A. J. Sackett and Sons Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 26, 1962

139 N.L.R.B. 1272 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

1272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
arguments , and opinions providing the expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.
The law is clear that an employer may assemble his employees on his own time
and tell them his opinion of the labor organization , and, short of threatening them
with reprisal or force or promising them a benefit , he does not commit an unfair
labor practice . If he can do this to a "captive audience " surely he can do it as an
invitee to the home of an employee . He can express his views , arguments, and
opinions, subject to the above proviso , in a church , a club , a tavern , or on a street
corner. The right of free speech under Section 8(c) of the Act is not limited as
to place, but only as to content.
Care must be exercised in not confusing conduct which is sufficient , under Board
and court law, to cause an election to be held again and conduct which amounts to
an unfair labor practice . For example , the same conduct might cause an election
to be rerun but might not be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Section
8(c) specifically applies only to unfair labor practices , as it says the expressing of
any views, etc ., ". . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor prac-
tice ..., if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." [Emphasis added .] Accordingly, home visits to employees with their
permission by managerial supervisors and agents during a union organizational cam-
paign , for the purpose of influencing the vote of the employees in a pending elec-
tion, is not a violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
3. The Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, as alleged.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
upon the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed
in its entirety.
A. J. Sackett and Sons Co . and United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO. Case No. 5-CA-2150. November 26, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 1, 1962, Trial Examiner Joseph I. Nachman issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermedi-
ate Report. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent
had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to
the Intermediate Report together with a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Rodgers, Fanning, and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this
139 NLRB No. 113.
A. J. SACKETT AND SONS CO. 1273
case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions,2 and recommen-
dations of the Trial Examiner, except as herein noted.
ORDER
The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the
Trial Examiner.3
1 No exceptions have been filed to the findings of the Trial Examiner that the Respond-
ent interfered with, restrained, or coerced Its employees In violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. In the absence of exceptions, we adopt these findings pro forma.
2 We agree with the Trial Examiner' s findings that the Respondent did not discrimina-
torily discharge employee Luberecki in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
In this regard, we rely not only on those reasons advanced by the Trial Examiner In the
Intermediate Report, but also on the fact that General Counsel' s witness , Antczak, ad-
mitted that Supervisor Hart also had Instructed him (Antczak) to perform a similar
grinding operation In a standing position.
8 The Appendix attached to the Intermediate Report is hereby modified by deleting the
words "60 days from the date hereto" In the next to the last paragraph of the notice and
inserting in its place the words "60 consecutive days from the date of posting... .
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, heard on June 15, 1962, in Baltimore, Maryland, before Trial
Examiner Joseph I. Nachman, involves allegations that A. J. Sackett and Sons Co.,
herein called Respondent, violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act.' All parties
were represented at the hearings and were afforded full opportunity to present
evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally on the record.
Briefs from Respondent and the General Counsel have been received and considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a Maryland corporation, with its principal office and place of busi-
ness of Baltimore, Maryland, is engaged in the manufacture of chemical processing
machinery. In the course and conduct of its business, Respondent annually receives
from, and ships to, points and places outside the State of Maryland, goods and
materials valued at in excess of $50,000. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is,
and at all times material has been, engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act
to assert jurisdiction herein.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The parties stipulated, and I find, that United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES INVOLVED
A. The interference, restraint, and coercion
1. The facts
Early in March 1962 the Union began an organizational campaign among Re-
spondent's employees. On March 14 it filed a petition for an election (5-RC-3772,
not published in NLRB volumes) and an election was conducted on April 26, 1962.2
The charge was filed and served April 23 , 1962; complaint issued June 1, 1962.
eExcept for a stipulation which was received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit
No. 2, and oral testimony with respect to the date of the election, the record contains no
Information concerning the proceedings in the representation case. In its brief Respond-
ent states that the Union won the election and is now certified.
