one to be fired
and that he, number two, was going to go. According to
Pegram , Sloop "acted like he didn't know what I was
talking about. I told him what he'd told me [in January],
and he denied making the statement." Sloop also denied
making the statement when he testified at the trial. I credit
Sloop over Pegram and find that he did not tell Pegram
that Ward and Pegram were big pushers for the Union or
that Ward was number one to be fired because of the
Union and Pegram was number two. Pegram did not
impress me as a frank and candid witness. He appeared to
be going out of his way to favor Ward and tarnish Sloop.
He was not trusted by his fellow employees as they
believed he had caused Ward to be fired in order that he
could get Ward's job. He admitted that on the evening of
Ward's discharge, one employee, Wellborn, threatened to
beat him up because the others didn't think he was with
them or the Union. I was of the distinct impression that the
only reason Pegram was on the side of Ward and the
Union was because he also had been fired and he wanted
hisjob back regardless of the truth.
Pegram's Discharge
When Ward was discharged on the afternoon of
February 4 at about 2 p.m., he went to "Mable's " (also
referred to as Sparks Music Center) and there drank beer
for some 10 hours. As the men from Ward's crew got off
work that afternoon, they joined Ward at Mable's so that
by 7 p.m. several employees including Owens Dobbins,
Perry Wellborn, Dick Watson, Bobby Anderson, Bobby
Hunt , Sidney Anderson, and Bill Pegram had joined him.
Charles Pack, Melvin Wood, and Mable Sparks were also
there. Ward was angry at being terminated believing that
he had been fired because of his union activities. He also
thought that someone, possibly seeking his job as leadman,
had told Respondent of his union activities. During the
evening , Ward commented to the effect that Pegram was
the man who wanted his job. Some of the other employees
harassed Pegram believing he was not "with them"; and, as
noted above, Wellborn threatened to beat him up. Pegram
testified that he got into his car about 7:30 and drove away
from Mable's but after driving some 2 miles decided to
return to Mable's to "set the record straight" with his
fellow employees.
According to Pegram, he remained at Mable's until
around 9:30 p.m. when he left for home. According to Will
Vogel, Ward telephoned him at his home at about
10:00-10:30 p.m. on the day of his discharge. Ward wanted
to know why he had been fired but Vogel knew nothing
about it. In the same telephone conversation, Bill Pegram
got on the phone, called him some dirty names, and told
him he had six witnesses who knew that Vogel knew that
Ward was for the Union and said "we were going to get
[you]." At the conclusion of the call which had "fright-
ened" him, he called Plant Manager Langevin and told
him that he had a call from Ward and Pegram and
Pegram's call "upset" him quite a bit. The next day the
personnel supervisor, Swift, asked Vogel to go to the
finishing office and discuss the phone call with him, telling
Vogel that Langevin had told him about the call. Vogel
told Swift what Pegram had told him on the telephone. The
following day which was Saturday, February 6, Swift asked
Vogel to sit in while Swift questioned Pegram about the
phone call. Swift asked Pegram if he had made the call,
and Pegram denied making the call. Vogel also testified
that about half an hour before he got the phone call, on his
way home, he passed Sparks Music Company and noticed
the cars of Pegram, Ward, and Pack parked in front. He
also had told this to Swift. Vogel had nothing to do with
the termination of Pegram. After Pegram had denied
making the phone call in the presence of Vogel, Swift said
that they would carry out further investigations and that
ended the interview.
Swift asked Pack, Respondent's materiel supervisor,
whose car had been spotted at Mabel's by Vogel, to go to
Mable's and investigate the call.
According to Pack's credited and uncontraverted testi-
mony, Langevin and Swift asked him if he would go back
to Mable's and find out who was there on the evening that
Vogel had received the threatening telephone call and if
the call had been made from Mable's. Accordingly, he
returned to Mable's. The following is the transcript of his
investigation:
A. Well, I went in and Mable was alone; and I
asked Mable what time all the drunks left; and she
says, well, 12:00 or midnight; and I said, "Muncie was
pretty high, wasn't he?"
And she said, "No, he wasn't high. He was mad."
I said, "at me?"
She said, "No, at Bill Pegram."
I said, "Why is that?"
She said, "Well, Muncie thought that Bill was the
one that had something to say in getting him fired."
I said, "They are neighbors and friends. I don't see
how this could be."
She said, "Well, I know Bill Pegram and his whole
family. I wouldn't trust them as far as I could throw
them."
