Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-6367.
June 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from 1978 until 2001, rising to the position of Director of Finance for Defendant's Exton office. In 2000, Pfizer transferred the Exton operations to New York, and Plaintiff's position was eliminated. Dissatisfied with the handling of his severance compensation, Plaintiff filed suit asserting, inter alia, claims for breach of contract and fraud, with violation of ERISA pleaded "in the alternative." Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that ERISA preempts the common law claims (Counts I-IV) of the complaint, and also that these claims fail to state a cause of action. In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot recover compensatory and punitive damages on his ERISA claim (Count V). Because ERISA preempts Plaintiff's state law claims, I will grant Defendant's motion.
Defendant has a severance plan which has been in place since June 1997. Although Plaintiff did not attach a copy to the Complaint, the Complaint references the document and therefore I may consider the copy supplied by Defendant in the context of a motion to dismiss.
The plan does not provide for severance payments based on a single event, but under several circumstances: 1) termination of employment when job performance requirements are not met; 2) termination of employment due to curtailment or cessation of operations or reorganization or elimination of positions; and 3) voluntary resignation if a release agreement is sought by the company. The plan does not apply in certain circumstances, including when termination is "for cause." "For cause" includes termination for "inadequate work performance due to intentional or deliberate misconduct or intentional or deliberate failure to act." Plan at 2. There may be occasions when a decision must be made as to whether a termination was because "job performance requirements [were] not met" or because of "inadequate work performance due to intentional or deliberate misconduct or intentional or deliberate failure to act" and therefore whether benefits are payable.
In addition to providing different amounts of compensation based upon length of service and whether a release is signed, there is language relating to ongoing administration. The plan provides that the Plan Administrator has the sole discretion to terminate benefits if there is a violation of a noncompete or nondisclosure agreement. In addition, the plan provides that "[t]he Senior Vice President, Employee Resources, or designee, is authorized to approve exceptions to this Plan within the limits prescribed by ERISA and other laws." Plan at 4. The plan is far more detailed and comprehensive than the severance pay at issue in the cases upon which Plaintiff relies, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that a Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing was not preempted by ERISA), and Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a plan was not governed by ERISA when it provided any employee who left the company with a lump sum payment of $75,000 and benefits for one year, administered the same way as benefits for active employees). Contrary to those cases, not all employees are treated the same under Pfizer's plan, and administrative decisions may be necessary.
Even if Defendant's plan is covered by ERISA, Plaintiff argues, he simply has pleaded alternative grounds of relief, and now is not the time to dismiss the state law claims. "However, if ERISA operates to pre-empt a plaintiff's state law claims, such pre-emption is mandatory, and other federal courts have dismissed state law claims on motions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on this basis." Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 F. Supp. 168, 172 (D.N.J. 1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1989). In this case, all of Plaintiff's claims relate to the alleged denial of benefits due under the Separation Plan.
An order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of June, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and to Strike Plaintiff's Demand for Compensatory and Punitive Damages, and the response thereto,IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. Counts I through IV of the Complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice and Plaintiff's demand for compensatory and punitive damages is STRICKEN. Count V is NOT DISMISSED.