1274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Two days prior to the election the employees were addressed in a group by Vice
President Walter Sackett, Jr., at the Company's plant. Employees Davis and Deckle-
man testified that Sackett told the assembled group, among other things, that if the
Union got in and the Company was unable to meet the Union's demands, Respond-
ent would be forced to close the shop, subcontract its production operations, and
operate from its uptown office; and that an offer to purchase Respondent's plant had
been received a few years back, and the matter could now be given further con-
sideration. Respondent's counsel, Skutch, who was present, verified Sackett's state-
ment, saying that the matter had been looked into and he knew it could be done.
Essentially, Sackett's version of this incident is not to the contrary.3 He admitted
that he addressed the assembled employees and that he told them that there was a
possibility of changing the Company's operation because he knew that it could
operate more economically by subcontracting, or as he put it, by subleasing some of
its work. I credit Davis and Deckleman and find that Sackett made the statements
they attributed to him.
The day preceding the election Respondent sent its employees in the unit a letter
which read as follows: 4
Every few years the hungry union organizers force me to discuss your family
security with you at home. I dislike bringing our mutual problems to your home
but I think that your husband's job security is so important to the whole family
that you ought to discuss it together.
On Thursday afternoon the National Labor Relations Board will hold another
election at our plant-this time to find out whether you want to be represented
by the Steelworkers Union or whether you will continue to enjoy job security
and close personal relations you have with us. This is the third time our em-
ployees have been asked to make such a decision. Each time they have decided
that they have greater benefits and security with us than any union could ever
get for them.
You both know that as long as your husband has been with us, he had 52
pay checks each and every year. We made a survey and have not found one
shop where this is true-where employees destinies are controlled by the Steel-
workers.
You know of the long and costly strikes the Steelworkers have so often.
Who benefits, certainly not the employees.
We are proud of what we have done for our people. I think our record of
regular wages is unequalled and I know unsurpassed.
During all the 65 years we have been in business, no one has ever paid a
penny for the privilege of working here. You owe it to yourselves and your
family to keep it so. The dues which the Steelworkers want to extract from
your pay will fatten the Steelworkers pockets-but cannot give you any Security.
In addition to 52 pay days every year-in many cases when we had no
business-you know that we set up a Profit-Sharing Retirement Plan for you
in 1960. All of the people who have worked for us for five or more years have
a substantial interest in this Plan. No union made us do this-no union could.
We did this because, to the extent that we could afford it, we wanted to give
you security when you become unable to work.
We have no idea what the Steelworkers promised you. We sincerely hope
that you will not be misled by relying on promises they can't fulfill. They
cannot increase your pay or give you any benefits you do not have now with-
out our consent and agreement. What can they do for you?
They can force you to walk a picket line-that is the only weapon that they
have-a weapon which the Steelworkers use so often, as all of you have seen.
So before you vote on Thursday, ask yourself:
What can I gain for myself and my family by paying dues and assessments
to the strangers who run the Steelworkers Union?
Can these strangers provide more benefits for me that A. J. Sackett & Com-
pany has and is already giving me?
Do I want to swap 52 pay days a year for the privilege of walking a picket
line at the Steelworkers command?
What will happen to my job and my family if I am on a picket line?
We are sincerely convinced that when you have considered these important
questions you must vote for your own best interests and vote NO, on Thursday.
Skutch did not testify.
* The evidence shows only that the letter referred to was received by employee Miller.
My finding that it was sent to all employees in the unit is based on an admission of that
fact in Respondent 's brief.
A. J. SACKETT AND SONS CO. 1275
I think you will agree that these matters are important enough to discuss
within your family because the Steelworkers Union cannot only wreck your
job security, it can seriously affect your home because your job with us sup-
ports your home-and regardless of who wins this election-there will be no
prejudice or discrimination against anyone.
Please be sure and vote on Thursday regardless of whether you have signed
a card for the Steelworkers-it means nothing-the only thing that counts is
your secret ballot.