Q. Did she say anything about Vogel?
A. Yes, she said they got on the telephone, and I
don't guess I will be working with Will Vogel any more.
They called him up and put the scare into him."
Q. You said she said "they"? Who had you been
talking about?
A. We had been talking about Bill and Muncie.
Q. After you talked to Mable, did you tell anybody
at the company about this conversation.
A. Well, I left then and went straight home. I did
call Mr. Langevin and tell him that the telephone call
was made there, and that they made the telephone call.
In summary, Pack investigated the telephone call on
Monday night, February 8, and reported to Langevin the
same night that Ward and Pegram had called Vogel on the
night of Ward's discharge. Swift testified that Pack
reported to him the following day that "they" meaning
Ward and Pegram, had made the telephone call to Vogel.
that Ward was number one to be fired because of the Union, and that he
was number two Pegram also erroneously identified Rhmehard and Pardue
as supervisors
ABITIBI CORPORATION
Swift then called in Pegram and discharged him for
insubordination based upon the threatening call to Vogel.
There was evidence adduced at the trial by the General
Counsel that the one who made the threatening telephone
call was Melvin Herman Wood and that Pegram did not in
fact make the threatening telephone call. Mabel Sparks,
although not in disagreement with the testimony of Pack,
testified that Wood took the telephone from Ward's hands
and threatened Vogel. Wood himself testified as to what he
told Vogel and Pegram denied making the telephone call
the two or three times that Swift accused him of having
made it.
Conclusions as to Pegram
The facts established are that Pegram was a good
employee and the Company thought well enough of him to
pay for further training for him. The Company knew at the
time Pegram was hired that Pegram had worked for two
different employers who were unionized, and Pegram's
testimony at the trial established that his union activities
were limited to his signing a union card (as did many other
employees). There was evidence that other employees
passed out many union cards and engaged in more union
activity than Pegram and nothing happened to them. There
is no credited evidence that the Employer was manufactur-
ing any evidence that would give them a good excuse to
discharge Pegram. Vogel is credited in his singular belief
that Pegram called him names and threatened him in the
telephone conversation on the evening of February 4 and
so informed the plant manager, Langevin, immediately
after the threat. The investigation conducted by Swift and
Langevin disclosed that Ward and Pegram had telephoned
Vogel and that they had put a scare in Vogel. Vogel is an
admitted supervisor, and I find that Pegram was dis-
charged by Swift for this act of insubordination in
telephoning Vogel and cursing him and threatening him in
the conversation. Accordingly, the General Counsel has
not sustained his burden of proof that the telephone
conversation was merely a pretext and that the real reason
why Pegram was fired was for his union activities.
Accordingly, I hereby grant Respondent's motion to
dismiss the allegation, which motion had been made at the
trial but on which ruling had been reserved. I will
recommend that this allegation in the complaint be
dismissed.
C. Case 11-CA-4506
The complaint in this case alleged that a majority of the
employees in the unit described above in Case
I I-RC-3247 had designated or selected the Union as their
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining with
Respondent since on or about November 14, 1970; that the
Union is the exclusive representative of the employees in
the unit; that the Union has been requesting Respondent
to bargain collectively with it; and that commencing on or
about December 22, 1970, Respondent has refused to
bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act. Respondent admitted that it refused to
bargain with the Union but denied the majority status or
the exclusive representative status of the Union.
1257
As noted above, in Case I1-RC-3247 a secret ballot
election had been held on February 25 which was lost by
the Union. As of February 25 there were approximately 86
eligible employees of which 43 cast valid votes against the
Union and 38 cast valid votes for the Union with 5
challenged ballots. The General Counsel adduced witness-
es that testified that the Union undertook an organization-
al drive at Respondent's plant in late November or early
December, 1970. Testimony concerning the signing of 47
union authorization cards was presented by the General
Counsel. The attached addendum is a chart of union
authorization cards identifying the employee signing and
with columns designating whether or not I believe the card
should be counted as a valid authorization card, and, if
not, the reasons therefor.
Conclusions as to Case I1 -CA-4506
Totaling the number of cards above that I would count
as wanting the Union without an election, I have 15.
Totaling the number of cards above that I count as having
been signed only to go to an election, I have 31.
Accordingly, I find the Union never had a majority of the
employees wanting it to be their collective-bargaining
representative.
