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Turner v. Arkansas

U.S.
Jun 19, 1972
407 U.S. 366 (1972)

Summary

holding that a subsequent prosecution for robbery was precluded by the defendant's prior acquittal for murder; the “case is thus squarely controlled by Ashe v. Swenson ”

Summary of this case from Wilkinson v. Gingrich

Opinion

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. 71-1309.

Decided June 19, 1972

Petitioner received a general verdict of acquittal on an information charging him with murder in the course of a robbery. When petitioner was subsequently indicted for the robbery, his defense, rejected by the state courts, was that constitutional principles of double jeopardy collaterally estopped the State from relitigating those factual issues already determined in his favor, determinations that make his conviction of robbery logically impossible. Held: It must be concluded that the jury (which had been given a charge on accessories) found that petitioner was not present at the robbery-murder scene, thus negating the possibility of a constitutionally valid conviction for the robbery. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436.

Petition for certiorari granted; 251 Ark. 499, 473 S.W.2d 904, reversed and remanded.


On December 24, 1968, petitioner, one Richard Turner (no relation to petitioner), the decedent Larry Wayne Yates, and one other person were involved in a poker game, which lasted until the early hours of Christmas morning. After he left the game, Yates was murdered and robbed, and an information filed on December 27 charged that:

"[Petitioner] on the 25th day of December, 1968 . . . did unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously and violently take from the person of one Larry Wayne Yates . . . a sum of money in excess of $300.00 . . . forcibly and against the will of the said Larry Wayne Yates . . . and while perpetrating said crime of robbery as aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully and with malice aforethought, and with premeditation and deliberation did kill and murder one Larry Wayne Yates . . . ." On April 24, 1969, petitioner received a general verdict of acquittal on this information.

On October 3, 1969, however, a county grand jury indicted petitioner for the robbery of Yates and alleged that petitioner

"on the 25th day of December, 1968, in Hempstead County, Arkansas, did unlawfully take from Larry Yates by force and intimidation lawful currency in the amount of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) belonging to the said Larry Yates, against the peace and dignity of the State of Arkansas."

Petitioner moved to dismiss this indictment on double jeopardy and res judicata grounds, but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, it was stipulated that "the murder charge, of which Defendant Dennis Turner was acquitted, and the robbery charge arose out of the same set of facts, circumstances, and the same occasion" and that "the same testimony adduced by the State of Arkansas in the murder trial will necessarily need be reintroduced in this robbery charge." A divided Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion, Turner v. State, 248 Ark. 367, 452 S.W.2d 317 (1970), holding that the only question determined at the murder trial was whether petitioner was guilty of murder. The court pointed out that under state law, murder and robbery charges could not be joined in one indictment or information and that no offense could be jointly tried with murder. Petitioner's rehearing petition, which argued the relevance of this Court's holding in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), announced seven days after the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision, was denied. Petitioner then entered the complete transcript of the murder trial into the record and once again moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy and res judicata grounds, and the trial court again denied the motion. An amended stipulation provided that the evidence the State would present on the robbery charge would be identical with that it introduced on the murder charge. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, 251 Ark. 499, 473 S.W.2d 904 (1971), declining to consider the applicability of this Court's decision in Ashe v. Swenson, supra, because it held that its earlier decision denying petitioner relief now constituted the "law of the case."

Petitioner contends that Fifth Amendment principles of double jeopardy, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), prevent his trial on the robbery indictment, because the State is collaterally estopped from relitigating those issues already determined in his favor at the murder trial, determinations that make his conviction on the robbery charge a logical impossibility. Collateral estoppel is part of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy guarantee, Ashe v. Swenson, supra, and it is "a matter of constitutional fact [this Court] must decide through an examination of the entire record." Id., at 443. Thus, the rejection of petitioner's claim by the Arkansas Supreme Court on procedural grounds does not foreclose our inquiry on this issue.

In Ashe, the defendant had been tried and acquitted by a general verdict of the robbery of one member of a poker game. He was then tried and convicted of the robbery of another of the poker players. This Court reversed his conviction, concluding that "[t]he single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury [in the first trial] was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers," 397 U.S., at 445, and that, this issue once having been determined by a jury in the petitioner's favor, the State was forestalled from relitigating it.

In the present case, petitioner was not charged with robbery at the first trial, but the State has stipulated that the robbery and murder arose out of "the same set of facts, circumstances, and the same occasion." The crucial question, therefore, is what issues a general verdict of acquittal at the murder trial resolved. The jury was instructed that it must find petitioner guilty of first-degree murder if it found that he had killed the decedent Yates either with premeditation or unintentionally during the course of a robbery. The jury's verdict thus necessarily means that it found petitioner not guilty of the killing. The State's theory, however, is that the jury might have believed that petitioner and Richard Turner robbed Yates, but that Richard actually committed the murder. This theory is belied by the actual instructions given the jury. The trial judge charged that:

These instructions reflect Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2227 which makes accessories before the fact to first-degree murder subject to the same punishment as principals. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-118 abolished the distinction between principals and accessories before the fact and also provides that "all accessories before the fact shall be deemed principals and punished as such." Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-119 defines an accessory as "he who stands by, aids, abets, or assists . . . the perpetration of the crime."

"An accessory is one who stands by, aids, abets, or assists . . . the perpetration of the crime.

. . . . .