2. Conclusions with respect to interference, restraint, and coercion
The speech by Vice President Sackett to the assembled employees was in substance
and effect a threat to close the steel shop if the employees selected union repre-
sentation. The Board has uniformly held such to be proscribed by Section 8(a)(1).5
I so find and conclude. The letter which Respondent admittedly distributed to its
employees likewise violated Section 8(a)(1). The first paragraph of the letter,
as well as the penultimate paragraph thereof, tells the employee that the advent of
the Union is a matter which affects his "job security." The second paragraph states
that in the then imminent Board election the employee must make a choice between
representation by the Union on one hand, and job security on the other. The clear
inference from this statement is that if the Union wins the election their job tenure,
or ,their wages, hours, and working conditions will be impaired. Considered in con-
text, as it must be with the speech made by Vice President Sackett just a day or two
before the letter, referred to above, the coercive character of the letter is clear. The
statement in the letter that regardless of the outcome of the election "there will be
no prejudice or discrimination against anyone," did not neutralize the coercion which
I have found inherent in other portions of the letter. In the minds of the employees
its coercive character would necessarily have been uppermost. Cf. The Pulaski
Rubber Company, 131 NLRB 347, 351-352.
B. The discharge of Anthony Luberecki
1. Background
Luberecki had been employed by Respondent at various intervals since 1954. His
last period of employment was from about August 1959 until his discharge on
April 17, 1962. During this period Luberecki worked in the steel shop. He was,
from the beginning, very active in the Union's organizational campaign. Along
with employee White, Luberecki, as a representative of the Union, attended a hear-
ing at the Board's Regional Office on March 29, and a rescheduled hearing on April 9,
in connection with the representation petition filed by the Union. Luberecki testi-
fied without contradiction that he obtained permission from Supervisor Hart to be
absent from work to attend the aforementioned hearings, but that on the second
occasion Hart, although granting the requested leave, told Luberecki that until
recently he had considered him a "pretty nice guy," but now he "considered him
an. . . . " There is also the undenied testimony which I credit, given by Mrs.
Vogtman, the mother of a young man then employed by Respondent, that Hart
told her to keep her son out of the union activities, that a lot of things that the
employees had been doing had been overlooked "but that the first thing they did
wrong now they were going to be fired." 6
Luberecki himself testified that in late March or early April 1962, he, with two
other employees, went to the union hall during the 12 to 12:30 lunch period, re-
turning an hour late about 1:30. Knowing that they would be queried about their
absence without leave, they agreed to and did tell Hart that they had gone after
hamburgers, and had a flat tire which they had to fix before they could get back to
the plant. After some questioning these employees, including Luberecki, admitted
that the story about the flat tire was a fabrication, and that they had in fact been
to the union hall. Luberecki made this admission in the presence of Hart and
Vice President Walter Sackett. Hart thereupon stated, "Don't you think we can
fire him for taking off from work and not telling us where he went?" Sackett made
no reply, and walked away. However, except for "docking" the three employees
for the time lost, Respondent took no disciplinary action against them.
G See , for example, L'>unswick Quick Freezer, Inc., 119 NLRB 1495: Dan River Mills,
Incorporated, Alabama Division, 121 NLRB 645 ; Hugh Major , d/b/a Major Truck Service,
129 NLRB 322 ; Watertown Undergarment Corporation , 137 NLRB 287.
9 According to Mrs. Vogtman this conversation occurred about 2 months prior to the
hearing, which was on June 15, 1962.
