Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-0280
April 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM RULING
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant, Cooper Cameron Corporation ("Cooper"), on March 1, 2002. (Document No. 33). Plaintiff, Bobby Ware, Sr. ("Ware"), has filed opposition. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.
Background
This race discrimination action arises from Cooper's termination of Ware, a black male, as a result of a reduction in force. Ware began his employment with Cooper in January, 1990. (Document No. 41, Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, ¶ B). Due to a slow down in oil production in late 1998, Cooper decided to implement a reduction in force at its Ville Platte Facility in 1999. (Document No. 33, Exhibit C, Affidavit of William Guidry, ¶ 3).
In connection with the reduction in force, John Motty ("Motty"), Cooper's Shipping/Receiving Supervisor, prepared a peer group analysis for his department in June, 1999. (Document No. 33, Exhibit C, ¶¶ 5, 6; Exhibit D, ¶¶ 1, 3). The peer group analysis ranked the employees by job proficiency, rather than by seniority. (Document No. 33, Exhibit C, ¶¶ 4, 9; Exhibit D, ¶¶ 4, 5). According to Motty's analysis, Ware ranked 24 out of 25 employees in the shipping/receiving department. (Document No. 33, Exhibit C, ¶ 10; Exhibit D, ¶ 6).
Ware was laid off from his employment with Cooper on October 7, 1999. (Document No. 33, Exhibit C, ¶ 13; Exhibit D, ¶ 9; Document No. 41, ¶ C). That same day, Ware met with Cooper's Human Resources Manager, William Guidry, and Motty in Guidry's office. (Document No. 33, Exhibit C, ¶ 14; Exhibit D, ¶ 10; Document No. 33, Exhibit B, and Document No. 40, Exhibit 1 ["Ware Deposition"], p. 69). At that time, Guidry gave Ware a document entitled "Waiver and Release and Acceptance of Additional Separation Allowance Benefits" (the "release"). (Document No. 33, Exhibit A; Exhibit C, ¶ 17; Exhibit D, ¶ 14). The release provides in pertinent part:
In consideration of the Company's agreement to provide me with 9 weeks of pay under Cameron's Hourly Reduction In Force policy of 1999, I hereby waive and release the Company from any and all present employment or termination related claims, damages, actions, rights of recall, rehire or reinstatement, demands, and causes of action, whether known or unknown, arising from, but not limited to, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act. . . . I have signed this agreement voluntarily and without coercion or duress. I have been advised to consult with an attorney prior to executing this agreement and I have been given twenty-one (21) days to consider this agreement before signing. I understand that I have seven (7) days to revoke, in writing, this agreement which will not become effective or enforceable until this seven (7) day period has expired. I further acknowledge that I am voluntarily accepting the Company's offer of additional separation allowance benefits.
Ware signed the release at the conclusion of the meeting on October 9, 1999. (Ware Deposition, pp. 71-73; Document No. 33, Exhibit C, ¶ 19; Exhibit D, ¶ 15). In consideration for signing the release, Guidry gave Ware nine severance checks representing nine extra weeks of pay, to which he was not otherwise entitled. (Document No. 33, Exhibit C, ¶¶ 20, 21; Exhibit D, ¶ 16; Ware Deposition, p. 76). After receiving the checks, Ware deposited them into his bank account. (Ware Deposition, pp. 75-76). Although Ware had contacted attorneys prior to being laid off, he did not consult with counsel prior to executing the release or cashing the checks. (Ware Deposition, pp. 81-83).
On February 13, 2001, Ware brought this action alleging that Cooper violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by laying him off, subjecting him to a hostile work environment, and subjecting him to disparate working conditions on the basis of his race. Cooper filed a counterclaim against Ware for breach of contract on September 24, 2001. (Document No. 18).
Claimant voluntarily dismissed his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Document No. 16).
On March 1, 2002, Cooper filed the instant motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Ware knowingly and voluntarily executed the release in which he waived and released his claims under Title VII; (2) Ware ratified the release by failing to tender back the consideration which he received for signing the agreement; (3) Ware cannot establish that he was subjected to disparate treatment based on his race; (4) Ware cannot establish that he was subjected to disparate treatment based on his race; and (5) Ware cannot establish that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment.
Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When the burden at trial rests on the nonmovant, the movant must merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in the record for the nonmovant's case. International Association of Machimsts and Aerospace Workers. AFL-CIO v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 199 F.3d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 2000), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Courts consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, yet the nonmovant may not rely on mere allegations in the pleadings; rather, the nonmovant must respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id., citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After the nonmovant has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted. Id., citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2458.
Analysis
Initially, Cooper argues that Ware's claims should be dismissed because Ware knowingly and voluntarily executed the release, then ratified the release by failing to tender back the consideration. Ware, however, asserts that the release is invalid because it (I) was not knowing and voluntary, and (2) was procured under duress or misrepresentation. As the Court finds that Ware waived his claims by executing the release and retaining the consideration, Cooper's remaining arguments regarding the merits of Ware's discrimination claims need not be addressed.
