Minn. R. Juv. P. 3.08
As amended through October 28, 2024
A lawyer representing a client in juvenile court, other than a public defender, shall file with the court administrator a certificate of representation prior to appearing.
Once a lawyer has filed a certificate of representation, that lawyer cannot withdraw from the case until all proceedings have been completed, except upon written order of the court pursuant to a written motion, or upon written substitution of counsel approved by the court ex parte.
A lawyer who wishes to withdraw from a case must file a written motion and serve it on the prosecuting attorney, and on the client by mail or personal service; and the lawyer shall have the matter heard by the court. No motion of withdrawal will be heard within 10 days of a date certain for hearing or trial.
If the court approves the withdrawal, it shall be effective when the order has been served on the prosecuting attorney, and on the client by mail or personal service, and due proof of such service has been filed with the court administrator.
Minn. R. Juv. P. 3.08
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3prescribes the general requirements for appointment of counsel for a juvenile. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.163, subd. 4 (2002). The right to counsel at public expense does not necessarily include the right to representation by a public defender. The right to representation by a public defender is governed by Minnesota Statutes, chapter 611.
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.01provides that the right to counsel attaches no later than the child's first appearance in juvenile court. See Minnesota Statutes, section 611.262(2002). Whether counsel is appointed by the court or retained by the child or the child's parents, the attorney must act solely as counsel for the child. American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties (1980). While it is certainly appropriate for an attorney representing a child to consult with the parents whose custodial interest in the child potentially may be affected by court intervention, it is essential that counsel conduct an initial interview with the child privately and outside of the presence of the parents. Following the initial private consultation, if the child affirmatively wants his or her parent(s) to be present, they may be present. The attorney may then consult with such other persons as the attorney deems necessary or appropriate. However, the child retains a right to consult privately with the attorney at any time, and either the child or the attorney may excuse the parents in order to speak privately and confidentially.
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02provides for the appointment of counsel for juveniles in delinquency proceedings. A parent may not represent a child unless he or she is an attorney. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel applied to state felony criminal proceedings. In In re Gault, the Supreme Court extended to juveniles the constitutional right to counsel in state delinquency proceedings. Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.163, subd. 4 (2002) expands the right to counsel and requires that an attorney shall be appointed in any delinquency proceeding in which a child is charged with a felony or gross misdemeanor.
If a child in a felony or gross misdemeanor case exercises the right to proceed without counsel, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1990), then Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 1 requires the court to appoint standby counsel to assist and consult with the child at all stages of the proceedings. See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1978); Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 1977); State v. Graff, 510 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994); State v. Savior, 480 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Parson, 457 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) pet. for rev. denied (Minn. July 31, 1990); State v. Lande, 376 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 1986).
In McKaskle v. Wiggins, the Supreme Court concluded that appointment of standby counsel was consistent with a defendant's Faretta right to proceed pro se, so long as standby counsel did not stifle the defendant's ability to preserve actual control over the case and to maintain the appearance of pro se representation. The child must have an opportunity to consult with standby counsel during every stage of the proceedings. State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1992). In order to vindicate this right, counsel must be physically present. "[I]t would be virtually impossible for a standby counsel to provide assistance, much less effective assistance, to a criminal client when that counsel has not been physically present during the taking of the testimony and all of the court proceedings that preceded the request ... [O]nce the trial court ... appoint[s] standby counsel, that standby counsel must be physically present in the courtroom from the time of appointment through all proceedings until the proceedings conclude." Parson, 457 N.W.2d at 263. Where the child proceeds pro se, it is the preferred practice for counsel to remain at the back of the courtroom and be available for consultation. Savior, 480 N.W.2d at 694-95; Parson, 457 N.W.2d at 263; Lande, 376 N.W.2d at 485. Moreover, standby counsel must be present at all bench and chambers conferences, even where the child is excluded. State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 196 (Minn. 1992).
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 2 requires a court to appoint counsel for a child charged with a misdemeanor in a delinquency proceeding unless that child affirmatively waives counsel as provided inMinn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.04.Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 3 requires the appointment of counsel or standby counsel in any proceeding in which out-of-home placement is proposed, and further limits those cases in which a child may waive the assistance of counsel without the appointment of standby counsel. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony unless he was represented by counsel." In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Court clarified any ambiguity when it held that in misdemeanor proceedings, the sentence the trial judge actually imposed, i.e. whether incarceration was ordered, rather than the one authorized by the statute, determined whether counsel must be appointed for the indigent.
