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Theard v. United States

U.S.
Jun 17, 1957
354 U.S. 278 (1957)

Summary

holding that the district court is not duty-bound to impose reciprocal discipline in all circumstances, especially when a long period of time has elapsed between the state-imposed discipline and the proposed reciprocal discipline in federal court

Summary of this case from In re Reciprocal Discipline of Zelotes

Opinion

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 68.

Argued December 13, 1956. Decided June 17, 1957.

In a proceeding instituted in 1950, a lawyer was disbarred by a State Supreme Court in 1954 for forging a promissory note in 1935, when he concededly was suffering from a degree of insanity which resulted in his confinement in an insane asylum for several years thereafter. After release from the asylum, he had practiced law for six years without any charge of misconduct being brought against him. Solely because of his disbarment by the State Court, petitioner subsequently was disbarred by a Federal District Court under a Rule providing for such action "Whenever . . . any member of its bar has been disbarred . . . from practice . . . in any other court." Held: The District Court erred in considering itself conclusively bound by the state-court disbarment, and the case is remanded to the District Court for disposition on the merits under its Rules, in accordance with the standards defined in Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, and in this Court's opinion in this case. Pp. 279-283.

(a) While a lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of a state court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal court by the same route. P. 281.

(b) Ample opportunity must be afforded to show cause why an accused practitioner should not be disbarred: and an order of disbarment by a state court is not conclusively binding on federal courts. P. 282.

(c) The "principles of right and justice" do not require a federal court to enforce automatic disbarment of a lawyer 18 years after he had uttered a forgery when concededly he was suffering from some form of insanity. P. 282.

228 F.2d 617, reversed and remanded.

Delvaille H. Theard argued the cause and filed a brief pro se.

Edward H. Hickey argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub and Paul A. Sweeney.

James G. Schillin filed a brief for the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the Louisiana State Bar Association supporting the United States.


Because of petitioner's disbarment by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana struck him from its roll of attorneys, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the order. 228 F.2d 617. The case raises an important question regarding disbarment by a federal court on the basis of disbarment by a state court and so we granted certiorari. 351 U.S. 961.

A proceeding for disbarment of a lawyer is always painful. The circumstances of this case make it puzzling as well as painful. The facts are few and clear. It is undisputed that petitioner, in 1935, forged a promissory note and collected its proceeds. Criminal prosecution and action for disbarment were duly initiated but both were aborted because the petitioner was "suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condition, some degree of insanity" at the time of this behavior, to such a degree that he was committed to an insane asylum and was under a decree of interdiction until 1948. Years after, criminal prosecution was unsuccessfully revived, State v. Theard, 212 La. 1022, 34 So.2d 248. The disbarment proceedings, which led to the order in the federal court now under review, got under way in 1950 and the Supreme Court of Louisiana, acting on the findings of a committee of the Louisiana State Bar Association, overruled exceptions to the petition for disbarment. In so doing, the court met the plea of insanity against the claim of misconduct with the statement that it did not "view the mental deficiency of a lawyer at the time of his misconduct to be a valid defense to his disbarment." Louisiana State Bar Association v. Theard, 222 La. 328, 334, 62 So.2d 501, 503. The next year, "after issue had been joined," the Supreme Court of Louisiana appointed a Commissioner to take evidence and to report to that court his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commissioner did so and reported to the Supreme Court this fact that we deem vital to the issue before us: "It must then, from the record, be held that the respondent was suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condition, some degree of insanity." 225 La. 98, 104, 105, 72 So.2d 310, 312. The Commissioner deemed himself, however, bound by "the law of the case" as announced by the Supreme Court in 222 La. 328, 334, 62 So.2d 501, 503, supra, according to which it was immaterial to disbarment that the petitioner "was probably suffering from amnesia and other mental deficiencies at the time of his misdeeds." Ibid. The Supreme Court of Louisiana in its second decision approved the Commissioner's view about "the law of the case," and added that, were the doctrine otherwise, it would not change its previous ruling. 225 La. 98, 108, 72 So.2d 310, 313.

The state proceedings thus establish that petitioner was disbarred in 1954 for an action in 1935, although at the time of the fateful conduct he was concededly in a condition of mental irresponsibility so pronounced that for years he was in an insane asylum under judicial restraint. The proceedings also establish that as an active practitioner for six years preceding disbarment, after recovering his capacity, including the argument of thirty-six cases before the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Parish of Orleans, no charge of misconduct or impropriety was brought against him.

It is not for this Court, except within the narrow limits for review open to this Court, as recently canvassed in Konigsberg v. California, 353 U.S. 252, and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, to sit in judgment on Louisiana disbarments, and we are not in any event sitting in review of the Louisiana judgment. While a lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of a state court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal court by the same route. The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context, lawyers are included. The court's control over a lawyer's professional life derives from his relation to the responsibilities of a court. The matter was compendiously put by Mr. Justice Cardozo, while Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. "`Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions' ( Matter of Rouss, [ 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 783]). The appellant was received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-471, 162 N.E. 487, 489. The power of disbarment is necessary for the protection of the public in order to strip a man of the implied representation by courts that a man who is allowed to hold himself out to practice before them is in "good standing" so to do.

The rules of the various federal courts, more particularly the District Court which disbarred this petitioner, have provisions substantially like the present Rule 8 of this Court dealing with disbarment. "Where it is shown to the court that any member of its bar has been disbarred from practice in any State, Territory, District, Commonwealth, or Possession, or has been guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of this court, he will be forthwith suspended from practice before this court. He will thereupon be afforded the opportunity to show good cause, within forty days, why he should not be disbarred." Disbarment being the very serious business that it is, ample opportunity must be afforded to show cause why an accused practitioner should not be disbarred. If the accusation rests on disbarment by a state court, such determination of course brings title deeds of high respect. But it is not conclusively binding on the federal courts. The recognition that must be accorded such a state judgment and the extent of the responsibility that remains in the federal judiciary were authoritatively expounded in Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46. The short of it is that disbarment by federal courts does not automatically flow from disbarment by state courts. Of the conditions that qualify such a state court judgment, the one here relevant is that some "grave reason existed which should convince us that to allow the natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with the duty which rests upon us not to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right and justice, we were constrained so to do." Id., at 51.

