A. Finkl & Sons, Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 20, 1970

180 N.L.R.B. 826 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. Finkl & Sons, Co . and Stanley J. Stepek. Case
13-CA-8825
January 20, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On October 15, 1969, Trial Examiner Harold X.
Summers issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further
found that Respondent had not engaged in certain
other unfair labor practices and recommended that
such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter,
Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a
supporting brief. The General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this proceeding to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions,
cross-exceptions, and briefs, and the entire record in
this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner, with the modification set forth below.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
modified herein, and orders that Respondent, A.
Finkl & Sons, Co., Chicago, Illinois, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Delete the word "other" from the paragraph
1(b) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order,
and substitute therefor the words "like or related."'
2. Delete the word "other" from the paragraph
beginning WE WILL NOT, in any other manner" in
the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision, and substitute therefor the words "like or
related."
'We make this modification in view of Respondent' s long and stable
collective-bargaining relationship with the Union and the absence of any
evidence of union animus.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
HAROLD X. SUMMERS, Trial Examiner: In this
proceeding, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board (herein called the General Counsel and
the Board, respectively) issued a complaint' alleging that
A. Finkl and Sons, Co (herein, Respondent) had engaged
in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act). The answer to the complaint
admitted some of its allegations, denied others, and
pleaded affirmatively; in effect, it denied the commission
of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a
hearing was held before me at Chicago, Illinois, on May
21, 1969; all parties were afforded full opportunity to call
and examine and to cross-examine witnesses, to argue
orally, and thereafter to submit briefs.
Upon the entire record' in the case, including my
evaluation of the reliability of the witnesses based upon
my observation of their demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent, its plant located in Chicago, Illinois, is an
Illinois corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing steel forgings and special steels. During the
calendar or the fiscal year immediately preceding the
issuance of the instant complaint, representative periods,
Respondent sold and shipped directly from its Chicago
plant to states of the United States, other than the State
of Illinois, goods and materials valued at in excess of
$100,000.
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNION
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron
Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers,
AFL-CIO, Lodge 1247 (herein called Boilermakers) acted
as bargaining agent for a unit of Respondent ' s employees
at all times material herein
Boilermakers is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Chronology
In 1946, Boilermakers was certified by the Board as the
exclusive bargaining agent of a unit of Respondent's
nonsupervisory production and maintenance employees.
Since that time, up to and including the date of the
instant hearing, the relationship between Respondent and
Boilermakers, interrupted only by negotiation periods, has
been formalized by a series of collective-bargaining
contracts. In addition, at all times relevant hereto,
Respondent dealt with the "Machinists"' and the
'The complaint was issued on April 23, 1969 The charge initiating the
proceeding was filed on December 31, 1968
'On September 16, 1968 , 1 issued an order to show cause why the
transcript of the hearing herein should not be corrected in specified
respects. No good cause to the contrary having been shown, the corrections
indicated in the order to show cause (which is received in the record as TX
Exh. 1) are hereby ordered made.
'Presumably , a constituent of the International Association of
Machinists.
180 NLRB No. 126
A. FINKL & SONS, CO.
"Electrical Workers"' over the working conditions of
other bargaining units of its employees. Finally, as of the
period involved, Respondent was party to a "cartage
agreement" with a "Teamsters" affiliate.
As of the latter half of 1968,' among their other
benefits, employees of Respondent, including those in the
bargaining unit represented by Boilermakers, were covered
by a group insurance policy issued by General Accident
Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd. (herein called
the insurance company) which provided, among other
things, for the payment of hospital and surgical expenses
arising out of illness or nonoccupational injuries, and for
the payment of disability benefits for loss of worktime due
to illness or nonoccupational injuries.,
On August 31, 1968, by their terms , Respondent's
collective- bargaining agreements with Boilermakers and
with the Machinists expired, and two separate sets of
negotiations on new contracts began at or about that time.
(There are indications in this record that Respondent's
contract with the Electrical Workers had also expired,
but, by agreement, negotiations looking toward a
successor contract were suspended awaiting the results of
the negotiations involving the other two unions.) No new
agreements having been consummated by September 9,
the employees represented by Boilermakers and the
Machinists went out on strike; and the employees
represented by the Electrical Workers and the Teamsters
honored their picket lines.
During all times material herein, Stanley J. Stepek, the
individual who filed the unfair labor practice charge
initiating this proceeding , has been and is (1) an employee
of Respondent within the bargaining unit represented by
Boilermakers and (2 ) secretary-treasurer of Boilermakers.