1276 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. The events of April 17, 1962
On April 17, Hart assigned Luberecki to grind a bevel edge on both 4-foot sides
and one 8-foot side of a steel plate three-eighths of an inch thick. The plate, which
weighed about 450 pounds, was by means of a crane placed on trestles, which
stood about 3 feet off the ground. This was done by Luberecki with the assistance
of a helper. According to Luberecki, who is just over 6 feet tall, he began the
work in a standing position using a hand grinder, but a "kink" developed in his
back and he decided to work seated on an inverted 5 gallon paint can; when he
obtained the paint can both of the 4-foot sides of the plate had been completed,
leaving only the 8-foot side to be ground; after obtaining the paint can and resum-
ing work in a seated position, he was approached by Hart who stated that the work
had to be done in a standing position; he told Hart that he had no objection to
doing the work while standing but wanted to get into a more comfortable position
either by sitting on the paint can or by raising the plate to a more comfortable level; 7
that Hart refused to permit him to follow either suggestion, and stated that Luberecki
could either follow instructions or he would be fired; Luberecki argued with Hart
claiming that other employees, specifically mentioning employee Miller, were per-
mitted to do such work while seated, and he could not see why he should not be
permitted to do so; and that the argument was abruptly ended when Hart fired him
and directed that he follow Hart to the office to get his pay.8
In its essential aspects Hart's testimony does not differ materially from that of
Luberecki. In substance, Hart testified that he permits men to sit when grinding
steel plate if the job requires more than a half hour. He justifies this position by
his conclusion that on a small job a man who is seated loses too much time (in rela-
tion to the total time required for the job), in arising from the seat, moving the
seat, and resuming work in the new position.9 Hart further testified that when he
first saw Luberecki undertake to do the grinding while seated, only about 15 min-
utes' work on this job remained (the 8-foot side), and because of the time that
would be wasted moving from one position to another (compared to the time re-
quired to complete the job), he refused to permit Luberecki to work while seated.io
According to Hart, when he refused to permit Luberecki to grind the plate while
seated, the latter stated that he did not want to do that job and asked to be as-
signed to another. Hart refused, telling Luberecki that he would do that job in
accordance with his instructions, or he could get his pay, and that Luberecki there-
upon left the shop saying that he was going to the office to talk to Vice President
Sackett. Hart says that he followed Luberecki to the office and that he there dis-
charged him for his insubordination.ii
7In his testimony Luberecki does not state that he informed Hart of the "kink" in
his back.
8 Employees Miller and Antczak testified that they had ground steel plates while seated.
I find this evidence to be of little value and certainly insufficient to establish any rule,
custom, or practice of permitting such work to be performed in a seated position when-
ever an employee might choose to do so. Miller and Antczak were unable to say that
Hart or any other responsible official of Respondent saw or otherwise learned that they
worked while seated . It also appears that for the most part these employees worked on
plates of one-half inch thickness which, the evidence shows, takes approximately twice
the time as required for a plate of three-eighths inch thickness. In short, their testimony
is not Inconsistent with that of Hart, hereafter set forth, that employees are permitted to
do grinding while seated if the particular job is of such nature as to justify it.
e Hart estimated, and his estimate is not controverted, that on a %-inch plate a man
will normally grind a lineal foot in approximately 2 minutes, and that if seated he would
have to move about every foot if the job is to be performed efficiently. Hart made no
estimate as to the length of time it would take for a man to arise from his seat and re-
sume work In a new position. He did say that this could be done in 2 seconds, "but the
men don't do It in 2 seconds." Luberecki's estimate that this could be done In one-fifth
of a second is rejected as inherently incredible.
10Also because of the time necessary to get a crane and higher trestles, Hart refused
Luberecki's request that the plate be raised
U Hart further testified that "around the first of March," he noticed a change In
Luberecki's attitude; that he became sarcastic, did not seem to care whether he got his
work done or not, or how long it took him, refused to cooperate with fellow employees,
and that he received complaints from his subforemen, who asked that Luberecki not be
assigned to him for the purpose of loading cars. For the most part this is denied by
Luberecki, but I deem it unnecessary to resolve the conflict. In my view the question
whether Luberecki 's discharge was discriminatorily motivated can be determined by the
events of April 17.
A. J. SACKETT AND SONS CO . 1277
3. Conclusions with respect to the discharge of Luberecki
The crucial question is, of course , Hart's motive at the time he discharged
Luberecki. The General Counsel contends that in light of Hart's statement to Mrs.
Vogtman, the events surrounding Luberecki's discharge on April 17 were a mere
pretext deliberately provoked and seized upon by Hart to get rid of an active union
adherent prior to the then scheduled election. Respondent, on the other hand, con-
tends that Luberecki was discharged for insubordination and that his union activity
played no part in the decision to discharge him. Notwithstanding the strong state-
ment of union animus made by Hart to Mrs. Vogtman, and the fact that the Re-
spondent may have welcomed the opportunity of ridding itself of Luberecki, I find
and conclude, for the reasons hereafter stated, that the latter was not discharged
for discriminatory reasons, but solely because of his insubordination.