We do not think that "the principles of right and justice" require a federal court to enforce disbarment of a man eighteen years after he had uttered a forgery when concededly he "was suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condition, some degree of insanity." Neither considerations relating to "the law of the case," cf. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, nor the temptation to get bogged down in the quagmire of controversy about the M'Naghten rule, require automatic acceptance by a federal court of the state disbarment in the circumstances of this case. The District Court apparently felt itself so bound. This we deem error. The case must therefore be remanded to that court for disposition of the motion for disbarment under that court's Rule 1(f) of its General Rules, in accordance with the standards defined in Selling v. Radford, supra, and this opinion.

It is so ordered.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACK concur in the result.

MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


Summaries of

Theard v. United States

U.S.
Jun 17, 1957
354 U.S. 278 (1957)

holding that the district court is not duty-bound to impose reciprocal discipline in all circumstances, especially when a long period of time has elapsed between the state-imposed discipline and the proposed reciprocal discipline in federal court

Summary of this case from In re Reciprocal Discipline of Zelotes

holding disbarment by federal courts does not necessarily flow from disbarment by state courts

Summary of this case from In re Grimsley

holding that although a lawyer is admitted to practice before the federal court by way of admission to the state court, the lawyer is not necessarily sent out of federal court by the same route and that the federal judiciary has autonomous control over the officers of the court

Summary of this case from In re Grimsley

finding state court disbarment decision "brings title deeds of high respect . . . [b]ut it is not conclusively binding on the federal courts," and concluding that federal court disbarment in that case was foreclosed by the "grave reason" prong of Selling

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upholding rule concerning disbarment of attorneys

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recognizing inherent power of district courts to promulgate and enforce rules concerning disbarment of attorneys

Summary of this case from Matter of Jaques

noting that the federal disbarment proceedings may be initiated where the "accusation rests [solely] on disbarment by a state court"

Summary of this case from In re Cook

stating that Selling "authoritatively expounded" the recognition a federal court must accord a state judgment of disbarment

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confirming Setting approach

Summary of this case from In re Edelstein

stating that disbarrment is a necessary power to protect the public

Summary of this case from In the Matter of Caranchini

remanding disbarment from federal district court without discussion of jurisdiction

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In Theard, as in this case, an attorney was suspended from a federal district court bar on the basis of a state disbarment.

Summary of this case from Greer's Refuse Serv. v. Browning-Ferris Indus

In Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957), the Supreme Court ruled that an attorney disbarred from a state bar association may not be summarily disbarred from practicing before a federal court even when that state bar membership was the predicate upon which the lawyer was admitted to the federal court. There was no evidence that Bowerstock was not in good standing in the Northern District of Ohio, notwithstanding the fact that his Ohio State Bar membership had lapsed.

Summary of this case from United States v. Carpenter

In Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957), the Court reversed a decision striking an attorney from a federal district court's roll of attorneys. The district court rules provided, as in the case before us, that an attorney disbarred from another jurisdiction "will be forthwith suspended."

Summary of this case from United States v. Hoffman

In Theard, a state disbarred an attorney "eighteen years after he had uttered a forgery when concededly he `was suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condition, some degree of insanity.'"

Summary of this case from In re Dawson

In Theard, the Supreme Court remanded a disbarment case to the District Court which had disbarred an attorney on the assumption that a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana foreclosed independent inquiry by the United States District Court.

Summary of this case from In re Ruffalo

In Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, at page 281, 77 S.Ct. 1274, at page 1276, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342, the court said: "It is not for this Court, except within the narrow limits for review open to this Court, as recently canvassed in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, [ 1 L.Ed.2d 810,] and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, [ 1 L.Ed.2d 796,] to sit in judgment on Louisiana disbarments, and we are not in any event sitting in review of the Louisiana judgment.

Summary of this case from Saier v. State Bar of Michigan

noting that the federal disbarment proceedings may be properly initiated where the "accusation rests [solely] on disbarment by a state court" because "such determination of course brings title deeds of high respect."

Summary of this case from In re Justice

discussing inherent power to admit, suspend, or disbar attorneys in federal courts

Summary of this case from United States v. Burk

discussing the weight to assign findings of the Supreme Court of New Mexico's Disciplinary Board in a disciplinary matter

Summary of this case from Wilson v. Jara

noting a federal court's discretion and autonomous authority to control its members

Summary of this case from In re Filosa

In Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957), the Supreme Court held the fact that state bar membership is a requirement for admission to a federal bar does not mean that loss of state bar membership requires automatic disbarment from the federal bar.

Summary of this case from Danner v. Tennessee Commission on Cont. Legal Educ

In Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957), the United States Supreme Court declined to impose the same discipline as had a state court eighteen years earlier when it had disbarred an attorney who was then suffering from extreme mental illness.

Summary of this case from In re McTighe

declining to impose same discipline as did state court 18 years earlier when it disbarred attorney who was then suffering from extreme mental illness

Summary of this case from In re Smith

discussing inherent power to admit, suspend, or disbar attorneys in federal courts

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Case details for

Theard v. United States

Case Details

Full title:THEARD v . UNITED STATES

Court:U.S.

Date published: Jun 17, 1957

Citations

354 U.S. 278 (1957)
77 S. Ct. 1274

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