One of those who went out on strike on September 9, he
thereafter engaged in picket line duty and received strike
benefits. In addition, on the basis of his office in
Boilermakers, he played a part in the distribution of
benefits to strikers: specifically, he was one of the two
who acted as directors of the strike benefit fund; each
week, he or the other director dispatched strike benefit
application forms to the Boilermakers ' International
office; he received the weekly overall benefit check from
the International office and deposited it in a local bank;
he or the other director picked up the preprepared
individual benefit checks from the bank, and each of them
countersigned these checks; and he or the other director
turned the checks over to Boilermakers ' stewards for
distribution.
On September 27, late at night, Stepek was one of
five persons picketing Respondent's plant when a number
of strangers assailed them . Stepek was stabbed , two other
pickets were otherwise injured, and all three were
hospitalized.' Stepek was in the hospital for several weeks.
'Not further identified in this record. However, back in 1946, a local of
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers had been certified as
bargaining agent for a unit composed of Respondent 's maintenance
electricians and helpers.
'Unless otherwise indicated , all dates referred to herein fall within the
calendar year 1968.
'The pertinent Boilermakers' collective-bargaining agreements
incorporate the benefits provided by the insurance policy, except that they
specify that both illnesses and injuries , to be covered , must result from
nonoccupational causes.
'There is no allegation , or evidence , that the attack was in any way
imputable either to Respondent or Boilermakers ; in fact - although
details are hazy - it appears that the only connection with the parties or
with the strike with which this case is concerned is the possibility that
robbery was the motive a motive related to the fact that Stepek may
827
In answer to early queries by hospital personnel
concerning Stepek's - and the others' - status as
employees and the existence of hospitalization/surgery
insurance, Respondent, through a representative, gave
answers which permitted the hospital and surgical
expenses of the three to be paid. These expenses were
subsequently paid by insurance company checks.
On November 22, at separate meetings, the employees
represented by Boilermakers and those represented by the
Machinists respectively ratified the terms of new
agreements which were presented to them. In effect, these
actions signaled an end to the strike, and Respondent's
employees returned to work, as needed, throughout the
period from November 25 to December 2.
Because of the injuries suffered by him on September
27, Stepek was unable to return to work until December
26. He did report for work on the latter date and,
thereafter, has been continuously employed by
Respondent.
Within apt time - prior to December 2 - Stepek
applied for disability benefits - i.e., benefits for the
period of time lost due to his injuries. Respondent through
Richard Burgess, its director of industrial relations,
almost immediately rejected Stepek's claim.'
It should be noted that claims for hospital and surgical
expenses are normally filed with and passed upon by the
insurance company; and (if allowed) they are paid directly
by insurance company check. Claims for sickness/ accident
(i.e., disability) benefits, on the other hand, are filed with
Respondent, which requires, among other things, the
submission of doctor's statements. Thereupon, without
consultation with the insurance company, Respondent's
officials grant or deny these claims. If the former,
Respondent issues and remits checks in payment. Only
after making and effectuating a disability decision does
Respondent send notification to the insurance company,
along with substantiating material. On occasion, the
insurance company has submitted followup requests for
additional information, but, insofar as is revealed by this
record, it has never reversed a disability decision by
Respondent. I find that Respondent's decision in this
respect carries dispositive weight.
As indicated, Respondent rejected Stepek's disability
claim . The assigned reason for the rejection was the
asserted belief that the conditions of the policy were not
met: Stepek's was not a nonoccupational injury; at the
time of the attack, he was, in effect, employed by an
employer (Boilermakers) (1) because, as a supposed
condition for receiving strike benefits, he was picketing for
Boilermakers , and (2) because - Respondent understood
- the motivation for the attack was the fact that the
attackers, having seen Stepek handle strike-benefit funds
away from the picket line, may have believed he was
carrying funds for Boilermakers at the time in question.
On or about December 26, after Stepek returned to
work, he re-raised the subject of his disability payments,
with Burgess. Burgess reiterated that he was not entitled
to them. Thereupon, Stepek visited the Regional Office of
the Board at Chicago and filed the unfair labor practice
charge initiating this proceeding.
have been seen signing, handling , and/or transmitting strike benefit checks
at a nearby tavern.
'There is some indication in this record that one of the two others
injured in the course of the September 27 attack on the picket line also
filed a claim for disability payments and that his claim was likewise
rejected . The denial of his benefits , however, was not a subject of litigation
herein
828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Subsequently the date is not specified in this record
a grievance was filed with Respondent on behalf of a
number of employees . Included was Stepek ' s complaint
about the disposition of his claim for disability benefits.'