Normally, the release of federal claims is governed by federal law. Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930, 935 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1019, 115 S.Ct. 582, 130 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). A general release of Title VII claims does not ordinarily violate public policy. Company, 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986). To the contrary, public policy favors voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII. Id.; Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 714 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1996).
A release waiving rights arising under Title VII must be both knowing and voluntary. Rogers, 781 F.2d at 454. Once a party establishes that his opponent signed a release that addresses the claims at issue, received adequate consideration, and breached the release, the opponent has the burden of demonstrating that the release was invalid because of fraud, duress, material mistake, or some other defense. Williams, 23 F.3d at 935.
Here, Ware signed the release, which specifically covered all claims relating to his employment layoff. In consideration of signing it, Ware received nine severance checks to which he was otherwise not entitled. Despite signing the release and cashing the severance checks, Ware filed this employment discrimination suit, thus breaching the agreement.
Ware now contends that the release was signed under duress because he was not allowed to read the document or take a copy with him after the meeting. Additionally, he states that Guidry and Motty misrepresented that the document which he signed was simply for the release of his check. In short, Ware states that he did not read the release before he signed it, and that he was not given a copy of the release.
Although Ware admitted that he had consulted with an attorney "way before" he got laid off, he did not seek advice prior to signing the release or cashing the checks. (Ware Deposition, p. 81). In any event, the fact that Ware did not actually consult an attorney prior to executing the release does not require this Court to find that the waiver was not knowing. Rogers, 781 at 456 n. 7.
There is no allegation that Guidry or Motty affirmatively misrepresented the contents of the release. Rather, the allegation made by Ware appears to be that Guidry and Motty did not fully explain the release to him. It appears that Guidry and Motty truthfully informed Ware that in order for Ware to receive the additional severance checks, to which he was not otherwise entitled, it would be necessary for him to sign the release. This was in fact true. Ware cites the court to no rule of law which would require Guidry and Motty to fully explain the term of a written release which they were presenting to Ware for his signature. While there is a dispute as to precisely what was told Ware at this meeting, the release which Ware signed is clear and unambiguous.
While Ware asserts that he was coerced into signing the release, this assertion is belied by Ware's own testimony. In effect, Ware testified that in order to receive the nine severance checks, that he had to sign for them. (Ware Deposition, p. 81). He could have refused to sign, and simply not received the checks. This does not amount to coercion under the facts of this case.
In essence, Ware asks the court to vitiate this settlement because he claims not to have read the release before signing it. It is, of course, a well established and generally accepted principle of contract law that absent fraud or mental incompetence, a person who intentionally signs a document is bound by its contents whether he has actually read the document or not. Donovan v. Mercer. 747 F.2d 304, 309 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1984).
There is no indication that Ware is incompetent, or for that matter that he was unable to read the release. There has been no showing here of fraud. Accordingly, based on well established contract principles, and given the public policy in favor of the settlement of Title VII suits, Jackson, supra, the release is enforceable and binding on Ware.
Cooper argues that even assuming that Ware could offer persuasive evidence that his execution of the release was tainted by misrepresentation or duress, he cannot now vitiate the release because by keeping the consideration, he ratified the release agreement. Cooper is correct. The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that retaining the consideration after learning that the release is voidable constitutes a ratification of the release. Blakeney v. Lomas Information Systems, Inc., 65 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158, 116 S.Ct. 1042, 134 L.Ed.2d 189 (1996); Williams, 23 F.3d at 937 (even if a release is tainted by misrepresentation or duress, it is ratified if the releasor retains the consideration after learning that the release is voidable); see also International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. AFL-CIO, 199 F.3d at 798 (employees waived WARN Act claims when they accepted valid releases in exchange for enhanced separation packages). A person who signs a release, then sues his employer for matters covered under the release, is obligated to return the consideration. Williams, 23 F.3d at 937. To properly rescind the contract, the employee must: (1) restore the status quo ante, and (2) rescind shortly after the discovery of the alleged deficiency. Blakeney, 65 F.3d at 485. Offering to tender back the consideration after obtaining relief in the lawsuit would be insufficient to avoid a finding of ratification. Williams, 23 F.3d at 937.
In consideration for signing the release, Ware received nine severance payments. Ware promptly deposited the checks and did not return the consideration to Cooper, even after filing this suit and making claims that the release was voidable. To this day, Ware has not tendered back the severance pay given him to Cooper. Even assuming arguendo that Ware did not knowingly and voluntarily sign the release, Ware ratified the release by retaining the consideration and not making a valid tender of the consideration back to Cooper. Williams, 23 F.3d at 937.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be GRANTED in favor of Cooper, dismissing Ware's claims with prejudice.