My observation of Luberecki on the stand convinces me that he is not, to put it
mildly, lacking in arrogance, and that his attitude was a major factor in provoking
the action which Hart took against him. He gave me the definite impression that
he regarded himself immune from disciplinary action because of his membership
in and activities on behalf of the Union. Plainly he enjoys no such immunity.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, 85 NLRB 1222; Chance Vought Aircraft Division
of United Aircraft Corporation, 85 NLRB 183. Hart's explanation for refusing
to permit Luberecki to grind the plate while seated or to raise its level, seems to me to
be reasonable exercise of his authority to operate the shop in what he deemed to be
an efficient and economical manner. I find no basis in the evidence for rejecting
it. I can appreciate that to Hart, Luberecki's conduct on April 17 presented a
challenge to his authority as a supervisor, and when Luberecki attempted to go
over his head by appealing directly to higher authority, that Hart regarded it as a
final act of insubordination which he could not tolerate. In short, I am impressed
by Hart's frank and forthright statement, which I fully credit, that when he dis-
charged Luberecki, "I was mad enough, I didn't even think about the Union."
Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint herein be dismissed insofar as
it alleges that Respondent discriminatorily discharged Luberecki and thereby violated
Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES FOUND UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of Respondent described in section 1, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirma-
tive action which I find necessary to dissipate the effect thereof and to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By the conduct referred to in section 111, above, Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them
by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5 It has not been established by the preponderance of the evidence that by dis-
charging Luberecki, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, as
alleged in the complaint herein.
1278 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is
recommended that the Respondent, A. J. Sackett and Sons Co., its officers, agents,
successors and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening to shut down its plant, to subcontract its operations, or to visit
other acts of reprisal upon its employees if they select union representation
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such
activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Baltimore, Maryland, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
the Fifth Region (Baltimore, Maryland), shall, after being duly signed by a repre-
sentative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.13
It is further recommended that so much of the complaint herein as alleges that
by discharging Anthony Luberecki Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act, be dismissed.
12 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "A De-
cision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommendations of a Trial
Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a
decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words
"Pursuant to a Decision and Order "
13 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director , In writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT threaten to shut down our plant, to subcontract our operations,
or to visit other acts of reprisal upon our employees if they select union
representation.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
and all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment, as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
UNITED FURNITURE WORKERS OF AMERICA, ETC . 1279
All our employees are free to become , remain , or refrain from becoming or re-
maining members of any labor organization.
A. J. SACKETT AND SONS CO.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain :posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 707 North
Calvert Street, Sixth Floor , Baltimore , Maryland , Telephone Number , Plaza 2-8460,
Extension 2100 , if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions.
United Furniture Workers of America , AFL-CIO, and J. Howard
Proudman , Representative and Jamestown Sterling Corpora-
tion . Case No. 3-CB-564. November 26, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 7, 1962, Trial Examiner John F. Funke issued his In-
termediate, Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached
Intermediate Report. The Trial Examiner also found that the Re-
spondents had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices
and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to
such allegations. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respond-
ents filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report and the entire record in the case, including the ex-
ceptions and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner as modified herein.'
I In the absence of exceptions to the failure to find violations based upon the incidents
concerning the throwing of a snowball at employee Anderson , the threatening gesture with
a knife toward the tires of the truck Anderson was driving , and the stone throwing by
Proudman in the lumberyard , we adopt these findings pro forma.
Inasmuch as the Intermediate Report contains ample testimony in support of the
violations found , we do not find it necessary to pass upon the cumulative testimony
which was stricken by the Trial Examiner upon motion of the Respondents . We specifi-
cally affirm the rulings of the Trial Examiner concerning the production of documents
under our Rules and Regulations , Series 8, Section 102.118. See Harvey Aluminum
(Incorporated) et at., 139 NLRB 151.
We add to Conclusion of Law No. 4 the words: "in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of
the Act.
The notice to be posted is hereby amended by striking the words "we hereby notify our
employees that" and substituting the words "we hereby notify you that."
139 NLRB No. 114.