At the suggestion of Burgess , apparently based on the fact
that the instant case was pending , Stepek ' s name10 was
stricken ," and this course was pursued no further.
A number of additional findings are here in order: (I)
Stepek received no salary as secretary -treasurer of
Boilermakers , but he did receive expense money on a
monthly basis. (2) He received no compensation for his
activities as codirector of the strike - benefit fund. (3)
During the strike against Respondent , he, along with other
strikers , received strike benefits -- $30 for weeks in
which he was eligible . Finally (4), eligibility for strike
benefits for a given week was not dependent upon
picketing that week ; rather, it was based upon whether the
claimant had been totally unemployed.
To fill out the picture, it should be noted (5) that a
number of other employees of Respondent, in the
Machinists ' and the Electrical Workers' units as well as in
the Boilermakers ', received disability benefits during part
or all of the period covered by the strike , some of them
resulting from injuries sustained during the strike period
but not at the picket line; likewise (6), hospital and
surgical expenses of "quite a few" of Respondent's
employees , incurred during the strike period , were paid for
under the group insurance policy.'r
B. Discussion-Conclusions
It is the denial of Stepek's claim for disability benefits
which is the sole matter of contention herein."
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that an
employee's peaceful picketing outside his employer's plant
during a strike is a union or protected concerted activity;
that Stepek was engaged in such activity when he was
injured; and that "it is evident that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act when it refused to pay Stepek
his disability benefits because he was injured while
engaged in protected activity." Anticipating contrary
arguments based upon a lack of evidence of specific
motivation to discriminate, he quotes from N.L.R B. v.
Erie Resistor Corp ," to the effect that, when conduct is
so discriminatory and so discourages union membership,
whatever the claimed justification may be, that an
employer must have foreseen the consequences of his acts,
further proof of intent is unnecessary. Conceding that the
insurance policy in question would not have required
payment for injuries sustained while Stepek worked for an
employer other than Respondent, General Counsel, relying
upon the facts that Stepek received no salary from
Boilermakers for his services as secretary-treasurer and
'As was that of the other picket whose disability claim had been
rejected
"Also, that of the other disability claimant
"This finding is based upon credible, uncontradicted testimony
Respondent's brief suggests that the testimony that Burgess played a part
is hearsay , but a reading of the transcript reveals that (1) on its face, it was
not hearsay , and (2 ) no objection on this ground was voiced at the time
"For a short period , Respondent took the position that the group
insurance policy was suspended between November I and November 22
Subsequently , however , it reversed itself, and this factor plays no part in
this matter.
131t is stipulated , and I find , that the claim , if approved, would amount
to a $60-per-week payment for the period from September 27 to December
26, 1968 Absent any other problem of eligibility for disability benefits, the
existence of a strike would not have barred payments
that his eligibility for strike benefits depended upon the
same factors as all other strikers factors which did not
include the duty to perform picket work and citing
Board cases" to the effect that strike benefits not geared
to picketing requirements could not be offset against
backpay due a person discharged discriminatorily,
concludes that Stepek was not "employed" when he was
injured -- hence, was entitled to the disability payment In
this respect, General Counsel points to the fact that, in its
prior treatment of the question of Stepek's hospital and
surgical expenses, Respondent had taken a position
inconsistent with the one it took on his disability.
Respondent, conceding that ". . . it is clear that the
Board has jurisdiction over questions arising under a
collective bargaining agreement when an alleged violation
of the agreement also constitutes an unfair labor
practice,"" nevertheless urges that the propriety of
Respondent's interpretation of the term "from
non-occupational causes" is a question of interpretation of
contract with which, under established precedents," the
Board should not concern itself Also, Respondent seeks
to justify its interpretation of Stepek's disability-payment
eligibility on the basis of judicial precedents," in view of
the facts available to Burgess when he made the decision
for Respondent, in consideration of the absence of
evidence of any union animus on its part," and giving due
weight to the fact that Respondent did give disability
benefits to other employees even though they were on
strike Basically, however, Respondent bases its argument
on the assertion that the Board's handling of this matter
on its merits would encourage employees to disregard
established grievance procedures.
Section 10(a) of the Act provides that the Board's
power to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice "shall not be affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise." As the
United States Supreme Court said in N.L.R.B v Strong,
393 U.S. 357, 361 (1969):
the Board may proscribe conduct which is an
unfair labor practice even though it is also a breach of
contract remediable as such by arbitration and in the
courts. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195,
197-198 (1962). It may also, if necessary, . . . interpret
and give effect to the terms of a collective bargaining
contract. N.L R B v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S.
421 (1967).