The reasons for my conclusion above are simply stated. I
observed the witnesses as they testified, and I am
convinced that those who signed cards on the oral
representation of the one passing out the cards that they
were for an election, signed them for that purpose only and
not for union representation although that was in the "fine
print" on the card. Union Representative Blalock never
testified, but witnesses credibly testified that he told them
in groups and in meetings that the cards were for an
election and he gave out cards to be distributed by the
employees after making these statements. Accordingly, any
employee who passed out a card with this statement was
acting as his agent as to the reason for the card. Blalock
knew it was necessary to suggest to employees that the card
was for an election; and he knew that he would not get a
majority without an election or he would not have said the
cards were for an election; and an election was held. To
attempt now to bind the employees to the writing on the
card is a deliberate fraud. I am persuaded by my
observation of them that these employees were more
inclined to honor the word of a man than the writing on a
card, and were not suspicious enough of his word to ask
him to scratch out the wording on the card and insert that
it was only for an election. Accordingly, if Union
Representative Blalock or a fellow employee told him the
card was for an election, that representation was good
enough for him. Good faith in collective bargaining and in
union representation requires good faith in words and deed
and might as well start that way. The Board's decisions
clearly instruct union organizers that the Board will not
certify a union which receives a majority of cards on a
deliberate misrepresentation that the cards are for an
election.
As the General Counsel has not established that the
Union represented an uncoerced and not deliberately
misled majority of employees when it requested Respon-
dent to bargain with it, the Respondent is under no
1258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
obligation , under the circumstances , to bargain and its
refusal to bargain did not violate Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act.
Accordingly, I hereby grant Respondent 's motion made at
the hearing, but on which ruling was reserved , that the
complaint in Case 11-CA-4506 be dismissed in its entirety.
The Remedy
Having found that Abitibi Corporation has engaged in
(certain conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I
shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom. In addition, I have found that these violations
have affected the voters' free choice in the election of
February 25 in Case 11-RC-3247; and I will recommend
that the election be set aside and a new election held in the
same unit at such time as the Regional Director shall
determine a free election can be held. Having found that
the General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Abitibi Corporation engage in
violations of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act in other particulars.
and that he has likewise failed to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Abitibi Corporation violated
Section 8(a)(3) by the discharge of Ward and Pegram and
refused to bargain in good faith, I shall recommend that
,the complaint be dismissed as to these alleged violations of
Section 8(a)(1)(3) and (5) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Abitibi Corporation is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in
,commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
,the Act.
2. International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO,
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. As to Cases 11-CA-4482 and 11-CA-4488,
(a) The General Counsel has established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Abitibi Corporation has violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as set out in paragraphs 7(a), (b),
(c), and (d) of the complaint; and of the evidence that
Abitibi Corporation violated the Act as set out in the
complaint in paragraphs 7(e) and (f) and paragraph 8.
4. As to Case I1-CA-4506, the General Counsel has
not established by a preponderance of the evidence that
Abitibi Corporation has violated the Act as set out in the
complaint.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I hereby make the following recommended:
ORDER
In Case 11-RC-3247• The election conducted on
February 25, 1971 , is set aside and a new election is to be
directed by the Regional Director for Region II as set
forth in the section entitled "The Remedy," above.
In Cases 11-CA-4482 and 11-CA-4488: The Abitibi
Corporation , its officers , agents , successors , and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening its employees that they might be
discharged because of the Union.
(b) Interrogating its employees as to the identity of those
who are pushing the Union.
(c) Interrogating its employees concerning the Union orl
other concerted activities.
(d) Informing its employees that it had contacted their ,
creditors for the purpose of putting pressure on them to
vote against the Union.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form , join , or assist
International Woodworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any,
other labor organization , or to engage in other concerted,
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
,mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any and all'
such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Post at its place of business in its plant at Roaringi
River , North Carolina, copies of the notice attached hereto
marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice , on forms',
provided for the Regional Director for Region 11, shall,
after being signed by the Respondent 's representative, be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days'
thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places-
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure
that such notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by
any other material.
(b) Notify said Regional Director, in writing , within 20
days from the receipt of this decision , what steps it has
taken to comply herewith.ii
The complaint is dismissed as to all other allegations.
In Case 1I -CA-4506 : The complaint is dismissed in its
entirety.
10 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
11 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, notify said Regional Director, in writing,
within 10 days of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith
ABITIBI CORPORATION
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that they may
be discharged because of International Woodworkers
of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT question our employees as to the
identity of those who are pushing for the International'
Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other
union.