"All persons being present, aiding and abetting, or ready and consenting to aid and abet, in any felony, shall be deemed principal offenders, and indicted or informed against, and punished as such." (Court's Instruction No. 13.)

Had the jury found petitioner present at the crime scene, it would have been obligated to return a verdict of guilty of murder even if it believed that he had not actually pulled the trigger. The only logical conclusion is that the jury found him not present at the scene of the murder and robbery, a finding that negates the possibility of a constitutionally valid conviction for the robbery of Yates. This case is thus squarely controlled by Ashe v. Swenson, supra, and must be reversed. See Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971).

The writ of certiorari is granted, the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.


Given the decision in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (see, however, my dissent in Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 (1971)), I join the judgment of the Court.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, rather than taking summary action in this case, would hear oral argument and give the matter plenary consideration.


Summaries of

Turner v. Arkansas

U.S.
Jun 19, 1972
407 U.S. 366 (1972)

holding that a subsequent prosecution for robbery was precluded by the defendant's prior acquittal for murder; the “case is thus squarely controlled by Ashe v. Swenson ”

Summary of this case from Wilkinson v. Gingrich

holding that a subsequent prosecution for robbery was precluded by the defendant's prior acquittal for murder; the “case is thus squarely controlled by Ashe v. Swenson ”

Summary of this case from Wilkinson v. Gingrich

holding that double jeopardy barred prosecution of the defendant for robbing a poker game participant where the defendant's prior acquittal for being an accessory to the robbery victim's murder necessarily included a finding that he was not present at the time of the robbery

Summary of this case from Bies v. Bagley

holding that defendant could not be tried for robbery occurring at a murder when jury had found defendant not guilty of accessory to murder because he was not present at murder scene

Summary of this case from State v. Ratliff

applying Ashe to a second trial where state law prohibited a single trial of the charges at issue

Summary of this case from Currier v. Virginia

noting jury returned "a general verdict of acquittal"

Summary of this case from Langley v. Prince

In Turner, the state had tried Dennis Turner for first degree murder on theories of premeditated murder and felony-murder committed in the course of a robbery.

Summary of this case from Langley v. Prince

using "logical" inferences to determine "what issues a general verdict of acquittal at the murder trial resolved"

Summary of this case from Langley v. Prince

applying Ashe and ruling in defendant's favor on issue preclusion double jeopardy claim because "[t]he only logical conclusion" from the trial record was that the defendant had already been acquitted of the act for which the Government sought to retry him

Summary of this case from Wilkerson v. Sci

In Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 92 S.Ct. 2096, 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972), Dennis Turner was charged with murdering Larry Wayne Yates during a poker game, but was acquitted upon the jury's finding that Turner was not present at the game.

Summary of this case from Bies v. Bagley

In Turner, the defendant was tried first for murder. Another man was involved in the alleged murder and the jury was plainly charged that any person aiding and abetting or consenting to aid and abet any felony shall be deemed a principal offender.

Summary of this case from United States v. Ballard

noting jury returned “a general verdict of acquittal”

Summary of this case from Hartman v. Miller

In Turner, the petitioner was tried first for a murder and after that trial, was then indicted a second time, for a robbery arising out of the same incident.

Summary of this case from Palermo v. U.S.

applying de novo standard of review to constitutional facts in collateral estoppel claims that implicate the "Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy guarantee"

Summary of this case from State v. Barzee

In Turner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the question of collateral estoppel is a matter of constitutional fact which the court must decide through an examination of the entire record.

Summary of this case from State v. Lynch

In Turner v Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366; 92 S Ct 2096; 32 L Ed 2d 798 (1972), a case factually similar to this case, the Court again presumed a rational jury.

Summary of this case from People v. Garcia

In Turner v Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366; 92 S Ct 2096; 32 L Ed 2d 798 (1972), the defendant received a general verdict of acquittal for a murder arising out of a robbery.Id. at 367.

Summary of this case from People v. Garcia

In Turner, the Court correctly held: "The only logical conclusion is that the jury found him not present at the scene of the murder and robbery...."

Summary of this case from People v. Garcia

applying collateral estoppel and rejecting, based upon review of record and jury instructions, State's argument that acquittal on murder charge at first trial might be based on theory that petitioner was accomplice of murderer and thus might be subsequently prosecuted for robbery of the same victim

Summary of this case from Ferrell v. State

In Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 92 S.Ct. 2096, 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972), the defendant had originally been indicted and tried on a charge of felony murder, i.e. murder while perpetrating the crime of robbery.

Summary of this case from Sanders v. State

In Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 92 S.Ct. 2096 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Court considered whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when state law prohibits the prosecution from joining in a multicount indictment all of its charges and proceeding against an accused in a single trial.

Summary of this case from Powers v. State

In Turner, the Supreme Court established that collateral estoppel applies even when a prosecutor is required to bring two separate proceedings because state law prohibits all of the charges against an accused from being joined in a single indictment. 407 U.S. at 369-70, 92 S.Ct. at 2099.

Summary of this case from Powers v. State

In Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 92 S.Ct. 2096, 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972), the sequence was a verdict of acquittal on a murder charge at a first trial ending on April 24, 1969, followed by a subsequent indictment on October 3, 1969, charging the robbery of the same victim.

Summary of this case from Ball v. State
Case details for

Turner v. Arkansas

Case Details

Full title:TURNER v . ARKANSAS

Court:U.S.

Date published: Jun 19, 1972

Citations

407 U.S. 366 (1972)
92 S. Ct. 2096

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