"373 U S 221, 228.
"Standard Printing Company of Canton, 151 NLRB 963, Rice Lake
Creamery Co. 151 NLRB 1113, affd in pertinent part 365 F.2d 888
(C.A.D C.), Florence Printing Co, 158 NLRB 775, enfd 376 F 2d 216
(C A. 4), cert denied 389 U S 840.
"Respondent 's brief, p 3
"Citing Republic Steel Corporation v. Maddox, 379 U.S 650, Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co , 175 NLRB No 23, Vickers, Incorporated, 153
NLRB 561, 570
"Morgan v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of US, 22 So (2d) 595
(La App ), Equitable Life Assurance Society of US v Bachrach, 120
N.W (2d) 327 (Minn. S.C.)
"Respondent points out, and I find , that Respondent has had
contractual relations with Boilermakers since May 1947; that their first
contract (1947) contained a maintenance of membership clause; and that
their second ( 1950) contained a 30-day union-shop provision I find further
that, in both the contract at whose expiration the strike involved herein
was called, and the contract which has since been executed , there are
provisions for a union shop and for a voluntary dues checkoff Finally, I
find that, in the most recent negotiations , Respondent offered to include a
provision for arbitration of otherwise unadjusted grievances but that
Boilermakers , citing costs, rejected the offer
A. FINKL & SONS, CO.
And this principle is particularly apt where, as here, there
is no provision for arbitration in the involved
collective-bargaining agreement.2°
Of course, the Board, on occasion, has exercised (or has
been told it should have exercised) its discretion against
handling the merits of an unfair labor practice allegation
where there was a question of contract interpretation; and,
as noted earlier, Respondent has cited several precedents
in support thereof. But it should be noted that - aside
from the fact that the cited precedents involved situations
in which arbitration was available for resolution of the
contract disputes the acts there complained of involved
employers' good-faith contractual interpretations
concerning a refusal to give severance pay," changes in
job-classifications, e2 and the institution of a relief-man
system.23 It is respectfully submitted that, where the
contract-intrepretation involves a possible infringement
upon the employees' right to picket, the Board should not
defer to any other means of disposition of the matter; the
Board must interpret the contract.
The insurance policy in question, in pertinent part,
provides that:
If the employee while covered under the policy becomes
totally and continuously disabled because of
non-occupational injuries sustained while the coverage is
in force . . and during such disability thereby is
prevented from performing any and every duty of his
occupation, the Company will pay benefits during such
period ... .
While it is true, as argued by Respondent, that the term
"nonoccupational" means "not of or pertaining to a trade,
occupation or work," the facts in the two cases it cites
therefore' are scarcely helpful here. In one , the plaintiff
was denied nonoccupational insurance benefits for injuries
sustained while using free transportation, furnished by her
employer, from her workplace and the plant entrance,
between which points employees' own automobiles were
not allowed; the court noted that employers often
furnished such facilities and that injuries arising therefrom
had invariably been held subject to Workmen's
Compensation laws. In the other, the appellant, having
sustained a heart injury in the course of handling
merchandise for his employer, first collected insurance
under a nonoccupational disability insurance policy, then
sought and won an award under a Workmen's
Compensation Act; and the court, having no difficulty in
finding "unjust enrichment," affirmed a judgment for the
insurance company in a suit for the return of the
insurance benefits. And not much more helpful are the
several cases I have found in which injuries which
employees sustained were somewhat related to union
functions.2S
"See N . L.R. B. v . C & C Plywood Corp., supra at 426
"Republic Steel Corporation v. Maddox , supra . It should also be noted
that this was not a Board case ; here , the appellee had filed a suit for
breach of contract instead of pursuing grievance procedures , including
arbitration , available to him.
"Vickers, Inc., supra.
"Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co ., supra.
'4Morgan v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of US, supra, and
Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S.. supra.
"Fegels v , Kaiser-Frazier , 44 N.W. 2d 880 (Mich. S .C.), in which
injuries sustained by an employee while participating in a lunchtime
election were held to have been incurred outside the scope of employment;
and Kennedy v. Thompson Lumber Co ., 26 N.W. 2d 459 ( Minn S C.), in
which an injury sustained by a shop steward while making a working-time
829
Closer to the mark are the General Counsel's citations
of precedents which have held that strike benefits are not
earnings, particularly that26 in which the Board went on to
say that
We are .. satisfied here that the strike benefits neither
resulted from nor created an employment relationship,
and that the strike benefit scheme is in the nature of a
private insurance arrangement.