In State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967), the Minnesota Supreme Court, using its inherent supervisory powers, anticipated the United States Supreme Court's Argersinger and Scott decisions, and shortly after Gideon required the appointment of counsel even in misdemeanor cases "which may lead to incarceration in a penal institution." Id. at 397, 154 N.W.2d at 894. Accord City of St. Paul v. Whidby, 295 Minn. 129, 203 N.W.2d 823 (1972); State v. Collins, 278 Minn. 437, 154 N.W.2d 688 (1967); State v. Illingworth, 278 Minn. 484, 154 N.W.2d 687 (1967) (ordinance violation). The Borst Court relied, in part, upon Gault's ruling on the need for counsel in delinquency cases to expand the scope of the right to counsel for adult defendants in any misdemeanor or ordinance prosecutions that could result in confinement. 278 Minn. at 392-93, 154 N.W.2d at 891. Like the Court in Gault, Borst recognized the adversarial reality of even "minor" prosecutions.
At the very least,Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 3 places the prosecution and court on notice that out-of-home placement may not occur unless counsel or standby counsel is appointed. For example, a child appearing on a third alcohol offense faces a dispositional possibility of out-of-home placement, but cannot be placed out of the home if the child is not represented by counsel unless the child is given the opportunity to withdraw the plea or obtain a new trial. See Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 17.02. The prosecutor should indicate, either on the petition or through a statement on the record, whether out-of-home placement will be proposed. Obviously, basing the initial decision to appoint counsel on the eventual sentence poses severe practical and administrative problems. It may be very difficult for a judge to anticipate what the eventual sentence likely would be without prejudging the child or prejudicing the right to a fair and impartial trial. Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 3 also provides that a child retains an absolute right to withdraw any plea obtained without the assistance of counsel or to obtain a new trial if adjudicated without the assistance of counsel, if that adjudication provides the underlying predicate for an out-of-home placement. See, e.g., In re D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d 650, 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("The cumulative history of uncounseled admissions resulting after an inadequate advisory of the right to counsel constitutes a manifest injustice"). Appointing counsel solely at disposition is inadequate to assure the validity of the underlying offenses on which such placement is based. Of course, routine appointment of counsel in all cases would readily avoid any such dilemma.
Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.007, subd. 16 defines "juvenile petty offenses," and includes most offenses that would be misdemeanors if committed by an adult.Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 5 and 17.02 explain when a juvenile petty offender is entitled to court-appointed counsel. If a child is charged as a juvenile petty offender, the child or the child's parents may retain and be represented by private counsel, but the child does not have a right to the appointment of a public defender or other counsel at public expense. The denial of access to court-appointed counsel is based on the limited dispositions that the juvenile court may impose on juvenile petty offenders. Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.235, subd. 4 (2002). However, children who are charged with a third or subsequent juvenile alcohol or controlled substance offense are subject to out-of-home placement and therefore have a right to court-appointed counsel, despite their status as juvenile petty offenders. If the court is authorized to impose a disposition that includes out-of-home placement, then the provisions ofMinn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 5 and 17.02 are applicable and provide the child a right to counsel at public expense.
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 6 is an exception to the prohibition of appointment of counsel at public expense for a juvenile traffic or juvenile petty offender. If such a child is detained, at any hearing to determine if continued detention is necessary, the child is entitled to court-appointed counsel if unrepresented because substantial liberty rights are at issue.
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02, subd. 7 is an exception to the prohibition of appointment of counsel at public expense for a juvenile traffic or juvenile petty offender. As soon as any child is alleged to be incompetent to proceed, that child has a right to be represented by an attorney at public expense for the proceeding to determine whether the child is competent to proceed. Substantial liberty rights are at issue in a competency proceeding. A finding of incompetency is a basis for a Child in Need of Protection or Services adjudication and possible out-of-home placement. Minnesota Statutes, sections 260C.007, subd. 6(15) and 260C.201 (2002). See also Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 20.01. Because out-of-home placement is a possibility, the child is entitled to court-appointed counsel.