WE WILL NOT question our employees concerning
their union or other concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT put pressure on our employees to vote
against the International Woodworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
1259
the International Woodworkers of America, AFLr-CIO
or any other labor organization, or to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities.
Dated By,
ABITIBI CORPORATION
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1624
Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston-
Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 919-723-9211,
Extension 360.
1260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ADDENDUM
Union Card Don't
For Count Count Reason for Not Counting
John Allen X
Muncie Ward
Terry Hampton
William Pegram x
X Watson , who gave him the card, told
him it was to get an election. He
is a supervisor.
He was asked to sign the card in order
to get an election . He was told he
was not obligated to join the Union
and a lot of people had signed the
cards but not a majority.
Robert Beasley X He was told the card was for an
election and he could go any way he
wished in the election and he was
under no obligation to the Union.
He was also told that a majority had
signed.
Thomas Mastin X
Nelson Brown X He was told the card would get union
representation in an election.
Hugh Evans X He was told the card was to have an
election.
Bobby Anderson
William Sturdivant X
Aubrey Carrier X
Sidney Anderson X
David Ratliff
X He was told the cards would be sent
to the Board so there could be an
election and at the election the
employees could decide whether they
wanted a union or not.
X He was told the only reason for the
card was to get an election.
Carris Church X He was told that if they got enough
cards for the Union there would be an
election.
ABITIBI CORPORATION 1261
Union Card
For
Perry Wellborn
Don' t
Count Count
Henry Shaffner X
Gilbert Sloop
Bobby Hunt
Lavan Sally X
Randy Wall X
Jack Waddell X
Robert Minton X
Harold Holcomb X
Douglas Harris
John Gentry
Joe Bauguess
Calvin Anderson
Steve Blackburn
Mack Triplett
X
X
X
X
X
X
Reason for Not Counting
He was told that so many cards had to
be signed up before there could be an
election . He handed out cards telling
employees to sign so that there can be
"an election to determine if we want a
union."
Same reason as Adolph.
Union organizer Blalock told him that
he wanted to get enough cards signed
so they could have an election for a
union . Hunt then passed out cards to
other employees telling some that
they were for an election.
Hunt told him the card was for an
election.
Same as Harris.
Same as Harris.
Union Organizer Blalock explained
that they wanted to get as many cards
signed as possible to get an election.
Perry Wellborn gave him the card and
told him that they had 40-some odd
cards that had been signed so that
they could have an election. As it
was for an election, Triplett said he
was glad to sign a card.
1262
James Shepherd
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Andrew Newman X
Benjamin Norman X
Owens Dobbins
Robert Hutchinson
Ronnie Ray
Richard Watson
Charles Adolph
Billy Ray Billings
Charlie Foster
Richard Holloway
Frelin Nichols
Larry Porter
Gene Williams
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Larry Wagoner told him the card was
for an election and if he didn't want
an election not to sign.
He was told by Union Representative
Blalock , who gave him the cards, that
if a majority signed cards they would
have an election. In turn he passed
out cards and told employees what
Blalock had told him.
He was told the card was for an
election.
He was told that there had to be a
certain number of people to sign a
card before they could have an
election.
Union Representative Blalock explained
to him that , until they got 51 percent
of the employees signed, there would
be no chance of an election . He passed
out cards and told this to others. He
testified "How can you have representa-
tion until you vote on something to
decide whether or not you want to be
represented?"
He was told by Watson that he needed
the cards for an election because there
could not be representation without an
election.
Same reason as Adolph.
Same reason as Adolph.
Same reason as Adolph.
Same reason as Adolph.
Same reason as Adolph.
Same reason as Adolph.
4
V
ABITIBI CORPORATION 1263
Larry Wagoner X Gary Wagoner , his brother , gave him
the card telling him it was for an
election ". . . if we wanted to have
an election , to sign , and if not,
not to sign."
Gary Wagoner X Bobby Hunt who gave him the card told
him the card was for an election.
Union Representative Blalock said the
only reason he wanted a card was for
an election.
James Ward X Richard Watson who gave him the card
told him it was to get a majority
of the employees up for an election.
Jim Cox X Erick Rogers gave him the card and
told him ". . . that it was just
enough to get a percentage to have an
election."
Total Cards 15 31
it U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1975 0-503-960