Moreover, the logic of this position, as it applies to the
instant situation, is persuasive. "Occupation" is:
the term usually . . . applied to a person's trade or
vocation. For example, a teacher's or accountant's
employment or principal way of making a living is
generally considered to be his occupation.27
or
the principal business of one's life- a craft, trade,
profession or other means of earning a living.28
While these definitions might not rule out, as an
occupation, one's secondary or "moonlighting" job - or
for that matter, picketing performed by outsiders hired for
the purpose - I am convinced that the term does not
encompass a striker's uncompensated picketing or other
acts performed in furtherance of the strike effort.
In sum , I find and conclude that, in rejecting Stepek's
disability claim on the ground that his injury was
"occupational" in origin, Respondent was not adhering to
the applicable group insurance policy, either because it
was acting upon facts not in existence or because it was
misinterpreting the provision in question.
I find that the Respondent's erroneous interpretation of
the insurance policy (for whatever reason), and its
consequent rejection of Stepek's disability claim, applied,
as it is applied, to picketing and related activities,29 had
and has the necessary effect of inhibiting employees' strike
activities, thereby interfering with employees in their
exercise of self-organizational rights guaranteed them
under Section 7 of the Act. Such interference, whether or
not based upon a good-faith interpretation of contract 130
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On this record, however - taking into consideration
the absence of any independent evidence of union animus
and noting particularly the evidence of a long and stable
relationship between Respondent and Boilermakers - I
am unable to perceive a discouragement of union
membership."
Upon the foregoing factual findings and conclusions, I
come to following:
telephone call to his union in an effort to avert an impending strike was
held to be covered by his employer's Workman's Compensation liability
"Standard Printing Co of Canton, supra at 967.
"Roberts' Dictionary of Industrial Relations, 1966
"Webster 's Third New International Dictionary, 1968.
"Respondent , at the hearing , conceded that the interpretation in question
would be applied to Stepek if he was engaged in picketing or if, away from
the picket line, he was engaged in distributing strike benefit checks, but
that it would not be applied if - despite the pendency of the strike -
Stepek was injured at his home while it was being robbed
"N.L.R.B v. Burnup and Sims, Inc , 379 U.S 21.
"Nor, in having found interference with self-organizational rights, have I
relied on the fact that Respondent, in dealing with the
hospitalization /surgical aspects of the insurance , took a position
apparently inconsistent with that taken on disability The situation
surrounding the earlier position taken has all the earmarks of a
"middle-of-the-night" act of compassion.
830 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Boilermakers is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By erroneously rejecting the disability claim of
Stanley J. Stepek arising out of injuries he incurred while
engaged in lawful picket line activities , Respondent
interfered with employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) thereof.
4. The foresaid act is an unfair labor practice affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
5. Except for the foregoing , Respondent has committed
no unfair labor practices under the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in a certain
unfair labor practice, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
I shall recommend that Respondent make Stanley J.
Stepek whole for any loss of disability payments suffered
by him because of Respondent's act, by payment to him
of a sum of money equal to the amount he would have
received in disability payments for the period September
27 to December 26, 1968, with interest at a rate of 6
percent per annum.
As the unfair labor practice committed by Respondent
is of the character striking at the roots of employees'
rights safeguarded by the Act, I shall also recommend
that Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any
manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in this case, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
A. Finkl & Sons, Co. of Chicago, Illinois, its officers,
agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Erroneously rejecting the disability claim of any of
its employees arising out of injuries incurred while
engaged in lawful picket line activities.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization , to form labor organizations , to join or
assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining , or other mutual aid or protection, and to
refrain from any and all such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make Stanley J. Stepek whole for any loss of
disability payments suffered by him, in a manner set forth
in the section above entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Post at its place of business at Chicago, Illinois,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix.""
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in
writing , within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith."
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
heretofore remedied in this Recommended Order.
"In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes . In the event
that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing
an Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read . "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 13 , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations
Board an agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT erroneously reject the disability claim
of any employee arising out of injuries he incurred
while engaged in lawful picket line activities.
WE WILL NOT, in any other manner , interfere with,
restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their rights to organize; to form, join, or assist a labor
organization ; to bargain collectively through a
bargaining agent chosen by themselves; to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; or to
refrain from any such activities except to the extent
that the right to refrain is limited by the lawful
enforcement of a lawful union-security clause.
WE WILL see that Stanley J. Stepek receives
disability payments for the period from September 27
to December 26, 1968.
A. FINKL & SONS, CO.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
A. FINKL & SONS, CO. 831
or covered by any other material. 881 U.S. Courthouse & Federal Office Building, 219
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604,
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office , Telephone 353-7572.