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.03regarding advising children of the perils of dual representation is patterned after Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.03, subd. 5.
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.04prescribes the circumstances under which a child charged with an offense may waive counsel. The validity of relinquishing a constitutional right is determined by assessing whether there was a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver" under the "totality of the circumstances." See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of counsel); In re M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1984); State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1980); In re L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The judicial position that a young minor can "knowingly and intelligently" waive constitutional rights is consistent with the legislature's judgment that a youth can make an informed waiver decision without parental concurrence or consultation with an attorney. Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.163, subd. 10 (2002) ("Waiver of any right ... must be an express waiver intelligently made by the child after the child has been fully and effectively informed of the right being waived").
While recognizing a right to waive counsel and proceed pro se,Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.02requires juvenile courts to appoint standby counsel to assist a child charged with a felony or gross misdemeanor, or where out-of-home placement is proposed, and to provide temporary counsel to consult with a child prior to any waiver in other types of cases. See, e.g., State v. Rubin, 409 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Minn. 1987) ("[A] trial court may not accept a guilty plea to a felony or gross misdemeanor charge made by an unrepresented defendant if the defendant has not consulted with counsel about waiving counsel and pleading guilty"); Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706 (standby counsel available to and did consult with defendant throughout proceedings and participated occasionally on defendant's behalf); Burt, 256 N.W.2d at 635 ("One way for a trial court to help ensure that a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent would be to provide a lawyer to consult with the defendant concerning his proposed waiver").
In State v. Rubin, the court described the type of "penetrating and comprehensive examination" that must precede a "knowing and intelligent" waiver and strongly recommended the appointment of counsel "to advise and consult with the defendant as to the waiver." See also ABA Standards of Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services, sections 5-7.3(1980); Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04. Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.04, subd. 1 prescribes the type of "penetrating and comprehensive examination" expected prior to finding a valid waiver. Prior to an initial waiver of counsel, a child must consult privately with an attorney who will describe the scope of the right to counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation. Following consultation with counsel, any waiver must be in writing and on the record, and counsel shall appear with the child to assure the court that private consultation and full discussion has occurred.
To determine whether a child "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waived the right to counsel, Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.04, subd. 1 requires the court to look at the "totality of the circumstances," which includes but is not limited to the child's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend and the presence and competence of the child's parent(s), legal guardian or legal custodian. In addition, the court shall decide whether the child understands the nature of the charges and the proceedings, the potential disposition that may be imposed, and that admissions or findings of delinquency may be valid even without the presence of counsel and may result in more severe sentences if the child re-offends and appears again in juvenile court or in criminal court. United States v. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738 (1994); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (use of prior juvenile convictions to enhance adult sentence). The court shall make findings and conclusions on the record as to why it accepts the child's waiver or appoints standby counsel to assist a juvenile who purports to waive counsel.
Even though a child initially may waive counsel, the child continues to have the right to counsel at all further stages of the proceeding. Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.05requires that at each subsequent court appearance at which a child appears without counsel, the court shall again determine on the record whether or not the child desires to exercise the right to counsel.
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.06prescribes the standard to be applied by the court in determining whether a child or the child's family is sufficiently indigent to require appointment of counsel. The standards and methods for determining eligibility are the same as those used in the Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subds. 3-5.
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.06, subd. 2 provides that if the parent(s) of a child can afford to retain counsel but have not done so and the child cannot otherwise afford to retain counsel, then the court shall appoint counsel for the child. When parents can afford to retain counsel but do not do so and counsel is appointed for the child at public expense, in the exercise of its sound discretion, the court may order reimbursement for the expenses and attorney's fees expended on behalf of the child. Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.331, subd. 5 (2002) ("[T]he court may inquire into the ability of the parents to pay for such counsel's services and, after giving the parents a reasonable opportunity to be heard, may order the parents to pay attorneys fees"). See, e.g., In re M.S.M., 387 N.W.2d 194, 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.07 implements the rights of a child's parent(s), legal guardian or legal custodian to participate in hearings affecting the child. After a child has been found to be delinquent and state intervention potentially may intrude upon the parent's custodial interests in the child, the parent(s) have an independent right to the assistance of counsel appointed at public expense if they are eligible for such services.